The_Capt

Good answer, I will stress again however, that the true master will have "fingerspitzengefeul"(sp?) or "sixth sense for battle" and instinctivly know when to employ one or the other. And more importantly be able to train his officers and men to be able to switch from one mindset to the next without dropping a beat. I have always hated the two names (Manoeuvre/Attrition) and have felt that a new set is warranted to prevent confusion.

Mr Ichiu has in fact hit the heart-of-the-matter. We need to clearly define just what the hell we are talking about and then determine if it has a role in CM. I believe it does but at a very distilled level. I think that the Normandy Campaign suggestion is excellent and it is there that we may actually see the two systems in action. Assuming of course, that the higher commanders utilize it as intended. I will only say my definitions represent what the current Canadian and US military are preaching as doctrine, I had the opportunity to hear and sit across from good LCol Leonhart in a mess dinner and I can say that the man has some revolutionary ideas. Whether or not they will work is still a matter of debate. I will accept other definitions but, as all good definitions must, they must also fully encompass the two systems at their roots and not simply try and describe to branches.

I will give you that "a" decisive battle "may" be the end result of a manoeuvre or Manoeuvre. The acutal goal of Manoeuvre is to get "inside" of the enemies decision cycle and maintain a higher tempo (therefore initiative) of action. By doing this you will be able to render his total force useless (dislocation) by preventing him the ability to concentrate it. You will seriously degrade his morale and command effectivness (disruption) furthering the cascade action of faster tempo. How you accomplish this is the heart of Manoeuvre warfare. By "letting go of the reins" and empowering subordinate commanders with the right to pursue your intent even in the face of disobeying your mission statement. You will achieve the ability to "move faster and exploit opportunity" at a pace which will render a slower opponent in a reactionary stance. Attrition stresses control over speed and is best employed when "breaking-in" or when the enemy is prepared and there is no way to "turn the flank" or "dance fancy". Then a highly controlled and well planned methodical "punching thru" of your forces will allow a "window" for exploitation and true Manoeuvre. As I had stated in an early thread, the question is; are we headed into a hybrid system in which the tenants of Manoeuvre will be executed using Attritionist methods. There lies the crux of the issue and if anything can make you a better CM player, this is it.

Actually Mr Cawley, the post was directed to the founder of the thread and not you. You have raised some of the fundemental problems I have with this attempt at grasping the differences between Attrition and Manoeuvre. Both of you and Mr Vetran are looking at the end result of to schools of doctrine, placing them in historical context and attempting to debate strengths and weaknesses of each. Neither of you (in my mind at least) has even come to term with the actual meaning of the two terms or the "why" of the two approaches. Nor has the full depth and breadth (read Scope) of the argumement. You argue platoon tactics and national strategy in the same breath, sweeping each with dangerously broad strokes. Manoeuvre and Attrition are not TACTICS they are APPROACHES to a problem. They are philosophy. The question isn't how many tanks I should by and how I plan to move em about but "why should I buy units in the first place". Application of Attrition and Manoeuvre on a scale such as CM is just plain silly. Yes, we can try and be sneaky and try and pull the enemy in (it is called deception) or we can try to bring fire from an unexpected quarter (it is commonly referred to as surprise), we can also pound the opponents troops thru superior application of Firepower (aka "Winning the firefight). None of this has a schmick to do with Attrition and Manouevre. They address the questions of, what do I do if "blah" happens and what would my boss want me to to in "blah" (Mission Analysis). Or my mission is "blah", I will do "blah" and then wait for orders. The rest of it (including the Marine Corp definition) tell us what to do with the approaches when we use em. "Isn't the best place to "hit" with a manuever element, a place *thin* in enemy manuever elements, and the best place to hit with indirect fires, a place *thick* with enemy manuever elements? Is anyone so dense as to actually deny this out of doctrinal orthodoxy? I think not." -your quote Exactly my point. You don't know why the hell you are even there or why your boss is in this position. Therefore you don't know if your statement is a good idea or not. The answer is it depends on yours, your commanders, and his commanders intent. An example from above. If the commander needs an enemy element "taken out" to better fufill his or his commanders plan. You would then carry out an engagement of "attrition" for Manouevrist reasons by hitting his forces head on. You cannot try to apply tactical doctrine to any situation without knowing the reasons why the methods differ or why they are employed.

