The_Capt

Wow, what a crazy weekend! So I figure I might be able to add to the discussion on the whole state of things, people normally have to pay for this but I like you guys so much you can have it gratis. We are currently in a human social singularity and have been since the beginning of the pandemic. Historians may very well point out that 1991 to 2022 was one big singularity. By that I mean the coin is literally in the air and there is no real way to tell how it will land. So here we are all spinning in a massive uncertainty and trying to cling onto certainty, very human. The best we can honestly do right now is enhance our strategic agility and collective resilience because no one really knows how this thing will unfold (trust me). Predictive assessment and projections are about as accurate as throwing dice in these situations so I really encourage everyone to avoid getting to attached to any one version of reality. So that all said, here is what we can say: War, all war, is a human social activity that is defined by a collision of certainties. It is a theory with primary components of: a version of reality, communication, negotiation and sacrifice, all laid overtop a foundation of culture/identity and power. Right now this is a three way war (at least): Russia, Ukraine and the West (for want of a better word). I include the West not only for the material and volunteer fighters but the incredible amount of information warfare being waged all pretty much in the direction of Russia. Further the West also has a vision of reality and certainty stake in all this. So what? Well the versions of reality by all parties is pretty clear by now, Russia's is a still a little vague but it is hard not to see an overall aim here. Communication is literally happening live on YouTube and Twitter in all its forms. Negotiation is ongoing in so many dimensions it would be impossible to see them all. Sacrifice, which is more than the obvious tragedy of loss of life it is what each side is willing to lose in order to win, is largely unknown outside of some really big rocks (e.g. The west is not willing to sacrifice New York for Kyiv). This war is definitely existential for Ukraine, maybe for Russian and very impactful for the western based view of the world order. In summary this system is still in collision and it is almost impossible to tell where it will land; if you want to know how a war ends, you have to fight it first. So what can we tell so far? Well for that I take a look at the deeper power frameworks: If we take Power as Will, Strength, Relationships and Opportunity (there are other models but this one works): - Opportunity. The options spaces for a short sharp war, which probably served Russian ends, is pretty much closed. And here I mean for all sides. Ukraine has dug in and I am not sure they would listen at a local level if the Ukrainian government begged them to put down arms. Russian military operations have not gone according to plan. There is too much evidence of stalls, logistical screw ups and frankly disturbing losses (mins/dis information caveats accepted - some of this equipment being towed by Ukrainian tractors are Div level assets). The Russian quick definitive war options spaces have likely collapsed unless they are willing to escalate to the WMD level. The West has swung the other way, dramatically. Soft support and kinda weak signals have been galvanized in a manner I find shocking to be honest. This, and the fourth party in this fight, the people of the global community, is also something I am not sure anyone was ready for. So what? Opportunity-wise Russia is facing one of two spheres of options: negotiate a "just enough win" or dig in for a long hard grind. Ukraine is looking to "just lose enough" or pretty much "hey Russia go f#ck yourself" and wage a hybrid war for the history books (we are talking Iberian Peninsula "war to the knife" type stuff). There have been zero signs of regional Ukrainian splits beyond the Donbas (and even there), so while Balkanization is likely on the table there is a lot of space between initial bargaining positions. - Relationships. This could not have gone better for Ukraine if they actually sat down and workshopped it as a movie script. Russia is isolated and villainized to a point I am not sure even the most optimistic western planner could hope for. China and India are basically staying out of this as far as I can see, while Russia's allies are Belarus and...? I mean if its true, the freakin Chechens (modern day Cossacks) said "no thank you". Only the most delusional Russophile could describe this as anything but a total relationship disaster for Russia and enormous victory for Ukraine, at least so far. - Strength. Well this is a deep rabbit hole but I am pretty sure most experts will (and are) saying that Russia still has an enormous military advantage (even subtracting the nuclear equation). Their economy is crashing a lot faster than many thought so unless those "military contractors" on the Russian side are being paid in USD, it is going to hurt eventually. But Russia is a big machine that will take a long time to choke out economically - at least that is the theory, I am beginning to wonder. So if this turns into a long grinding war we will likely see urban sieges (wow that takes me back) and a brutal insurgency that is really not good for anyone. Russians will bleed, heavily and Ukraine will take decades to recover. In the end, neither side is showing an inability to muster and project military power, at least for now. - Will, the church of warfare, and it definitely applies here. Whose will break first? Not the West, our stakes are much lower and we are pretty much all in for the little guy, plus we are not hurting. Putin really has only one option space wrt to western Will and that is nuclear war; however, he will likely suffer a 9mm headache if he tries to go that far. Ukrainian Will, well one can only go on online video and open source here but it seems pretty clear that Ukrainian will to fight has escalated in the last 5 days, not diminished. Compare the Ukraine to the Afghan National Army vs Taliban last Aug if one wants a stark contrast of the concept of Will. Russia, hoo buddy, lets sit down and have a conversation. So things have definitely not gone according to any sane plan. The Ukrainians are really pissed off and are digging in hard, they own the ground and are being supplied by the best the west can give them and that cheque is pretty close to blank. So, how bad do you really want the Ukraine? I mean really want it? This is making that little misadventure to Afghanistan back in 79 look pretty benign. You can probably "win" this militarily but it may very well break your nation trying to do it. Russian Will is right now the center of gravity for this whole thing and time is not on its side. I am not sure the Russian people have the stomach for a months long siege of Kyiv (In 16-17, it took 115k Iraqis with western support and all the airspace 9 months to take Mosul from about 12k ISIL fighters), so what does next Christmas look like for Russians, cause I suspect Ukrainians are already planning for it. Anyway, just keep watching but I do recommend that we take mental health breaks too because this is still got room to be one crazy ride. Oh and remember while you are at it that there are those, even on this forum, who cannot take mental health breaks, this is not theoretical for them so try and keep that in mind too.

