Tero

>Higher level tactics, which are totally >within the control of the player, can be >influenced to more-or-less conform to the >real world tactics used by that formation in >the same situations in the real war. Concur. My preferred Allied forces are the British. They resemble the Finnish forces the most in terms of squad level armament and they perform as efficiently as the US troops when proper (in my case Finnish ) tactics are used. >The Germans tried to engage the enemy at >longer ranges than shorter, whenever >possible. Really ? I always thought that applied to the armour while the infantry was not too shy about getting ist hands dirty, especially in the west when they could get out of or avoid alltogether the barrages by hugging the Allied troops. >A player can attempt to engage T34s or >Shermans at 100m, but it is not a good >idea. Is there anything to the seeming inaccuracy of the hand held AT weapons, other than the laws of statistics that is ? Are the accuracies going to be altered for CMBB ? BTW: what is your source for the Finnish AT research data ? >It is true that the player can only >influence the tactics used above squad >level. This is true for all games I can >think of, including Close Combat, that do >not focus on the single soldier as a >commandable element. So any differences that >would come about at the sub-unit level would >have to be programmed in by us. Glad to see we agree in principle. >But WHAT changes should we be programming >in? Aye, there's the rub. In my view there is no way to program any of these changes in before the spotting is changed from absolute to relative. Only then will the squads be acting as the individual units they really are and only then can they be assigned with force specific combat drills that do not throw a monkey wrench into the game engine as a whole. >Hence the German tactics designed to keep >the enemy at a distance, especially while on >the defensive. That may have been the case prior to 1943 when they were holding all the aces and the jokers but what about the realities of the eastern front (seemingly endless hordes of armour and men coupled by withering artillery barrages) and how they affected the tactical and doctrinal development of the German army ? They opted to increase the number of automatic weapons in a squad, just like you said, so that would indicate that they were getting prepared to close quarter fighting. How did that affect their tactics and doctrine ? >So if Tero and others are simply asking us >to make squads inherently different from >each other, it is already done A graphic example: Here is a comparison between the BAR and the Finnish LS-26 LMG BAR, selective fire or full auto only, depending on the model Caliber .30 (7.62 mm) Muzzle velocity 853.4 mps (2800 fps) Capacity 20-round detachable box magazine Weight 8.33 kg (18.5 lbs) Overall length 1194 mm (47 in.) Rate of fire 550 rounds per minute Effective range 550m (600 yds) M-26 LAHTI-SALORANTA LMG, selective fire Caliber: 7.62 mm x 53 R Muzzle velocity 800 mps (2800 fps) Capacity: 20-round box magazine Weight: 9320 g ( 20.55 lbs. ) Overall lenght: 1180 mm ( 46.5 in ) Rate of Fire: 450-550 r.p.m. Practical ROF 180 r.p.m Effective range: up to 1400 meters, Practical range 200 - 1400 meters 1935 pattern text book Finnish platoon TOE: Source Rifle and LMG (litterally rapid fire rifle, not LMG at all) squad in combat, 1935 Infantry squad was 1+ 9 men (leader, SMG gunner, 7 riflemen, 1 riflegrenade man). Squad weapons: 9 rifles, 1 SMG, 1 rifle grenade launcher LMG squad was 1+ 6 men (leader, LMG gunner, gunners assistant, 4 ammo beares of which one can double up as the sharp shooter), Squad weapons: 5 rifles, 1 LMG, 2 pistols (for the gunner and his assistant) Finnish platoon consisted of 2 rifle squads and 2 LMG squads. There has been posts that claim that the US troops were hampered by BAR. The Finnish LS-26 is virtually identical in characteristics, yet it was not hampering the Finnish infantry, it was considered a valuable asset eventhough it had serious defects due to too fine machining that rendered it inoperable in sub-zero temperatures. It could be made operational again by urinating on it so Finnish soldiers were litterally urinating on their guns in combat to save their lifes. Captured Degtaryev LMG's were taken up to supplement the LS-26, but can troops capture weapons from the enemy in CMBB during the game ? So, going by the CM premise that only the guns matter coupled with experience and fitness levels, not how the weapons is used as a part of the force specific squad level combat drill I look forward to see the modelling of the Finnish troops in CMBB. >If we are being asked to make the individual >men (all else being equal) different from >each other, we will never do that. I play FP shooters if I want to see individual men in action.

