The_Capt

Again?! I mean how did Operation Canuck Freedom go last time? https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/war-of-1812 Of course the old adage “History is written by the losers who only remember New Orleans, and left unchallenged by the winners who are too polite to bring it up and still feel bad about burning the White House” applies here.

Just to pile on and follow up. I can see no real reason why the UA would do this as an inside job to be honest. I mean technically it might drive RA back a bit from flooding but we are talking a few hundred meters, it does not threaten RA supply lines and manoeuvre beyond the strip of the flood zone. Beyond ravaging their own country, the flooding will make their own ops there more difficult in the short term. A UA defensive angle makes no sense as the RA has shown no capability or intent on offensive ops back over the river. So we are down to weird “spoofing” scenarios to try and convince the RA they are safe to pull forces from that sector. These are stretching things a lot. Given the post war reconstruction cost, I am pretty sure there are better options to pull RA out of that sector, you know, like supporting Russian insurgents on the other side of the front?

Dave, brilliant nuclear analysis (I do not even want to know what your hourly is) as always, but you are talking to a ghost. Of course he can still read it from the side…wow, I think you might be the first nuclear medium in history.

I have been pulled away and will be for the next couple weeks but if anyone can take a hard look at these videos (and there will be more), keep an eye out, and look closely for RA indirect and direct fires. From what I can see, this minefield was not being covered by RA fires (but I could be wrong, there could be ATGM and PGM). Minefields not effectively covered by fire are actually good news on the larger picture because it means the defender does not have enough troop density to do it, and cannot react fast enough for counter actions. Again, it is not just about what is there, it is also about what is not there but should be.

This one is really weird. Making a water obstacle harder cuts both ways, now the UA can also also thin out in this sector because the RA is also not going to be able to threaten it. As to IDPs, I am wondering how many people were living close to this river to start with as it is essentially a front line? I am sure there are some but have we seen mass columns of refugees? Finally, without data on how fast that river is moving it is hard to say just how much harder this stunt made a river crossing operation. The width of the obstacle just went up and one is seeing more debris but this was likely a ferry crossing operation to begin with - the RA withdrawal but now the UA attacking. Blowing the dam made defending the RA bank a lot harder as well. Any minefields they laid on the bank approaches are likely well buried under water and silt, so now ineffective. Positions would have been moved back (an easy way to see who did this, just track who moved OPs before the explosion - if no one did, it was likely unplanned). And by blowing the dam you are also redrawing the river in very unpredictable ways. One could wind up making new viable landing sites. One thing is certain, the RA was worried about UA action across that river if this was deliberate, and they probably should still be.

Ok, so this is really starting to look like a strategic shaping op. The Russians are clearly rattled. Guess we are calling BS on the whole nuclear threshold line.

Was wondering why everyone is talking about UW all of a sudden.

This is 2023, if the RA bagged that much UA hardware there would be video of it all over the internet. It is pretty clear the RA has not established fully effective ISR as they are seeing “the offensive” all over the place right now. More likely these are UA probes designed to keep them guessing where the main effort will fall - Interestingly all quiet at Kherson/Dnipro sector.

Well the fact is that the 13 year old kid is the battle hardened veteran in this scenario. There is a line stretching back eons of human civilization of old men saying exactly what you are here - “Back in my day we smashed each others heads in with rocks. Now these kids are throwing pointy sticks!? Oh humanity!” Insert muskets, machine guns, artillery, aircraft, ATGMs and now UAS, same thing. Best advice from history is “get over it, fast.” Warfare does not care about philosophy, it only cares about victory or defeat. Ukraine can figure out what to do about its individual qualities once they establish that they are able to survive.

Ok, now I am stealing a quote.

I have a weird sense about that western axis. Most are writing it off because of the river crossing requirement but there are a lot of pluses for doing the big shove here - Russian force strength are weakest in this area because they also think the river will make it too hard - Right flank is the Black Sea as opposed to double flanks just about everywhere else. - Bottle up the RA in Crimea and then push left towards Melitopol makes a lot of sense. - several MSR options that could support at least 3 axis of advance If the UA could get across that river in several locations and sustain it, they could crash in on that front, and then do a push down from the north in the center simultaneously it would likely paralyze the RA.

