The_Capt

What exactly were those US boots going to do? They were already pushing a Gulf War solution that clearly was not going to work. US advisors would have simply been pushing that solution forward. US boots would not be connected to US AirPower so I am not sure how they would have made a difference. All US boots would have done is likely get in the way and create US casualties as advisors got hit. Unless we are talking US fighting boots, which is just a non-starter and if people do not get why after 3000 pages I cannot help them.

Yup, that tracks. US/West came up with an obsolete solution that was only going to work in narrow context, definitely not this war. A “single concentrated” strike would have been seen well ahead of time by the Russians and countered. More mass just means more casualties - the RA has proved this repeatedly. Western planners have no combat experience in this sort of war either. Ukraine tried a more dispersed approach akin to what they did in Kherson (after trying the concentrated method a few times). Which simply cannot pull together enough combat power to crack the defences. Further they made the mistake of moving towards “western mechanized” when it was likely clear that is not what they needed, nor would it work under these conditions. US/West designed and supported a solution for them. Ukraine tried to use a solution for them but equipped and trained for the western one. And they lost time trying to equip and train for it as well. They ended up with a Frankenstein’s Monster while the RA sat back and waited. Third Way: focused corrosive warfare. So rather than spending billions on making western mechanized forces, spend that effort and money on - UAS/UGV, Deep strike and infantry…lots of infantry. Do corrosion and then infiltration…deep infiltration. During the battle for Kyiv the UA had light infantry very deep into RA lines. So deep they could be called SOF. Focus on air superiority below 2000 feet. Go semi/full autonomy hybrid on unmanned. And then hit the Russian system everywhere all at once. You are still going to lose people but your chances are better. Russians do not like being surrounded and the inexperienced troops they have are more likely to bolt once UA infantry start showing up all around them. Once the RA starts to buckle, then do the mech thing to pursue/breakthrough. And here’s the, thing I am not even sure that will work but it is probably better than what they tried. Edit : [dear gawd, I think I just signed onto LLFs Ranger Bns idea]

In conditions like these troop rotations become absolutely key. In WW1 some troops would only spend about a week forward and then be rotated back to secondary and reserve trench systems. https://www.warmuseum.ca/firstworldwar/history/life-at-the-front/behind-the-front-lines/#:~:text=Soldiers rotated into and out,%2C finally%2C the reserve trenches. And there rotations away from trenches to rear areas varied but a 50-50% spilt seemed to be normal - basically a month on followed by a month off. So in an attritional battle an ability to regularly rotate is key. For that you need depth of offsets.

Well I suspect that “yes” the RA have gotten a better grip on C4ISR. I am not sure that has translated into tactical offensive effects - eg we have not seen stream after stream of UA soldiers getting chased around trees yet and Russia would be posting that with glee. So we have what both the Ukrainian CHOD and president have admitted - a somewhat static tactical/operational battlefield. No one appears to have figured out how to break this deadlock and I am not sure we can in a short term as the technology really does not exist en masse yet. As to Ukrainian Will to fight versus Russian Will, well we have seen pages on this subject. The loudest local voice has declared that Ukraine is doomed and the war is lost. Other opinions differ. Personally, I would need to see some evidence beyond a lone Ukrainian poster who seems intent to pick all the worst-case data points and play chicken with Steve’s banning policy. The rest of us are murmuring and debating the state of the world…as old men often do.

Well the problem here is that if they do have a long view (doesn’t have to be ‘secret squirrel’) then 1) a short term war is less likely because they are playing a clever long game and we are getting all hot and bothered for nothing - or conversely, 2) if one buys into Glass Dragon, they can see their imminent collapse and will be forced to move by 2027. If they are simply like the rest of us, A) they are emotional and shortsighted and will make a Putin-esque mistake. Or B they do not see their looming crisis and will sit back for awhile because full on war does not make a lot of short term sense. Out of that menu a lot of people are going with 2-A, which does not make a whole lot of logical sense because it is drawing a worst case out of opposing frameworks. I argue that is seeing what we fear and not objective analysis. The other problem is that creating deterrence is not a passive exercise. From the other side it looks a lot like build up and aggression. If China has a long term view we might be ok because they will let us spend a position over time but play the longer game. If they are emotional and short-sighted, they may see the wrong signals and panic. If I have one singular point it is that the war in Ukraine has us all in a pretty binary mood, however, a more nuanced and complex level of thinking will be required with respect to China, particularly once this war is over.

I have often wondered if China was trying to figure out how to achieve regional dominance and stability without having to be #1. And now has come to the realization that is impossible? The system we in the west built essentially will force them towards top slot to grab the pen on a new world order. We definitely do not seem in the mood for negotiations.

