Tero

Originally posted by JasonC: You are hosestly trying to maintain that a no tech JU-87 operating over Russia late war had better combat conditions to find ID and KO targets with 12 rounds of 37mm Flak than A-10s did in Desert Storm, by talking down the latter. It is just farcical the lengths to which the fanboys will go. Do you actually read what you write ? It was you who presented the "data" on the kill rates per mission. The conclusion you made yourself talked up the Ju-87. You just replaced the actual kill rate of the Ju by "jack" because anything above 0,1 would have been very close to A-10 actual performance as presented by your numbers. Which is still vastly higher real effectiveness than any non-smart weapon system in history. How do you determine real effectiveness ? Kill per $ ? In contrast, the stuka pilots had to find their targets by armed recce and the seat of their pants, with at best ground unit reports typically 24 hours old as to where there would be action, over a front of a thousand miles, against a numerically superior enemy air force. Funny how you can make the modern "targets of opportunity" seem like mission impossible if you are not equipped with everything but the kitchen sink. How many more times do you think a Stuka had to abort than an A-10 in desert storm? How many more times did they get chased off by fighters (remember, for the A-10 the answer is "zero"). How many times did they fail to find the intended target - if there was one at take off? How many times did they settle for a line of wagons, a train, or an enemy held town? How many times did they come across an enemy force where it was supposed to be when it was supposed to be ? Does anybody honestly think the Ju-87 is going to get more tank engagements per sortie? That is not the issue, is it ? The issue is kills per mission. Gee is AA more likely there during those few seconds or at maverick range, with half an hour to pick your time to fire, if you want it? How many times could they creep up on the enemy by flying NOE and get away with the no tech AA not being able to fire off a single shot ? Only because the AA did not have proximity fuses, radar control and had only a fraction of a second to determine the axix of attack ? Which had more casualties during Desert Storm, RAF or USAF ? Why did RAF have to switch during Desert Storm from "real" low level CAS missions they had trained for for decades to US style mission profiling ? The A-10 can fire 150 rounds in a single 2 second burst, with vastly greater penetration overmatch and inherent accuracy (80% within 5 mils on a test range) - when it isn't using a guided missile powerful enough to destroy anything. "Inherent accuracy" applies when doing max speed at NOE ? Does anybody honestly think the 37mms are going to get more hits or full kills per engagement? The data as presented by you seems to indicate that if "jack" is more than 0,1 then the actual rate was comparable to A-10 performance. Rudel's claims are as high as the A-10 claims, and they are ludicruous. The A-10 claims are *still* high compared to actual A-10 kills, but not ridiculously so. They had gun camera of all of it, they had 24 hour BDA by multiple means, and they still overclaimed. We have surveyed wrecks and known before and after, and full accounting of weapons used. And from it we can deduce the A-10s with all advantages probably did not reach 0.2 tank kills per sorties. How many sorties against how many potential targets across what time period are we talking about here, respectively ? Rudel claims he did with none of those advantages. And the explanation of why is simple - Rudel is a bald faced liar. Based on what ? Has anybody actually been able to actually verify the Soviet army figures you base your claim about Rudels claims being bogus on ? It is a well established fact a kill is not always a kill even if the vehicle is made combat ineffective.

