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Blackhorse

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Posts posted by Blackhorse

    Strykers...and Why I thank god I am not Stryker Infantry

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    sgtgoody,

    Nice series of posts. The challenge with transformation/change is that noone has a crystal ball. You can estimate what future conflicts will look like, but you cannot guarnatee that they will in fact end up that way.

    The interwar years between WWI and WWII, as you mentioned, saw a few nations get it right, but the majority, ourselves included, get it mostly wrong. The key is to be able to adapt and adjust on the fly, while in contact and to work towards ultimately getting it right.

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    Strykers...and Why I thank god I am not Stryker Infantry

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    JasonC,

    Wow.

    You are Brilliant. You are a genius.

    If you are so inclined to send me your resume, I will get it in front of the Chief of Staff of the US Army this week.

    He needs your help.

    Every officer and soldier, from lowly private first class to Lieutenant General, from the past twenty plus years screwed the pooch and you had the answers all along, if only they had asked.

    And you know better now even as we continue to blunder our way blindly and aimlessly through Iraq.

    That's some amazing ****.

    So should we be upset with you for holding back and only posting these pearls on obscure game company forums, or should we expect to see you step up to the plate and contribute in some more tangible way to the success of our Nation during this war.

    Sitting on the sidelines spewing crap and bigoted ideas only goes so far. How about walking the walk. Write a book, write an article for one of our many professional journals, or get a job where you can make a difference. Do something, anything to help.

    Your talents are most definitely being wasted up there in MA.

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    Strykers...and Why I thank god I am not Stryker Infantry

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    James,

    Long time! Glad to see you around.

    Technically, I can be recalled anytime up to 65. I retired out of the Regular Army, so both the Ready Reserve and the Guard are out.

    I was pretty much the same as you (except I was that 11th ACR Blackhorse and a heavy armor all the way, the answer is Abrams and Bradleys type as opposed to the light fighter type).

    Then I too started talking to those that command STRYKER units and the soldiers and NCOs that fight the STRYKERS. I then went and saw them in action and talked more with soldiers and, Bob's your uncle, I too did a 180.

    [ August 05, 2007, 01:55 PM: Message edited by: Blackhorse ]

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    Strykers...and Why I thank god I am not Stryker Infantry

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    Originally posted by AdamL:

    What are the advantages tactically of the Stryker over the Bradley?

    Advantages and disadvantages may change due to conditions.

    In certain conditions, the STRYKER may have greater tactical mobility. Or it may have better RPG protection due to its slat armor. Or it may have better speed giving STRYKER units the ability to reposition faster. Or it may be quieter than the BFV. Or, the STRYKER may be able to continue depite losing a tire, whereas the BFV might not be able to continue due to losing a track. Or it may be the availability of supporting MGS fires or mortars at the STRYKER company level

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    Strykers...and Why I thank god I am not Stryker Infantry

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    If by other specific vehicle you mean the BFV, then my answer is no. I do not believe the STRYKER is necessarily better or tougher. Both vehicles represent different capabilities. each has advantages and disadvantages compared to the other.

    Could we have built a tougher vehicle more cheaply? I don't believe so. That would have entailed a full life cycle acquisition program and those typically last 10 or so years. If the current FCS is any indication, then the cost over-runs may have been substantial. Would the end result have been better? I have no idea. We could very well have ended up with a successor to the BFV. Honestly though, that is speculation and I just don't know.

    Could we have bought something else off the shelf at the time? Yes. We could even have used our numerous mothballed M113s (upgraded to M113A3s or better of course) and realized substantial $$ savings.

    $$ savings aside, after the tests conducted at Ft. Knox in '99 the Army chose the LAV-III as the vehicle for the new Bde concept. The Army tested a wide variety (35 different types) of vehicles back then before settling on the LAV-III.

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    Strykers...and Why I thank god I am not Stryker Infantry

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    And from pages 64-65

    Not only had the brigade documented tactical lessons for future use, it had also cultivated a reputation within CJTF–7 as a highly mobile

    infantry force capable of responding rapidly and effectively to changing operational conditions. The command and its successor had made use of this unique capability again and again, calling upon the Stryker Brigade to take the fight to the enemy not only in northwestern Iraq but also in Samarra,Balad,AnNajaf,Baghdad,and Babil Province. As the unit had conducted those operations,it had also trained Iraqi National Guard units and had carried out numerous civic action programs.

