PzKpfw 1

The Soviets in the Berlin fighting reported recieving Panzerfaust fire from 2nd story rooms, balconies, roofs, basement windows etc. In the house to house fighting in Berlin, German troops were fireing PF down stairwells into to doorways, Basements, hallways, & into rooms Soviet troops entered, PF were fired in the extensive, & bloody battles in the sewers under Berlin etc. Lets just say the Soviet troops must have been very happy when the Panzerfaust stocks finlay ran dry in Berlin. Regards, John Waters

in live test fireing vs Panther tanks conducted @ insigny, & Balleroy in 1944 the US/UK determined that 76mm T4 HVAP & 17lb APCBC were the 2 best rounds vs the PzKpfw V ie,: 17lb APDS was ruled out because it was to innacurate ie,: Lorrin Birds research on 17lb APDS provided the following.: Regards, John Waters

90% armor quality on the T-34-85 seems rather optimistic IMHO. ie, reports on T-34-85 examples in 44/45 found poor or incomplete welding, with visible gaps throught the joints of some of the models exhaimed. This was attributed to poor QC or an effeort to increase production. Post war US examination of T-34-85s found in Berlin, showed the 45mm plate greately varied in impact resistance from 4 to 14ft/lbs Charpy notch impact resistance. Also anylss of T-34-85 armor showed it contained no nickel, Vanadium, or Molybdenium, & about 50% less Chrome then german plate. Compared to a German report dated June 1942 on the T-34-76 that showed armor composition as: C, .22 to .25 Mn, 1.30-1.50 Si, 1.35-1.45 Cr, .80-.90 Mo, .15-.25 V, 0.0 Ni, 1.30-1.50 Basicly it apperars Soviet armor production was suffering from the same problems as late war German production. I'd say an 85% quality rateing would apply to Soviet armor as well. An report on the* Panther glacis, reported that the inferior toughness was attributed to" a combination of incomplete transformation to martensite upon quenching and temper embrittlement". The plate was quenched incompletely, or too slowly, which would leave the center of the plate not sufficiently quenched (transformed to martensite), although the outer sections would be completely quenched to martensite. & that the armor may have been tempered in the temperature zone which leads to embrittlement (400-1000degF). This would degrade the quality of the steel in both "good" and "bad" sections, leading to overall poor quality due to brittleness. The Panther glacis was of adequate hardness, but inadequate toughness, throughout the cross-section. A zone at the center of the section was even more brittle than the outer zones. Basicly from the report one could say the entire plate was flawed, with an seriously flawed layer at the center. *Data from Robert Livingston. Also i'd add that a Soviet report on the Tiger B armor, stated the Panthers armor they had analyzed at the same time, had superior ballistic protection to the Tiger B they examined. Regards, John Waters

Vanir, sorry about the late reply, my post should have said M61 APCBC, NOT M62. M61 performed better vs face hardened armor & sloped armor then M72 AP. The M72 conversion was to M61 APCBC. Regards, John Waters

Oops that should read 1,750 tanks prior to Zitadelle excludeing PzKpfw V/VI totals. Regards, John Waters

As of 01.07.43 the Germans had 1,397 tanks deployed prior to Zitadelle broken down as*: PzKpfw III 5.cm L/60 - 538 PzKpfw III 5.cm L/42 - 117 PzKpfw III 7.5cm L/24 - 170 PzKpfw IV 7.5cm L/43/48 - 859 PzKpfw IV 7.5cm L/24 - 54 PzKpfw 38t - 12 Total: 1,750 tanks. 1,397 lang 5.cm. 7.5cm & 341 Kurtz 5cm 7.5cm *See Jentz Thomas L. Panzer Truppen vol.2 pp. 78 - 82. Regards, John Waters

Oh c'mon Jason, you stated their were no German heavies, until 43, the plain fact is the Germans had Tigers operateing from Sept 42 on. and it makes no difrence at all to your statement, if their were 12 or 100, or if they showed up the last day of the calendar for 1942. Please show me where i said any of the above. Ahh doesn't this just bring back memories of the good ol evil 'Tiger lobby' conspiracy days, Jason to bad Jeff, Claus, or Lorrin arn't here we could have a meeting. Regards, John Waters