A carry over from the old tread By dalem >Let's go even further and let's say that >you're correct, or even partially so, in >that some nations were 'just better' (which >I don't think is the case). I wonder why you assume I think some nations were (or are) "just better". "Just better" is a very complex issue. The über-Finnish infantry arguably knew how to fight in the forest but they had no exprience in combined arms tactics (apart from the infantry element of our sole armoured division). During the summer of 1944 they would sometimes panic when the armour seemed to pull back when in fact they were going to rearm when they had expended all their ammo. They would fight on even if they were sustaining casualties but if they saw a tank pulling back they would assume it was time to pull back. >How would you apply those to CM anyway? Under the current spotting there is no way to implement force specific squad battle drills realistically. >So my squad drill is different than yours - >does that mean I go to ground differently >than you do? Propably not. Depends entirely on circumstances and how we have been conditioned by our respective trainings and experiences. >That I run differently? Depends on the gear. And not only your combat load of ammo and you weapon but also if your uniform is suitable for the terrain and climate. It also depends what is meant by "run" in the context of squad battle drill. >That I die differently? That is a tough one. Depends if I go against conventions and use illegal ammunition, like dum-dums (the Red Army did use explosive bullets). In the Eastern Front German and Red Army troops did not use the helmet as much as it was used in the west. It was considered dead weight more than it was protection. So, will the Germans and the Red Army units be more susceptible to casualties from for example treebursts in CMBB ? >Squads under fire seek cover, stay put, and >may or may not fire back whilst doing so. >Currently CM allows you to have an >experience of Veteran, which means on >average that your squad will do any >and all of these things better than mine if >mine is 'merely' Regular. The addition of >the Fitness attribute in CM2 will allow even >more differentiation. Yes. Fitness has interesting prospects. But even here I have a caveat. It has been suggested that Winter War scenarios can be made using CMBB as a base. You just model the Finns as Elite. OK. But the fighting went on for 105 days with most of the troops in the front with a minimalistic rotation cycle. So by February, if you want to be ultra realistic, you have to model them as Tired or Exhausted Elite vs Fresh Green or Regulars. The Finnish defences caved under the extreme pressure at Summa. After that the Red Army advanced some 30 km's in thet sector while the eastern part of the Mannerheim line held its positions before the peace was signed some 30 days later. North of Lake Ladoga the defenders held their position in a place called Kollaa. Had it fallen the Mannerheim line would have been in a danger of being taken from the behind. The question now is will a historically accurate set up with historically accurate fitness ratings but with historically inaccurate experience ratings (not all Finnish units were elite) work out properly to produce historically viable results. >I still fail to see why you are dissatisfied >with the current implementation. The current system works OK because the forces currently engaged in CM are demographically unified with fairly unified tactics and doctrine. The Allies use tactics that were not that different from each other, the Germans on the opposing team are chips off the same block. When CM goes Barbarossa there are new players involved that do not adhere to the team tactics and doctrine. On one side you have the Red Army with subtypes (not unlike the Germans in CM) on the other side you have the Germans with subtypes. These should work OK using the CM game engime when pitted against each other. What muddy up the equation are the other nationalities fighting against the Red Army with non-comformist equipment and tactics and doctrine developed to suit those weapons they have at hand. [ 07-10-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

>Tero, you wont read this, but one more time. I've read all your posts. >What you want is to replace what the human >does (order units around) with a computer AI >deciding if a Finn would do that or a German >do this. No no no no no. What I look for is a set of variables that directs the the units to act according to their respective historical tactics and doctrine if and when they encounter unexpected stimuli while fulfilling the orders given by the human player. >And you want a few nationalities to be all >powerful based upon bar room talk. Where DO you get this **** ? Is the transmitter in you mouth acting up again or what ? Are you still looking for a way to best me in a debate ? It seems to me to you this is all about winning the debate, not having one. BTW: did you check those arty volumes of yours for the number of pages as I requested ? >Luckily, neither will ever happen, as Steve >has said. Post all day long, and it still >wont happen. So ? Should I get started with the ashes and a spare set of clothes ? >If you could define a variable in which one >unit was superior to another that was not >already simulated in the game. Is it really all about superiority ? Really ? I am contesting the premise that every unit of the same class do things exactly the same fashion and manner regardless of their respective historical tactics and doctrine. Not better or worse but DIFFERENTLY. I think the others used the term squad drill to give a name to the phenomenon. >If you could present it in a form that was >not nationalistic (for example, your >variable would have to apply to all soldiers >if the same situations which caused it came >about). > >If you could support your contention with >more than a citation from a single narrative >source, and if a model could be built on >your concept that implied that it actually >mattered in the game, then you would be in >the big league and it would not be world + >dog versus you. A quote from a previous post of yours: >I only seem to attack you because this >element of blind nationalism (and sexism) is >distasteful, and counterproductive. So in fact you are not attacking me, you attack my disease ? Glad to see your rationalization is still working 100% so that you can explain away your bitterness with really solid facts. If only you could get in terms with the sore loser side of yours and get on with your life. I am capable of admitting defeat, are you ?

>Well, I'll be damned. That revelation trashed the entire basis I was laying my point on. In the true über-Finn fashion I was low on ammo with the hordes attacking from all sides. I was looking for new ammo when I discovered my position was getting eroded by a force of nature I had no contol over. And consequently I had nothing else left to do but to acknowledge the fact, cut my losses and pull back in a controlled fashion to fight another day. :cool: Mind you, as I said my POV on the issue is still basically unchanged. >I guess I'll have to get a new sig now. And I a new hobby horse. Trade your sig for a well ridden and tested hobby horse ? [ 07-09-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

When you wife becomes tired (mine did after about 3-4 hours) be sure NOT to sit her down below the clock that shows how many people gets killed in wars each second (I think it is in the basement by the Holocaust exhibit). Boy was she depressed and angry at me after sitting there for almost 2 hrs.

