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Blackhorse

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    Russian Tanks Invade Georgia

    in General Discussion Forum

    Posted

    BigDukeSix,

    It is most incredible and awesome that you are able to provide such interesting and insightful first-hand accounts. Many many thanks for that. I'm sure you have been in a bit of danger on an occasion or two.

    If I may ask, what brings you into the area of operations and into such close proximity with the two Armies?

    Stay safe and warmest regards,

    BH

    0

    what order should you launch/land airstrikes in a carrier game?

    in General Discussion Forum

    Posted

    Here is the Japanese account taken from here:

    http://www.history.navy.mil/library/special/midway.htm

    Office of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy

    June 1947

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the fifth anniversary of the Battle of Midway, the Office of Naval Intelligence publishes the official Japanese action report of this engagement, recently translated under the supervision of the Naval Analysis Division, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, and here available in English for the first time.

    Although this document is not perfectly complete (part IV for example is missing), it is believed that nothing of any importance will be discovered in the future to change the story in any of its essential details. The report was prepared in the first place under difficulties. It must be remembered that the war diaries of many of the ships engaged, their charts and other valuable papers were lost as a result of the ships having become "inoperational," in the Japanese euphemism.

    There is nothing to indicate that the Japanese were not perfectly frank in this report. It was intended only for the highest echelons in the Japanese Navy and Government, and was guarded very closely throughout the war. There have been no alterations or corrections, omissions or additions to this report, beyond the supplying of a few clarifying footnotes.

    PART III. DESCRIPTION OF THE OPERATION

    1. Direction of Operation by the Commander and his Movements

    The Mobile Force departed Hashira Jima at 0600 17 May. Maintaining strict anti-sub screen and a rigid radio silence, the force headed for the area to the northwest of Midway following course 1 as given in Mobile Force Secret OpOrd 35.

    On 1 and 2 June,4 all ships were refueled.

    Visibility steadily decreased from about 1000 2 June so that by 2300 on the 3d, all ships were being navigated blindly. No visual signals could be employed during this period. Since there seemed little likelihood of the fog's lifting, the radio was used as a last resort at 1030 on the 3d (long wave) to give change of course.

    Shortly after this, the fog lifted somewhat, making visual signals barely possible. By the morning of the 4th visibility on the surface improved greatly, but there were scattered clouds overhead.

    At 1640 the Tone reported sighting about 10 enemy planes bearing 260 degrees. Three fighters immediately took off from the Akagi in pursuit of these but they were unable to sight the enemy. There is some element of doubt in the reported sighting.

    At about 2330 on the same day, the Akagi twice sighted what was thought to be enemy planes weav-

    --6--

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ing in and out of the clouds. All hands were immediately ordered to battle stations. There is considerable doubt as to the reliability of this sighting.

    At 0130 on the 5th,5 under command of flight officer of the Hiryu, Lieut. Tomonaga, Organization #5 composed of 36 ship-based fighters, 36 ship-based bombers, and 36 ship-based torpedo planes, took off to attack Midway.

    Between 0130 and 0200, 1 ship-based torpedo plane each from Akagi and Kaga, 2 Type 0 Float Recco each from Tone and Chikuma (distance 300 miles, to the left 60 miles) and 1 Type-95 Float Recco from the Haruna (distance 150 miles, to the left 40 miles), took off in search of enemy task forces to the South and to the East.

    From about 0230, two to three enemy flying boats maintained continuous contact with us.

    Shortly after taking off, the attack unit was contacted by enemy flying boats. When about 30 miles short of the target on Midway, the above mentioned flying boats suddenly dropped illumination bombs over our attack plane units to attract overhead cover fighters.

    Thereafter, while engaging in bitter air combats, bombs were dropped on military installations on Midway between about 0345 and 0410. Fires resulted. All but 2 ship-based fighters, 1 ship-based bomber and 3 ship-based torpedo planes returned to their carriers by about 0600.