Originally posted by JasonC: A complete air supremacy B enemy fighters everywhere Now, who is buying the propaganda line, hook and sinker ? A total networked C3I B a radio So ? A J-Stars spotting targets B mark I eyeball Both prone to all kinds of spoofing and misidentification. A night vision and IR B dawn patrol See above. Plus the camo discipline was undone by the early mufflers in the machines belching smoke and sometimes flames. A stationary dumb targets B the Russian front The difference being ? A tightly packed target area B the Russian front You are a selfproclaimed expert on EF technics, tactics and doctrine. Given the Red Army tactics and doctrine would you say (and deny your own axioms) that the Red Army deployment stressed dispersal of forces and loose deployment, especially when setting up an attack , thus denying the enemy a target rich environment ? A desert terrain B some steppe, lots of forest Which would mean the A-10 would have failed in Europe in case of a shooting war ? A guided missiles B deflection shooting Deflection shooting against (relatively) stationary targets ? Really ? A HEAT warheads B plain AP Composite armour vs plain steel plate. A cluster bombs B 37mm or dumb frag bomb The Germans did have cluster ammunition available. A 1000 rounds cannon B 12 rounds cannon 675 kmh vs 344 kmh max speed. A 70 rounds per second B 2 rounds per second See above. A claim 0.25 tanks per sortie B claim 0.2 tanks per sortie A actually got 0.1 to 0.15 B actually got jack B got jack only because that is the only way to make the A-10 not look sucky ?

Can't. Scheduled maintenance downtime.

In clip a Stuka is seen making firing passes as described by Neumann. With more than 2 shots per gun fired to boot.

Originally posted by JasonC: There is no reason whatever to think Rudel was anything other than a self promoting Baron Munchausen, talking up his prefered weapon system in an attempt to garner more resources for them and the like. You can't believe a single word he says. There is no reason to. The evaporating tank armies destroyed by air attack that his claims imply, are simply nowhere in evidence in the actual operational history of the war. Gefechtsverband Kuhlmey (using FW-190 and ju-87D) was credited with 200 tank kills during their stint in the Karelian Isthmus front in the summer of 1944. The Finns hold the Stuka pilots in high regard and acknowleged the fact that the Ju-87 was fully capable of disabling massed armour preparing for attack. If you want to enter the debate asto what is considered a kill then be my guest. Kuhlmey planes were material in preventing several attacks by taking out the armour massed armour just before they moved out. This is why I would not cathegorically dismiss Rudels claims off hand as pure BS.

Originally posted by JasonC: There is no reason whatever to think Rudel was anything other than a self promoting Baron Munchausen, talking up his prefered weapon system in an attempt to garner more resources for them and the like. You can't believe a single word he says. There is no reason to. The evaporating tank armies destroyed by air attack that his claims imply, are simply nowhere in evidence in the actual operational history of the war. Gefechtsverband Kuhlmey (using FW-190 and ju-87D) was credited with 200 tank kills during their stint in the Karelian Isthmus front in the summer of 1944. The Finns hold the Stuka pilots in high regard and acknowleged the fact that the Ju-87 was fully capable of disabling massed armour preparing for attack. If you want to enter the debate asto what is considered a kill then be my guest. Kuhlmey planes were material in preventing several attacks by taking out the armour massed armour just before they moved out. This is why I would not cathegorically dismiss Rudels claims off hand as pure BS.

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Originally posted by Redwolf: The problem with the Sherman is that it exposes such a huge amount of front turret armor. Assuming it is the turret front which faces the enemy at all times.

Comparing the sizes IRL http://www.pbase.com/melissakos/image/59789843

http://www.battlefront.com/products/books/wiking/wehrmacht_panzers_intro.html

A few Landsverk Anti AA tanks were used. That's it.

