Tero

>the website Tero is quoting was not written >by me and is not my website, and is not my >control in any way. How could I know that ? Your remark Yep, I wrote that almost a year and a half ago from a copy of Jentz that credited it with gyros (I was wrong of course)..... BTW-- what is your point of posting a quote from an ancient commentary I wrote about it? burned to my retina. And the website I found it word for word when fishing for data on firing on the move and other related stuff is after all named slapdragon.org.

>Interesting. What does 'on hand' mean? >Vehicles in workshops/replacement units >included or not. They are included in the figure. Even vehicles in England are in it. The losses are write offs. The number of KO'd vehicles is bound to be greater than the number presented here. >Also, this shows that your earlier analysis >was misleading. The average is meaningless >in this case since in fact the vehicle >number was built up considerably over 9 >months. It is more misleading if you start count the percentages using the cumulative amount of vehicles, 2 140. With it the total loss percentage is "only" 5,61. Only, there were never 2 140 M18's present in ETO at any given point in time. Aren't statistics wonderful ? It is actually more complex than that. How many of the vehicles listed were in the UK in replacement depots and thus inherently out of the circulation when it comes to the average number of vehicles available for combat ? How many were Cat 1-3 repairs and how did that affect the number of serviceable vehicles ready for action ? The average I used was the easiest to pick. A bit provocative I admit but not totally uncalled for IMO, given the variables present. >Compare it to numbers of M10 or M36 to get a >better indication of usefulness. OK. Here are more monthly figures from the same source M10 691..... 1 743..... 17 758..... 28 763..... 40 486..... 71 573..... 45 790..... 62 768..... 69 686..... 106 M36 0....... 0 0....... 0 0....... 0 0....... 0 170..... 2 183..... 5 236..... 21 365..... 26 826..... 18 >I would venture a guess based on this that >someone somewhere must have thought they >were useful weapons. Better than the M4 Here are the monthly figures for M4 2202.... 167 2093.... 121 2557.... 557 2423.... 436 2464.... 237 2832.... 257 4076.... 495 4561.... 585 0....... 0 The zeros for M4 denote the data was not available at the time I received the data. Enjoy. [ 08-09-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

>As for Tero's numbers -- oddly enough his >numbers seem a bit strange, since 3rd Army >alone under Patton had 150 M18s in 3 >Battalions not counting replacements. I >would say, without reading his source, that >it is not accurate. The person you should contact is Rich Anderson The Dupuy Institute He sent me a list I am using as a source "The source is the USETO/USFET/COMM-Z Armored Fighting Vehicle and Weapons Decimel Correspondence Files." "Monthly ETO Loss Reports of AFV's by Type" "Type of Vehicle" "M18 76mm SP Tank Destroyers" ........................On Hand..Losses 6-20 Jun 44.............146......0 20 Jun-20 Jul 44........141......0 20 Jul-20 Aug 44........176......6 20 Aug-20 Sep 44........170......6 20 Sep-20 Oct 44........189......14 20 Oct-20 Nov 44........252......7 20 Nov-20 Dec 44........306......44 20 Dec 44-20 Jan 45.....312......27 20 Jan-20 Feb 44........448......16 You better recheck your source on the total number of M18's in the ETO. And I do not mean the grand total when you count together all the monthly figures. I mean the number of actual vehicles in the entire ETO area of operations.

Originally posted by opfor6: The fact they had to design a vehicle like the M18 shows there was a problem with other vehicles being able to cope with firing accurately on the move against enemy AT defenses and AFVs. Nope. The "problem" was doctrinal axiom that the tank is an infantry support weapon which is not supposed to go against the enemy armour in the battlefield. That is why they established the TD command and that is why they constructed specialist TD vehicles. One reason for the failure of the TD doctrine was found at: http://www.google.com/search?q=cache :-orFAgcR96DM:www-cgsc.army.mil/csi/MMAS/1976%2520MMAS.htm+%22tank+destroyer+doctrine%22&hl=en omit the - between : and o when accessing. I had to include that because otherwise the it will come up as A technological threat from heavy German tanks caused development efforts in the United States to incorporate bigger guns. The US Army’s failure to properly assess the magnitude of the threat resulted in a scarcity of adequate antitank weapons in Northwest Europe. When the ideal tank destroyer, the M-18 “Hellcat,” finally reached Europe; it proved to be undergunned. The study concludes that the development of equipment is not strictly a technological process. Doctrine and combat experience alter the path of development. Personalities and the pressure of war accentuate different views and also effect development. Technology dictates the speed of creating new equipment demanded by doctrine and combat experience. another interesting remark: From http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Congress/1418/armor4.htm American Tank Destroyer doctrine was as faulty in its own way as was American tank doctrine. Relying on their superior mobility, tank destroyers were to actively engage in seeking out and destroy enemy tanks6. The vehicles were simply too thin-skinned for this type of active role and unit commanders began to improvise. By the end of 1944, tank destroyers were unofficially emulating German tactics: scurry out in front of the tanks, find some good cover, hunker down and wait for the German tanks to appear. This tactical change improved the situation somewhat and tank destroyers began to score some hits before they were knocked out by German return fire. How the fire on the move for CMBB should be modelled should be a more general fix. Not aimed at tinkering with certain vehicles. The new game will have vehicles from several different countries and time periods (early to very late). Only the Soviets used firing on the move as an integral part of their doctrine. Has anyone tried using faster German vehicles on the move? I am curious if the result is just not a Allied slanted item. In my experience German tanks in CM tend to complete their assigned movement orders before they start even turning the turret to engage the target. That is why I try to issue as short movement orders as possible to avoid losing them between waypoints. [ 08-08-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