That is because nothing is really happening! Slow grinding misery on both sides. Speaking for myself, one can only watch so much war porn. Discussions on larger issues is the break (and for the record I have quite a few external citations in my posts). Beyond Ukrainian Doom-Gloom, we are in a pretty static situation with respect to operational-tactical situation on the ground….so we talk political and strategic. I would love to go one higher and talk theory but let’s not risk using diagrams and PowerPoints again based on the reaction last time.

Looks like some sort of sniper hide trick from WW1. I wouldn’t armour them. Use real dirt and sod from the same fields. That would make them nearly invisible to thermal. But we are talking positioning OPs/LPs and sniper type stuff. Not much use en masse as I am pretty sure someone would notice a hundred dirt turtles crawling at them and then drop the sky. Pretty good indication of just how illuminated these battlefields are.

About 1/2 trillion per year. US sells about 1/4 trillion back. Pre-WW1 is an excellent example of everyone talking themselves into a war no one really wanted. Mis-reads, wrong signalling, identities that were already obsolete and unnecessary escalation - along with some baffling alliance decisions - led to an insane conflagration that ruined European dominance forever. So can we all be dumb enough to do that again..oh ya. Putin just proved it in this war. Now should we? No freakin way. So linking this back to Russia and the much larger question: how does this end? Russia back in a Cold War shoebox? China happily making our running shoes for cheap while struggles to feed everyone? I have yet to hear one coherent post-conflict strategy for this strategic competition. It all “we will win and figure it out later”…gawd but haven’t we made that particular mistake enough?

For Asia, maybe. So “meh China”, except of course when we want to discuss security? So which is it? China is just another upstart power with no real attributes. Or China rise is a clear and present threat to western way of life and we need to invest trillions in defence in order to thwart them. You can see how the narrative appears muddled. Also, we didn’t take Japan seriously and it took an A-bomb to bring them down…so maybe we should be a little more respectful this time?

Money talks, BS walks: https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/phl/partner/chn https://tradingeconomics.com/china/exports/philippines There are no “friends” in international politics - there are only business partners…and opponents.

Must be Tuesday again….

Apparently over the last week: - War is over - War is not over but Ukraine is doomed - War is over for Ukraine but not Russia - It is all the West’s fault. Whelp that was interesting….

Ok let’s not start pointing out temper tantrums by every nation on earth or we will be here all night. FFS, shall we talk about the US performance during COVID? I do not know about it being genetic but China essentially collapsed in the 20th century after being a great power in the east previously. In 60 years they went from being a 3rd world nation that could not even feed its people to a position where they can be considered a challenger. Poo-poo all you want but that did not just spontaneously happen. As a nation they must be doing something right because we are all talking about them. If someone would have told me even 30 years ago Russia would beholden to China in the middle of a European war I would have called them nuts. Yet here we are. We are not going to solve for China here but this whole “ya they ain’t so great” followed by “but they only want to destroy our freedoms, today Taiwan, tomorrow Nebraska” is almost as bad as whatever Putin was pushing before this war started. Respect an opponent until they prove otherwise. You do yourself no favours assuming they are stupid, anymore than you do assuming they are geniuses. As to the current situation, I think we may see some sort of Iron Curtain with Russia, however, it will have holes in it. We definitely are not going to see a Bamboo Curtain anytime soon. Our trade with China is simply too large and our lifestyles too dependent. https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china That is an eye-watering 3/4 trillion per year. Sure we could cut them off. As soon as you can convince North America to stop buying their stuff, or selling our stuff. And accepting enormous price hikes as we try to re-wire locally.

@LongLeftFlank look here. Yes, there is definitely an element of this. Our deterrence failed in Ukraine. And I think we are still in "how dare they" mode. Well they "did dare" and continue to. So we are still stinging from this because Putin just took a big ol poop on the Rules Based International Order. So now that good ol order it kinda tender and ready to start really deterring...we really mean it this time. All over the place. Problem with Detterence is that it always comes with an inductive flipside. A reaction. Sometimes that can turn into inadvertent compellance and escalations that no one really wanted. So this war in Ukraine is intrinsically linked to the next one involving the great powers. It will like shape our thinking for the next decade at least on both sides of any equation. One thing we can agree upon is that the stakes are high. China needs to look at Ukraine and go "nope" because the cost would be too high. But it also cannot go "oh crap" because we overplayed the hand and trigger something nobody really wants. Finally a little empathy may be helpful too. [See: we can do both at once. I mean between war porn and maps of course.]