    After our attack unit had taken off, enemy flying boats maintained contact with us. At about 0400 the first enemy wave attacked. From then until about 0730, the enemy attacked almost continuously. We counter attacked with fighters and AA fire and were able to bring most of the attackers down by 0645. About 30 carrier-based bombers then attacked us resulting in fires aboard the Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu, forcing them to fall behind and leaving only the Hiryu untouched.

    Prior to this and subsequent to the take off of the initial attack unit, the fleet had Organization Number 4 (ship-based torpedo planes) stand by in readiness to act against any enemy surface vessels. However, at 0415, the command plane of the Hiryu radioed that:

    "There is a necessity for carrying out a second attack (0400)."

    It was decided, therefore, that a second attack would be directed against Midway. Orders were issued for the ship-based attack planes to remove their torpedoes and replace them with #80 land bombs.

    At about 0500, Tone's #4 plane reported:

    "Sighted what appears to be the enemy composed of 10 (ships), bearing 10 degrees, distance 240 miles from Midway, on course 150 degrees, speed 20 knots (0428)."

    Two subsequent reports concerning the weather (0440) and the enemy's course and speed (0455) were received but since we had not been advised of details, the plane was ordered to:

    "Advise ship types."

    At 0530, Tone's plane reported:

    "The enemy is accompanied by what appears to be a carrier in a position to the rear of the others (0520)."

    and again at about 0540:

    "Sight what appears to be 2 cruisers in position bearing 8 degrees, distance 250 miles from Midway; course, 150 degrees; speed 20 knots (0530)."

    Thus, it was definitely established that enemy carriers were operating in the vicinity. The following dispatch was, therefore, sent to CinC Combined Fleet:

    "(Info: CinC 2nd Fleet) At 0500, the enemy composed of 1 carrier, 5 cruisers, and 5 destroyers, was sighted in position bearing 10 degrees, distance 240 miles from Midway. We are heading for it."

    Under orders issued at 0415, the ship-based attack planes were already being re-equipped with #80 land bombs which made immediate take-offs of the ship-based attack planes in Organization Number 4, impossible. It was therefore decided that we would await the return of the Midway attack unit and then carry out a grand scale air attack. The Fleet was advised as follows:

    "After taking on the returning planes, we shall proceed north to contact and destroy the enemy task force."

    This was sent at 0605.

    In reply to this CarDiv 1 advised that its ship-based attack planes (torpedo equipped) would be ready for the take-off at 0730 and CarDiv 2 that its ship-based attack planes (to be equipped with torpedoes upon their return from the first attack), would be ready for the take-off by from 0730 to 0800. Subsequent to this, every effort was made to expedite completing preparations for the take-off of Organization Number 4. (Akagi: 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based attack planes. Kaga: 3 ship-based fighters; 27 ship-based attack planes. Hiryu: 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based bombers. Soryu: 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based bombers).

    --7--

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While we were engaged in this, the enemy struck. Communication facilities were knocked out of all damaged ships. There was little likelihood of the fires being extinguished in the immediate future. For these reasons, I decided to direct the operations from the Nagara, and transferred to her at 0830.

    After our ships had been damaged, the commander of CarDiv 2 decided to carry out the attack against the enemy carrier sighted by Tone's float recco plane. At 0758, Hiryu's attack unit (6 fighters and 18 bombers) took off and carried out the attack. Direct hits by 5 #25 ordinary and 1 land bombs were scored on an Enterprise class carrier, inflicting serious damage to her (possibly sinking her).

    Prior to this, at 0530, a type 13 experimental ship-based bomber from the Soryu was ordered to maintain contact with the enemy carrier but due to break-down in radio facilities, it was not known until the return of this plane that, in addition to the aforementioned, there was a task force which had as its nucleus a carrier of the Enterprise class and another of the Hornet class. This task force was operating in waters to the north of the other one.

    With this information at hand, the Hiryu attack unit (4 fighters and 9 torpedo planes, supplemented by 2 fighters from the Kaga and 1 torpedo plane from the Akagi) was ordered to the attack. Three torpedo hits were scored on a carrier of the Enterprise class, seriously damaging her. Heavy damages were also inflicted on a heavy cruiser of the San Francisco class.