>....rather than comments I made more than a year ago based on faulty data I think the statement was lifted off your site. http://www.slapdragon.org/midnight/closeup/hellcat/ Apart from the faulty stabilizer data you should revise your site even further: "Most hellcats in Europe had a good 76mm cannon, but a few were equipped with 105mm cannon that fired all HEAT rounds to deal with Tigers and Panthers. " http://battletanks.com/m88_mod_hellcat.htm Modified "Hellcat" mounting a 105mm howitzer on the M18 chassis. Not a successful design. Only one built. >and posted by Lewis to start a flame war. While his post does seem inflammatory I do not see any makings of a flame war in it. It is not flaming if somebody points out YOUR facts are not correct. You are not the only one around with a maliciuous sarcastic streak so learn to live being in the receiving end from occasionally. >I would be happy to reply to comments on that. OK, here goes. >Yep, I wrote that almost a year and a half >ago from a copy of Jentz that credited it >with gyros (I was wrong of course). Based in >part on Evans who claimed on the move hits >and Jentz who credited gyros. Later books >correct this. You should revise your site (opinions even ?) to reflect this. >The M18 is very hard to employ properly on >smaller CM boards. How so ? Adhere to proper, RL US Army TD tactics and doctrine and it should do just fine. If the CM is modelled propely to reflect RL battlefield occurances totally impartially without any biases or undertones. >One hit kills it with most weapons. **** happens. Why do you think they made it lightly armoured and FAST in the first place ? All the sources I have read on it state plainly that it was a consciencious design decision brought on by prevailing US Army-specific doctrinal thinking on tank destroyers. >German tanks can take it easy if you use it >the way it was used in WW2. What do you mean ? Shoot and scoot was the doctrine and tactic it was built for. What makes you think it was NOT easy to take it out IRL ? An average of 50% attrition rate over a period of 9 months (5% average monthly attrition rate) does indicate that it was NOT invulnerable. Another related issue: if they built 2500 specimens and it was so darn good a tank killer why was the number of available M18's in ETO only 237 (monthly average, June 1944 146 on hand, February 20th 1945 448 on hand in the entire ETO inventory) ? Where were the rest of the 1 900-odd (deducting the 120 total losses in ETO) vehicles stashed away ? 800 in MTO, 800 in PTO and 300 back home being used in training ? Production started July 1943 but when did it end ? What are you griping about the M18 being too brittle for ? Most gripes in this tread are due to the fact that that darn M18 (any Allied tank really) can hit (and kill) with the first shot while going Fast over uneven terrain while the German tanks sitting still usually miss with the first shot and get killed. If they even get that one shot off before getting snuffed. >It has to be very close to make moving hits, In my experience it can hit any target it comes up against at 500+ meters while moving. In CM that is.

>No...but I'm not sure that's an accurate >analogy. For one thing, I was driving; for >another, I'm not a trained CD changer. I have tried it a few times in my youth (OK, I was not driving and I was drunk in most cases ) and to focus on a task that requires precision in a bouncing vehicle is not really easy, espcially if your friends are yelling at you to hurry up. >No, the point is that you can have a slow >ROF even when the gun is loaded because you >are unable to line up the gunsight with the >potential target. I know. >I don't think that the presence or absence >of stabilizers has much to do with my >argument, although of course the amount of >time it takes a gunner to lay the gun on a >target might be affected by the presence of >a stabilizer, or by the fact that the >gunner can use his shoulder as a >stabilizer. In either case, the ROF would >still be lower than for a stationary tank. True. But I think both the accuracy and the ROF are important issues here. >Why indeed. As the commander who gave the >order to charge across the field. :c Bouncing overwatch is out of the question ? Or is the procedure only to be used in a dire emergency ? >Where do you get from that that the hit >chance increases when you fire on the move? No comparative figure was represented on firing from a stationary platform but judging from the CM modelling it seems that way. >The 50% number I got from the post upthread >on british accuracy while shooting on the >move; the number should be whatever is >historically accurate and could be much >lower. The number presented is historically accurate for British tanks with 2prd guns in free swing mounts but NOT for tanks with mechanical stabilizer and geared gun laying handwheels. I do not recall if the early British tanks had geared gun laying handwheels on the side, I think they did not have them. And the 50% hit chance is universal for every shot: you either hit or you don't. >The accuracy of shooting from a stationary >tank at a range of 300 m is almost 100%, >even for a first shot. Not in CM it is not. Or I have been constantly and consistently unlucky with the first shot hits. It seems that even if the MISS chance is 3% that is what the CM game engine picks that over the 97% hit chance for unstabilized non-moved guns. The chances I have seen the most revolve around the 14-17% mark. >Umm, they did train tank gunners to do >this. In the WHOLE wide world. >Then they later told them not to fire on >the move. My theory why this was a bad idea >is that it was due not just to (1) reduced >accuracy, but also due to slower ROF due to >the difficulty of reloading *and* laying >the gun. Concur. >I mean this doctrine should apply for >british tankers in '42, of course; not that >it should apply in CMBO because british >tankers did it in '42. So, is the use of the data based on the '42 test correct and called for in your opinion ? >Down, boy! Down! I'm collecting data to support my views on this matter on the side and this tread has proved to be a real treasure chest for me. All sorts of force specific tactical and doctrinal facts are being thrown around. As I said it was a cheap hobby horse shot and I will cease and desist forthwith along this line until further notice. [ 08-07-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