A quick post before we reach the 300 posts mark so that you guys do not think I am totally beaten by all these negative vibes you have been trying to lay on me for being an outspoken infidel. I was going through some articles and books on WWII small unit tactics over the weekend. And I had a revelation. It would seem that ALL solutions to tactical situations and tactical problems rely on the units perception of the battlefield. All the training is directed at responding to stimuli that the individual unit receives (radio messages, aural and visual spotting etc) according to the preferences set by the respective military establishments. And with absolute spotting that individual unit perception is negated. The TacAI works with the data it has available and if that data is gamey (in the sense that the force is handeled as a sort of amoeba and that all the data one part of the amoeba gets is instantly available to all the other parts) there is aboslutely no way to simulate intricate approaches each army developed to counter the changing battle field situations. Thus any and all attempts to induce differentiated, army specific tactics and doctrines to simulate the different paths the different armies took to reach their goals (which were more often than not very different) that are not based on technical facts (mv, fp, signals equipment etc.) or such abstractions as fitness and experience level are inherently impossible to model without the results becomming gamey, unbalansed, unrealistic and historically untrue. So while my POV on differentiated, army specific tactics and doctrines is still as firm as ever I will have to put a lid on it until the spotting is changed from absolute spotting to relative spotting. [ 07-09-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

>Used correctly (as it often was, btw) under >the right circumstances, it was a >hellacious god-awful suppressor. I agree. But the debate is about what constituted correct use and what were the right circumstances. >At 60m, especially in village and forest, I >believe the MP to be superior. But that >isn't how most of the war was fought. Not >all Germans had MPs anyway, far from it. Agreed. That is why I was surprised to find those statements about US infantry not being used as direct fire suppression assets. I had always assumed that would have been the sensible thing to do with a semi-auto rifle such as the M1. Much like the TD doctrine of the US armoured forces the tactics and doctrine used were not in step with the requirements of the battlefield. >In other words, unless they encountered a >company exclusively armed with MP44s, the >American rifle company could put out more >shoulder-fired suppression than any >comparable organization in the war. Yes. But the question is was it used for suppression ? >Training and doctrine were the reason that >this was not fully exploited at first. Once >recognized as a deficiency, it was >corrected at the unit level by individual >commanders on an increasingly widespread >basis (Doubler). Thank you. >Tendency of the fired-upon to go to ground >is hardly unique to American forces (nor >was it US doctrine). Training, leadership, >and experience are needed to correct it. >After St. Lo, many US units were retrained >behind the front in "new" techniques to >storm specific objectives. They also >learned to coordinate delivery of HE >(direct and indirect) more effectively in >the time-honored American practice of >substituting material for lives when >possible, a practice I happen to support. Thank you for the support.

>So you'd go for some across-the-board >penalty for US troops in some form or >another. OK. In what way? And at what >quantified level? Suppression thresholds and spotting abilities of the US troops. >Based on how many references, and properly >cross-referenced to account for counter- >arguments? So far two. No counter arguments have been made. None that have come with actual, factual counterclaims anyway. >Fixated, or adjusting through the months of >1942-45? Adjusting through the months. That would seem to be the indicated progress according to my source, which puts the doctrine chance around December 1944 (latter half of the war). >So, okay, you've staked out that you want >nationality modifiers. To TacAI automated responces to stimuli to account for diffences in tactics and doctrine. Just to make sure we are on the level with that. >BTS has staked out that you're not going to >get them, using far more compelling reasons >than you have offered. I do not believe that ALL armies responded EXACTLY the same way in ALL situations to the same battlefield stimuli, the ONLY determining factor being their experience level. >I'm glad that BTS (Steve) has been willing >to articulate the standards it strives for >here, arguing against stock nationality >shifts as applied down to squad or single- >man level in wargames. The operative phrase being "as applied down to squad or single-man level in wargames". I agree with him in that. These two corraborative statements I use are representative of both the German and the US tactics and doctrine and how they predisposed their troops to respond to battlefield stimuli differently, regarless of their experience level. >If you want uber-Finns & uber-Germans, roll >up your sleeves and work with the scenario >design parameters, and make them yourself >in your own scenarios. I an NOT advocating any über-Anybody to be modelled in the game. I am challenging the premise that all things are equal in the terms of training and lessons learned. >The "fitness" factor for CM2 is another new >variable you'll get to play around with. Yes. Interesting prospects >You can keep whipping out Dupuy (or even >Weigley or Creveld) to make your case that >US troops should get across-the-board >negative modifiers. I hope you do not call it a negative modifier only because it happens to be the US troops that are the subject of this debate. And the modification would not necessarily be across the board. It could be applied the indicated factors only. >Others here could whip out Ambrose or >Doubler to counter such assertions. Yes. But so far there has been only hyperventilation with no counterfacts to overthrow the two statements I use as my base. I do know how flimsy that base is... >My added point here is that I don't trust >for any one author to make all of my case--- >-not Dupuy nor Doubler (and certainly not >Ambrose!). What about the relevant US Army records, training manuals and AAR's ? >Keep on arguing for "nationality" for CM if >you want, but BTS has laid it out ad >nauseum that it's an argument you'll still >lose. Well, they DID write the code so they are the keepers of the keys.