    NOTES

    Report of Chikuma's recco plane at 1413, 5th:

    (a) Sighted an enemy carrier of the Enterprise class listing and stopped in position 30-15N, l76-50W. (No evidence of fire. No damage to flight deck.) Three cruisers and 5 destroyers were in the vicinity. At about 1420, leaving the carrier on the scene, the others proceeded eastward on course 80 degrees, speed 20 knots.

    (B) Sighted 2 enemy carriers (Yorktown or Hornet class) at 1510, in position 30-23N, 176-05W. Each was being directly escorted by 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers. Distance between the two groups, 3 miles; course 270 degrees; speed 12 knots.

    © Two other carriers (class undetermined) escorted by 5 cruisers and 6 destroyers sighted at 1516 in a position about 4 miles to the south of the others. Course 260 degrees, speed 12 knots.

    (d) Since the above sightings were made by the #2 plane while it was proceeding southward on a course of about 180 degrees from about 1500, and were seen one after another along this line, there is no chance of duplication.6 Moreover, sightings described in (B) and © above, were from below cloud level, or at about 300 meters altitude.

    Judging from these reports, it seemed probable that the carrier damaged by torpedoes remained adrift until the following morning.

    Subsequent searches failed to locate the carrier damaged by 5 ordinary bombs and 1 land bomb.

    From these evidences, it was possible to estimate that one carrier was sunk by bombing while another was seriously damaged by torpedoes. The damaged carrier was sunk the following day by submarine torpedoes.

    The three attacks resulted in the loss of most of Hiryu's attack unit. At 1240, she only had 6 fighters, 5 bombers, and 4 torpedo planes left. Contact was maintained, however, with Soryu's Type 13 experimental ship-based bomber (the plane which was ordered to the Hiryu because of fire on board the Soryu after returning from reconnaissance). Preparations were pressed for a fourth attack, aimed at the destruction of the Hornet class carrier.

    During this time, the Hiryu had the planes of her air cover maintain constant cover. At 1403, at the very moment when a type 13 experimental ship-based bomber was about to take off, the Hiryu was subjected to dive bombing attacks from 13 enemy ship-based bombers. The Hiryu, also, broke out in flames.

    Damages to our carriers up to this time were as follows:

    (a) AKAGI

    The enemy attack unit which carried out a sustained attack from about 0400 was almost totally destroyed by friendly cover fighters. Up to 0650, our surface units had suffered practically no damage and the skies were clear of enemy planes.

    At 0700, the second wave struck. Fourteen enemy torpedo planes, splitting into two groups approached from the northwest. One group carried out a torpedo attack against the Kaga and was followed up with several planes dive-bombing her.

    At 0706, enemy torpedo planes were sighted bearing 118 degrees. To minimize the target area, the Akagi turned to course 300 degrees and stayed on this course. At a time when all of our surface

    --8--

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    units had maneuvered themselves into maximum defense against the torpedo planes, enemy dive bombers were suddenly noted among the clouds overhead at 0726. Resorting to evasive tactics, every effort was made to avoid the bombs, but one direct hit was sustained on the aft rim of the lift amidship and another on the rear guard of the port flight deck. (Neither were fatal hits.)

    Since the Akagi was at the time preparing to carry out the second attack, the fire spread over the entire hangar area and with induced explosions, the fire gradually moved from the aft quarters, forward with great intensity, spreading even to the immediate vicinity of the bridge.

    Ammunition rooms were immediately ordered flooded, and all hands were ordered to fire-fighting stations. The pump system aboard, however, failed to function and it became apparent that the fire would not be extinguishable in the immediate future. The headquarters, therefore, was moved to the Nagara at 0746. Subsequent to this, every effort was made to bring the fire under control but it became increasingly evident that there would be little hope of success.

