The_Capt

Read the article @Chudacabra just posted. Gives a very good break down of what is happening. A veneer of defence is just that, under scrutiny it becomes pretty evident very quickly that laws of armed conflict are being violated. For example, blowing up a high rise full of civilians because “Hamas met there once” is well outside the LOAC. The power targets, which are an admitted IDF target set, are also no more legitimate under the LOAC than Russian cruise missile strikes on Ukrainian high rises. Finally, you are clearly a civilian and do not understand just how dangerous the scenario you paint is for a military organization. Beyond moral injury and exposing your own troops to war criminality, this sort of “painting over” is how really bad things happen. It creates a level of acceptability that erodes military discipline. “Ok guys, we all know higher is playing cover up so shoot who you want.” “Hey Sarge, can we rape Palestinian women too?” Civilians have just about zero understanding about just how slippery a slope warfare is. They think it is all “drama”. In reality “killing” is among the easiest things to do. Morally a military organization can find itself upside down very fast. Officers and NCOs spend an inordinate amount of time making sure scared heavily armed teenagers don’t get out of hand in fighting the enemy. They do this primarily to ensure things don’t get so bad that those teenagers don’t start shooting each other. If the IDF keeps going the way they are it will be nearly impossible to tell them apart from the RA in a few months.

Short answer is “Chain of Command”. It would start with who had what authorities and who granted those authorities. Politicians are famous for trying to push any and all illegal activities onto the military. It is rare for political level prosecution to occur, but it does happen (eg Yugoslavia). So in the case of the IDF the first question will be: what were the Rules of Engagement? Who developed them? Who authorized them? If the ROEs were weak or outright illegal then responsibility will be much higher and wider. Next is how were those ROEs interpreted? So targeting in the modern era is pretty complex. Rarely is a Bn CO given authority to call in airstrikes, especially in a counter-insurgency type scenario with this many civilians around. It would be held at the formation or operational level. The tactical unit can call for fire but the collateral estimates and authority is normally held at a higher level. The Bn is responsible for its own organic fires, which are substantial and making responsible requests for support. However, final release for aircraft would be held higher, unless that aircraft was actually directly attached to that tactical unit…again rare. So for an individual incident, say a soldier shooting a civilian. An investigation would include all the background ROEs and authorities, and then would look at the context of the situation. What was happening on the ground? Was this an isolated incident or did this unit interpret the ROEs more loosely than others? As the incident widens, so does the investigation. An airstrike is going to be formation level or higher. In the case of the IDF right now, based on the levels of destruction and frequency of reports, I would expect an international investigation. The main reason is that parts of Gaza look like free-fire zones right now. These are areas of basically weapons free ROEs. Airstrikes are levelling neighbourhoods and hitting all sorts of questionable targets. This would suggest a sanctioning of illegal ROEs coming from near the top…possibly all the way up. This speaks to more than a few units getting out of hand, it may speak to a systemic and deliberate violation of the LOAC in both the IDF and political level. That is The Hauge type stuff. It speaks to this. There is a military solution - clean out Gaza and ensure the Palestinians never come back. If one were to pursue it, the overall results would not look all that different from what we are seeing - deliberate systemic destruction of civilian infrastructure in Gaza with intent to ensure the place is uninhabitable. This is a form of ethnic cleansing and has been practiced elsewhere, we have precedent. And frankly Israel appears to be pursuing this strategy. Unlike individuals, states are not afforded the right to presumed innocence, particularly in wartime. Based on the levels of widespread destruction there is enough here to raise more than a few red flags.

It is interesting that CM modern titles were actually pretty conservative in modelling near-future warfare. I can recall playing CMBS and seeing a lot of these sorts of phenomenon but if one could establish a level of superiority manoeuvre was still possible. Next-Gen ATGMs alone would be game changers but add in UAS, ISR and other PGM and one can quickly see where this goes. Of course if BFC had modeled modern warfare correctly the hue and cry from the community would have been epic. Well the next title should be interesting. Or we could all just go back to our comfort zones…like CMCW!