I have a problem accepting your definitions as gospel. They do not match current modern military thinking nor do they actually address the fundamental differences between the two schools of thought. All warfare focuses on the decisive moment and how to achieve it. All warfare aims at the destruction of the enemy (believe it or not the weak underbelly, so often used as the aim of Manoeuvre, will result in the destruction of the enemy as a fighting force as well). In fact Manoeuvre employs the same "brute force" ratios just at positions of opportunity, where attritionist mentality would be to carry it to pre-determined targets. I believe your search for a decisive battle is grabbing at smoke as any war will have a series of such engagements but not a single one which carries the course of the war. If you don't believe me answer me this; are not all of the battles which lead to a perceived "decisive engagement" just as important? The two systems are not easily definable and I question upon what grounds of authority you have to solidify your claim. Otherwise you have an interesting hypothesis but no qualification by which to support it.

Even Better!

Patton once said " The one who wins is he who gets there fastest with the mostest" (I am paraphrasing) He probably should have added " He also needs to know what to do with his mostest when he gets there...Oh and he really needs to know where "there" is and with luck he won't run into the other guy with his own ideas on the way" That about sums up my advice on how to win at CM use it in good health.

Some point out the "left hook" by allies as some great indicator of "Maneuver Warfare" but "turning the flank" has always been a goal in combat.

Bang on Steve, I would direct you to my thread on CM and Manoeuvre. I have asked the question "is CM the future of warfare" and how will it change our doctrine. You have echoed my own hypothesis which is that: "In the future a commander will use Attritionist doctrine to obtain Manoeuvrist goals" We do it right now in CM. We exercise initiative, dislocation, disruption, striking at weakness and the general "joi du guerre" associated with the Grand Spirit of Manoeuvre but we do it within a totally Attritionist methedology. We tell our troop exactly what to do and when. They exercise no initiative on their own but instead react "near-instantly" to our instruction. If the real world is heading towards CM then our approach to the whole thing is going to have to change.

Of course who better to defeat by these means? A quick easy (read cheap) victory against a poor opponent. In fact one of the best cases for true Manoeuvre not happening, was in the Gulf. Not on our side but on good-ol Saddams. If he had been a true military genius instead of a raging control freak, with distinct thug-like qualities, he would have hit hard and first against a weaker opponent. Yanks and Saudies (sp?) Not only would have this strategic Manoeuvre supported a clear intent (which he did not have) of ruling the Middle East but would have; a. Forced the Coallition to operated from another location, Turkey maybe. b. Gained control of 40% of the worlds oil. Too far, perhaps but it sure beat taking a tiny bite and getting slammed. Saddam really blew the estimate on that one. He guessed wrong on the reaction of just about everybody and didn't have the balls to take steps to render that reaction moot. I would think that good-ol Saddam is a student of history and therefore prone to apply it to the present (a dangerous practice) and hoped to pull off a Hitler, slow nibbling of ground until we get what we want.

I believe VL are used to artificially represent Key Terrain and Vital Ground two key products in terrain analysis. The problem is that in a QB these locations are random and not based on any real analysis of the ground. The flags are in fact much more "gamey" than any edge hugging tactics, which in fact is employed to prevent attack at least one flank, effective but dangeous at it eliminates an avenue for your own movement. VLs can be susicide, I usually analyze the ground picking out dominating terrain against enemy avenues of approach. If you know your enemy is going to head for the Flags this is much easier. I have handedly won battles by picking ground which dominates the VL and letting my opponent stroll on in. I like the idea of turning off Flags and focusing on the enemy.

Your list is backwards. Units, equipment, terrain and the enemy all drive your understanding and use of tactics and strategy. Taking the different factors (1-3 and a healthy dash of 4) and using them in context of a strong understanding of tactics (or employment) is vital to winning. Last thought.."You beat your opponent not his troops".

It also was no great leap of logic that a machine gun and breech rapid fire artillery will render the horse cavalry as irrelevent but guess what? The shift of mentality required to take that leap is unbelievably enormous and has implications on training, doctrine and even who we choose to lead an armed force. Training of subordinates to exercise Manoeuvre has been an absolute nightmare. To actually teach a junior officer that "disobeying an order" is a good thing in the right circumstances is almost as hard as teaching a senior officer that true sins are ones of "ommission" not "commission" and when a jr officer takes initiative we do not stomp on them even when it goes bad, we instead analyse why they did it and allow them to learn from it. This is leading down a totally different path in what is wrong with the military and how Manoeuvre and military mindset (most that is) do not mix well. The officers who are in fact the best warriors for Manoeuvre are in fact the ones who do not go anywhere and wind up with all the ****ty jobs in peacetime. The when operations start up you are stuck with a senior officer Corps wholly unprepared to deal with rapid fire decsion making....Ok now I am on a Canadian military rant....time to count to ten and remember this is just a game.