>Mind you, the Germans discussed here did >not use shoulder stabilised pea-shooters, >but Real Guns , 88mm etc. I'd like to see the speeds they recommended be used: crawling backwards or charging ahead at full speed. >Furthermore, we know that it was Soviet SOP >to fire on the move. Yes. But they never even expected to hit anything, just scare the shait out of the troops in the receiving end. >So, this to me conclusively proves that >somebody somewhere at sometime decided >shooting on the move was a good idea. The >German quote and WO whatsit also indicate >that sometimes, people did even hit >somefink. Can we agree on this? Firing on the move ? I think so, yes. Hitting something with that fire... dunno. I think that is too much dependant on the prevailing circumstances to be bracketed down for a great sweeping generalization. >If so, discussions on whether this was a >stupid doctrine (it probably was) are >rather irrelevant, and musing whether all >those tanks lost pre-Alamein were lost >because of shooting on the move are equally >important in the context, i.e. not at all. I have a notion DAK tankers were more critical on the British moving diagonally in nice parade ground formations presenting nice broadsides of thin armour to shoot at rather than them firing and missing on the move. And their 50L42's had a greater effective range than the 2prd had IIRC. They could outgun them while the British were presenting posh precision parade ground moves. >What matters is how accurate they were and >how often they fired when on the move. That is at the core of this furball. >The first figure by definition must be >range-dependent and on a range between 0 >and 100%. I'd say the closer you get the more time it will take to line up a shot. The logic being they have to reallign the turret more the closer they get to the target when the the platform gets jolted around. The further the target is the less they have to turn the turret to reaqcuire the target in case the platform gets jolted enough to throw the aim off completely. >The second figure must be between ) and 'a >lot', with 'a lot' presumably being lower >than a stationary tank., and presumably >dependent on turret layout and round size >and weight. >BTW: did the Red Army have M18s?[/QB]

>55mph on the flat, The only place where the terrain is flat and even enough is paved roads. >a 76mm gun with lots of tungsten ammo, Lots of tungsten ? Where from ? The tungsten ammo was heavily rationed and in short supply. The CM design team has given some to ALL units with the 76mm gun regarless of the prevailing TD doctrine. >I have seen M18's going full speed get >picked off in competition play by STUGs who >in real life were easy meat for the M18 - >they could not follow along with their guns >fast enough to get an effective shot In what conditions ? IIRC the Stug has 20º firing arc. Moving diaconally across that 20º arc at combat distance of 500-1000 meters does give the Stug crew plenty of time to follow along and fire at the M18 moving at 55mph. >while the M18 crews, many of which knew how >to use their gyro stabilisers in battle IF they had one. But what they most definitely did NOT have was IR goggles. The Stug was easily concealed in ambush positions that would have given them first shot surprise benefits not modelled properly in CM now. Not to mention smokeless powder in the shells making their fire harder to spot. >(something which the line tank crews often >did not) What is your opinion of the CM modelling of stabilizers again ? >allowed them to fire on the move while >ducking from hiding place to hiding >place. But did they manage to hit anything with consistently the same rate that is now seen in CM ? >With cheesy armour, often called on to >fight in close combat in support of >Infantry, the Hellcat's expected life in >combat is dismal in Combat Mission. It was that IRL too. Between June 6th 1944 and February 20th 1945 the monthly average of M18's in service in ETO was 238 vehicles. Total irrevocable losses during that same period was 120 vehicles. For the M10 the figures are 695 and 439. For the M36 the period is September 20th 1944 and February 20th 1945 and the figures 356 and 72. Comparing to the other prominent CM vehicles: M4's (both 75mm and 76mm armed): Between June 6th 1944 and January 20th 1945 the monthly average was 2901 vehicles and the total losses sustained during that period 2855 vehicles. Light tanks (M3, M5, M24) 2057 monthly average, 1069 total losses. M8 AC 1854 monthly average, 672 total losses M20 AC 711 monthly average, 364 total losses (of which 277 were lost 20 Nov-20 Dec 44) NOTE: all losses listed are irrevocable losses. Combat losses repaired and returned to service are not included. [ 08-07-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by opfor6: The M18 may well have done all that. It was designed to do that. But I am not convinced it was done routinely. Generally speaking to stalk tanks you move fairly slowly trying to find the enemy. Once the engagement starts you may lay on speed. But flying around the battlefield makes it very difficult to see anything. The german Hetzer was very small and hard to spot by Allied AT gunners even when they knew where it was. The crews would be able to worm the vehicle into amazingly inventive positions. These are both examples of deviations from the norm. If the M18 had an extra loader then it should not recieve as much of a reduction in ROF for movement. If the crews trained to fight on the move they should be portrayed as crack or veteran crews to gain a benefit because of that. For the average crews for all nations, at the very least, ROF at fast move should be reduced to simulate the difficulty to locate and lay on target as well as the difficulties in loading the main gun.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Concur. Hear hear. All the appropriate exclamations of agreement. Furthermore: the RL ROF of the M-18 is impressive. But it also based on, lets face it, anecdotal evidence. What is more important, it also implies that their hit accuracy was less than perfect. I mean, shots fired at a ROF of 15-20 shells fired while moving at full speed (more often than not) at a single target. I take it their SOP was to fire the first shot from a concealed position and when it had blown their cover they would haul ass and fill the air with enough lead to make the German tankers at least flinch so they could get into cover before the STATIONARY enemy tank can get a fix on them and blow them away with one well aimed shot. [ 08-07-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