The world is what we make it. That is kinda the point of international laws of armed conflict in the first place. The major point of disagreement we seem to have is that if one side is not following the rules then it is acceptable for the other side to toss them out the window as well - this is simply not true. Israel has to live in this world once this war is over. Hamas is not and never was an existential threat to then state of Israel anymore than AQ was to the US. They are capable of horrible behaviours and doing terrible things to Israeli citizens - I do not dispute the atrocities one wit. But Israel is not on some edge of existence that justifies this behaviour. In fact the only group who fits that description is Hamas and I am pretty sure we can agree their behaviour is not acceptable either. Their warcrimes are also crimes. Any Hamas PoWs need to be investigated and prosecuted for their part as well. This is going to be pretty damned hard to do righteously if the IDF is also conducting illegal wartime activities. Or are you basically saying “how things are” is to simply execute them all? However, Israel is a modern democracy. A member of the international community. It does not get to toss out the rule ok anymore than Russia. Interestingly, no one has responded to this point on Russian warcrimes in Ukraine. Are we just going to let those slide? I mean Russia likely can come up with all sorts of “human shields” and “legitimate military targets” as well. Russia will claim that it “had to deal with the world as it was, not how they wanted it to be” at Bucha. This is what I mean by application. We cannot go after Russian warcrimes, or whoever does this stuff next, if we simply shrug when the IDF is straying “terrorists-watcha gonna do?” We had restrictive ROEs in both Iraq and Afghanistan. We had them in the Gulf War. We had them in Kosovo. I am not sure where the myth came that we somehow simply ignore the LOAC in conflict but it is simply not true. I have been part of a killchain and targeting prices and the LOAC is a primary consideration all the time. We do not “wink and nod” at it because “lawyers”. Every commander on ops knows the ROEs and is held responsible to enforce them…no matter who we are fighting. Finally, things are getting so bad that even Israel is beginning to doubt itself: https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/the-death-toll-from-an-israeli-airstrike-in-central-gaza-rises-to-106-palestinian-officials-say-1.6700908 So for context in this case the IDF will need to show that the target they hit was worth 106 civilian dead…in a refugee camp…that they directed civilians to move to. Was this a rocket system? Was it the Hamas leader? There are scenarios where this would be acceptable but that bar is very high. If this was a dozen Hamas shleps with rifles…this was an unrighteous shoot. Now we cannot say definitely what this was or was not but we can sure as hell question it. We do have that right and responsibility.

Well there we go…nothing to see here. I guess we will simply abandon all international law because it seems pretty random in its application.

Well it kinda is. A furious illegal response is…illegal. Now if we just want to throw out the law book because “furious” well then that will have very large repercussions. For example, we will see no prosecution of Russian war criminals in that war. Nations could in fact go right back to business as usual with Russia once the war is over because war crimes are no longer a thing. China can pretty much do whatever because we have shut down the LOAC. Or do we mean only our enemies have to be accountable for war crimes? Us and our allies can get a by if we are really angry? There has been ample evidence that the IDF is out of control, at least on a few occasions. Investigations will need to be done and if anyone did act illegally they will need to be prosecuted. Same as soldiers who did do dirty in Iraq. Revenge, even righteous, does not excuse someone from conducting illegal shoots or indiscriminate killing of civilians. So which is it? Do we have a law of armed conflict or not. Because if not then legally Russian can start using chemical weapons…and send them to Hamas for that matter. I mean if you want anarchy just be damned sure you understand what that looks like. What I am seeing on this thread looks a lot like schoolyard justice, and that is not a basis for international law and order. Or national law and order for that matter.

Good example of a safe lane being compromised. It doesn’t take much in this day and age.