Originally posted by bitchen frizzy: How is domestic consumption relevant to this question at all? Beats me. I (and others here) are arguing that their standards were wrong. I see no reason not to fault the mentality behind the decisionmaking as well as the decisions. They freely decided to conduct a two-front war. It was not forced on them. So if they didn't plan for it, didn't prepare for it, then went to war anyway then that's a damning indictment of their decisionmaking, is it not? Agreed. But the point is all that is hindsight 20-20 and firmly based in the outsiders POV on the situation as they saw it. Yes, they were stupid to start the war on two fronts AND not to mobilize for total war. But total war was not their original intention and between the fall of France and the start of Barbarossa (possibly as far as deglaring war on USA and failure to take Moscow) the situation as seen from the German POV as not being serious enough to warrant going to total war footing. Up to that point they had picked the fights and while it is painfully obvious to us now they were in over their heads their chosen POV and MO did not give them that overall interpretation of the facts at hand. You are the one that introduced a distinction between political and military decisionmaking into this argument, and presented it as an excuse for German failure to fully mobilize. Why did you do that, if you understand that such distinctions don't really exist? Jason thinks it was the manouverism which dictated the German actions when deciding the economical issues. That disregards the fundamental axiom of war being the extention of politics by other means. The goals and the objectives were chosen by the political leadership and all the actions taken were in sync with the political guidelines and not with the military realities. I'm not niggling over rates of increase and so forth. The central question is whether Germany fully mobilized and prepared for war with the Soviet Union. Not just against USSR. When the West campaign was left unfinished the preparations were done according to projections that the British could not mount an attack inside a certain timeframe and in that timeframe the Red Army would be beaten. When the Eastern campaing dragged on the total war mobilization was the only option. Only, by that time the enemies were too numerous and the production increase rate (coupled with the man power attrition) too slow to be able to meet the demands. I'm not clear what point you're trying to make with the comparison to the U.S. Are you arguing the political infeasibility of ramping up the German war economy on par with the U.S. increase? Yes. Hitler had promised the German people an easy, short and victorious war. Total war footing too early would have destabilized the regime. Roosevelt could not coerse the US people (political leadership) to commit to an armed conflict abroad. He used the startagem of helping out the British through Lend-Lease which enabled the preparation of the US production for war footing before the country was actually at war. You are able to diss the British, if you wish. Go right ahead. It's not relevant to the dissing of the Germans, though. Yes it is if you claim the use of stocks instead of steady flow straight from the production line is somehow the wrong approach just because. If the Germans could not feasibly prepare for a two-front war against a larger opponent, then their decision to go to war anyway is faulty. I agree totally. Hitler started by playing chicken with the Western leaders and ended up butting heads with pretty much everybody simultaneously. If they could have done better at preparation for what they knew would be a life-or-death fight, and didn't prepare, then their decision not to fully mobilize was faulty. Faulty decisionmaking: that's the premise. Yes. But the decision was politically motivated. The startegists had determined the extent of preparations and stocks needed to sustain the war effort and that was why the Germans did not make the decision to go to total war footing until everybody else had already gone to total war footing.

Originally posted by bitchen frizzy: What difference to Jason's point does it make if American domestic consumption fell? Goes to the relevance of the German domestic consumption (what ever that is) and how it did or did not fall at what point. The same goes to the British/USSR level of consumption and gearing for total war. Anyway, the United States did introduce civilian rationing almost immediately upon entering the war. Which was when ? December 1941 or when Roosevelt deglared Lend-Lease was in effect (March 1941). Why does it matter where Germany's steel went? It wasn't going to things that go boom. How much went to other war materiel other than armaments ? By definition the percentage of steel going to armaments can not possibly be 100%. If the Germans deemed one shift a day to be "enough at the time," then that was a part of their mistake of not going to full mobilization, wasn't it? Indeed. But I think the guestion has been all along wether or not the decision to go to total war footing at such a late date can be deemed to have been wrong by their standards. They did not plan on going to war on two fronts either. When it was seen they could not quit either front they made the decision to go to total war footing. "Political decision" or "military decision" makes no difference to the argument. The German government decided - "politically" or "militarily" - not to maximize armaments production. How does it matter to this argument how you categorize the decision? War is the extention of politics with other means. And that is what the Anglo-American history writing has consistently ignored. You can not detach military decisions from the political framework. So American production was initially, in large part, a part of Lend Lease. So what? Point is, American production ramped up early - you are admitting that happened even before entry into the war. Again, how is it relevant how you categorize it? Goes to the growth rate of the US military industry. The level they increased from was not from, say, the 1938 level. I would think the German increase rate is different if you calculate it from, say, 1934 to 1944 or from 1941 to 1944. (Years chosen to depict the political leaderships decision to go to war) Maybe the British decision not to produce more tanks was a bad one. Separate argument. What does that have to do with Germany's bad decisions? Goes to the British frame of mind about troops actually landing on British soil. If you diss the Germans for their preconceived notions you have to be able to diss others for theirs. So the Soviets did a lot of things the Germans could have done, but didn't. Wasn't the failure of the Germans to do these things a part of their mistakes in preparing for war? The Germans prepared for war waged in manageable bite size portions. The USSR prepared for global revolt of the working masses while at the same time they geared to be able to defend against intrusions by massive multinational forces (which they had experienced in the 20's during the civil war).