    At 1038, the Emperor's portrait was transferred to the destroyer Nowake. By 1620, the situation was deemed hopeless, and the captain of the Akagi decided to order all hands to abandon ship. A report to that effect was made to the commander of the Mobile Force and the order was issued at 1625. Personnel began transferring to the destroyers Arashi and Nowake at 1700. At 1925 CinC Combined Fleet ordered: "Delay disposition." While standing by awaiting further orders, CinC Combined Fleet ordered: "Dispose," at 0150 on the 6th. In accordance with this order, the ship was scuttled at 0200, in position 30-30N, 178-40W.

    (B) KAGA

    Against enemy torpedo plane attacks which were carried out after 0400, AA fire and evasive action proved completely successful. While still engaged in evasive action at about 0715 against the persistent enemy torpedo planes, 9 enemy dive bombers were suddenly sighted among the clouds at 0722. Every effort was made to counter these through evasive action and AA fire cover. These efforts were successful against the first, second, and third bombs, but #4 hit starboard, aft, while #7 was a direct hit in the vicinity of the forward elevator. Glass on the bridge was shattered and because of the smoke from the bombs, visibility from that point was reduced to zero. The captain ordered emergency steering apparatus put in operation. Bomb #8 hit in the vicinity of the forward elevator. Practically nothing of the bridge remained after this hit. All persons who were on the bridge at the time, including the captain, were killed in action. Bomb #9 also hit amidship. Fire-fighting was conducted under the direction of the air officer, but since there seemed to be little hope of getting the fire under control, the Emperor's portrait was transferred to the Hagikaze at 1025. The situation became hopeless by 1340 and all hands were ordered to abandon ship. They were transferred to the destroyers Hagikaze and Maikaze. The fire on board spread to both the forward and aft fuel tanks by 1625, causing two great explosions and the ship's sinking. Position of Kaga's sinking: 30-20.3N, 179-17.2W.

    © HIRYU

    Fire broke out as a result of dive-bombing attacks by 13 enemy dive bombers at 1403. From then until 1803 she resorted to evasive action under battle speed #1, while efforts were made to escape from the battle area and to fight fires. The flames could not be brought under control, however, and the fires killed one man after another in the engine rooms until further operation of the ship became impossible. Telephone communications with the engine rooms were maintained until the last. The manner in which the engine room personnel from Engineer Commander Kunizo Aimune down to the last man, carried on in the face of death which finally overtook them, can only be described as heroic.

    The ship's list, due to shipping water, constantly increased to about 15 degrees.

    At 2058, it seemed as if the fires might be brought under control, but at that time there was another induced explosion and the fierce fires were rekindled. It became evident that further fire-fightng operations were useless and all hands were ordered to prepare to abandon ship at 2330. At 2350 Captain Tomeo Kaki and Squadron Commander Rear-Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi delivered messages to the crew. This was followed by expressions of reverence and respect to the Emperor, the shouting of Banzai's, the lowering of the battle flag and command flag. At 0015, all hands were ordered to abandon ship, His Imperial Highness' portrait removed, and the transfer of personnel to the destroyers Kazagumo and Makigumo put underway. The transfer of portrait and men was completed at 0130.

    --9--

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After completion, of the transfer operations, the Division Commander and Captain remained aboard ship. They waved their caps to their men and with complete composure joined their fate with that of their ship.

    At 0210 the Hiryu was scuttled by torpedo (1) from the Makigumo. Position of Hiryu's scuttling: 31-27.5N, 179-23.5W.

    (d) SORYU

    The Soryu was attacked by 13 dive bombers from 0725. Three hits were scored on her at 0725, 0726, and 0728. By 0730, the fires quickly spread and caused induced explosions from the bomb-storage room, torpedo-storage room, AA and machine-gun-ammunition rooms as well as from gasoline tanks. Fires enveloped the entire ship in no time. By 0740 both engines had stopped. At 0743, attempts were made to steer her, but with the entire ship in flames, she was helpless. "Abandon ship" was ordered at 0745.

    While most of the officers and men, including the Executive officer, had congregated on deck, having been forced to leave their posts due to the flames, a terrific explosion occurred. The explosion sent them flying into the water.