So reviewing ISW and it hits upon particular peeve of mine with respect to western strategic mindset: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine-part-2-—-military-threat-and-beyond If you read these toe pieces what jump out is how binary the analysis it. We either fully liberate Ukraine and somehow live in a safer world - the impacts on Russia of a total defeat and possible follow on impacts of that on regional security are not explored. Or we lose Ukraine entirely. The analysis of losing Ukraine entirely is solid and I do not dispute. What I dispute is the lack of any negotiation space. All war is negotiation. Most wars in history have ended in some form of negotiated end-state. We tend to highlight and fixate on the maximalist wars because they had very “hot” impacts and make for good drama. But most wars end somewhere in the middle - no one gets 100% of what they wanted. So a major shortfall in the west has been a clear articulation of strategic end-states. I am not proposing we give Russia “outs” or off-ramps but we have not even painted a vision of what a post-war order will look like. What are our conditions for renormalization with Russia? What is the post-war reconstruction plan? How quickly can Ukraine be pulled into NATO? What do we plan to do in the event of a Russian collapse? The sum total of western declaration has been “support Ukraine to the end” without defining what that end in fact is or is not. By failing to do this we tie victory to the map and not human conditions. That is dangerous as we know the map may not demonstrate what we need to win, nor does it indicate a loss. Now I strongly suspect that this thing has been mapped out by staffs in the backfield and all we hear is the party line. However, this war may end with a complete Russia failure. The RA may turn around and March on Moscow. A military coup in Russia is not good news. The last time it tore the country apart. This time it could make things worse not better. The absolute military victory being championed by ISW (and others) will very likely mean complete chaos in Russia itself. We have never had a nuclear power completely fall apart below the state level. Many simply go “meh, we will deal with it.” But then lose their minds when we ask “well what if we wind up with less than we want”. This is called strategic scope eye: a dangerously singular focus on one certainty while neglecting the rest of the problem. We should absolutely support Ukraine. We should push them as much as we can. We must bring them into a collective defence umbrella - it is the only proven deterrence to Russian aggression. We must rebuild Ukraine. We must also map out what renormalization with Russia would look like. What are the enticements /inducements? Finally “victory” may be a continuing work in progress. We may have to accept partial victory now and work to a broader one later. And accept Russia is going to do the same. I keep coming back to this, in the middle victory spaces: there is “declared victory” and there is “real victory”. Russia can declare whatever it wants. Putin could be pushed back to pre-22 lines and still cry victory because he held onto Crimea and Donbas. He will definitely crow and declare total victory if he holds onto what he has right now. So freakin what? Russia failed to achieve its strategic goals - undeclared and declared. As to “real” Ukrainian victory: if Ukraine is in NATO and seeing hundreds of billions in reconstruction as it is being fast-tracked into the EU in 2025 - how is that not a strategic victory? By 2030 Ukraine could be an Eastern European powerhouse with a larger economy and military industrial base (as it schools the entire western world on how to fight a modern war) than it had before the war. Russia will likely be sulking and planning…much as it has for the Baltics for decades. But it will be doing it under sanctions as a Chinese satellite. It may not even be a great power by that point. It ability to project regional threats will be diminished. It will face a decision to renormalize with the west or continue to decline. Is all that going to be a massive strategic defeat if we are stuck at the current conflict lines? Was Korea a major strategic defeat for South Korea? We have to deal with NK but we have shown we can…for years. Is all this a major Russia strategic victory? This is the problem with binary end-states, they ignore the realities of war. The reality is that parties enter into the conflict with a certainty - a version of reality without doubt. Those certainties are in collision and irreconcilable with the opponent. The “war” is that violent collision. As it progresses, a third certainty is created and each party must negotiate with it. War is as much about negotiation with oneself as an enemy. To be clear, I am not advocating withdrawing support to Ukraine in any way shape or form. I am not arguing appeasement with Russia. What I am asking is that if we have run out of military option space - what are we willing to live with inside that third certainty?