This is the central premise but back to what we can actually see. China was pursuing a longer term expansionist strategy largely aimed at securing bilateral agreements globally for resources and influence through economic/diplomatic means. Suddenly, they are on the verge of collapse and need to invade Taiwan to fix that..."how"? Taiwan is an identity/social issue, not a pragmatic economic one. So how does China offset its looming economic collapse? How does it offset its looming demographic collapse? We have leapt to Taiwan and overt aggression. Now it could be real. Or the whole damn thing could be SDI all over again. How do we know China believes that time is against it? And is it? I honestly think we cannot discount the recency effect of Russia's action and impact on western calculus. We did not see an overt invasion of Ukraine coming, at least no where near soon enough. And now we are suddenly convinced the other great power is doing the same. I mean look at these: https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/02/02/cf-chinas-economy-is-rebounding-but-reforms-are-still-needed https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58957#:~:text=growth of productivity.-,Projections of Income for 2023 to 2033,percent from 2026 to 2033. If I were a Chinese analyst I am not going to lose my mind over this. Sure China has challenges - we all do. US is starring flat lines in the face. Reduction in works forces and a projected GDP growth trajectory under 3%. China is looking to GDPs shrinking but still sustaining over 3% growth out to 2028. If you check to Economic Policies chart, you are not going to see - engage in an incredibly costly major conventional conflict over a single small island of 23 million people. So is China flexing and doing stretches because it needs to? Or are they doing it for other reasons? The single biggest threat to China is a blunting or dislocation of its expansion westward. The massive markets of the west (and east) have not changed since the Silk Road. Resources, particularly energy security lie in the west, not Taiwan. So I am not sure how we suddenly got here but the whole thing feels like a distraction to be honest. This is what I honestly see in front of us right now. China remains our first or second largest trading partner. They do not appear caged or desperate, yet. I do not see the cliff face in 2027 (and a little bit of sucking and blowing in the US narrative on that one: "Chinese long-term thinking is a myth, yet they can see out to 2050 and 2027 is their last chance"...I mean which is it?). Interestingly, this: " Harvard University political scientist Joseph S. Nye, pointing to research by Yale historian Donald Kagan, has argued that Graham Allison misinterprets the Peloponnesian War; Nye argues that the war was not the result of a rising Athens challenging Sparta, but rather the consequence of Athenian stagnation leading Sparta to think that a number of "Athenian policy mistakes" made war "worth the risk".[26] Historian Arthur Waldron likewise argued that Kagan and Harvard classics scholar Ernst Badian had "long ago proved that no such thing exists as the 'Thucydides Trap'" with regards to the Peloponnesian War.[25] Relatedly, political scientists Athanassios Platias and Vasilis Trigkas submitted that the Thucydides Trap is based on "inadvertent escalation" whereas the Peloponnesian war was an outcome of rational calculations.[29]" Leads one to wonder "who is trapping whom?" in all this. I honestly doubt this is a discussion point in US power circles. I mean we get it (wanna talk about "aggression and insecurity"), the US has sounded the horn of Gondor. But in the vassal states we kinda are looking at this from a different angle. I mean do we jump in? How hard? Do we really need to spill all the beer? None of us recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state, kinda like Puerto Rico, but with semi-conductors. So do we really want WW3 over this?