>1. It made a war time publication. Hmmm, >the Dupray article is from 1986 and is an >oral rememborance. > >2. I have a war time publication that tells >me how the Sherman was superior to the >Panther. Take these with a grain of salt. "You are holding the best rifle there is" can be taken with a grain of salt. "Listen guys, perhaps you should do someting differently with the best rifle in your hand except using it as a crutch while waiting for the artillery barrage to clear the enemy position" is something else. >3. Dupray own article tells of how they >didn't do well in the hedgerows. That place >him in the 90th Infantry Division when the >unit was suffering under mismangement. What about the colonel in the unit in Italy ? Did he and/or the unit exist ? Was that unit also mismanaged ? >4. In your own quote, Dupray claims by the >end of the war the unit didn't have that >problem. So, between July of 44 and Apr 45 >it has been fixed. Perhaps it was more of a >bad training, bad leadership, heavy >casualty thing then one of a national >failure? Had it been just been in the Gen. Depuys interview it could have been chalked up as a personal view. When it surfaced as an advice given by a colonel who was a CO of a unit in Italy printed in a DoD pamphlet it upgraded the issue into a new level. >When would this national doctrine change >during the 11 months of combat? That is the thing I am missing too. But if the US TD doctrine is a correlation then the change could have taken months. >5. Quoting the 101st commander doesn't >prove a thing either. That 25% only fired >their rifles has always been debated. >HOTLY i may add. First time I saw it. >Sorry, in my eyes you have proved nothing. >I require more proof then this to sway me >to your side of the arguement. Lets put it this way: can anybody find a fact (statement, whatever) that contradicts (or indeed corraborate) both the pamphlet and Gen. Depuys statement about the tactics and doctrine ? [ 07-06-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

>Depuy doesn't say anything about any >weapons that would have been good >suppressors if they had only been used as >such, there or anywhere else. Indeed. But he does state that the infantry units armed with M-1 did not engage unseen targets because of their TRAINING and DOCTRINE, not because the M-1 was such a lousy weapon. >What parts of these sentences do you not >understand? The quote talks about tactics and doctrine, not about the qualities of the M-1 as a weapon. >Yes, silly you. I thought we were talking >about Depuy's opinion of the M1, not yours. Actually we are talking about his views on US infantry tactics and doctrine, NOT about his views on the Garand characteristics.

>One blatant example: > >You quote this to support your contention >that Dupey thought the M1 Garand would be a >good suppression weapon if they had tried to >use it as such. This despite the fact that >he makes no mention of the M1 anywhere in >that quote. Well DUH ! What was their primary infantry fire arm at the time ? >I find these statements very hard to >reconcile with your contention that Depuy >thought the M1 was an "excellent suppressor" >(your exact words). Why is that ? I used to think that the Garand WAS an excellent suppressor, being rifle caliber, high MV, semiauto, multiple shot weapon. Silly me. Then I found out the US Army doctrine predisposed the troops not to use it as one because they had been tought to fire at clearly presented point targets. In my view Depuy is blaming faulty tactics and doctrine more than the troops and the weapon. >>Americans see the boogie man every time the >>effectiveness of your army gets questioned >>? > >Yet another stereotype. It was a question, not a statement. Are you grasping at straws ?

>It still would not be Finnish, thus it would >not be superior. No, you condescending sore loser of debates. Those sour grapes must have tasted really good since you keep coming for seconds. Does it really hurt so bad when I was able to trash your set of facts about Finnish history in a honest and fair debate that you have to resort to sniping, underhanded sneering and womanlike badmouthing in every turn ? When you can not overturn my facts with other facts you attack me. Some scholar you are. All I have seen from you are opinions supposedly based on facts (which you keep hidden away). I at least try to present my sources whenever possible. I am not even expecting you to take my word for it. I try to seek them on the net so that they can be read and judged without spending and arm and a leg on the bookstore. On the subject: What makes you think that a system conceived by you is better than the conceived by others ? I know for a fact the US system WWII was good. All the major players used their own tactics and doctrine and all had their strong points and weaknesses. I also know that the Finnish artillery doctrine conceived and developed before the war and perfected during it through practical experiences. In combat it was at least equal to the US system, perhaps even better. Just like the British, the Soviet and the German systems were in some respects. There are no absolutes in this field so I see no reason how you could monopolize it by a blanket statement. You say your system was the best, I say ours was the best. And we are both right. The next time you have some free time do a search on the net check out http://foto.hut.fi/seura/members/lofstrom.html. It is an obituary about a man who worked on the special camera that was instrumental in developing our artillery arm and its accuracy. As it happens I know all the ins and outs of calling up and directing arty fire using the WWII Finnish system, having been inside the system as a signals NCO in a Finnish coastal artillery fort. We had to learn rigging the old system up just in case we get EMP'd. How much hands on experience do you have on the subject ? >while I will just languish away >with my US Army "Artillery Systems of the >Second World War", "Field Manual for >Artilley Soldiers", Brassy's "Artillery of >the World Volume 2 (WWII)", and other >technical discussions of artillery that are >worthless in the face of set beliefs. And these impressive volumes are 100% accurate and there is nothing in the world of artillery they have not overlooked. If I am a zelot then you are a blind zelot if you do not acknowledge that there might be some things out of your field of view. Please take a quick test for me: how many pages on US (or British, or Soviet or German) artillery and how many on Finnish artillery ?