One tip I have found usefull: Turn off the "Hide file extensions for known file types" in View preferences. That way you can visually spot for example any .VBS files that are named .TXT.VBS

Originally posted by Andrew Hedges: (2) the loader can load regardless of whether the gunner is lined up on the target; the gunner can't fire until the gun is loaded. Ever tried changing a C-casette/CD in a car moving at 50mph in a bad road turning sharply left and right and going up and down and you can not look out the window to get a heads up on the bumps and turns ? I know it is not as difficult as a tank going off road at 15mph as the loader has no window . But the shell is a hell of a lot bulkier and heavier. And you do NOT want to fumble the shell head first to the floor. Also (3) the gun might already be loaded as the tank commences its fast move, which would eliminate reloading difficulties as a reason for a slow ROF, but would not mean that there wasn't a slower ROF due to the difficulty of laying the gun. It would also mean that the gunner gets only one shot. ROF does entail firing multiple shots. So for both of these reasons I think that ROF should be (at least potentially) slowed down for tanks on the move. The gunner-induced slower ROF might also explain why the firing-on-the-move accuracy statistics are higher than one would expect -- perhaps a trained gunner could obtain surprising accuracy on the move when he had a semi-clear shot lined up. One thing that must be remembered is the fact that the early British tanks with 2prd and 6prd relied on the gunner to act as the stabilizer. The gun mount was a "free swing" type mount that gave the gunner more direct control over the guns (he used his shoulder to help stabilize and lay the gun) than the latter gun mounts for both the 6prd and the 75mm guns allowed. To draw any conclusions about the operational viability of stabilizers from a study that does not name the vehicle being tested is dubious. This is because to infer any superior performance of the mechanical stabilizer from a test made with a totally different lay out is plain flawed. Ceterum censeo the ROF and accuracy for tanks firing on the move should be dramatically reduced. Stabilizer or no stabilizer The difficulty would be in getting the semi-clear shot in the first place. Why run out shooting if you already have a clear or semi-clear shot at the target standing still ? So perhaps a 50% accuracy rate for a moving tank is not unrealistic *if* the game recognizes that the tank will only fire when the gunner has a good shot lined up...an event that might occur only once a turn. And perhaps less frequently for green tankers. This 50% accuracy brings out an interesting point: what about the (first shot) accuracy of tanks (AT guns, IF guns) that have not moved an inch ? The hit chance INCREASES when you fire on the move ? Sorry, I do not buy that. So the main reason not to fire on the move wouldn't be that the shots you fired were inaccurate; the real problem would be having the opportunity to fire in the first place. If this was true wouldn't the armies have started training their tank gunners to fire on the move, even on mounts that were not stabilized ? Also, if British doctrine in '42 called for firing without pausing, that's how a fast move should work. How many tanks did they actually lose and was their doctrine revised subsequently ? CM is about fighting in '44. Did the truths that were selfevident in '42 survive intact until '44 ? A cheap hobby horse shot: CM is built around the premise of the universal soldier/tanker/gunner. You are indicating that the British training, tactics and doctrine were dissimilar to the rest of the forces present in the CM now. Yet all of them are harnessed to act according to the British doctrine and the unsubstantiated use of built in mechanical stabilizer in this particular instance. The Allies get benefits, the Germans get penalized.