Wasn’t a stronger and more photogenic Chamberlain, Churchill?

On the drone strikes in Russia: - far too soon for direct attribution back to Ukraine. Even if those drones were Ukrainian made that does not mean they were targeted and executed by the UA. Ukrainian government appears to have denied and Russia has failed to attribute sponsorship or direct operation. - these strikes could just as easily be Ukrainian sponsored but carried out by Russia resistance/insurgents - this scenario is far more disruptive and undeciding for the Russian government than a direct UA attack. - these attacks could also be Russian government sponsored and carried out with captured or re manufactured Ukrainian systems. Given the light damage and lack of any real noted casualties, this could easily be a scare tactic by Putin on his own people to drive support narrative his way. Right now there has been no conclusive evidence either way. - if this was a UA directed and executed strike well it was both impressive and not. We are either looking at a behind the lines op with a lot of moving parts or a 500-600 deep strike. It is not impressive in that it was imprecise and hit no serious targets beyond breaking some windows and rattling shingles in a “rich neighbourhood”. This is what lend me to think it was third party or inside job. Ukraine has demonstrated significant precision in its deep strikes - Kerch Bridge, airfields in Crimea, and those ships on the Azov in port. So to suddenly be “blind lobbing” into Moscow is off trend. - As to the legitimacy of the targets, well what were the actual targets? We do not know. Those drones could have been aimed at a number of military targets but Russian EW drove them into those neighborhoods. Those “rich people” could be leadership in the Russian government or military which would make them legit and any civilians as acceptable collateral - and here it gets into a whole lot of targeteering and legality issues. - Effects. Well a lot of them and more than a little muddled. Ukrainian moral will be buoyed as they are finally hitting back so there is a symbolism there. Russians will be scared as their war comes home to roost; however, this is hardly “shock and awe”. This will likely drive a lot of support Putin’s way to protect his people and do whatever it takes. It will also likely provide fodder for anti-Putin sentiment as he did not protect them and drove Russia into this mess. The targeting of “rich neighborhoods” is interesting as it sends a message of class divides - this is more likely sign of insurgency, an inside Russian false flag job would have targeted common folk. In the West we will raise an eyebrow and scratch our heads a bit. I mean we start seeing dead Russian children and there will likely be a backlash (two wrongs not making right in many books) but this was not that. Ukraine does need to tread carefully here (and has), no point conducting operations that enhance anti-war support in the West. Militarily it could pull more AD assets back into Russia proper and away from the main theatre, so in that way it could be shaping. So overall a bit of a mishmash really. All negative decision pressure but some could work for Putin and gang, while others do not. Gotta be honest, to my eyes this looks a lot like third party backfield pot stirring - central question remains “by whom?” Effective attribution is three layers deep: What happened? Who did it? (an entire chain there from operator to sponsor). Why did they do it? Right now as far as I can see we do not even have the first one covered fully.

You are welcome. And for those that want to really get into the deep end: https://www.iwp.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/The-Strategy-of-Subversion-Manipulating-the-Politics-of-Other-Nations-by-Paul-W-Blackstock.pdf Really is a lost art in the West, and one we will likely need to re-learn

Kind of a Capt Special but I borrowed heavily from “US political warfare doctrine” started by Keenan (just type that in and you will get lots). For the Russian angle I would start with Russian Hybrid Warfare by Ofir Fridman. The steps are my own framework which is a simplification of some far more complex ones.

We are definitely in Step 1 and likely Step 2 - part of exploiting fractures is to increase influence and pre-position as a result of those exploits. The fact that we are divided politically on what to do about it is not a good sign. One has to keep in mind that an opponent does not need to do all 5 steps. They can simply rattle in steps 2 and 3 indefinitely and render a target nation pretty paralyzed and ineffectual which is often enough for strategic ends.