>First off: The Finnish did not use a system >of radio switching to allow platoon level >access to artillery. That was not the SOP. What makes the US system so superior to other systems ? That fact that is an US system ?

>I keep telling myself this is pointless, but >I keep posting anyway. I can't explain it. Perhaps you find the excercise in logics as refreshing as I do. What I find intriquing is the fact that the only facts for or against are being presented by me. Come on, lads. GOGOGO !!! >He never said anything of the sort, or even >suggested it. Really ? GEN DEPUY: We didn’t do that very well. You see, one of our training deficiencies was that almost all suppression was done by indirect fire weapons. Very little suppression was done by small arms. Occasionally, we would use our heavy machine guns. People thought first about mortars and artillery, then heavy machine guns, and finally, light machine guns. Really, they didn’t think much about using riflemen for suppression..... We didn’t do direct fire suppression very well in my outfit until the latter part of the war. >Check the FP rating for the M1 and K98 >sometime. I will. >You tell me. You're the one wanting to give >them extra bonuses. Actually I am wanting the US troops to act in accordance with the historical tactics and doctrine. Which was different from the way (at least) the Germans acted, if that can be extrapolated from Gen. Depuys text. >The thing that bothers me so much about your >nationality modifier crusade is that it's >based upon stereotypes like the one above. The only steroetype in the example was "Rock'nRoll!" bit. The rest was in accordance with the narrative of both Gen. Depuy and the Pamphlet. >The use of stereotypes, even ones with some >basis in fact, in modeling human behavior is >wrongheaded So it is OK for BTS to use Cheerios as a metaphore but I can not use examples that are closer to real life ? >Result would hinge entirely upon what the 2 >squads had eaten for breakfast. That is entirely possible. But lets talk about a CM scope scenario. >Now you're just making things up. And >another stereotype to boot. "US soldiers >were so jittery a single shot would suppress >them for minutes. German soldiers, however, >would bravely push forward, unbothered by >the small annoyance." You read too much into my text. Do you Americans see the boogie man every time the effectiveness of your army gets questioned ? It has been establieshed that US troops would be predisposed not to open fire on unseen targets UNLESS ordered to do so. A single rifle shot is fired. Instead of opening up towards direction the sound indicats the US troops would do what ? Troops from any army would hit the deck, that goes without saying. Would it be too much to surmise that soldiers from some other army would open on their own, without waiting for a NCO or officer to give them orders to fire and give them a target. >All your weighty evidence amounts to words >you've put into Depuy's mouth combined with >stuff you've pulled out of thin air. What words have I put into Gen. Depuys mouth, exactly. That thin air I use has been provided by the US department of defence pamphlet. >Are you suggesting there were no above >average US troops in the ETO. How logical is >that? Why do you think I think there should be some changed made to the game engine ? Even BTS says "use lower quality troops to simulate this" and I say it is not realistic. [ 07-06-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

>Very realistic, provided the correct >experience choices were made. Who desides what is correct ? >If you want to simulate the poorer side of a >force, any force, you drop the Experience >rating. But that will affect the superior sides of that side as well. And there is where I feel the unrealism lies. The player can not affect only one aspect of the troop combat behaviour. >The Germans didn't just decide to let the >Americans win in such situations -> they >were beat. Even if some members like to think I disagree with that I do not. And the US troops did get better while the Germans got worse. But that does not make the fact that there were inherent differences in tactics and doctrine that affected the behaviour of the troops in team A so that they would respond differently to battlefield stimuli. >Experience is the key element to simulating >troop quality. There are others, but many >are inherent (headcount, weapons, mix of >formation weapons, etc.) and unique to that >nationality. So when you combine the >correct Experience setting, with >historically correct troops, in a >historically realistic battle situation you >should (and do!) get historically correct >results all else being equal. Assuming all things ARE equal. Which I think are not. Not at least in such a degree that would warrant wholesale bunching of nationalities to act under the same manner, only with diffent equipment and different colour uniforms. [ 07-06-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