>Are all Finns like the Finns that post here >on the CM board? We use examples based on the Finnish experiences during the war. That is our frame of reference. These examples are sometimes grossly out of whack from the experiences of the forces that fought the "real" WWII. Some examples: a PAK40 manned by Finns would need anything from 1 to 20 rounds to kill a single T-34 during the summer of 1944. And it would survive the engagement after firing those 20 rounds at a single target. (A Finnish 50mm PAK38 used up to 40 rounds to kill a single T-34). There is a recorded incident when a crew lifted the back of a PAK40 carriage to allow the gunner to engage tanks below the lowest possible depression allowed by the gun in that particular position. A Pzfaust or Pzschreck used by the Finns would consistently get confirmed first shot kills against T-34's and IS-2's during the summer of 1944. And some of them were first ever training shots at live targets with untranslated instructions being read to the firer as he was going through the motions. And please stowe the über-Finn crap. These are cold facts based on the Finnish war experiences. We are not native speakers so while our English may seem perfect compared to the average American high school student it still means that our terminology is sometimes based on Finglish. Hence the apparent lack of cohesion in our statements.

>Not quite what I read. The South Alberta >Rgt when in Britain in 1943 trained firing >on the move, according to their history. Trained. But what is said about combat use of said method and how effective did it prove ? I rely largely on a stament made in a Discovery Channel program. I know for a fact the shoulder rest for the 2prd gun made it up to the Churchill Mk1 so the training must have gone on. But from what I can gather the effectiveness of firing on the move dropped when the peace time army of professionals was flooded with the 30-day wonders. >They had Ram II tanks with 6pdr guns at the >time, and these could only shoot AP, no HE, >so it was not for suppressive effect. A clean miss with a AP round seldom suppresses a tank. Theyt may not even realize they are being targeted until they get hit. >I agree with Jeff's statement though that >the doctrine was flawed. That did not stop >them from teaching it though. Agreed. But it is the RL effectivness that is being debated, not its doctrinal employment as such.

A what-about-harmonious-vibration-from-the-running-gear-and-recoil-from-previous-shots-affecting-the-aiming-and-firing bump. [ 08-02-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

The British were big on firing on the move before the war. The gunner acted as the stabilizer in their tanks. But alas that worked only for the professional tankers with years of experience. Once the fresh conscripts started manning the tanks that doctrine was proven less than ideal so they had to revert to stopping to shoot. I assume the test mentioned was done on a stationary target which is not shooting back at you with a tank that had its gun in a "free swing" mount with the expert gunner standing on the floor and using his body as the shock absorber-cum-aiming apparatus (like they were in the early the cruisers). Also, while faster moving tank could be more accurate on the test there is nothing said about the reload cycles and ROF and how they are affected by the "less bumpy" speeds. IIRC only the modern Soviet/Russian MBT models have mechanical loaders, the rest use humans. The tanks used humans during WWII. I think the 37mm gun on the M5/Stuarts was a single shot weapon as was the 2 pounder. Reportedly one of the reasons the mechanical stabilizer was disconnected was because it made reloading harder. How do the British test results correlate to the accuracy of mechanically stabilized guns fired on the move, if the test was done with a mount that was not mechanically stabilized and was not mechanically operated (handwheels used to lay the gun) ? Furthermore, there is no elements in the CM modelling now that account for breakdowns and/or malfunctions of the mechanical stabilizer. Where they 100% reliable ? On aiming and shooting on the move: one thing not being induced into the equation is multi-axis "bumps" that tilt the tank both horizontally and vertically. These kinds of bumps would make reacquisition of a target really hard and time consuming (in the battle field scale). [ 08-01-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