Originally posted by JasonC: She simply did not reduce domestic civilian consumption appreciably until after Stalingrad. How much did domestic civilian consumption fall in the US when she was accelerating war material production ? Just for comparison. 40% of steel output going to armaments 1942. The rest, not. You can not be bothered to actually give us a break down of where that rest 60% of production went ? Plants switching from army output to u-boats in August 1941 because the war in Russia is supposedly already won. That was a bad call. In 20-20 hindsight. At the time the attrition of the army assets was being made up by use of captured stock (which was equal or marginally better than their own gear) while the Kriegsmarine was woefully understocked. In their eyes the switch was justified. German war plant was still only running one shift a day and the work day was 10 hours. That was what they deemed was enough at the time. But no, that program or anything like it was not the reason for limited armaments output in 1940-42. It seems you separate potential from actual measures taken. They are separate and the use of the full potential was a political decision, not a military one. German output barely budged in those years. In contrast, when the US mobilized, current output rose 40% per year, overall, let alone the focused output in armaments. You are not taking into account the fact that at the time the focused output of armaments was done it was preseded by an acceleration to fullfil the pledge to become the Arsenal of Democracy. The increased production war materiel output prior to early 1942 was explained to the US population as being designated for Lend-Lease. That was because Roosevelt had not been able to coerse the US political leadership to commit to armed conflict at that time. The comparison with the US production is valid though because the US political scene (just like the German one) was being prepared for total war while the production was being geared up so that when Roosevelt (Hitler) flicked the switch the production was ready to proceed. It is interesting to note that the US and the German production tempo increased at the same pace and peaked at the same timetable. The US benefitted from the fact that their domestic political preparations and the production facilities were prepared when the country was at peace. The Germans were hurt by the accelerated rate of their plans of conquest which outpaced their domestic political preparations, not their industrial output capacity. They had the same problem sustaining the battle of Britain against UK fighter output, since they tried to wage that one out of a fixed stock rather than an ongoing flow, too. By your reasoning the British decision not to increase the production of tanks at the time was a really bad one. There is a reason the Russians go to 1500 tanks a month in 6 months and the same increase takes the Germans over 3 years, and it is not that the Germans are already fully mobilized for war. What was the Soviet loss rate at the time ? You are conveniently forgetting that the Soviets had centralized planning and control, opted to limit their range of models, standardize the components and accept lower standard craftmanship to keep the production flowing.

Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry: in my honest opinion these modern studies show it beyond reasonable doubt that Germans did plan for long war of attrition and that they had full total war economy very early on. That would tie in with coes depiction of attrition warfare (call it attrition-lite). The conventional wisdom is the total war economy was postponed due to domestic political considerations. That does not rule out actually having a total war economy, the Germans just needed to keep the "business as usual" facade up longer than others. From what I have read the German plans were drawn with the minimum of slack and overestimation or overengineering. The overkill was in a way built in their equipment designs, the actual plans were drawn with the economy of force in mind. When they succeeded they usually succeeded spectacularly and often over projected results. When they failed the failures were equally spectacular and over projected results.