To provide more examples on my previous posts, concerning mixed Tank Tank Brigada, for the failed Soviet offensive at Kharkov in 1942 the main strike force was Pushkin's Tank Group, with 4 Tank Korps, consisting of 4th TC, 13th TC, 23rd TC, & 24th TC. Pushkin's forces had a total of 568 tanks in 12 Brigada broken down by type: T-34-76 - 127 KV - 82 T-60 - 206 T-70 -14 MK III(Valantine) - 30 Stuart, M3 - 76 Grant, M3 - 33 As we see above 40% of the tanks were Lt tanks, the Soviets were forced to use Lt tanks in place of mediums & heavies in the formations as they could not produce enough T-34 & KV to outfit their TC to Shtat levels. Pushkin's Group was encircled and destroyed at Izyum in May 1942. This example highlights Rotmistrovs remarks i used earlier. A Soviet study after Kharkov on problems with mixed brigades described the problem as being that T-34s left the KV-1 & Lt tanks to far behind during operations for them to contribute to the inital breakthru phase & splintering the force. Ie, T-34s entered German anti tank gun defence ranges before the KV-1 could move ahead to breakthru the German defenseive positions. KV's also caused problems in that they often broke thru bridges, which delayed follow up forces from advanceing, it didnt help that Soviet bridgeing material was only rated for 30 tons, so special bridgeing had to be made for the KV that wasnt usualy available in operations till later. Same with the Lt tanks they to were left behind & could not contribute in time to the initial phase. Also poor coordination & tactics were cited as well as lack of radios. Ie, the solution was to let the KV advance, breakthru the German inital German defensive line then send in the T-34 & Lt tanks to exploit it. These experiences led to the formation of the Soviet Independant Heavy Tank Regiments. Another problem encountered increaseingly in 1942 was the appearence in greater numbers of the PAK 50, with PzGr.40 APCR ammunition or 'arrowhead' as it could penetrate the KV-1 armor. As well as the introduction of the PAK 40. Prior to this the KV had earned the nick name 'white mammoth' with its crews, when single KVs were able to sit outside German defensive positions with impunity & fire away on those positions, after the appearence of the PAK 40/50 this was no longer practicle. Regards, John Waters

Jason, Tiger were operateing on the Eastren front in 1942 ie, s.H.Pz.Abt.502(511), their first loss of a Tiger in combat was 25.11.42 To state their were no heavies on the Eastren front till 1943, is rather misleading. Regards, John Waters

3/s.H.Pz.Pz.Abt 506 reported the loss of 1, Tiger II on 24.09.44 to an "PIAT", operateing with Kg. Spindler SE of Osterbeek. regards, John Waters

Jason i'm not saying it does per sey, what i am getting at with workhorse is the T-34 did not achieve what the Soviets refered to as "strategic mobility" prior to late 1943. Ie, a point Rotmistrov makes concerning this subject about mixed Tank Brigades, the KV-, T-60/70 could not keep up with T-34-76 in operations, so T-34s left their componet light tank elements in the dust, which made the attacks less cordinated & with less firepower etc. & their was no fix for this until such time as T-34s were available in sufficent numbers, to outfit all TB'S With T-34 & remove the light tank componets. Until then the mixed brigades hindered Soviet mobile operations, to an extent, yes they were successful despite of this, but not soley because of the T-34. And to comment on your earlier post, their were not 8,000 T-34 in inventory on 31.12.42 their was only 7,600 T-34, M3 Grant in inventory faceing the Germans as of January 1943. at the most 5,953 T-34s survived 1942. Agreed,but i'm not sure for the same reasons, the Soviets continued to use Light tanks out of neccessity they had no choice, their were not enough T-34 available to soley equip all tank brigades till late 43. & here is where the full production finaly kicks in as 61% of all T-34 on hand, & produced were lost in 1943. & here is where we disagree, in opinion to me i see the transition occur in Bagration & after this to me was the T-34s strategic mobility realised. I dont agree that the Soviets had superior quality in November 42, the T-34 was not the dominant tank, their were more T-60/T-70 in the Tank Corps tank Brigades then T-34. T-34s worked with light tanks used as medium tanks a role they were forced into by neccessity. & one can not dismiss the contribution of the light tanks to Soviet successes. Nor can one atribute operational succecess soley to tanks their was a combined arms componet as well. Also one cannot dissmiss STAVKA planning & logistics effects on operations. Ie, Uranus was carefully planned & executed & unlike previous Soviet operation to date it worked because they struck the weakest link in the German defences, the satalite forces, and the Germans had no mobile reserves to use to halt it. Also to use November 1942 as an example of superiority one cannot dismiss the defeat that occured in Zhukovs oft forgotten Operation Mars, which was as important as Uranus,& more in some ways, where unlike Uranus, the Germans had mobile reserves that smashed Zhukovs forces, despite the initial commitment of 668,000 men, & 2000 tanks to the main assault. Mars losses were 100,000 KIA/MIA with 235,000 WIA, as well as the loss of 1,600 tanks. Mars stands as one of the worst Soviet operational defeats of the war in terms of cost in men & material, at a time of suposed Soviet force superiority. And one cant pretend or wish MARs away as the Soviets tried to do. Regards, John Waters