    Every effort was made to pick these men up and put them on the forward deck. Medical aid was given those needing it there. Transfers to the destroyers Hamakaze and Isonami were completed at about 1600.

    As soon as the fires broke out aboard ship, the captain, Ryusaku Yanagimoto, appeared on the signal tower to the starboard of the bridge. He took command from this post and pleaded that his men seek shelter and safety. He would allow no man to approach him. Flames surrounded him but he refused to give up his post. He was shouting "Banzai" over and over again when heroic death overtook him.

    Fires died down somewhat by about 1600, and the air officer who was the acting commander, organized fire fighters with the intention of reboarding the ship. However, the ship sank7 at 1613 and there was a great underwater explosion at 1620.

    Position: 30-42.5N, 178-37.5W.

    At 0828, after the headquarters had been transferred to the Nagara, a plane from the Chikuma reported: "The enemy is in position bearing 70 degrees, distance 90 miles from us (0810)." It was decided that the enemy would be destroyed in a daytime attack. Therefore, the following order was issued at 0853: "We are now going to attack. Assemble." At 0900, our course was set at 60 degrees, speed 16 knots; at 0945, course 0 degrees, speed 20 knots; 1000, speed 24 knots.

    At 1045, the enemy changed its course to 90 degrees and the opportunity for battle seemed to be close at hand. Somewhat later, Tone's #4 plane reported: "The enemy is in position bearing 114 degrees, distance 110 miles from my position of 1230." From this it became evident that the enemy was trying to put distance between himself and us.

    It was deemed that if under these conditions, the enemy chose to strike, we would be at a distinct disadvantage in that we would be unable to carry out a decisive battle.

    We, therefore, turned about and proceeded westward, with the expectation of destroying the enemy in a night encounter.

    Prior to this, at 1120, the following order was issued to the Second Mobile Force:

    "The First Mobile Force is in (grid) position TO E WO 33 at 1100, 5th. After destroying enemy striking force to the east, we plan to proceed northward. The Second Mobile Force will rendezvous with us as soon as possible. Our (grid) position at 1130 will be: YU YU KE 44, on course 285, speed 24 knots. Plan to rendezvous with Landing Force at 1600."

    While thus laying plans for the night attack, the Hiryu also broke out in flames at 1405. That meant that while all four of our carriers had been lost, the enemy had at least one. Moreover, as long as we were in the operational radius of their shore-based air, we would be at a very distinct disadvantage.

    By 1433, the enemy began to retreat to the east on course 70, speed 20 knots, which further reduced our hopes for a night engagement. However, we still were determined to carry it out. Nagara's plane was ordered to prepare for a take-off and all the ships were ordered to assemble in the vicinity of the Nagara. At 1450, CinC Second Fleet, issued the orders for the night battle.

    At 1530, the commander of DesDiv 4 ordered the destroyers under his command to stand by the various carriers assigned to them and to protect them from enemy submarines and task forces.

    At about this time the commander of the Chikuma made the following report: "This ship's #2 plane reports that at about 1530 he sighted 4 enemy carriers, 6 cruisers and 15 destroyers proceeding westward in a position about 30 miles east of the listing and burning enemy carrier."

    0

    No romance in Yanks...

    in General Discussion Forum

    Posted

    Mark Twain definately heard of number three, e.g., A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court.

    Per'aps lad, but Mark Twain weren't from the North were he?

    Salty's point three was that "Inside the Northern states, "Yankee" means an inhabitant of New England." i.e. That people in New York and New Jersey and Pennsylvania and Delaware referred to New Englanders as Yankees, but not themselves as such. That's just not accurate. Plenty of New Yorkers and New Jersians and Pennsylvanians refer to themselves as Yankees too.

    That's also sort of where the New York Yankee reference comes in to play.

    As for the reference to the great EB White...I believe that was meant in jest..which may have been the effect Salty was striving to achieve. dunno.