Originally posted by Andreas: I see it as separate, but not disconnected. A matter of taste really. Both errors were required to cock it up as badly as they did. Totally agreed. The URC vs JasonC debate is based on the disareement about what caused these two fatal errors to cohabit the same master plan. IMO URC is more correct because it was not manouverism which inspired the overconfidence. The overconfidence was based IMO on reliance on "scientific and methodolical" calculation and projections. The parameters for these were in turn set down by politicians with little or no heed to long term strategic planning. All was based on the assumption the war would be swift and victorious. With each glorious victory there was no need for long term worst case scenario planning because the battles had been won easily in the tactical level and totally in the political level (and this is where I think Jason loses as he totally discounts the political aspect). The victories were won with minimal resources to boot so Barbarossa planning was only about the extent of the preparations, not the outcome which was a given from the outset.

Originally posted by Andreas: It's still execrable planning, which is the point everyone is making. Agreed. The fact still remains though that the plans were drawn based on data at hand. Before Winter War the facts on the Red Army were: 20 000-odd tanks, millions upon millions of troops, huge airforce, advanced tactics and doctrine (deep penetration as rehearsed with the Germans) etc. Based on that the Germans plans did not call for a confrontation with the Soviets before 1943 (IIRC). After the Winter War the facts were: 20 000-odd tanks all defeatable by the 37mm gun or otherwise totally devoid of combat value due to lack of mobility, huge airforce of dubious combat value, WWI era tactics and doctrine, millions upon millions of dismally and mechanically led troops. That change in the projected abilities of the enemy was the basis the entire idea behind Barbarossa rested. I think there was no command level German officer or political leader who dreamed of war on two fronts before the Red Army showed its abilities against the Finns during Winter War. The Übergermans got it flat out wrong, and not only that, they had themselves convinced by their erroneous assumptions to a degree that they did not even conduct worst-case planning in case they were wrong. That is a separate, inexcusable mistake. IMO that particular error was not separate. It was compounded in the entire train of thought in the minds of the German planners. The Eurpean armies were push-overs. The Red Army was perceived to have been proven to be a paper tiger. What could possibly be the worst case scenario when all the calculations and formulas had already been proven to work, to be accurate and based on valid data ? The war in the West was stagnating and the UK/CW was gearing up and getting an influx of resourced from the Americans. With the Red Army being that weak and guarding huge resourced what was the next logical step but to attack east and beat the enemy there before the West got stronger. With the Eastern resources the American help did not matter, the British were doomed. Anyone not agreeing should easily be able to apply for and get the contract to write Rumsfeld's authorised biography. I think everybody is in agreement with the basics. It is only the motivation and reasoning behind the faulty planning that is being debated.

Does the remark (paraphrasing) "We have to only kick down the front door and the whole edifice will come crashing down" ring a bell ? That pretty well sums up the German take on both the mobilization and projected enemy ability to resist issues. It was not manouverism that was the undoing of the Germans, it was the poor account the Red Army gave of itself during Winter War which accelerated the German plans beyond their (then) present industrial gearing. They did not plan to invade USSR until somewhere in the mid 40's until the Red Army show of force made them rethink their strategy of not going to war on two fronts.

Originally posted by flamingknives: The lack of MG and open turret is only a problem if the vehicle is used as a tank, which it isn't. When used as a tank destroyer, it's not much of a handicap, but more of an advantage (better observation) In close terrain with enemy lurking around you really think it is wise to start exposing the crew to any number of hazards to get better observation (given the doctrine called for outmanouvering the enemy through superior mobility and flank/rear shots) ?

Originally posted by flamingknives: There are few to no German weapons that can harm a Tank Destroyer that cannot also harm a Medium tank. Hand grenade, rifle grenade, small arms fire, splinters and debris from exploding shells. The TD concept wasn't successful? Not sure some round here would agree. Perhaps using them as tanks wasn't successful, but that's not really the concept. The concept entailed tanks did not act as TD's. And that is where the main fault laid.