I am not saying @Haiduk is an impartial source (and seriously who could blame him) but he called this a couple hours ago.

My guess too, someone may try and spin as a tac nuke but there was a primary and then big secondary.

That is literally the craziest thing I have seen yet.

Oh man Steve, you are not a young man anymore and we kinda want to keep this gaming thing going for at least awhile yet.

I think the term we are searching for is "progressive unreality" and it happened to the US in '03 as well. It is where the logic gets somewhat narrowed by a set of more and more unrealistic assumptions that look realistic from inside the chamber. Clearly Vlad and the gang were looking for shock and awe that would paralyze the Ukrainian will to fight. They likely built a house of cards assumptions/logic along the way that made very tenuous connections between A, B and C but once you are "inside the bubble" they become perfectly logical. The problem is that there is no robustness to the system and if things do not go exactly as planned...well...bad. I also smell hubris here, likely a belief that the Ukrainians would not or could not actually resist because they are "less than us". This all becomes a "good idea to show the world we still got game" built on some really shaky echo chamber logic. It is still early days but if you do not want the locals to really get a head of steam you need to convince them quickly that resistance is totally useless or will not be needed, Russia has accomplished neither. The fact that we can even see Ukrainian strikes, empty Russian vehicles and Russian POWs is a very bad sign that this whole thing has gone sideways from a Russian point of view. More to the point, Russia is not controlling the narrative here, Ukraine is. In simpler terms, Russian option space is shrinking (as demonstrated by nuclear sabre rattling), while Ukrainian option space still wide open and when you are invading another country that is about as bad as it gets. This ain't over yet but the Russians need a big win and to put it out loud and proud or at best this is going to be a very long slog for them. The bigger picture is that the world order likely shifted in the last week and we are likely into some sort of weird Second Cold War that has in reality been building for years.