>I do it all the time. What is your problem >here? I have no trouble at all ordering >this, nor does my opponents. That is not my experience. When there are too many units in the house that are only seen as contact markers they "block" area fire orders as there is no "room" for them in the house. But if there is even one unit seen that you can target there fire is switched to "regular" fire and you can demolish the house at will. >So you want to be able to fire relatively >small lumps of metal into an area where >your troops think a unit has been? That unit being a tank. >You are going about this the wrong way. If >you want to kill a tank (and kill it now) >that you can't see you only have two >options. > >1. Get a LOS to it with a unit capable of >destroying the tank. > >2. Order artillery (any large calibre >indirect firing gun capable of >immobilizing/destroying the tank) to fire >at the area where you think the tank is. > >Those are the options in RL anyway. Nope. IRL there is a third option. Recce by (direct) fire. IRL, if you see a tank pull behind or you think you see one inside a softish LOS cover (inside a forest) you can pump a round or two at or near the location you saw it go in to see if it really is there or if it has moved on. If the enemy tank has not spotted you yet it is unwise to use HE because if it misses your cover is blown, litterally. With a AP shot the enemy tank crew may not pick up it is being targeted. Depending on the activity in that neck of the battle field. >No, the operative phrase is "previously >spotted." Now you see it, now you don't. So why persistent contact markers with ID tags, if there is no real fuction for them inside the TacAI ? They are great references for the player but they also create an illusion that the TacAI uses them in its calculations. >You can always be sure of what your troops >can and can't see. That is what the LOS >tool does. You must already know this. I used to think that is the case, yes. But now I am not so sure. >As a trooper you are not firing at "the >last known position", that is not an issue, >you are firing at an area that your >commander tells you to fire at. Nope again. IRL a trained unit commander always nominates the target being fired at and what it is you are supposed to hit in case there are people in his units that can not see the indicated target. It can be called area suppression fire when you are trying to keep the other guys heads down and perhaps even inflict a few casualties. If you are firing at a location where an enemy unit was seen the location is last known position. But if a clear target presents itself close by and it poses a treath to the unit the fire is automatically shifted to the new target. If it is "only" a target of opportunity a unit commander can order for example his LMG and a few men fire at the new target while the rest keep on firing area suppression fire at the old target location. >Please trust me (and everyone else) when I >say that you never ever want to fire large >calibre AP at a location, ie as area fire. "Never ever" is a pretty strong expression. If you see a tank enter brushes and you can hear it revving up as it goes along you can pump a few rounds in hope you can hit it. >If a threat pops up elsewhere you either >continue to obey your last order (Elite >troops almost never disobey orders, think >about that) I would have thought Elite troops would recoqnice a mortal treath when they see one and act accordingly more readily than green troops. There is a difference between disobeying orders and acting stupidly. >and figure that your brilliant >commander have you covered, or you disobey >a direct and specific order and try to kill >the new threat. I've seen both happen in CM. Me too. But it is the marginal cases (like AT guns targeting infantry units when there are tanks about) where the gripes lie. >I think you might suffer under several >misapprehensions of what CM does and what >is represented. The term "abstration" has fallen into disuse in this forum. >There might be several faults with CM but I >haven't seen you present even one so far. All the good ones have already been covered. Why go over them just for the hell of it. >Accepting that someone else (not me, I mean >the game designers and beta testers here) >knows more about something than you do >isn't a bad thing you know. I accept the fact that they know more about a lot of things inside the CM world. But having some experience IRL small unit tactics I see there are design desicions and features in the game (like including stabilizers in Allied tanks) that are not very clear and/or not very well explained.

>Being elite does not give a unit 100% >perfect spotting ability. Agreed. But does it give a bonus over the other experience levels ? And actually I do think the fact that they both are in the middle of the road is more decisive factor here. >Frankly, I can't believe you actually think >there is something wrong with this. I disagree. What a surprise. >The tanks are obviously close to the limit >of sight in those conditions. Yes. But would it have been any different if it was a fresh contact we are talking about here ? Even with Hide orders I think it would be very difficult to hide a beast like that in the middle of the road. And in case you missed this: the LOS line stays green on both sides of the contact marker all the way to the limit but is cut short at the contact marker when you draw it across it. So all indications point to the direction that the tank crew is definitely seeing something at that spot but for some reason the contact is not being upgraded. If this was happening in other terrain than on a road I could chalk it up as obstructions such as brushes or tall grass. But since it is on the road I would like an explanation from BTS on the occurance. **** happens however does not cut it. >Besides which, this is one single incident. Yes. But does it bear any indications to underlying problems perhaps ? >Anything can happen once. Statistically the chance can be minimal. Then again not. We are talking about a program with hardcoded algorithms and a predetermined set of variables. It could be a freak occurance due to all of the planets aligning which happens simultaneously with sun spots, eclipse and full moon. But all of these events can be calculated beforehand and so the convergence can be expected, simulated and tested. Perhaps once in a blue moon but still. >This is like those people who see their >Panther get weak spot penetrated by a >Stuart and say "BTS fix of do somefink". Can a million flies be wrong ? And what if all those weak spot penetrations were on Allied tanks (I think I have not seen any on Jumbos but I have seen them way too often on Panthers and Tigers) ? What kind of reaction would you think that would raise ? While it could be statistically possible it just plain feels wrong. But lets not get into that. And BTW I am not calling fo a "do somefink", I'm just equiring "is this a bug or what" >As for the question marks... The tank has >been identified (contact level 4). The >infantry units have not (contact level 2 or >3). Actually the other tank in my arsenal took 4 shots at it previously but having missed all I decided to swiched the man at the bat. You can understand why I wanted not to lose the first tank that engaged it. The infantry had been also engaged and I had to pull it back as it was getting beaten by that enemy tank. Anyways, with such novelties as radios (and the fact that they were all in the same area) would it be terribly unrealistic to assume I as the commander was sending that tank to specifically hunt that enemy tank down ? Would it be fair to assume that the TC would have been told what he was up against and where it was last seen so he could be on the lookout for that very spot specifically ? [ 07-21-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B: Tero, I got your saved game that you sent to me and Steve and maybe others. Upon looking at it, it immediately became obvious that you had neglected to mention one very small detail: the game is at NIGHT in a RAINSTORM! LOS range is 96m max and the tanks are 85m from each other [ 07-21-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> And you forgot to mention one very small detail: the unit doing the spotting is Elite and both tanks are standing still in the middle of the road. If we were talking about infantry I would agree that these factors could be significant. But we are talking about two tanks in the middle of the road. I trust you tried both LOS and target commands. The LOS command does not come up with ? after the ID for the tank as it does for the infantry unit in the building. How normal is that in a situation like this ?