I am in. This is a clear chance to practice true Manoeuvre and see if it really works. Axis please.

Looks more like a 3-D Close Combat game than CM.

Steve, I would ask we don't shut this one down as it is tangent to the continuing argument over Manoeuvre and Attrition raging around us. The question is not what they "were" or what they "are". I belive we all coming to terms with these concepts. It is a question of the future and how we will apply them. CM with FOW turned off is actually a desired end state in terms of information available to a field commander. The question is "How are we going to use it". This question is perhaps the most critical since the introduction of Total Warefare. Information Warefare will be more critical to future conflict than any here really understand and CM is a great vehicle to demonstrate this. LCol Leonhart was a guest speaker at staff school and he gave some really deep insights into the future of warfare, which rocked the foundations of what we thought was the "Manoeuvre solution". In a true conflict in which we have "Information Superiority" Attritionist doctrine and methodology is better employed towards achieving Manoeuvrist objectives. We are looking at a hybrid evolution and I believe it stares us in the face every time we boot up and play.

To Steve, the problem with a computer game is that our units do not have a human brain which can actually process a situation within the context of Manoeuvre doctrine. So loss of control actually becomes a "mob rush" which is really all I see in those games. In reality C&C and Age of Empires are far more attritionist than CM in that it really comes down to who has the most. The left and the right is poorly understood in gaming and the real military, boundary lines have caused more grief than could be believed by people who haven't lived it. The cooperative relationship which is vital in Manoeuvre Warfare really need to be developed, we still rely too heavily on report lines and "pieces of terrain" belonging to someone or the other. This is outside of the scope of the battle. What you are talking about is either a battle that does not happen or one that happens instead of another. This is what we call "scope creep" in gaming. Combat Mission is a tactical wargame. It is not supposed to have anything to do with the Big Picture. You find yourself in a confrontation, either of or not of your choosing. It doesn't matter how you wish to think of it, just understand that it happened BEOFRE turn one. In other words, the decisions you are thinking of have already been made. Either by you (in theory) or your superior. I mean, who is to say that the Germans in Last Defense (prior to Turn 1) didn't divert their drive against another bridge, which was more heavily defended, and instead attack the one actually in that scenario? See what I mean? quote: I understand and agree but you must understand that for actual Manoeuvre Warfare to happen we need to allow for this to happen and then the freedom of action must be allowed. This is well beyong the scope of a tactical wargame. I believe the CMHQ "Meta-Campaign" or a large multi-player campaign "pack" released by BTS could be made to provide this "dynamic" environment. The question remains though, would anybody buy it, except us "Army geeks". For Mr. Rock, You are correct in both sets of definitions and in fact both sets support the other. Ths systems as you call them support the philosophies and are each applicable to certain conditions. WWI was not attritionist because the generals were inept or rich-idiot-third-sons. The art of manoeuvre and Manoeuvre were well known and well employed at all levels. WWI was Attritionist because technology had outstripped any freedom of movement, the mentality or system did not work. So instead they kept trying for the break-through using Attritionist control. The system supports the philosophy and the philosophy depends on the system. A better term would be "objectives" and "means". The system provides the "means" and the philosophy provides the "objectives". Although I would say that Attritionist method can still strike at weakness, look for gaps etc, it is more a question of control and who holds it. Lastly for Mr Cawley, I think I now understand the real aim of your discussion. However, the way you are trying to prove it is weak. First of all define "won" and "lost". These two conditions happened a thousand times a day in any given conflict at a myriad of different levels. You have overgeneralized the employment of the two schools of thought to the extreme. You have further "muddied" the waters by dragging in personalities to try and prove your point. Gen So-and-So was an attritionist on the winning side but Gen Whats-his-Name wasn't so attrition is better. This is not logical nor does it provide proof of your original position. One does not supercede the other. They are TOOLS gentlemen, each with inherent strengths and weakness to be employed equally and at the right time is a true sign of mastery. Proof of that is in every historical example given. It was all a question of timing. If you don't believe me take any battle in the last 1000 years and show that the "objectives" of each school did not exist at some level. The "means" and formalization thereof is a different matter and is in fact something we are still coming to grips with.