From January 1, 1942 - December 31, 1942, the Soviets lost 15,000 tanks broken down as, 1,200 Heavy tanks, 6,600 T-34, 7,200 Lt. tanks 42.13% of the tanks on hand & produced in this time period are lost. You continue to ignore actual Tank Corps & Brigade composition & returns show their were more light tanks then either T-34 or KV in front line combat formations. Im not disputeing that the T-34 or KV or they wern't superior to German tanks etc, you threw that in for some reason. I'm also not discussing strategic initiative, nor the merits of the increase in the medium or heavy tank % etc. Nor am i being rude or sarcastic. And please point me to where i claimed they "had only light tanks'. This comment alone begs the question, have you even read any of my posts?. My point is/was that was apperently lost on you, that the T-34 did not become the workhorse it did till late 1943 Ie, the dominant tank numericly & to the point all TC Tank Brigades were outfitted entirely with T-34s, or the fleets ppl refer to. The Soviets despite production increase could not in 1942 outfit their entire force with T-34 nor could they until late 1943 due to losses, Ie, the German drive to Stalingrad left a wake of destroyed Tank Corps that for the most part had to retreat on foot & be rebuilt completely which ate production as well. The lt tanks were used in great numbers to make up for the lack of T-34s in the Tank Corps. After Dec 43 the Lt tanks begin to dissapear from the Tank & Mech Corps replaced by the T-34 & relegated to training establishments as of 01.01.45 their were still 5700 lt tanks in inventory in the training regts. This is why if you look at Stalingrad you see a Tank Corps during Uranus ie, 1st Tank corps had 96 T-34, 63 T-70 4th TC had 21-23 KV, 60 T-34, 30 MK II, & 60 T-60. 7th TC had 20 KV, 46 T-34, 30 T-70, 69 T-60 & these were TC specialy built up to relive Stalingrad. Yes some Tank Corps did achive the July 1942 Shtat levels Ie, the 17th Tank Corps, 3 Tank Brigades had their allotted 32 T-34, & 21 T-70 per brigade. But this was an exception compared to other TC tank type & numbers. Either i'm not being clear enough here, for you to understand, the pupose of my posts, or you just dont want to, or you want to arue for arguements sake, either way i'm here all week . Regards, John Waters

Where did you get the Germans started Barbarossa with 3,300 tanks?. As of June 22 1941 the Germans had 5,264* tanks faceing east: PzKpfw Bef. - 330 PzKpfw 1 - 877 PzKpfw II - 1,074 PzKpfw III 1,440: 350 3,7cm, 1,090 5cm PzKpfw IV - 517 PzKpfw 35t - 187 PzKpfw 38t - 754 Flammpanzer - 85 if we exclude the 877 PzKpfw 1, & PzKpfw 35t not assigned to combat units, that still leaves 4,200 German tanks & 377 AG's vs 15,000** Soviet tanks in the Westren Military Districts. *See: Jentz Thomas L. Panzer Truppen. vol 1. p.186. **See: Dunn Walter S. Hitler's Nemesis. p.117. Regards, John Waters

Correction on T-34 tank losses 1942 total T-34 irreversible losses was 6,600 T-34-76 Regards, John Waters

Thx for the M36 numbers John. Regards, John Waters