Originally posted by JonS: * In literal terms, the M10 has less armour than the M4. n people grok that. * In practical terms, the difference is irrelevant. n-1 people grok that. The difference is irrelevant. What was relevant and all important to the tank crews was the fact the "proper" tanks were denied for a long time the proper assets (76mm/90mm gun + hot ammo) they needed to combat the enemy armour in a meaningful manner. The US TD doctrine was an utter failure because it put tanks and the TD in a position where both were in a disadvantage because neither could act properly in the main battle tank role. The German and the Soviet TD doctrine relied on most (all ?) models fielding the same gun (75/76/85/88 mm) which standardized the arsenal and levelled the playing field for all vehicles regardless of the design specification vis-a-vis the doctrinal purpose of the vehicle. You make the TD kill rate into a huge issue when the focus should be concentrated in the tank loss rate which the TD's were doctrinally supposed to prevent.

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: Sure, but the criticisms just seem to be reaching in some cases, as discussed below. As if there has not been any sweeping oversimplyfied generalizing statements made on this very forum. Having said that the claim is not without merit from the grunt POV. And then the US Army gets lambasted for not adopting the 17-pdr due to the "not developed here" school of thought, so they can't win, right? Of course not ! The way the managed to botch up the MG42 changeover what do you expect ? I don't see what is so troubling about "foreign" designs.... Everyone did it. They had to. Perhaps the guy grew weary of the contemporary hype (which bypasses such trivial facts like the origin of some designs) about the ingenious citizen army as it clearly ran contrary to his experiences. But only briefly, until replaced by the superior M1, which was retained into the 1980s . I would not be surprised if that M1 was copied from the Red Army helmet. I would have thought using the best design possible should trump national considerations; not sure why it is an indictment to use "foreign" stuff off the shelf. In his experience the off the shelf stuff was far from being the best in use at the time. Not sure what this has to do with 1941-45? It has to do with the infantry AT capability and how it was improved over the years. Recoilless guns, I suspect - Canada used the 106mm in the 1970s and 80s, but I think the US had them well before that? More battle tanks and mech formations? Doctrine? Most likely. That left the US infantry to its own devices design wise. Not that it mattered much in the post-war years but other armies took the infantry portable AT more seriously than the US. But I think that is a subject that could be hotly debated between a pair of equipment grogs with axes to grind. I don't particularly have one to grind on either side; both armies seem to have done well with their choices. Agreed. Suffice it to say the gits assesment of his gear is his own based on his own experiences and have to be taken as such.