The "challenge" as Mr Cawley put it is an usless exercise. Trying to provide an exmple of a "war" in which Manouvre or Attrition decided the day is an endless loop. I will give Mr Cawley the benifit of the doubt and take it as a trick question. Wars are won by a combination of the two and how well one uses them will determine a victor. Do not get too hung up on the past gentlemen. Yes those who fail to learn from it are doomed to repeat it, just as those that fail to recognize that, "that was then this is now and victory is tomorrow". D-Day was a brilliant Strategic manoeuvre to open up a second Western Front. Hitting Germany on the weak side with clear intent to driving for it's heart. It was also an operation carried out in a classical Attritionist doctrine, bomb, shell, land and secure BLUE line by 1900hrs. In reality it had to be. The Gulf was the reverse, our intent is to destroy the Republican Guard (a more Attritionist intent you could not have) but we will allow our forces to execute it via a Manoeuverist mentality (exploit, exploit, exploit) You see, brilliant Manoeuvre at one level can be brutally Attritionist at another so you challenge is impossible to truly answer because the second we try and grab the smoke it blows away.

To respond to Steve: I have just started a thread on CM and Manoeuvre which is headed in that direction. I will give you the scenario briefings as an exmple of Manoeuvre (I actually forgot about those) in that one is given intent, resources and the ability to execute as we see fit. From our POV down however, we can exercise the goals of Manoeuvre (tempo=dislocation, disruption, recce pull etc) but it really doesn"t happen. If we "lost" control of our units and the AI was about ten years older we may be able to duplicate this experience. When a commander, in the context of "aufstragtactik" (gotta use at least one German buzzword) or mission command gives his orders and intent he is allowing is subordinates "free reign" within the guilines of his intent to carry out the mission. True Manoeuvrists trust their subordinates to the point of complete hands off, with the exception of the Reserve. That is reality but probably would be a very frustrating game. CM also excludes the left and right, which is a poorly understood, critical, relationship. There would be a Battalion Commander left and right of you, guys you've trained, drank and whored with. The coordination of these men to cooperate under a commanders intent is a key Manoeuvre experience which is missing. Manoeuvre is not a Grand Scale device and can be applied to a Platoon attack. It simply stresses allowing subordinates to know more and therefore do more when the opportunity arises. I guess an idea for CM Manouvre could be played out in an operation where the ability to exploit (or not) between maps could be allowed. One must see Manouevre in context with the picture around them. In Last Defence if the enemy hasn't shown up by turn X (and my commanders intent is to counter attack to regain initiative) I have no option to carry out that c-move with my troops till we run out of gas, nor is there a commander with a Reserve to push thru me once I do. Last point, I am not saying Manoeuvre is "the next Grail", in fact I do not believe it is even going to be relevant in the near future. Attrition and Manoeuvre are two sides of the same coin and a truly masterful commander can switch betwen the two with perfect timing and not miss a beat.

OK, I will first direct everyone to my tirad on Attrition and Manoeuvre in the ATTRITION thread. First let me say that I will refer to the two above concepts in terms of modern military doctrine (as taught at the Canadian Staff College, we have american instructors and students too so both nations have roughly the same ideas). The two concepts are in fact philosophies and doctrine on "how to do business". The goals of Manoeuvre; dislocation, disruption and whatever the hell the last one was, are all aims of Manouvre doctrine but not the doctrine itself. One can be executing Manoeuvre doctrine by doing nothing or digging in to take the brunt of the enemies force "face on face" so long as it fully supports your commanders (and his commanders) intent, regardless of the mission. Now let's discuss something really wild. Manoeuvre was developed to empower subordinates with the capability to exploit opportunity, within the guidance of just what in the hell the entire team is trying to do. This was done because warfare evolved around ones ability to "think faster/plan faster and move faster" and therefore be able to strike weakness and bring about decisive victory quickly. And troops on the ground have a much better view, and therefore, are in a better position to see opportunity when it comes. Now CM is attritionist by nature, we direct almost every movement that happens, our troops do not carry out any major initiatives. If they did I have no doubt the "bug" posts would be endless. The point is, should they? Our Point of View (POV) is godlike in comparison to the real world we know much more than out troops do about the "big picture" we get instant feedback from out troops and even with FOW we get an instant picture of the battlefield. The entire reason why Manoeuvre doctrine is being adopted was because troops in the front have a better view of the battlefield than a commander hearing reports on the radio, we then empower them to act. Not so in CM we, the commanders, see and know everything faster and more completly than our troops, should not the power for decision rest with us. All interesting stuff but answer me this; isn't modern combat beginning to look more and more like CM. The E-Battlefield is a reality right around the corner and it may render the philosophy of Manoeuvre as obsolete. The idea of striking weakness and flanking are not new gentlemen, it how one goes about doing it in which lies the future...your thoughts please.