    The Stryker had played a substantial role in the brigade’s success.The 5thBattalion,20th Infantry’s operations officer, Major Baker,who replaced Major O’Steen when he moved up to become battalion executive officer, summed up its unique capabilities. Bradleys “could not have accomplished the mission in as large an area,” he said. “They were not fast enough, they had a much larger logistical tail, and they were not mechanically reliable when traveling great distances. We would have had comparable mobility if we had been equipped with Humvees, but they were inadequate in terms of protection. The soldiers gained a lot of confidence in their vehicles when they realized they had a platform that could take a lot of punishment. It represents just the right mix of light and heavy mentality, providing the Army with a full spectrum of capabilities.”

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    Strykers...and Why I thank god I am not Stryker Infantry

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    The following excerpt is taken from the Analysis chapter of From Transformation To Combat The First STRYKER Brigade at War

    by

    Mark J. Reardon

    Jeffery A. Charlston

    Center of Military History

    United States Army

    Washington, D.C., 2007

    It provides background and unique insights and analyis into the first combat deployment of a STRYKER Brigade.

    At the end of the Cold War in 1991, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Sullivan, understood that the future held many dangers and that the Army would have to transform itself to fit a new strategic mold. Sullivan’s successor,General Reimer,expanded upon the concept. Concerned that the Army’s combat units relied solely upon vehicles such as the M1 Abrams tank and the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle that were too heavy for rapid deployment, Reimer took the first steps to create medium-weight units capable not only of fighting traditional wars but also of responding quickly and effectively to smaller emergencies.

    The job of completing this effort fell to Reimer’s successor, General Shinseki. Since no one could predict with certainty where conflicts would occur or how extensive they would be,the general sought to create a force that would be easy to deploy and supply anywhere in the world and as lethal as in the past. Able to meet a broad range of challenges, it would be versatile enough to shift from irregular to conventional warfare should the need arise. To achieve these goals, Shinseki’s planners decided to equip light infantry units with medium-weight armored systems.The reconfigured forces would possess improved logistical capabilities and the latest communications and intelligence-gathering devices.Their troops would receive arms and equipment designed to enhance their effectiveness in combat.

    When the War on Terror began in September 2001, the Army found that to respond effectively it would have to accelerate its efforts to field medium-weight units. This involved much more than downsizing heavily armed brigade combat teams or reequipping light infantry units with medium-weight vehicles. Doctrinal changes also had to occur, particularly the creation of a basic unit that commanders could deploy quickly and customize to meet particular problems. Since World War I the service’s building block had been the division. Brigades, regiments, and battalions had been divisional components, and field armies and corps had been groups of divisions and their supporting organizations. In the new Army of 2001, however, the ideal component would be the brigade,an organization normally less than one-third of a division,highly

    adaptable, and easy to deploy.

    The Army also altered its outlook on fighting alongside other services. It was no longer sufficient for its forces to accept joint interoperability, an approach that emphasized improving communications between the various services and establishing common doctrine. To function properly, the transformed brigade had to be organized,equipped,and trained along joint-force lines so that it functioned as part of an inter-service team. This would enhance its mobility, intelligence resources, firepower, air support, logistics, and survivability.

    The debate over wheeled versus tracked platforms that followed General Shinseki’s October 1999 Association of the United States Army speech for a time diverted attention away from the Army’s effort to transform itself, but the program continued nonetheless. In November 2000 the service chose the eight-wheeled LAV III, soon to be renamed the Stryker, as its new medium-weight armored vehicle. Transformation proponents also settled upon the Rapid Fielding Initiative as the best means to acquire advanced technologies to meet soldiers’ needs. This permitted the purchase of commercially available products off the shelf to avoid the extended delays often imposed by traditional acquisition processes. It was through this program that the soldiers of the Army’s first transformed brigade, named the Stryker Brigade after its new vehicle, received redesigned body armor and ballistic goggles, personal communications gear, and improved individual weapons-sighting systems that promised to enhance their ability to carry the fight to the enemy.