>What "evidence"? Selective reasoning >abstracted from a few words from one author? One author ? You obviously did not read my post through or follow up the links I posted The first was an interview of General Depuy (NOT Dupuy the mathematician, he was present during the previous encounter). http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=104 Changing an Army, 1986 (Interview with General William E. Depuy, 1979) Recapping the highlights INTERVIEWER: Did the training programs include live fire? GEN DEPUY: ..... However, the M-l rifle, coupled with the rifle marksmanship program, worked to discourage active firing in combat by the average soldier. He was trained to shoot at and hit a target, but in combat, in the attack, he rarely ever saw a target. So, he was indisposed to shoot. The Germans, on the other hand, used machine pistols which were area weapons. That is, they sprayed the area ahead of them and achieved fire superiority which we now call suppression. INTERVIEWER: Could you overwatch from your hedgerow? GEN DEPUY: We didn’t do that very well. You see, one of our training deficiencies was that almost all suppression was done by indirect fire weapons. Very little suppression was done by small arms. Occasionally, we would use our heavy machine guns. People thought first about mortars and artillery, then heavy machine guns, and finally, light machine guns. Really, they didn’t think much about using riflemen for suppression. They just thought of using riflemen for maneuvering and sharpshooting. The M-l rifle was a precision weapon but there were no precision targets. This problem was not confined to the 90th Division. You have read SLAM Marshall and know that even in the IOlst only 25 percent of the troopers fired.* And, we only had eight heavy machine guns in a battalion. So, it didn’t work very well. We didn’t do direct fire suppression very well in my outfit until the latter part of the war. INTERVIEWER: Was there anything about their tactics, good or bad, that impressed you? GEN DEPUY: Yes, the infantry tactics of the Germans involved a lot of direct fire suppression that our tactics didn’t. They didn’t have as much indirect fire suppression, as much artillery, as we did, but they had mortars, and direct fire suppression, coupled with a lot of movement. The other source at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=143 is Combat Lessons No.3, War Department Pamphlet, 1944 From page p26 (p35 in the Acrobat document) "Use Your Rifle Colonel Harry B. Sherman, Commanding Officer -th Infantry, ITALY: “We have a hard time getting riflemen to use their rifles; they depend on the artillery and other supporting weapons too much. In most cases it would be better if they fired even if there is no visible target. A group of riflemen may be stopped by a German machine gun which they can’t locate, but if they will open fire in the general direction of the machine gun the Germans will usually pull out. I believe that we have placed too much emphasis on fire orders and fire control by unit leaders. Men must be taught to open fire at once in the general direction of any target that is holding them up, without waiting for any squad leader or other individual to tell them to open fire.” ------ Which part of the text above am I misunderstanding ? Gen. DEpuys personal recollections are one thing. If it reaches a War Department publication I'd say the problem is real, compounded and widespread enough to warrant measures to talk the troops out of it. >Sorry, the "evidence" you have presented in >this discussion, and others, is simply a >relrection of your own personal biases. It is not. Who is not being openminded now ? I hate it too when the Finnish army gets belittled and badmouthed. But instead of the denial you seem to show I try to find evidence to counter the claims I feel are unjustified. That is not what I am seeing you doing here. >Have I mentioned that national modifiers >are bad and that CM will never employ such >factors? I think we have discussed it a few times. But this case at hand is the first I have been able to find that is a recorded instance of quantifiable and above all programmable national specific combat behaviour pattern. Too bad it happened to be about US infantry but the tread was about Allied vs German SMG's.

>From my readings it seems that Commonwealth >FOOs did a good amount of 'off-map' firing, >where they would direct the artillery >without necessarily being present at the >location it was needed. There usually was >one FOO attached to every battalion, and he >would always be where the main effort was >undertaken. The Finnish artillery would habitually fire at the sound of the guns. This was because the communications were based mostly on phonelines which went dead very easily. They had a host of preselected targets already plotted as part of the fire plan and the friendly positions were either plotted on the artillery fire mission maps (overlays) or they knew them otherwise. If the FO went off the air the battery commander could and would use his best judgement and he would pick targets and deliver fire missions on them based on the sounds of the battle. If the firing suddenly escalated it usually meant that the friendly positions were being overrun so he would direct fire on and in front of friendly positions at the direction of the heaviest firing. >I heard the UK still uses FOOs, I think the >Germans do, what about other armies? To the best of my knowledge FOO's are used in the Finnish army. So are towed artillery pieces BTW.

>I think the US units not returning fire was >in large part a function of the weapons they >were using i.e. M1 Garand. As Depuy said, it >was a point target weapon, not a suppressor. Not in my opinion. The way I read Depuy it was down to tactics and doctrine. Depuy said that the men were tought, in accordance with prevailing tactics and doctrine, to use it as a point target weapon and not waste ammunition by firing wildly without a clear target UNLESS they were so ordered. To me he comes across as having been turned from that into thinking that the M1 would have been an excellent suppressor if it had been deployed in that manner. >I suspect this is already factored into the >FP rating of the weapon in CM. I suspect it is not. A semi-auto FP rating is better than the bolt action FP. Bullet for bullet. >And in case you think the Germans were >somehow immune to this phenomenon, note that >Dupey's comments talk about German units >suppressing US units with automatic weapons >fire, not bolt action rifle fire The >Germans used a lot of K98 rifles. Yes. But how did the Germans react in a similar tactical situation ? "Hey, somebody is firing at us from that direction with a MG ! Sorry, can't see it. Can you see i..argh. **** this ****, lets call in some arty to flush that speck of woods. Yeah, Rock'nRoll !" No ? I think so too. >In short, the superior German ability to >suppress with infantry fire is already >modeled by giving them a lot more automatic >weapons than the Allies. Yes. But is the suppression sustained by various nationalities in step with this ? Picture this: A German squad (9 men) vs an American squad (12 men), both in covered terrain and advancing, distance 75 meters. The Germans open up first when they spot the US squad before it spots them. What happens next ? Which team in your oppinion prevails and why ? >And I doubt all those Germans with bolt >action K98s were firing more than US guys >with semi-auto M1s, Hmmmmm.... could it be that the MG-42 would keep on suppressing while the other members move closer until they can attack the US position ? That is the way they did it, according to Depuy. And a single shot from a K98k would drive the entire US platoon to ground and they would look for a sniper for minutes before they dare to move on. Is that now modelled in the game ? >so an across the board bonus to all German >infantry (or across the board penalty to all >US infantry) is not warranted. I would go for the across the board penalty so as not to inconvenience the Commonwealth troops too much. I think this is worth a closer look at least, given the weight of evidence. >Correct modeling of weapons effect will take >care of that. Up to a point, yes. >Using regular Germans vs. green Americans >can compensate for any other discrepancy. That would mean that in essence using above average troop quality for the US infantry becomes gamey. How realistic is that ? [ 07-06-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