>You can always fire at houses that you have >a LOS to. If there are no "full blown >contacts" there are no specific targets. No >specific target no direct fire opportunity. Have you tried firing a mortar at a house with infantry contact markers but no targetable enemy units in it ? >You want to be able to order a tank/gun to >fire relatively small lumps of metal into >the vicinity of a possible/probable tank >because they might hit something they can't >even see? Would you want to fire HE against a tank ? The operative pharse here is "they can't even see". There is a contact marker abstracting a previously spotted enemy asset. Given the limitations of absolute spotting as it is modelled now the player can not be really sure what his units see or do not see. >I honestly fail to see what this has to do >with your earlier suggestion? You suggested I should to do some playing when I asked Steve wether a unit will revert from area fire to engage a targer unmasking near its area fire target. I provided you with an gaming experience. >First you want to be able to tell a >gun/tank to fire AP as area fire. These are two separate issues. >Then you want the tank/gun to have the >intelligence and initiative to counter your >direct order and fire at a threat and >quickly too. That was actually my opponents wish. And I do second his motion. I fail to see how it would be unrealistic to wish the TacAI to engage targets of opportunity to save itself instead of blasting away on some suspected enemy positions. >Do you want the game to be smart enough to >figure out why you are ordering it to area >fire at a spot? Well, the contact marker DOES indicate what was there the last time. And the player as the commander is trying to flush out what the contact marker indicates, doesn't he ? Why fire area fire if it is only to till some land to plant some potatoes and not to engage a specific enemy asset class that was last seen in that very location ? You order area fire at a last known position of an AT asset and an AT asset engages you some ways from the position you are flushing out. What would you do IRL, continue firing at the last known position or target the new contact that is dangerous ? If the TacAI does not know my intentions it must surely at least quess I do not intend it to keep on firing at a suspected position when the unit is at risk of being taken out.

>Yes it has. Halftracks will get knocked out >by HE rounds hitting close to them. Not quite what I mean. What about tanks receiving a direct hit ? You can not fire at houses with area fire if there are enough contact markers in the house but no full blown contacts to make the fire aimed at a specific target. Will you be able to issue area fire orders ON the contact marker when there is an actual unit under it ? >Firing high caliber AP at something you >can't see is stupid and not SOP in any army >at any time. Well, lets assume the unit actually KNOWS the marker stands for a tank spotted earlier (and by Jove BTS has included ID tags on the contact markers to simulate this). If they decide or they are ordered to fire blind at the contact should they pick HE or AP for that particular target, IF they know it is a tank and they carry both ? Troops shot blind at moving brushes during WWII so would it be too unrealistic to let the guns fire appropriate rounds according to the class of target they are supposed to be engageing ? If the human commander so wishes ? >This just shows that you should consider >spending more time playing the game and >doing your own tests instead of being >obnoxious. On the v1.2 BETA days a PBEM opponent of my lost his last operational Sherman to a Pzschreck when he ordered area fire on its last known spot marked by a contact marker. I had moved it a few meters to the left and it was able to fire 5 (five) rounds at the Sherman. The Sherman spotted the schreck after the second shot but did not deviate from its area fire target until the 5th round took it out. Even the hull MG did not fire at it eventhough the target was well within its arc of fire. My opponent took the matter up with BTS. Their reply was (to this effect): "the TacAI can not know what you are trying to shoot at when you issue the area fire order so we see no fault in the TacAI in this respect". Ever since that I have been very cautios with the area fire order so as not to subject my units to sudden death because they will not deviate from it to save themselves. >Just a suggestion. Suggest all you want. >I realise that CM can not be everyones cup >of tea but I get the feeling that you are >enjoying complaining and arguing more than >anything else? I do love a good DEBATE. I see a lot of complaints on this board. What makes one complaint better than another ? Do you jump on all of them like this ? I do not start my every post with a "Hail, BTS, Full of Grace" but that does not mean I hate the game. Quite the contrary, it is the best tactical game around. But it is not picture perfect and without flaws and blemishes and imperfections. I quess am not just PC enough to take a place in the band wagon blindfolded. I try not to be antagonistic about the issues but I am not afraid to stand alone in a crowd either. [ 07-20-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by argie: I can't believe it! I (almost) agree with Tero in something! <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Noooooooooo !!!! What is the almost bit ? (Just to keep up the appearance of not agreeing)