    The term network centric also sparked much debate as the Army learned more about Transformation. The concept required that each vehicle in the new Stryker Brigade have the ability to connect with all the information systems serving the unit.Under this arrangement, the force’s digital network would be able to share real-time battlefield information with virtually all of its soldiers while also easing and accelerating decision-making at all levels of command. Relieved of many of the burdens associated with continuously gathering information and updating the battlefield situation, unit commanders would in theory be able to focus more of their attention on shaping future events. Army leaders hoped that this capability would extend the new brigade’s capacities enough for it to assume responsibility for an area of operations previously allotted to a division-size organization.

    When the new unit arrived in Iraq, however, theory diverged from operational reality just as soon as the brigade received its first mission to conduct stabilization operations, a process that depended heavily on constant presence rather than rapid maneuver. Added to this were the unforeseen missions of protecting key facilities, training Iraqi units, and safeguarding the newly formed Iraqi government. While the brigade,ably assisted by other elements of TF olympIa, performed all these tasks well, success had its price. The unit had to convert its field artillery battalion and cavalry squadron into de facto infantry units.

    The performance of the brigade during its year-long tour in Iraq became the first step toward validating the Army’s vision of a strategically, operationally, and tactically flexible brigade-based force. The unit’s movement from the continental United States into theater proceeded quickly and effectively, requiring only commercially chartered aircraft and two specialized sealift vessels. At the operational level, the brigade demonstrated its flexibility almost at once by changing missions in mid-stride while deploying from Kuwait to Mosul. It did so without requiring even a small measure of logistical assistance from higher headquarters.

    Over the course of the year that followed, the force repeated the process many times at levels ranging from platoon through brigade. It operated with virtually every major U.S. command in the country, including the 4th Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division, TF olympIa, the 1st Infantry Division, the 13th Corps Support Command, and the I Marine Expeditionary Force. There were, however, limits. When the brigade assumed the mission of the reinforced 101st Airborne Division, it managed to maintain a high level of security in Mosul while continually detaching up to one-third of its infantry to assist units in other parts of Iraq. It could do this, however, only by assigning security responsibilities to units that normally would have never received that sort of mission.

    Since TRADOC planners expected the Strykers to operate for sustained periods over a large area, they were hardly surprised to learn that the operational reach of the brigade often spanned more than two-thirds of Iraq, extending from the upper reaches of the Syrian-Iraqi border in the north to Al Kut and An Najaf in the south. Despite daily challenges, the unit was also able to maintain an extremely high operational tempo. This was a tribute to the individual skills of its soldiers, their equipment, and the logistical system that sustained them.

    The experiences of the brigade’s subordinate units demonstrated that this flexibility extended deep into the organization. The no-notice deployment of TF arrow to An Najaf, which involved rifle companies from three different battalions, highlighted the operational and tactical flexibility of the brigade’s components and the improved ability of Stryker-equipped organizations to sustain themselves logistically. The task force proved itself so capable of reconfiguring its internal organization to meet changing requirements that it interacted as effectively with the 1st Infantry Division as it did with the 13th Corps Support Command and every other unit that its Strykers encountered during their daily 160-mile trip along Highway 1.

    Compared with the battle that occurred in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993, the fight that Stryker Brigade elements fought at Tall Afar on 4 September 2004 served as a good indicator of the progress Army Transformation had achieved. Although the rules of engagement and the friendly and enemy forces involved were not identical, there were clear parallels. Even so, the outcome in each case was different.

    At Mogadishu, U.S. forces were called upon to rescue the crews of two downed Black Hawk helicopters; at Tall Afar, the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry, encountered a similar situation when it had to retrieve the pilots of a stricken Kiowa Warrior. At Mogadishu, the Americans were pinned down overnight by strong opposition. In the end, although they inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, they had to fight their way out on foot at considerable cost. At Tall Afar, the Stryker unit ensured the retrieval of the aircraft and its crew while inflicting serious casualties on the enemy and suffering only a few wounded of its own. Those results were not achieved by good luck or happenstance. Although the enemy gained the initiative when he shot down the Kiowa, the Strykers could move and mass very rapidly. They reached the helicopter first, set up a defense, and overwhelmed the forces attempting to overrun the site.