>This is a universal factor with soldiers. >Under fire many do not fire back but seek >cover. The speed at which they return fire, >and the volume of fire needed to make them >duck are factors of experience and training. Indeed ! A CO of a US Army unit said the training of his troops predisposed them to hold fire until they saw the target clearly enough. And from the tone of his voice we can see that he viewed that as a definitive disavantage when compared to the German troops. If the US troops saw no target they did not fire back. Would soldiers of other armies with similar experience but different training remained unresponsive in similar situation ? >the US Army was the only Army in the world >that tried to do an "Every Gun in Range" >system, using swtiching and routing, >allowing the lowliest Lieutenant to be >assigned control of the largest artillery >barrage. The Finnish army perfected such a "Every Gun in Range" method to a working system during WWII. Only the Finnish army used skilled FO's and a device called korjausmuunnin which facilitated the translation of the fire mission from a single FO to firing solutions in the different batteries in range. With the help of pre-war topological work the Finnish artillery was the most accurate artillery of the entire WWII. http://www.warlinks.com/memories/hyry.htm In the focal point of battle the Red Army had in average 130 to 150 artillery pieces plus 59 rocket launcher barrels per front kilometer, that makes 520 to 900 field pieces plus 230 to 350 rocket launcher barrels for the same 4 to 6 km length of front. However, at Tali-Ihantala the Finnish artillery was able to concentrate the fire of all the 250 guns available in any single target within range in matter of minutes. For your benefit: some gratuitious über-Finn revisionism can be found at http://www.kaiku.com/notcapitulate.html http://hkkk.fi/~yrjola/war/finland/intel/ >This is superior, when it works, to the FO >system since the FO may not be in the right >place at the right time. Provided the boot brown bar at the end of the horn can read a map. How did it go again: "When we fired the Germans ducked, when the Germans fired we ducked. When the Americans fire everybody ducked." >In addition, the US M2HB's long range >suppressive power, and the fact that it was >mounted on almost everything that could >move, allowed US units to pin the enemy in >place and deal with them with artillery. That was not quite as effcetive as you would like to think and it did not work quite like that, according to Depuy. [ 07-06-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

>Many players do indeed buy SMG squads for >their short range firepower - especially if >the QB perameter is heavy trees/farm/rural >setting and even more so if the weather >conditions mean poor visibility. > >But is it not true that allied players under >such conditions nearly always purchase >Americans? If you play with random weather settigs you can not determine the weather until after you have picked your forces. >Not many players would choose British, >Canadian, or Polish since we know that their >infantry cannot cut it at close range >encounters? When used properly even Commonwealth troops do just fine. I'm just finishing (last turn under way) a PBEM QB with 20+ meter LOS (night+heavy fog) and while my infantry did take heavy casualties (no remaining squad has more than 4 men) I have yet to lose a single tank out of 4 I bought while I have taken down 2+ platoons of infantry, AT teams, MG's, a wooden bunker, Jpz-IV with skirts and a late Stug-IV. I have taken all but 1 flag. It remains to be seen how the results look. I currently show 60% victory while my morale is soaring at 30-something.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software: I guess my point was that they did not choose the SMG over the rifle by mistake. The SMG was the optimal choice for this sort of tactical unit for a couple of big reasons. Firepower was one of them. Soviet doctrine is all about hitting hard as well as fast. Dropping 8 men with bolt action rifles off a tank 250m in front of the enemy gets you speed, but it doesn't get you the hard hitting punch necessary for the tactic to succeed against anything but a weak enemy MLR. Therefore, firepower had to have been a consideration when coming up with this tactic. Steve<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> One noteworthy consideration was the fact that the tankriders acted also as protection against enemy infantry AT assets. There was little they could do against AT guns firing from 1000 meters but being armed with the SMG did give them enough firepower to suppress and take out infantry AT teams, even when they had suffered 80% casualties.