Oh definitely on density. This front should be far too wide to cover off with the troops the RA has. Even with the minefield. But UAS/ISR have changed the game. The UA cannot move any forces in concentration without getting picked up and the lit up. The RA should not be able to protect such a large frontage with so few troops…but they are. I supposed it is only fair in hindsight as the UA stopped them with really insanely bad force ratios. So here we are, the calcs are out the window. In reality one might get 1 or 2 lanes, open for a window before scatterable mines close it. In that time you have to transit roughly 30-40 vehicles for a conventional combat team F and A1, A2 ech. A Battlegroup needs over 100. At around 10-15 kms/hr it is going to take each vehicle about 2 mins to transit the obstacle. Assuming double spacings that is a train probably around 400m long per Cbt team. So we are likely talking 10-15 mins per Cbt Tm accounting for stop and gos etc. An entire BG is looking at maybe an hour using 2 safe lanes. So if one cannot suppress the enemy guns and kill the ATGMs the odds of those two lanes getting blocked are extremely high. As to open country. Well I am not sure if there is any left. And if there is, it is likely a kill zone. From what we have seen anything large and hot that comes within about 10km of the front from either side gets picked up and hammered. The entire problem of offence in this war right now is one of suppressing enemy ISR, guns and ATGMs well enough and in depth enough to get any freedom of manoeuvre. Minefield are only driving the defence force density costs down…way down.

So the MICLIC or other line charge may blow an 8m lane but you are going to drive down the centre of that lane. This leaves 2m safety on either side but one can expect some possible holdouts. When a safe lane gets traffic the vehicles are not on rails. They can slip and jimmy depending on conditions. One would never send 2 x MBTs abreast on an explosive breach.

Explosive line charge is going to give a single lane at best. One would either have to greatly increase weight of explosives to get wider breach or you are very likely to get hits trying to go two abreast. Even running track vehicles is tricky as tanks have wider tracks and footprint. It is war and likely why one does want to blow this attempt because the enemy will punish for it. Only reliable way to prove a breach lane is with rollers. Now those don’t have to be on a tank but they will need to be on a vehicle. Oh, well let me shut that down right away then. There is no way to conduct a breach without securing the minefield first. Even if you got a lane in, the follow on break out force has to traverse the obstacle and then bounce out. That is going to be a long and dangerous crossing with security in place. Without it is a RA style suicide charge as a single ATGM team can stop it cold. Even navigating a safe lane is tricky and has to be done carefully and deliberately (trust me, lived it). There is no way to do this without establishing pre-conditions: - secure both sides. Find and kill ATGMs - push enemy ISR and UAS back. Create own superiority. - suppress enemy guns. - put a force in place to interdict c-moves. - deep strike in support. - ensure denial everywhere else. If one does not do that then it simply does not matter how the minefield itself is breached. A breakout force is going to get spotted and engaged before it can exploit the breach itself. The problem is not the minefield - it is everything that can exploit what a minefield forces one to do while trying to get past it.

From what I can see they are biiiiig. Even if they avoid ground pressure, tilt rod and magnetic influence mines are going to light them up. I think something this big, hot and loud is going to draw fire from everywhere before it gets to the minefield.

Cannot see the article. That first one is a major change. Ukrainian neutrality was one of his declared war aims - and he reiterated this again a few weeks ago. If he is backing off neutrality then it could be either a sign of a shift, or it is BS bait. As we saw with Finland (and to a lesser extent, Sweden), it is possible for NATO to pull in a member in weeks/months. My bet is Putin is betting that the membership process will drift into the next US election, which opens the door to his BFF getting back in the chair. Unless of course we pull a fast one and get Ukraine in before then. Once Article 5 kicks in a single cruise missile could trigger it...and Putin does fear the hell out of that. Biggest problem is that Ukrainian entry would need to be kept a secret to avoid Russia pre-emption...and NATO leaks like a an old man after midnight. That second one is just bizarre - maybe someone with political savvy can weigh in. What on earth does Putin gain by letting the US lead the dance here? I mean I guess he gets to claim "big boy pants" and US dominance to play to Russian support, but is he so close to the edge he needs that? The US will not only be in the position to "enforce conditions" on Kyiv, they will be also a stakeholder in enforcing conditions on Russia. Perhaps this is the poison pill in all this. With the US at the table as lead the entire thing simply will not work and Putin knows it?