    The Stryker battalion that fought at Tall Afar had capabilities that the U.S. Army force in Somalia lacked. Although the American soldiers in both engagements had similar skills and equipment,the Stryker-equipped unit also had the advantage of access to real-ime intelligence; responsive joint firepower; mobile, armor-protected combat systems; and shared awareness down to the squad level. The advantages the unit’s communications offered in this case were not always present in its other operations, where the enemy employed weapons and tactics that allowed him to blend easily into the civilian population; but the force’s technological advantages at Tall Afar made a decided difference.

    The crucial test of the Stryker Brigade, and of Army Transformation, did not take place in a laboratory or amid the dusty trails and hills of Fort Irwin’s National Training Center. It came in Iraq, where the soldiers of the Stryker Brigade faced a resilient and dedicated foe. The effort cost the unit over the course of that year a total of 13 combat deaths, 13 noncombat deaths, and some 300 other casualties. The price to its opponents was immeasurably greater.

    The fielding of the initial Stryker Brigade represented but the first step in an ongoing process to change the nation’s Army. The entire force, not just a few select organizations, must be capable of providing combat commanders with well-led, well-trained, and well-equipped fighting units. The scope of this effort becomes apparent only with a realization that the Army is focusing not only on organizational and technological solutions but also on the military culture that gives those attributes their strength: the sum total of the training, education, and leadership qualities of the people who make change happen. Throughout the process, the American soldier will figure large, for he is the centerpiece of the entire organization.

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    Strykers...and Why I thank god I am not Stryker Infantry

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    Originally posted by Bigduke6:

    My opinion, Blackhorse is wrong, Jason is right. That's the short version.

    Bigduke, I agree with you with regards to the article.

    Originally posted by Bigduke6:

    The "Stryker concept" doesn't buy that logic of course - but then the "Stryker concept" has yet to win a war, conventional or otherwise.

    Alone it won't. I'll quote doctrine (FM 3-21.31 The SBCT) again here.

    The Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) is designed to be a full spectrum, early entry combat force. It has utility in all operational environments against all projected future threats. It possesses significant utility for divisions and corps engaged in a major-theater war; however, the SBCT is optimized to meet the challenges of smaller-scale

    contingencies.

    [ August 05, 2007, 12:26 AM: Message edited by: Blackhorse ]

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    Strykers...and Why I thank god I am not Stryker Infantry

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    Originally posted by JasonC:

    My issue is not with a war but with the stupid doctrine currently losing it. A stupid doctrine foisted on us over the last 20 years by the maneuver warfare, lighter faster more deployable, baffle 'em with static on the command net, win in 3 weeks without fighting by being inside their decision loop, crowd. In other words, the background you cite makes me see you as part of the problem, not an expert.

    Your opinion of the military, in particular, those you view as the lighter faster, more deployable crowd is low. I get it. (I never considered myself one, being an armor and ACR guy. And I love the ACR…) If I understand you correctly, The US Army has hosed up its doctrine over the last 20 years. We should have anticipated the situation we currently have in Iraq and as an Army should have prepared for it.

    Originally posted by JasonC:

    Of course I know current US doctrine. I also know many things wrong with it, something apparently inconceivable to you.

    Oookay.

    Originally posted by JasonC:

    Stating that the nation is losing but the army is not shows a profound ignorance of the basic maxims of warfare.

    My point there was that you singled out the Army, I was saying that whatever happens is a collective and shared responsibility.

    Originally posted by JasonC:

    Shall I start with the Russian way of making the point? "The basic condition of the vitality of military doctrine consists in its strong correspondence with the general goals of the state and those material and spiritual resources which it has at its disposal."

    Or would you prefer the classic German formulation, which I presume you can recite in your sleep at the mere mention of his name? Hint, starts with Claus, rhymes with something notoriously missing in our present military direction.

    Here you have more low opinion of the military and its current doctrine. I get it. We were discussing the SBCT originally.

    Originally posted by JasonC:

    As for the cut and paste from the BCT sales brochure, it is utter bromide and fails to say a blessed thing. I just love the part about decisiveness at the infantry company level, that is priceless.

    We’ll never agree then, because that cut and paste is directly from Army doctrine (FM 3-21.31 The SBCT); doctrine that you the research analyst find amusing. The doctrine is what it is, and your opinion is what it is. Oh well. We were discussing the SBCT originally, and there may be some folks here who are not aware (unlike you who are intimately aware of) US Doctrine with regards to the SBCT. Again, you find it laughable and absurd. Others might not. Who is to say? The SBCT being the original topic of discussion, the words of the doctrine are applicable.