>John, also don't forget one other advantage >of a SMG vs. a Rifle -> training. If you >hand someone a SMG and some basic >instructions, then get them into a good >combat position, the chances are that >soldier will do a lot better than the same >soldier with a rifle. I quess that is why the Finnish army gave the SMG's to the BEST soldiers. It was an honour and a privilege to be given a SMG. This does not exactly contradict the point of training but it does raise the question of effectiveness of few SMG's in the hands of the crem-de-la-crem vs a fecesload of SMG's in the hands of average troops.

>OK... Tero asked a lot of questions. He is a >Finn, so this is to be expected The word of God is sancrosanct only if it is accompanied with an impressive array of signs and portents. Coupled with bolts of lightning and cryptic omens. >I'll answer his questions here as a good way >to wrap this up: A few follow ups: >>Care to comment on the US troops tendency >>of not engageing if no clear targets >>present themselves and if or how that is >>modelled into the CM TacAI presently ? > >Not sure what you mean. I think you are >talking about straight forward logic of not >engaging enemy targets unless you have a >good chance of doing some damage. That is >programmed into the TacAI for all unit >types, although weighted differently >depending on the type of unit. I was referring to the remarks by (among others) Gen. Depuy about US troops being predisposed not to returning fire at enemy units unless they could clearly see a target and how that sometimes subjected the US units to become suppressed easier than the enemy units. Your aswer is plausible but it did not answer the question. >There certainly isn't anything that makes US >troops treated differently by the TacAI. >A US Rifle Squad, a German Pattern 44 Rifle >Squad, and a Commonwealth Rifle Squad should >all behave the same. A SMG Squad will >probably act a little differently, but only >because of the range of its weapons. I agree the model works when engageing targets. But what about when being fired on. How, if at all, is the respective "suppressability" of the different nationalities modelled ? Experience level is a factor but I wish Depuy would have explained how the US units went about suppressing enemy units if the tactics and doctrine did not consider the infantry the proper tool for that task. He just said the US troops perfected their method later on. >There is no such thing as a "historically >accurate" KG formation. Agreed. Sorry. The term I was looking for was "historically viable" KG formation. A sort of semiauto-purchase force composition where you get a point pool and some non-tradeable units (infantry ?). You also get to pick some units, like for instance which type of tank you want and wether you wish to trade some of these chooseable assets for, say, more off-map arty or more infantry. >So yes, if there are three unrelated squads >in a fireline, Is that the limit ? I hope not. >fairly bunched up, then a MG >(LMG, MMG, or HMG) will have a greater >chance of affecting all three units more so >than happens in CMBO. The behavior already >exists in CMBO but we decided it needed to >be tweaked upwards a bit more. So in effect the MG's will become more realistic in area suppression ? >Anyway, not to worry... SMG troops will, in >general, be quite inexpensive for the Soviet >player after about 1942 or so. Before then >they were much less common to see. OK >No, we are not going to do this. Combine a >Run and Assault move to achieve this if you >like. The difference in this case between >Run and Rush is too small to justify a new >order. OK. What about more defensive manouvering options, including widrawing to other dircetions than towards your own base line ? And while on the subject: after having experienced some tedious PBEM widrawals I propose an Early End command to fast forward the remaining turns in case you wish to widraw off the map and your opponent does not wish to pursuit. It could go something like this: The player who wishes to pull out presses the Early End command button which orders all remaining units to get out of the map under TacAI using the safest route they can find. The opponent is informed "Our radio intel has picked up a general widrawal command being issued in your sector. Do you wish to Consolidate or Pursuit ?" Picking Consolidate will execute the remaining turns consequtively without any player interference, subjecting the widrawing units to normal TacAI targeting and other battle field phenomenon such as minefields. Any ongoing off board arty fire missions will be executed normally. Picking Pursuit will execute the game normally, with each non-widrawing players turn starting with Consolidate/Pursuit option. >No, there will be no firepower changes to >rifles. We feel the FP is rated correctly, >but the lack of flexibility in how ammo >points are consumed means that we can't have >such firing use up, for example, 0.50 Ammo >Points. We had initially thought that this >wouldn't be a problem, but a year's worth of >playing has shown us that on average there >is a need for a fix. So our choice was to >either increase the FP to account for more >bullets being fired or increase the ammo. >Since increasing the intensity of outgoing >fire at longer ranges would be unrealistic, >and the ammo usage problem would remain, the >obvious solution was to increase Rifle heavy >unit's Ammo counts up a bit. Have you projected how this increased ammo load is going to reflect on the rifle squads close combat abilities ? It will have obvious more staying power but are there any other implications ? >Yes, that is the whole basis of Rarity. Are there any other units that will be affected by Rarity ?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Mannheim Tanker: Actually, this isn't necessarily unrealistic. The standard drill in most armies when ambushed is to assault the enemy position in an effort to disrupt the ambush.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Agreed. But that does involve a certain amount of shooting at the enemy when approaching the cover, doesn't it ?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Mannheim Tanker: Actually, this isn't necessarily unrealistic. The standard drill in most armies when ambushed is to assault the enemy position in an effort to disrupt the ambush.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Agreed. But that does involve a certain amount of shooting at the enemy when approaching the cover, doesn't it ?