Worst porn name ever....

Both systems have advantages and disadvantages. Jets are fast, but hot and loud with limited range. Heavy drones have better range and lift and likely better noise and heat. But they are likely slower and larger. I see a combination of all these systems as they kinda offset each other. Jets for highly mobile JTA(G)S to get them into position quickly. Heavy Drones to push UGVs, heavy weapons and supplies/ammo. Heavy drones for med evac. Small light drones for ISR and FPV/loitering for strike/suppression. Get the UGVs in place teamed up with human operators and one has a viable bridgehead force that can 1) hunt and kill layback ATGM teams at range, 2) Act as a defence against enemy C-moves, and 3) guide and prep next jumping off point for breakout force. Nothing stopping this system from employing an airborne explosive breaching system to keep mass profile low right up until the crossing - I do like that. Breakout force is likely going to be light but armed to teeth. Think quads/ATVs and wheels. Med could follow behind their heels. Heavy for hardpoints, shoulders and reserve. Whole damn thing is under a plastic sky of UAS who are suppressing enemy ISR and keeping their UAS at bay. All the while guns and deep strike, linked into operational ISR are hammering depth and enemy artillery. Might just work if one could build it.

Interesting articles on Russian tank production: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/02/17/the-russian-army-could-run-out-of-tanks-in-a-few-years-what-happens-then/?sh=2cc92c502061 https://wavellroom.com/2023/05/01/1500-new-and-modernised-tanks-really/ Edit: news isn’t so great for UAVs either: https://jamestown.org/program/russias-drone-industry-hits-serious-turbulence/ https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/russian-military-drones-.pdf

Ok no bad idea time but no one bips off on this? Meanwhile jet packs - of which there are multiple videos - that gets potshots? Seriously, so if I am understanding this right, using 10m sections would require 50 flights by a heavy drone for each charge. I am still not sure what the detonation plan is here. Light them off one at a time after they are dropped? Or all at once? One at a time is going to pretty visible as we are talking about 50 individual explosions. All at one is likely better, particularly if you lay them at night/under smoke, but then you get into how does one simultaneously detonate 50 x 10m charges at the exact same time? Any delays could cause blow aways and gaps in the lane. And you still need heavy vehicle based proving once the breach is in regardless. Explosives are not 100%. And the risk is obvious, the lead vehicle gets taken out and all the rest now either try and turn around or have to go around into uncleared space. So a proving system is a must and right now those are mine rollers. If one can actually see each individual mine then a UGV dropping small shaped charges with simultaneous detonation is a much better way to go. Even if you get a mis-time the odds will be that they won’t blow away the next charges. And even then one will need to use rollers to prove..and we are back to a vehicle. To be honest I am a lot less worried on how to breach the minefield - there are plenty of good systems for this. The major problem is how to secure/isolate the minefield so the breach can happen.

Yeesh and I thought the CRTC was bad. Copyright? Seriously?! People in North Korea are probably looking at NZ in pity. Regardless, Priggy will be missed for entertainment value alone. His abortive march to Moscow was the longest and fastest offensive drive this entire war. You know Putin has a locket with one of Priggy’s eyelashes in it.

It was a matter of time….

Ok, I see where you are going. I am not sure how one would place them. A line charge runs an explosive chain from end to end. If you split the line charge into pieces, each one would need to be individually triggered. A single 500m line charge would be too heavy for any drone. It would take a team of drones to carry and place, which does not sound practical. Now some sort of FAB system…