    Originally posted by JasonC:

    But the mish mash that is light enough to lose to a tank army because it was once supposed to be deployable but isn't really, but is adequate against light militias though not quite as good as ordinary heavies - that sort of capability one pays 10 figures for, only because those on the other end of the paying think it a capital idea.

    You still haven't explained how a BCT is better than an ACR at anything. Of course the ACR would also be up commo'ed and all that.

    I never said the BCT was better than an ACR. I’ve stated all along the SBCT has capabilities the HBCTs, BCTs, and ACR do not have and vice versa.

    Originally posted by JasonC:

    Since you disclaim all responsibility for the tangle that is present US doctrine, and barely seem to even recognize major features of it, or that they are debatable and forcefully debated, I'll spare you the actual strategy lesson.

    Unless you ask are actually interested. (I assume this is a mere exercise in weapon-system apologetics for you, and you have no real professional interest in learning the military art, or noticing how the men around you are royally bolixing it up...)

    Yeah ok whatever. We were originally talking about the SBCT. This last quoted bit is pure hubris. Debate is indeed good and necessary. I’m not a weapon system apologist, and you, sir, are arrogant for assuming to know my professional interests.

    We went from the SBCT to Iraq and the current strategy there…good one. The original topic was about the SBCT. Why are you only a research analyst and not someone making decisions somewhere a’la DoD or as a general in the Army? You seem to have it all figured out.

    [ August 05, 2007, 12:27 AM: Message edited by: Blackhorse ]

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    Strykers...and Why I thank god I am not Stryker Infantry

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    Originally posted by JasonC:

    Shall I explain to you why you are losing the war in Iraq? Or should we start with, "that" you are losing the war in Iraq? (Hint, you have an objectively inferior military doctrine).

    How is that rapid victory in less than 3 weeks winning without fighting by baffling them with static on the command net, working out for you? Smashing success in all respects? Wouldn't change a thing?

    How is the whole maneuver warfare theory proving as a grand strategy? (We all got the tactics stuff oh about 64 years ago). Are you von Manstein yet, or are you just approaching his long-run won-loss record?

    For starters, nice, real nice. So your actual issue is with the Iraq War , not necessarily the STRYKER. Sorry, don't have my nice Latin fallacy sheet handy to impress.

    1. I have about as much influence over this war as you do. Read Cobra II and Bush at War for more information on how our Nation goes about planning for wars and campaigns and the roles of current and past people whose names you'll recognize.

    2. If the war is being lost in Iraq, it's not the Army that's losing it, it's the nation. There is so much more involved than Army units patrolling neighborhoods in Baghdad and Ramadi. State Department, USAID, NGOs etc, companies back here, all have a hand in this.

    3. Maneuver Warfare Grand Strategy? What are you on about? That is not our doctrine. I'm not sure where you got that.

    4. I don't believe you know what current Army doctrine is. If you do, then so be it, you do. Some of the things you say lead me to believe otherwise. I'm not even sure how Von Manstein comes into play. As an FYI, these days we're studying past insurgencies.

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    Strykers...and Why I thank god I am not Stryker Infantry

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    Sure Jason, ignore the fact that I called you out on your saying, and I quote

    You are behaving like a buffoon, trying to lecture men who know far more about the matter than you do, as though they are idiots. We aren't.
    If you don't expect that to get a rise out of anyone, then what do you expect. Biased nonsense? Where and when. I've presented the doctrinal position and I've worked with STRYKER soldiers. How is that biased? It isn't and you know it.

    Our doctrine, with regards to STRYKERs and the SBCTs states,

    The Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) is a full-spectrum combat

    force that provides division, corps, or joint task force commanders a

    unique capability across the spectrum of conflict. The SBCT balances

    lethality, mobility, and survivability against the requirements for rapid

    strategic deployability. The SBCT’s cavalry squadron (reconnaissance,

    surveillance, and target acquisition [RSTA]); robust intelligence,

    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) integration capability; and

    combined arms infantry battalions ensure its versatility across the full

    range of operations (offense, defense, stability, and support). This chapter

    highlights the capabilities and limitations of the SBCT, discusses likely

    scenarios in which the SBCT may be employed, and provides an overview

    of the SBCT’s organizational structure.