Soapbox?! Ok if that is what you want to call modern military doctrine. This is not definition by concensus. I have been doing this full time for the last 13 years and spent last year in staff college, I don't really care what the rest of the community thinks, I am only giving the definition and concept "chapter and verse" from current teaching. I am not here to argue. Most people on this forum have made the beginner mistake of thinking Manouevre Warfare has something to of with sneaky moves and flankings. It is an amateurs view but in most professional military circles what I have offered is in line with current teaching. Mr. Cawley, thank you for the history lesson and yes history shows us wonderful examples of each types of warfare (although the modern concept of Manouvre doctrine is relativly new). Yes Verdun was open attrition but it was not Attritionist doctrine. D-Day, the March to Caen, Gettysburg were all wonderful examples of Attrition Doctrine by which a very controlled and centralized deployment of units towards a well-defined terrain objective. Try if you can to re-think the concepts as methodologies rather than a set of tactics/strategies historical or otherwise. Manoeuvre is a "way" of carrying out warfare not a set of rules or tricks. As for historical examples, the Gulf is your best bet not perfect by any stretch but the only real historical use in the formal sense. You are quite right though in it having been practiced by many great commanders, it was instinct and a personal gift. We are now trying to train leaders towards the idea rather than hope it develops Mr Abbott, what you have is a very good case of deception and initiative but not Manoeuvre (with the capital M). In order to execute the scenario you describe you will still plot each units move and position in order to execute your brillant plan. True Manoeuvre would be your troops executing the gap exploitation against what you told them to do because if best supported your intent and in real combat you cannot see what they can nor get instant feedback. That is Manoeuvre. What you have are a neat bag of tricks which do emulate some of the tools used in Manoeuvre (or goals of this methodology) but Attritionist still.

Just having completed a year long staff course, the topic of manoeuvre and attrition was forefront throughout. Manoeuvre is NOT the rapid deployment of forces towards an enemy weakness, all Blitzkriegy and sneaky. Attrition is NOT the opening of the Somme and 6000 dead in about 25 minutes. The labels "Attritionist and Manoeuvrist" are in fact terrible as they conjure up the above images. Manoeuvre is a methodology. A way of doing business. It is actually quite simple but amazingly complex to apply. Manoeuvre doctrine at it's absolute essentials stresses the Commanders "intent" over that of the actual mission, to the point, (everybody pay attention here) that it becomes more important to the actual mission statement itself. Manouvre "empowers" a subordinate to exercise maximum initiative in contributing to the overall success of the plan. This mentality yields a very fast tempo pace of warefare which relies on armour (because it can move quicky) to exploit and "show max initiative", normally aimed at enemy weakness. The applications and implications of that statement are legion so I will move on. Attritionist doctrine, stresses the actual letter of the law rather than the spirit. It focuses on immediate objectives with little or no room for change. "Take the Flag", not why or what if the enemy does "blah", just "TAKE THE FLAG" until I say otherwise. Attritionist doctrine stresses maximum control over your troops towards a central (normally terrain based objective..Vimy Ridge for example). To answer what seems to be a snide post by Mr Cawley (no doubt born out of frustration)...No War has been one by single use of either of these two principals. They are in fact two sides of the same coin and have direct application to any conflict. D-Day was an attrition battle. The sole design of which was to allow "break-in" into Germany where some commanders (Patton most notably and Monty most "not"-notably) employed a manoeuvrist method to the battle across France. Attrition stresses control and maximum planning and is normally used in the break-in battle when "fancy-footwork" will only get you killed. Manoeuvre is used when an attrition battle has been successful and exploitation can be accomplished. Both of these methods may be employed numerous times in any given conflict. As to CM, it is attritionist, period. Sub-commanders are actually strings of code and cannot execute initiative beyond a very narrow scope. Also the entire emphasis is on Flags or terrain objective which may or may not have any real value in term of what the enemy is doing. We may have battles which may have been part of a "manoeuvrist" operation but each battle is an execise in attrition, no matter how fancy someone is with their tanks and Halftracks. Anybody who preaches otherwise has no real understanding of the concept but have jumped on the "buzz-word" band wagon anyway.