Originally posted by JasonC: Tero - fine let us start with your picked example of his picked example, the Grant. I did not pick it initially. Actually. First, it was known and planned as a stopgap measure from the very begining, while waiting for the Shermans to be finished. ....Gee, did anybody else in the course of the war mount a gun turretless to get a larger gun to fit on an existing hull? Agreed. The M3 design is right there with its contemprory, the Italian M11-39. Gee, it is a good thing the StuG, Jagdpanzer, Hetzer, Jadgpanther, Semovente, SU-76, 85, 100, 122, 152 etc didn't have that problem. These models did not have that ~1,5 meter hull/turret extension over the sponson. He complains the front isn't sloped enough. The least sloped plates are more so than the front of a StuG (or any other German tank before the Panther in mid 1943), and about half the area is sloped at 45 degrees. http://www.wwiivehicles.com/usa/tanks_medium/m3.html The sloped bit is indeed half the area. If you discount the sponson. It is too tall - true enough, at 10 foot 3 it is a whole 6 inches taller than a Panther or a Sherman. What about the height of each model in hull down position ? It was still the best tank on the field at the time it reached the field, and equal to the average on the German side by the time it was withdrawn. It was the best US tank at the time, I'll give you that. Then the claim is either that there was no innovation in the infantry or that all the innovation was in the air force. Actually. In the infantry, bazookas. No they were not left without improvement for 20 years - before the end of the war there were also 57mm and 75mm shoulder mount recoilless rifles, and 105mm jeep mounted ones postwar, and 3.5 inch bazookas in Korea (which were copied from schrecks, copied from zooks). Which is not 20 years. And the replacement for the bazooka was introduced when ? No the Russians did not "go full automatic", they fielded millions of bolt action 5 shot Mosin Nagants. Yes they also fielded PPsh in quantity, the US fielded tommy and grease guns in quantity. The diffence being the Red Army used the subs in the front line, the US Army in the rear echelon. The US also fielded 20 round clip fed carbines, and fully equipped the bulk of the force with semi autos. Which was innovation by any standard. The US army was the only one which could do that due to its industrial capacity. It was not uniquely innovative however since other armies started fielding semiautos at the same time the Garand was conceived. Small arms ammo was also improved. The ammo issue is a matter of taste. The US also fielded WP in quantity for all sorts of weapons, That may be unique. fielded rifled mortars, Not unique fielded AT rifle grenades fired from semi auto, Semi-auto is a redundant qualifier in this statement. AFAIK others had these items too. innovated endlessly in airborne operations, Now you are letting your imagination drift... Been reading Ambrose have we ? fielded pack howitzers air mobile and mountain packed, And nobody else did ? in air-ground liason, Concept copied from the Germans. in organic air assets in the IDs spotting for artillery, Granted. in artillery fire direction (TOTs) HAH ! Even the low tech Finnish arty managed that. and equipment (VT), Could be done with timed fuses too. in radar detection of enemy batteries, Already during WWII ? That is news to me. in walkie talkies (nobody else had anything comparable). That is true. They also supplied independent armor battalions and SP TD battalions and armored cavalry to every infantry division, Stripping the regular armour of the 76mm guns and "hot" ammo in the process. all of them innovations or equippage on a scale the Germans could only dream about. The thing is the Germans dreamed them first, they just lacked the means to implement them. Ask a German if he would willingly swap artilleries with the Americans. No need to. "When the Americans fire EVERYBODY ducks" The places the Americans actually lagged were small unit tactics, night fighting, discipline issues (as in it was always loose and the tight asses this guy is bothered about, his "bullies", weren't a hundredth as mean as they needed to be), and replacement practices (by individual rather than cohort with cadre). He is not finding important matters to highlight possible improvements, he is cherry picking minutae for spin value (he simply thinks the Grant looks silly e.g., or that calling equipment WW I era and old sounds like a plausible indictment). Why? Because he is a crabby git, that's why, trying to send up a pompous atmosphere he despised and taking out his dislike of the war as an event on those who in objective fact kept his sorry ass from being blown to smithereens. IMO he is expressing his POV to contrast the flag waiving exultation of "ingenious citizen soldier army" who admit only "Yes, we had a few minor problems but we overcame them through our own being such cleverly ingenious breed" without actually going through what the actual problems were. The fact that infantry tactics was called "minor tactics" speaks volumes about how highly it was ranked at the time. [ December 21, 2006, 04:17 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: But so what? Goes to the allegations made about the US army copying and manufacturing foreign equipment. Or lack thereof. (ie if it ain't broke, don't fix it) Agreed. But it does not make the fact that they were based on foreign designs go away. As for the "British helmets" you don't know what you're talking about (they weren't British, and they weren't used in combat outside the early battles in the Pacific). British design. Agreed on the use but the British design was nonetheless used. The Enfield Rifle was used in training and only because M-1 Garands couldn't be made fast enough. The Marines used the Springfield early on out of necessity. No contest. But that still does not make the claim about US infantry using foreign based equipment any less valid. The Bazooka most certainly did not go without improvement for 20 years, as improved models were fielded in 1945 and again in the Korean War. AFAIK it was also used in Vietnam. But what was the replacement for it during that 20-odd years ? In case of WWIII how would the US infantry been able to take on the newer breed of Soviet tanks before LAW was introduced ? Personal equipment was well designed except for the lack of a decent small pack; I've owned complete sets of German, American and CW equipment - the German stuff was rickety and held together impermanently by hooks rather than buckling securely together. There was a reason for the design specks being so different. Like that those rickety hooks made it easier to remove and add items as needed.