    The SBCT’s operational

    capabilities are

    • Combined arms assault in the close fight.

    • Mobility.

    • Reach.

    • Enhanced common operational picture (COP).

    • Lethality.

    • Force protection and survivability.

    • Joint, multinational, or interagency operability.

    • Full-spectrum flexibility and augmentation.

    • Simultaneous operations.

    Doctrine states for the Combined Arms Assault in the Close Fight that:

    1-1. COMBINED ARMS ASSAULT IN THE CLOSE FIGHT

    The SBCT achieves decisive action with combined arms at the infantry company level by

    applying the effects of direct fires from the mobile gun system (MGS), indirect fires from

    mortars and artillery, and joint effects of other services to support the infantry assault.

    I can provide additional doctrine if necessary, but you get the point. Somewhere between the Light Infantry Divisions (82nd, 101st, 10th Mtn, 25th ID) and the heavy Divisions. Actually we should be talking BCT and HBCTs nowadays, lie the SBCTs.

    The STRYKER is deployable on the C-130. It is not deployable with its add-on armor package installed. That requires time once landed.

    You can say the decision was stupid all you want, but upon what do you base that? Your gut instincts? A personal preference you have to maybe the M113 or the ACR or whatever? That is bias. I urge you to get out and talk to the soldiers and commanders that use these things.

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    Strykers...and Why I thank god I am not Stryker Infantry

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    LOL.. good one Jason.

    Jason,

    I'm not entirely familiar with your intimate knowledge of the Armed forces, To say that I'm a buffoon for lecturing "men who know far more about the matter than you do" is comical.

    Look Jason. I've spent over 20 years in the Army, as an Armor Officer. I've commanded in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Don't lecture me on the merits of the ACR over the SBCT. Been there done that...Apples and Oranges. When were you in the Blackhorse Regiment? Maybe I'll remember you?

    You are the one acting the idiot. You know not what you speak. Next time you want to come across as knowing what the heck you're talking about, do some real, un-biased research. and be damn sure you talk to the soldiers.

    [ August 06, 2007, 10:10 PM: Message edited by: Blackhorse ]

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    New member of the Stryker familiy?

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    Originally posted by jens198:

    </font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Blackhorse:

    If, on the other hand, you're trying to impress us with your screen capture and image posting skills, then drive on; you're knocking us all off our feet with your skills.

    That's what I had in mind actually. I'm glad that finaly someone honored my screen capture and image posting skills.

    Jens </font>

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    Strykers...and Why I thank god I am not Stryker Infantry

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    Originally posted by JasonC:

    The Stryker is a glorified BTR. Nothing revolutionary about it, and a ridiculous price tag.

    Better comms (which time gives anyway) and the remote weapon station (which is modular and can go on lots of stuff) are the only advances. For what was paid for them, distinctly underwhelming.

    As for the endlessly repeated assertion that they only replace lighter stuff, it is nonsense. They suck up $5 billion up front and about as much again operating, and use the soldiers manning them, all of which could fund as much heavy stuff at least as easily etc.

    Anyone seriously want to try to maintain that the medium force with them is better than the heavy force with Brads? As in, show me in game? Didn't think so.

    But we have them now and they are in the game. So we use them or we have fun blowing them up as OPFOR (grin).

    Spoken like one who has never been on one...have you ever been on one? have you ever talked to soldiers from the SBCT?

    Do you discount the concept of strategic mobiblity?

    The assertion that the STRYKER replaces Light "stuff" is not nonsense. It is fact. How can you honestly claim that it is nonsense? Upon what do you base such a claim? pricetag alone? Bollox.

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    Strykers...and Why I thank god I am not Stryker Infantry

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    The Russian viewpoint is skewed because they are comparing it to their own BTR/wheeled concepts. They should be comparing the SBCT to their light ionfantry Brigades. Then, and only then does one understand what the capabilities STRYKERs bring to the light infantry.

    The key point that is being missed is that the STRYKER concept is applied to light infantry; Infantry that formerly had only boots for mobility and body armor for protection.

    Taken in that context, the entire Russian analysis is flawed and worthless.

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