    0

    No romance in Yanks...

    in General Discussion Forum

    Posted

    I'm sure I've posted this before, but AIUI the guide to usage of "Yankee" is:

    Outside the United states, "Yankee" means an inhabitant of the USA.

    Inside the United States, "Yankee" means an inhabitant of the Northern states.

    Inside the Northern states, "Yankee" means an inhabitant of New England.

    Inside New England, "Yankee" means an inhabitant of Vermont.

    Inside Vermont, "Yankee" means somebody who eats apple pie for breakfast.

    All the best,

    John.

    The first two sure..

    the last three...methinks you've kissed el Blarney Stone a few too many times.

    I've never in my 44 years as a US citizen (Many spent growing up in New Jersey and New York) heard of those. I'm also pretty sure the New York Yankees and their fans would take issue with the "New England" (Boston Red Sox home turf) bit.

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    No romance in Yanks...

    in General Discussion Forum

    Posted

    Sherman, Pershing, Stuart, Lee, Patton, Abrams, Bradley..

    Shilelagh, Javelin, Dragon, Stinger,

    Voodoo, Walleye, Valkerie, Thunderbird, Starfighter, Galaxy, Hercules, Starlifter, Mule, Blackbird, Black Widow, Mustang, Warhawk, Corsair, Wildcat, Hellcat, Helldiver, Dauntless, etc....

    Come on, those are cool names (mostly)

    And I agree..NEVER name anything Invincible.

    0

    Air raids on Berlin... in WW I?

    in General Discussion Forum

    Posted

    From here:

    http://www.firstworldwar.com/airwar/bombers_britain.htm

    In October 1917 Hugh Trenchard, commander of the RFC in France, was ordered to commence a strategic bombing campaign against German industrial targets. To this end the 41st Wing was formed, taking squadrons from both the RFC and the RNAS. The 41st flew DH4s, O/100s and the venerable Fe2B pusher which was proving its worth as a night bomber and ground strafer. They later began re-equipping with the O/400, an improved version of the O/100 with a 910 kg (2000 lb) bomb load and a range of 965 km (600 miles).

    For the first few months the 41st wing concentrated on attacking local targets, but they made their first long-distance raid when 10 Handley-Pages attacked the towns of Mannheim and Ludwigshafen.

    By February of 1918 they were capable of mounting the first "round the clock" bombing raid, against the town of Trier, with the DH4s attacking by day and the Handley-Pages attacking by night. In March they carried out a number of day raids, including raids of Mannheim, Mainz and Stuttgart, but this was at the price of six of the Handley-Pages, as the Germans were increasing their anti-aircraft fire and bolstering their fighter defence.

    When the RAF was formed on the 1st of April 1918, the decision was made to increase strategic bombing activities. Trenchard was placed in charge of this enlarged force, which became known as the "Independent Force, RAF".

    Trenchard preferred to bomb a number of targets, rather than concentrate on one. He also preferred daylight bombing rather than night bombing, as he felt the day bombers were more accurate, but conditions in the field overruled him.

    By July of 1918 his day bomber squadrons were suffering too high an attrition rate, and could not operate without fighter escort. The bulk of the bombing effort was eventually carried out by the Handley-Page night bombers, which by September of 1918 were carrying Britain's largest bomb, weighing 750 kg (1,650 lb).

    These aircraft dropped two thirds of the 558,000 kg (1,230,000 lb) of bombs dropped by the Independent Force in the latter half of 1918.

    At the signing of the armistice the RAF had just taken delivery of its most advanced bomber. The Handley Page V/1500 was a four engined plane that could carry a bomb load of 3,400 kg (7,500 lb) from East Anglia to Berlin, but the plane was never used.

    0

    Freeking hilarious.

    in General Discussion Forum

    Posted

    It rather reminds me of a comedy sketch in which two sweary tough-talking crooks have all their bad language edited by censors.

    "You're talking bulldish, you goddam cake sucker!"

    It might catch on here.

    That dockhead farging ashhole sure better watch out or else there will be a full on asp whooping.

    golddang it.

    Oh yeah. I can see that catching on big time. Might be quite fun...

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