>I don't understand you here. If the LOS is >broken to all friendly units, at least >enough so that they are not actively >spotting it, BUT the unit remains there... >the situation is the same as if it moved. Up to a point, yes. I agree spotting infantry is trickier but NOT spotting a large piece of equipment should be not that hard. Especially if was sitting in the middle of the road the last it was seen and it still sitting there. The friendly units KNOW they are facing a specific enemy asset and it has been "positively" identified, right ? Should they be mindfull of its presense (state of alertness), regardless of its current disposition ? Are they aware of the enemy assets capabilities pertaining movement ? When they reach a position which has LOS over the spot where friendly units last saw the asset should they (or should they not) check out that spot first to see if it has indeed moved or not ? If it has moved no problem. You extrapolate its last known trajectory given the prevailing tactical situation and terrain features and make your best quess based on that. If it has not moved, then what ? "Sorry, sir. I can eyeball the location the tank was last seen in but due to circumstances beyond my control I can not say if it is there or not. Damn these PoS binoculars. I can spot new contacts with them without any problems but if I try to reacquire old known contacts they fog up." >At least so far as the other player is >concerned. In other words there is no way >of knowing if the enemy unit is still there >or not until you get in and establish >better LOS. One unit is all that is needed >to do this. In our case it was not enough. >How elese should it work? The way you describe. But it did not work in this particular case. >It does, so I repeat... I have no idea what >set of circumstances led to the situation >you described. It sounds like, to me, that >they didn't have LOS to each other. The LOS line was green. >The "spotting market" part of your >statement leads me to believe this, since >if they were in LOS they would have spotted >each other. That was our impression too. >Do you *really* think that 1.5 years after >the game was first released that we >wouldn't have that bit working correctly? Dunno. Have you ? >The actual game file. From what you >described, I'd say they didn't have LOS to >each other. But since I haven't seen the >game, I can't even guess as to why. I'll look it up and send it. >Uhm... would you fire precious AP rounds at >shadows? I think not. At least not >normally. Agreed. But what if you hit but there is no damage and the other guy has an AP round chambered and you have just revealed your position by firing first ? I think there should be an option. TacAI does not know what the player is trying to hit. I think it should at least know the class of target being engaged. >What you are asking for is "gamey". More realistic than gamey. What if you know you have a chance of taking out a pillbox with your AP shot but your HE can not do it and you have a contact marker of a pillbox that you can engage with area fire command but not directly ? Unless of course you mean that persistent contact markers are gamey in themselves. >It works just like artillery striking areas >where you don't have LOS. A HE round does >not care if the target is in LOS or not. >Why should it? So just like artillery fired >blindly, the only way you will know if you >hit something is to see a plume of smoke. >Otherwise, you don't get to see anything. >Sounds right to me. Will the firing unit divert from area fire to engageing the target to save itself when the enemy fires back ? >I have no idea what you are talking about >(again ). Has it been tested that unspotted armour under the cover of a contact marker are not impervious to direct area fire hitting its location.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software: As to the whole discussion about SMGs in general, this has been addressed in CMBB (along with other behaviors that people don't seem so hung up on, but are actually the root cause of SMG problems). However, we did this without changing pricing or firepower structure. As I said before, we decided to go for the root causes of SMG overuse/overeffectiveness. Rarity, new move orders, and better MG simulation takes care of that quite nicely Steve<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I find this broobahah about the alledged overeffectiveness of the SMG superfluous. IMO a SMG rush is no more gamey than any kind of rush. And while it is admittedly hard to beat back it is not impossible to beat it back. Even with the current set of assets and settings.

>The contact marker is removed if the unit >is spotted elsewhere or if a friendly >unit "spots" the contact marker location >enough to know that nothing is there. Ah ! What if there is still something there ? Absolute spotting negates or inhibits spotting unless you get a second opinion from a unit with a better spotting ability ? >Yes, this is supposed to be able to happen. How realistic is that ? Two unbuttoned tanks facing each should be able to spot each other on their own right but because the oversight committee of spotting has decided the value is not over the treshold to turn the last know position marker into a full blown spotted unit they fail ? I would have thought the knowledge that there is a unit in the area would make spotting and ID'ing easier, not more difficult. >I can not speculate what caused this in >your particular game. How much data is needed ? >Area Fire is blind. There is absolutely >no "thinking" about what *might* be there >or might not be. Really ? When there is a contact marker to indicate the type of unit. "We saw a tank there a minute ago and for all we know it is still there. But since that location is in LOS but we can not confirm it is still there, for some curious reason, lets fire HE instead of AP." >HE, small arms, or grenades are used. AP >ammo is not used since a target must be >present for AP to work. Getting an AP >round "close" means little. True. But will the fire actually hit and inflict damage on a non-infantry, well armoured unit capable of withstanding the HE impact ? And how will the impact be presented to the firing unit ? Will it upgrade the marker from last known position contact to unidentified (or indeed identified) vehicle ? Area fire targets the ground but what about non-infantry units that "levitate" above the ground in the target location.

Wife asleep, lurk mode off: >The current spotting value determines what >the friendly side gets to see/know about >the Enemy unit. What if there is a contact marker and the enemy unit has not moved ? >This means that there has to be a continual >spotting of the Enemy unit to keep it >marked on the map...... In a recent PBEM we had two unbuttoned tanks face eachother for two turns well inside LOS and the markers did not change from contact to full blown ID'd unit until we got some help from additional units. How is area fire modelled in a situation like this ? You can not target a contact marker and area fire is liable to get you into troubles as the TacAI will not be aware of what it is supposed to shoot at. And with what ammo type.