Honestly my guess, and I stress guess is that Grey Zone/Subversive warfare can have a counter-effect in the people space if done too fast or clumsily. If people think they are being actively subverted or manipulated then it can essentially change the salinity of the water. Suddenly everything that happens is attributed to the Russians. They run out of manoeuvre room because they have already burned too much of the conative forest, too fast. I am sure Russia had bushels of self-interested collaborators, plenty examples of this; however, that does not translate into dislocation of micro-social networks at scale. The people on a micro-social level decided "no". Russia did not set the conditions to ensure that answer was a "maybe", if they had they may have pulled this thing off. They did not have enough of the Ukrainian military in pockets, or critical infrastructure or government institutions. They look like they made a lot of assumptions that did not translate. Crimea and Donbas salted the water to the point that Russia became vilified and subversion does not work well when you have united a people in their hate and mistrust of you.

Surprised there was any doubt at all: https://www.duvarenglish.com/turkey-ranks-103rd-among-167-countries-in-global-democracy-index-news-61772 Of course it does not matter who was right or wrong - this is not grade school. What matters are the geopolitical implications both within Turkey and outside as a result of this outcome.

So Ukraine deep strike capability maybe not so much neutralized?

So if one looks at Subversive/Political Warfare Doctrine to my eyes Russia was attempting a Step 4 - Create Puppets. This can be done covertly or overtly, they went for overt. Normally one has already done Steps 1-3 (Mapping, Exploit Fractures, Build Cancers) to a point where you have already gotten your own people in the right places and hijacked the central nervous system of the society. Step 4 can happen as a sponsored coup a la Crimea/Donbas or something a little more aggressive but the key component is a rapid fall of existing macro social structures that you have eroded to dysfunctional and replacement with your own, which are often just waiting to step in. So to my eyes this is less about “Grey Zoning It” and more about moving forward in a Grey Zone strategy well before you have set the conditions. Russia did almost zero shaping internationally as far as we can tell. We had months of “we are only on exercise” which we even saw here when the pro-Russian crowd weighed in. But no real mechanisms that would sow seeds of western doubt beyond some clumsy attempts. Clearly whatever they had ready in the wings was nowhere near ready to backstop the move. The Ukrainian military was clearly not on board and neither was the people space in Ukraine itself. So if one tries for Step 4 before establishing conditions you get exactly this: Grey Zone gone Dark Zone, because you have not fundamentally undecided the issues both outside and inside Ukraine enough. Your opponents are not under effective Reflexive Control. While at the same time you are not set up for Dark Zone open warfare. From a professional point of view this was sloppy as hell and a sign of serious disconnects within the halls of power in Russia - a fact that has been borne out by prosecution of this war itself. Russia was basically running into the night without a flashlight at that point. So high on their own supply that progressive unreality set in and all sorts of assumptions became hard facts in the calculus…right up to the point reality came out of the dark and bit their noses off.

We have seen this sort of assessment before and frankly it kinda lands in the “opinion” pile. We have seen no evidence of sustained effective logistical strikes on the UA that are causing operational level disruption. That would be incredibly hard to hide in this day and age. Stuff like a lot of UA equipment out of gas, large ammunition shortfalls etc. We do see things exploding in the RA backfield pretty much daily. We have heard HIMARs are no longer effective, now Storm Shadow is kaput as well. All of this is largely guessing and opinion without any real evidence to back it up. I trust publications like RUSI that outline the shortfalls they are working with up front. They clearly highlight the bias risk and lack of information. Pieces like this do not. They spout off a lot of “facts” with little or zero reference evidence to back it up. And have no caveats to speak of, this is presented as iron clad conclusions. In the end we shall see. If the UA offensive sputters or simply does not shape up at all, well then apparently something has changed. Perhaps Russian AD and AirPower have finally gotten it together enough to freeze this thing up. Or maybe this is all nonsense and we will be talking about the Crimea as a military operation by this Fall.

Ok you can poo poo all you like but you have to admit these look pretty slick when stacked up against the urine-soaked hobo corpse ridden parking options we see here in the finest North American offerings. I mean seriously:

Oh cool, he is now onto nuclear deterrence calculus.

Hey whatever happened to that 70 year old Vietnam vet? The one with the incredible wide set of skills and expertise?

Exactly and outstanding example. And here you are talking about modern MBTs on a training scenario. Sitting in a comfy chair in squeaky slippers it is easy to wonder what in the sweet seven hells is going on when something like this happens. In real life it is so easy to get confused distracted and generally messed up. This is what makes CM work so well, they managed to bottle chaos just enough. And warfare is all about managing chaos.