Actually in Z’s favour, posting unsubstantiated hyperbolic opinion does force a look afield for counter-points…and one can find some good stuff: https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/04/russias-military-industry-forecast-2023-2025/ So basically as I read it, despite pouring historic levels of funding into the military complex Russia appears to be struggling to surge military manufacturing. In most cases it look like they are barely sustaining their base in face of sanctions etc. With respect to aircraft Russia is pretty much flat in its manufacturing ability compared to previous years. Of course combat losses and wear and tear are attriting the RuAF faster than it can be sustained, let alone surge. So what? Well unless we cut off UA AD capability entirely Russia is not going to be able to somehow re-establish air superiority. This is good news for UA defence while they re-set and figure out where to go from here. As to posting opinion. Well sure everyone can do this. Some positions are well known and cause little stir. But if someone is going to come on this thread and pose a highly controversial or something really new then they will be challenged regardless of personal situation. We all should be doing more background research and posting information here as best we can. But not everyone has the time or inclination so of course not every post is going to have deep research behind it. However, if someone wants to come on the thread and openly declare that “Russia is Winning because XYZ!” Gets challenged on it and then makes a lot of angry noises as opposed to providing facts or research to back them up, then it is their original position and credibility on this position that takes the hits. I for one do not believe the OP position and deductions are sound. They do not reflect a quick background check. This is going to inform my perception of the next positions he may take.

Sure, if all Russia was using and producing were SU-34s. And how on earth do you have any proof at all “that they were able to increase production”? My problem with your post is that it is skewing facts and ignoring context. This is the hallmark of an agenda, not objective analysis. You are pushing and promoting a point. You are cherry picking information out of larger context - when you cite information at all - in order to shore it up. Russia is losing nearly twice as many A/C as it can manufacture annually. I am sure if this were the facts about the Ukrainian airforce you would be shouting from the rooftops “Ukrainian Airforce is losing!!” But when it is Russia - “Russia is unstoppable and building more aircraft than it loses”. My problem with your post(s) is that they are biases and promoting to the point of outright mis/dis information. I don’t know what your angle is and frankly am past caring. What needs to stop is you coming here, dropping “informed opinion” like it is gospel. Do some leg work. It is called Google…use it and back up your positions. The Russian Airforce is in serious trouble. Why? Because they have much larger problems than Ukraine. Russia has a big @ss sky to try and control. They are worried about NATO (among other things). Losing that much hardware and not being able to replace it is not a good news story for them. In fact it is a strategic indicator that, shockingly, Russia is not getting better as a result of this war…they are getting worse. Edit: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/08/the-uncounted-losses-to-russias-air-force.html

Ok this has to stop. Look dude, I know you are squarely in the “all is lost” camp but there is a point where this becomes disinformation. https://wavellroom.com/2023/02/17/russian-combat-aircraft-sanctions/ https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html You state things as fact with zero proof or citations to back it up. You can see this? You see how your world view is skewing everything? So best estimates (and pony up some credible info if you have it) is that Russia managed to produce 22 military aircraft in 2022. Assuming they did the same in 23 (and that is a leap) then they are at about 44 aircraft produced. They lost over twice that number in this war…that we can see and confirm. The reality is likely higher. You get a hall pass because of the situation you are in. But you need to back up your “facts” with actual facts. “I heard it at the grocery store” has limited traction. Do you have some secret access to Russian aircraft production scheduling? If so, post it!

I rarely disagree with ISW but on this I do: “ISW has assessed that the collapse of Western aid would likely lead to the eventual collapse of Ukraine’s ability to hold off the Russian military and that the current positional war in Ukraine is not a stable stalemate because the current instable balance could readily be tipped in either direction by decisions made in the West.[5] Continued Western security assistance that empowers Ukrainian forces to repel ongoing and future Russian offensive efforts and to liberate more Ukrainian territory is the only course of action at this time that can make the Russian failure to achieve Putin’s maximalist objectives in Ukraine permanent.” We can push weapons, ammo and money into Ukraine. Ukraine could take back every lost inch of territory. And it is not a permanent solution. The permanent solution is to 1) remove Russian political will to achieve those maximalist objectives and 2) pull Ukraine into a collective defence mechanism that makes attaining Russian objectives prohibitive. I am not sure how to do #1 but have some ideas on #2.