You can quote "some guy on the internet for now". It has come up as both an external and internal "shiny" ploy in discussions (strictly unclass of course). The whole thing just doesn't make sense. China has been highly preoccupied with global expansion (Belts, Roads, whatever) with a focus on breaking into Europe, which they continue to do. They got hit by COVID like everyone else and depending on how much one buys into Glass Dragon theory somehow come out of that deciding its best "new play" was to start a major war over Taiwan? The internal pressures narrative might hold some water but their economy is still growing. A major indicator of social instability is the death of a middle class but China's is healthy and the largest in the world: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_China So I am not fully buying the "China is going to collapse tomorrow, so the CCP is trying to distract them with Taiwan." I have read Brands and the Thucydides Trap theory has a lot of holes in it. We have had two major power transitions without full on conflagration between the two primaries in the last two centuries alone. First was UK and US. There were wars but not with each other. And then Soviet Union and West - Cold War definitely but the nuclear equation may have changed how we do this. It is also very possible to pull oneself into a scenario by simply believing and acting like it is already happening. If we are in a bar and I am convinced that we are going to fight. Take off my sweater, start shadow boxing and trash talking you. Stern looks and posturing. Well you might have gone into that bar with a totally different perspective and suddenly you are getting into a fight. Both sides believe they are only defending themselves but before you know it we create a self-fulfilling prophecy. The current rhetoric around Taiwan sometimes looks a lot like this, except maybe it was China making all the noise to get a reaction. I have read a lot of wargame results and discussion...they all forget about stuff this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_094_submarine That is 72 MIRVs, each in the 20-150 kt range. I honestly think that any fight over Taiwan is as bounded as Ukraine by the nuclear equation. So what is going on? Well if you read Chinese doctrine the whole hot and bother on Taiwan could just as easily fit into the 3 - warfare theory. Now why would they do that? Well we sure as hell never talk about Africa anymore. I honestly don't know or come down on either side hard. We have to be ready to fight anyway but if we get too focused on any one region or issue we do tend to lose sight of the rest of the game - was a fear with Israel, and happened with GWOT/Iraq/Afghanistan/Syria and the rise of Russia. From a Chinese perspective we in the West have laughably short attention spans, they do see that as a major weakness. All this sabre rattling and posturing would kind of fit that perspective. As to "China must do X before Y, because after that they are done like dinner." Seriously, the one superpower/empire to repeatedly come back is China. No one else has demonstrated the same ability. They are doing it right now. Sure they have pressures but their ability to weather them and...wait for it...sacrifice, is frankly amazing. China may even take serious hits but I think they have programmed in a lot of resilience and recovery - they always do. We point to economic issues, demographic issues and political issues but frankly we are all facing similar pressures. Forecasts of Chinese collapse leading to desperate action before then I tend to take with a grain of salt. I mean the country had a famine 60 years ago that may have killed 55 million people, and now it is pushing for top slot. I think the more important question is whether or not China figures that it can retain regional superiority and security without having to replace the USA to do that? This is the central question for China. I suspect they are leaning towards "no". But looking out at 50 year horizons, why start a major war in the Pacific? Now? Finally, linking it back to this war. Russia got us totally spooked. We did not think it possible that a Great Power would use military hard power to achieve political objectives...at least not like this. It was a new age of human security, collectivism, and American exceptionalism. So it is awfully convenient that we are suddenly really terrified that China is going to do the same thing. There are times this whole thing feels like a shell game. We will pivot to the Pacific and the funding and attention will go with it. We should probably ask ourselves if that is what China wants right now though.

I think the Viet Cong probably provide a better counter-point. Terrorism normally has political objectives, the disconnect occurs on the relative term of "realistic". Terrorism can often be non-linear in nature - ends way, and means tend to blur until options emerge. As such a whole lot of relative rationality is at play. It is incorrect, and dangerous to label all terrorist as blood-thirsty revenge seeking monsters - that was a narrative from the GWOT days. It came about because "we do not negotiate" etc. The reality is that terrorism, is a tactic of violent extremism and asymmetric warfare (among other labels) and almost always has some sort of political objectives, they can just be hard to see or understand from the outside: - OBL - Caliphate 2.0 (with him at the top no doubt). Terrorism was a way to get the US into a grinding ground war in Asia that would break it a la Vietnam. It was an inductive action to garner a response. - ISIL - Armageddon 2.0. A real mish-mash in this crew but they were looking for some sort of decisive battle that would trigger the Second Coming. Can't negotiate with that so we killed them. - White Supremacy - Looking for the inverse John Brown moment that would spark a race-based civil war in the USA (the oldies never go out of style) You can go through the long list back to the Zealots, thru Order of Assassins, Religion based, Anarchists, the -isms and now whatever the hell all this is. All of it is about weaker opponents trying to induce a larger one to make mistakes, or somehow garner support to the point they can take it to the next level of Revolution. Rarely works but we can't seem to shake the idea. What should be bothering Hamas is that all of the terrorism wins had an external state backer(s) that provide safe haven and support. History is not kind to terrorist/VOEs who are in relative isolation.

I would double down with UGVs and start looking at fully autonomous/semi-autonomous fleets. Ukraine right now are the world leaders on military use of unmanned systems. Reinforce this and lean into corrosive warfare by unmanned. Problem is range and volume more than C4ISR. I find it hard to believe that if we can produce billion dollar high tech stealth aircraft, we cannot solve for these issues for cheap unmanned systems.

Not sure what "air advantage" means anymore to be honest. Let alone if we could build it in the Ukraine. I if was going to spend a few billion on it, I would likely double down on small, longer range unmanned systems and deep fires. I mean all an aircraft really does is carry the "boom", suck up data and try to deny the same to the enemy. If you can do that other ways cheaper and faster that might create what they are referring to. I think the idea of "more, better expensive western kit" is fundamentally flawed. First we cannot produce that equipment in the numbers this war would need. Second, Ukraine could not field it for years - eg a full SEAD suite. Third, Ukraine would be challenged to sustain it. Fourth, it still might not work. I mean keep pushing what we have, sure. Better than nothing. But we get into the "one more Abrams" trap. We need to start thinking about hacking this war from a Ukrainian perspective and stop projecting "how we would do it" onto them.