So it is about 11 pm in Kyiv so let's summarize day 3 of this nasty bit of business. If I miss anything feel free to jump in. [aside: people will recall when Iran shot down that Ukrainian airliner (just weird) how a bunch of internet nerds figured out where the shooter were before western intel did, well this little thread is doing one bang up job of intel analysis so I wanna try and capture that]. Caveat - this assessment is based on unclassified open source intelligence, much of it unverified or unverifiable at this time. Strategic Level: While the strategic causes of this military action by Russia remain vague and unconfirmed (i.e. I still have not seen a reason "why now" beyond "why not"), the overall most likely strategic objective is the total defeat of Ukraine as a nation, followed by installation of a puppet regime as a demonstration to NATO and western powers of Russian power in the region. The overall Russian strategy in this action was to overwhelm the Ukrainian forces quickly with a knockout blow aimed at Kyiv designed to break the will of Ukrainian resistance. It appears that this objective was in a 48-72 hour window, other strategic objectives are largely unknow at this time (?). One of the biggest strategic unknowns at this time is the overall will of the Russian people to continue to prosecute this war, current Russian leadership likely remain fully committed and short of a regime change will not likely voluntarily pull out. Over the last 72 hours Europe and the West appear to have solidified their stance on this war with respect to increasing sanctions and military support to the Ukraine. China and India remain two global powers who have not engaged in punitive measures against Russia, nor have they provided direct support to Ukraine. Another unknown at this time is whether Turkey will close the Black Sea to additional Russian maritime forces. It is clear that outside Russia, at least, Russia has not managed to control the strategic narrative for this war nor have dis/mis information campaigns been effective widening divisions in Western responses. In fact the opposite appear to be true as this action has created unity in NATO and the European community, at least in the short term. Operational Level: - As of 72 hours into the war there is evidence that Russia has not achieved air superiority, information/cyber superiority, decision superiority or effectively eroded the Ukrainian infrastructure (military or civilian) or power centers of gravity at the operational or tactical level. Russian advances on a multi-pronged assault have made modest gains however it appears that some lines of advance may have stalled. - Russian casualties are likely high (again very hard to get specifics) or at least higher than expected. - There are indications that Russian logistical systems have failed in some locations, whether this is an indicator of isolated issues or a broader issue remains unknown. Evidence of fuel shortages has been presented suggesting disruption in operational LOCs - Russian forces are currently of questionable quality along some axis of advance at least based on captured POWs. Further based on largely anecdotal evidence, it appears that Russia has not employed a form of Mission Command, nor really provided any detailed SA to some Russian tactical units (again based on POW interviews). - Latest reports are that heavy concentrations of artillery are forming one the outskirts of Kyiv, which could signal a shift in strategy from a "knock out maneuver" toward a more "shock and awe" approach, or the Russians have essentially opted for an attritional approach to Kyiv at least. - Ukrainian forces have demonstrated a level of lethality and coordination beyond expectations of open source analysts and likely Russian planners. How much of this is do to outside support and how much is due to Russian setback remains unclear. Tactical: - Ukrainian forces have broadcast examples of both ambush and deep strike, the role of specific military capability remains vague. The effectiveness next gen ATGM systems and MANPADs remains unknown but reported high armored vehicle casualties indicate they have been effective. Overall Summary: As of the first 72 hours of the war, it appears that the Russian military has overestimated its own capabilities and/or the capabilities of Ukrainian resistance and has not likely met the timelines it had set during pre-war planning. The assessment is that the next 24-48 hours will be critical in the outcome of this war and if Russian forces are not about to take Kyiv and inflict some serious damage to the Ukrainian people's will, their own strategic center of gravity will become more vulnerable. Did I miss anything? Seriously, jump in.

Hey I get tactical context but that weapon system is normally in a DAG - probably pushed down to a lower level in this one no doubt. One does not simply drop ones MLRS, by my count 3 systems with 120 tubes can do a good job of suppressing a grid square, this would be a equivalent of a BTG dropping its rifle. Sure conditions exist where you would but none of them are very good. You are either out of gas, out of ammo or the enemy have overrun your rear area to name a few. More precisely - What would drive a commander to drop those weapon systems?

Oh, I am not so sure, the generals have all the guns. The "spirited resistance of Kyiv" is making mainstream news now [I am noticing that mainstream news is about 6-12 hours behind the live feeds]. We will know this is really over when the NATO has to get assurances that Ukraine will not counter-attack into Russia. Of course a completely upside down Russia is not great either.

That is a good point, incompetency does not a principle make. I am wondering about those Ukrainian UAVs. We could not keep air superiority below 2000 feet in Iraq and I am wondering what it looks like over there now.

Hell I am talking about Twitter! Come on, invasion 101 guys, cut the power, cut off communications and bring lots of gas, then be ready to stay for awhile.

Which will be really fun when they get to Western Ukraine and a 150 x 250 km belt of Carpathian mountains along borders of NATO nations. Seriously, who thought this was a good idea? Did they workshop this at all?

I guess it was next to "gas" on the note on the fridge. In Crimea, Russia had hacked the cell phone system to a frankly stunning degree, I guess they figured "meh" on this one?

Unless increased lethality is pushing that ratio outward. I am also starting to wonder about the metrics of air superiority.

Add to this the fact that we really are not talking really long LOCs yet. Based on the open source maps I can only see about 100km of penetration. In order to take central Ukraine you are talking 3-4 times that distance in what seems to be pretty hostile territory. I am honestly starting to think that the whole Russian plan was a 48-72 push to Kyiv, take capital and the Ukrainians surrender. Tactical formations all carry about 3-4 DOS after that operational level needs to be clicking and at least in these isolated cases it appear to not be. Now the Russians may be doubling down on success letting the "weak and failed" go without but that is high risk, if for the only reason the whole world is watching Russian units caught with their pants down. Speaking of which, how/why does Ukraine still have internet and phone?