Having read the above exchanges may I offer a simple suggestion. Give the player the ability to have more control of targeting. If TacAI can't do something it is in the best interest of gameplay to allow the player to take on that function. Target "Lock": Shoot at that Churchill until it out of LOS, then keep orientated to that direction until I say otherwise. Target Priority: Churchill till out of LOS then target someone else. Could also be incorporated into an SOP style of "priority of engagement". Target "Free": Shoot at whatever your little silicon brain figures it should, based on experience and threat profile. Such a system may go a long way to allowing more control as to what gets fired upon. I think we have to remember that the "computer tank commander" is just that and cannot be expected to react like a person. CM is very good but could use a little tweaking. I also think that the "powers that be" know this and are going to make CM2 all things to all people. In fact I am thinking of starting the "Church of CM2" with the faith that CM2 is in fact the second coming and will bring 1000 yrs of bliss to humanity. It shall cast "Lucifer" aka Bill Gates into the fiery pit of hell were he will roast and be tortured by guys who can actually do more than one push up and be forced to work on his own OS for 1000 yrs....or words to that effect.

Bang on comments by "tss" and "Dorosh". I could go on at great length as to the employment principals of obstacles and the "general" vs "close support" concepts. Regardless, tss has an excellent learning point in that all obstacle must be covered by direct or indirect fire. Another clear example is the Gulf War. If the Iraqis had actually offered resistance along their defensive obstacles the US casualties would have been much higher. The AT ditch embedded in a minefield is my worst nightmare. With modern armoured assets (ploughs, rollers, dozer tanks and Armoured bridges) it still takes around 5 mins to breach an AT ditch in the middle of a minefield. And as everybody here knows 5 min is one hell of a long time under fire. As to CM engineers, yup, what we are seeing are actually Pioneers or trained infantry, semi-permanently attached to a battalion. These guys did the dirty work of blowing wire and holes in bunkers. "Engineers" were centrally controlled and would execute Brigade level obstacle plans. This is changing with the concept of manoeuvre warfare and empowerment of subordinates. Engineers are now cut to Battalions in sufficient numbers to do a hell of a lot more in a shorter planning cycle. Last note on the subject: CM is probably one of the better games in the use of engineer and engineer works. Steel Panthers III also does a pretty good job of modeling the effect of obstacles. I hope CM 2 will improve this by adding the complete spectrum of engineer capability available in the time period.

Ok time for me to wade in. I have spent 12 yrs as a full-time Combat Engineering officer and though I may have limited knowledge of WWII employment of the "sapper" I think I can shed some light on the ensuing argument. For the purposes of CM engineers are employed in to distinct roles. Defensive: Defensive works are completed prior to engagement with the enemy. WWII did not have SCAT Mines of FASCAM which could actually influence the defensive battle so wire, minefields, bridges etc would be prep prior to the actual contact with the enemy. CM has been rather gamey (my only criticism of the game by the way) on the actual effectiveness of these works. Minefields were/are normally 400m in depth and can be several kms long, with AP rows mixed in. The AT ditch, which is a real "show stopper", is not even modeled. These effects were no doubt "toned down" to enhance game play but they are unrealistic. In the defensive battle one could see bridge demolition but in the scope of CM it would probably, be an entire battle on it's own, not a tactical device. Next the offence. Engineers are critical in the offensive role. They remove enemy obstacles by breaching. Breaching can be by hand (very slow and costly) or by explosive means (bangalore, line charges, satchel etc). The breaching of buildings or "mouse-hole breaching" is the act of engineers placing a satchel charge on a safe wall and blowing a hole for the infantry to enter and clear. The charge not only provides an opening but also tends to neutralize anybody inside the building in the vicinity, much the same for pillboxes. Breaching of barbwire and roadblocks is very "do-able" and is in fact part of the "mobility support". Second-to-last and not really included in CM is general support. Fortifications are an example. Hull-down positions and extensive trenches/CP hardening are not in the game but should be, for a price. Last, we can see small pieces of it but Armoured Engineering has also been left out. Breaching Tanks, flails, rollers (WWII?) which provide a high-speed and protected method to deal with these problems would also add to the game.