Well there is the lesson the Russians will tell themselves, and then there is the hard political lessons. Despite funding and providing safe haven to cross-border terrorism (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fenian_raids), the USA never invaded Canada again. The costs were simply too high. They had plans for it until the beginning of WW2 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Plan_Red#:~:text=War Plan Red first set,reinforcement to the Canadians—the). We were basically Ukraine in this whole equation. Instead the US realized that they could get what they wanted (i.e. Canadian resources) through trade and cultural immersion. We were far more valuable as a trading partner than any conquest would have provided. Once we were fully pulled into the US orbit we essentially became a pseudo-vassal state (client state has also been used, in the end it really doesn't make a difference). The US got us on the cheap without all the bother of having 40 million democrats mess up the US system. Will Russia walk away with the same lesson? Doubtful, at least under this regime. The lesson will likely be that hard power plays are potentially a lot more expensive than initial sticker price. Putin might go all NK and try to double down on hard power but are the Russian people in the mood for that? What is their appetite for another military adventure in the Stans? - last one did not go well either. My bet is the Putin Regime bet the house on this bloody war and knows they came damned close to losing it. My bet is that there will be attempts at detent and rapprochement after this war is over. But they will be bilateral and targeted. Putin knows our greatest weakness in the west is unity. So he will pick away at Turkey and other states he thinks he can see cracks in. Make side deals and try to unravel the opposition. That way if he does do another end-run somewhere far away-but not too close to China, we will be more divided. Will Russia learn anything from this war? That is the question we are really asking. I simply do not know to be honest. I doubt it will be "zero", but it may also be the wrong lessons for "reasons". I guess we will have to see.

If you want to get a reaction just say “we will spend 2% on defence, as soon as you spend 2% on stopping climate change”

https://world101.cfr.org/understanding-international-system/conflict/eight-hot-wars-during-cold-war Ukraine by definition is a proxy war: https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/the-return-of-great-power-proxy-wars/ On that list on the first link: Congo, Nicaragua (kinda), Chile and Afghanistan were all successfully waged by the US in the background and no overt commitment. You could likely add Israel and its various wars to this list. As to the Cold War itself. Although there were definitely hot actions that both did and did not directly involve US ground troops. And commitments of significant ground forces were required for deterrence. The reality is that the war was decided by internal economic and political pressures that built up over time within the Soviet Union. NATO military power had a role in making that happen but it was not linked to anyone military victory or defeat. Ukraine will very likely be a proxy war victory for the West, although as has been debated, not a total victory - these things rarely are. Further it will be a victory where no western ground troops (beyond the possibility of SOF) have been committed. I strongly suspect that China and Russia will take note of this and we can expect significant trouble when next we decide to saunter into Nation B to pursue some sort of interests. The lesson of Vietnam, Afghanistan (and the War of 1812), is that Peter Sellers had it right, the US is a very magnanimous winner but also a very sore loser - they are a hot blooded, emotional peoples. There are options for manipulation for competing powers in this. In fact there is a not so radical idea that Taiwan is no more than bait to grab US attention while China continues to push westward, not eastward. 1812-1815 on this continent is a fascinating conflict when viewed in parallel to Ukraine. A larger growing power with simply terrible strategy and planning. Making many of the same poor assumptions Russia did at the start of this war. A small vassal proto-state (Canada would not be a full nation for another 50 years) to another great power is invaded and through a combination of direct and indirect support defeats the invading greater power soundly. War ends with one defensive victory by the US at New Orleans, after failing to achieve any and all of its initial strategic objectives. In fact gets its capital destroyed. But in the post-ceasefire convinces itself and the rest of the world that it won by successfully defending itself from “British aggression.” 150 years later, someone writes a catchy tune and it is a done deal. I strongly suspect Putin will do the exact same thing. Ukraine will go down as a great Russian victory when they pushed back the Western powers and taught us all a lesson by taking back a strip of land south of the Dnipro. Victory or defeat in any war is a meta stable human concept. Both sides in anything but total destruction will claim victory. The trick is to not forget the larger objective each said head at the outset and then judge accordingly.

Easy there. One also still has to adhere to those pesky laws of armed conflict too. Executive actions are very tightly controlled and need to be precise.

You forgot the part where no one in the neighborhood ever invites you to the monthly BBQ. You get awkward dinners with the Chinese couple next door, but it is just so...not normal. And that weird sweaty NK guy who lives all alone in the house where the lights are never on wants to be your best friend.