I suspect you are right on this one. If so this is hubris and just bad military planning. 1st wave is find and fix, 2nd is finish, 3rd is exploit...that was Soviet doctrine. I am starting to wonder if our standard force ratio calcs are in need of a re-look. I think the character of this war will be decided by Mon morning. The Russian blitzkrieg is definitely starting to look less likely but day ain't over yet. So we could be talking slow grinding grudge match, if so that is not in Russian favour at all.

Wow, well that seems to hint at the whole "will they resist for the long haul" pretty well.

You assume it will be over in 48 hours? CM has taught us all that any combat scenario is going to be ten times harder than we assume.

I am all about verify, verify and verify especially in the middle of a war, but this is really weird if true. In western doctrine finding and killing these things was near the top of the target list. To have an HVT like this "run out of gas and be abandoned" points to an unraveling of Russian logistics (and morale) at least on this road.

So this is interesting and in the spirit of the thread I am not going to make this personal. Instead I think we have a fundamental failure to understand different perspectives. I have no doubt at all we in the west do not fully understand the Russian/Putin perspective, hence why I think we are having such a reaction to all this, but this appears to cut both ways. So, why this is very unreasonable: - First, any western politician who accepts these terms will have a Neville Chamberlain meme tattooed to their forehead right until the next election cycle, so there is that. - Next, the "rules" say that the only international body that can make dictates to a nation or group of nations is the UN itself via the UNSC...and it just got shot in the head (again) by a veto carrying nation. - Further, the "rules" then state that the only nations that can or cannot "allow the US" or anyone else for that matter to exercise anywhere are the recognized sovereign nations that control those territories. A third party nation, like Russia cannot dictate it for them, that is a violation of a state. Same goes for "allowing" 15 nations to still support Ukraine - except the US and three "others" - again the only nation that can legally determine that is the Ukraine itself. To even suggest this as a starting point is in effect negotiating how much sovereignty Russia can violate, which is "none" under the current international system. This is akin to breaking into someone's house and negotiating what you can steal as "reasonable negotiation", - But but, the US in Iraq. I know this will come up and it definitely has some baggage; however, Iraq was a known and sanctioned rogue state that even though the global order did not like the US move, could live with it because the angels were not really on Saddam's side. Russian cannot apply the same calculus here as neither the Ukraine or Baltic states are doing anything except exercising their own sovereignty in a manner that Russia does not agree with. - Again on the US. In '03 Canada said "nope, not in big guy" on the whole Iraq thing. If you want a parallel between Russian and Ukraine, US and Canada is not a bad one (we even had a war way back). Canada is in a lot of ways a satellite state to the US, so when we said "no", well there were a lot of hurt feelings and nasty rhetoric but we did not see ("or else") threats of military force if we did not support. So what? Russian actions before, during and no doubt after this whole thing are nowhere near accepted norms baseline and from that position this was always going to be a non-starter

Most of the open source analysts seem to agree that the capital would fall this weekend and the whole conventional thing would end shortly after that. I am not sure, and could not say even if I did what the J2 guys are seeing. I am still wondering if Russian has a card (that does not involve WMDs) left to play but sluggish and messy is what I put on what I have seen so far. If the Russians are still slugging it out on the outskirts of Kyiv by say Mon then I do not think this has gone to plan.

You wanna make sanctions stick for a generation (see Iraq and Syria) keep going down this road. Further if the Russian public were unsteady before, gassing civilians really does not do much to reassure.

We gotta be careful with info sources but 1) this poster sounds like he knows what he is talking about, I would guess professional military background and 2) a lot of this resonates. This whole thing is starting to feel sluggish on the Russian side and the steady stream of really expensive equipment losses are adding up (even if half of them are errors).

So this does not sound like Russian air superiority or at least not total. Even if this was an artillery strike it likely had airborne ISR to be this accurate. Tanks and infantry stuff is supposed to get “got”. Even arty, but engineers and logistics are not.

I don’t want to lose this one. Ok, so this is important. Beyond the fact that there are some violations of laws of armed conflict here with uniform switching and use of non-military but this whole thing is violation of laws of armed conflict so there’s that. This is hybrid warfare. I do recall reading that the Soviets had planned to use this approach as a deep battle tactic but not on the frontline. This is tactical level hybrid subversive/infiltration on a significant scale.