Andreas

I thought I post this, since it shows quite well the situation in the Yelnia salient, where the Wehrmacht received its first operational defeat since the start of the war in 1939. Yelnia was Zuhkov’s first victory over the Wehrmacht, made possible because the Wehrmacht very seriously underestimated Soviet reserves, and because its armoured forces were stretched to the limit. The Germans held on to the salient in the face of heavy Soviet attacks for almost two months. When the armour of Guderian’s Panzergruppe 2 was withdrawn to assist in encircling the Kiev pocket in mid-August, the time was up, and on 4th September the salient had to be given up. A measure of how desperate things were can be read in the history of B17 (in Froben): ‘OP crews repeatedly fought off infiltrated Russians and tanks. Almost on a daily basis, T34, and once a 52-tonner (KW1 or 2) broke through to the battery positions and had to be destroyed by direct fire or Stukas. On 24th and 25th July, the crew of the analysis post ‘Sound’ (AW-Stelle Schall) destroyed 4 tanks with magnetic mines (Haftladungen). Early on, Soviet FOOs were still hidden behind the German line and directed fire on anything that moved. The OC and his 2i/c of B7 from Munich got treated to this when visiting B17. When artillery ammunition ran low for a while, Stukas attacked targets registered by the detachment (B17).’ (p.252) This map shows the position of various counter-battery units in the salient. There were four different units in the salient: SS Beob.Batt. of 2.SS "Das Reich" Beob.Batt. 90 [322] of 10. PD Beob.Batt. 27 [337] of 17. PD 2. Beob.Abt. 17 Beob.Abt. 20 A special unit in the salient is Arko 101 (CP NE of Yelnia). As far as I understand, Arko units were special fire direction commands that had the ability to deliver concentrated fire of a whole Corps’ (or higher?) artillery onto important targets, and would only be used at critical points. I would be grateful if someone could let me know if this interpretation of their role is correct. The number of special artillery and counter-battery observation units in the salient itself can be seen as a measure of the strength of Soviet artillery lying on it, I guess. The western-most line of sound ranging posts (just E of Babarkin Cholm) was where B17 moved to after the German retreat. Some explanations: the Ops (Meßstellen) are the circles with the line on them, to show their facing, I guess. Flash-ranging is colour-coded (Rot, Gelb, Weiss and Schwarz), and has an ‘L’ in the circle. Sound ranging is coded by letters (A, B etc). Advance warning posts for sound ranging are small circles with a ‘V’ in them (look for them on the south-eastern edge of the map). I believe that the gridlines in the SE and NW corners are the German army's grid system numbers, from which the position of batteries and units relative to an axis could be derived. Some interesting stats. By 1st August 1942, B17 had reconnoitered 1,362 targets by sound, and 188 by flash-ranging. Of these, 214 (15.7%) and 130 (69.1%) were attacked. The ammunition for this was 9,279 rounds, an average of 27 rounds per target. B17 was then almost destroyed in the encirclement of Welikije Luki in December 1942 (this was a smaller operation in conjunction with ‘Mars’, the attack on the Rhzev salient.

Paul, hi. I realised I did not put info about the probable strength of 13. PD up here after I read your post. Strength return from 1st August 1944 (numbers in brackets are TO&E) </font> Armour Panzer III 5 (10)</font> Panzer IV 36 (81)</font> Panzer V Panther 0 (79)</font> SPW, AC, FOO Tanks 75 (264)</font> SP AT 17 (31) Artillery</font> Hummel 7 (8)</font> Wespe 16 (16)</font> towed 41 (43)</font> towed heavy AT 41 (71)</font> MG 690 (1,104) Vehicles</font> Trucks 697 (1,637)</font> small vehicles 240 (677) </font>A statement in the history of 13. PD is that 'the defensive attributes of the position were good, because higher ground on the western side of the Dnjestr offered good observation into the rear of the enemy'. They did however have serious problems with Malaria and fevers, caused by Mosquitoes in the swamp. Edited to correct list. [ August 04, 2002, 03:07 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

Paul, hi. I realised I did not put info about the probable strength of 13. PD up here after I read your post. Strength return from 1st August 1944 (numbers in brackets are TO&E) </font> Armour Panzer III 5 (10)</font> Panzer IV 36 (81)</font> Panzer V Panther 0 (79)</font> SPW, AC, FOO Tanks 75 (264)</font> SP AT 17 (31) Artillery</font> Hummel 7 (8)</font> Wespe 16 (16)</font> towed 41 (43)</font> towed heavy AT 41 (71)</font> MG 690 (1,104) Vehicles</font> Trucks 697 (1,637)</font> small vehicles 240 (677) </font>A statement in the history of 13. PD is that 'the defensive attributes of the position were good, because higher ground on the western side of the Dnjestr offered good observation into the rear of the enemy'. They did however have serious problems with Malaria and fevers, caused by Mosquitoes in the swamp. Edited to correct list. [ August 04, 2002, 03:07 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

Oswald, don't know about the rules, but if you want to know more about ground use of 8,8cm FLAKs, this is the source to go for: Piekalkiewicz, Janusz: Die 8,8cm Flak im Erdeinsatz German original English language translation Since you seem to be able to speak German, I would go for the original. Having just done a big translation job, I know how easily things get cocked up. Schiffer is especially bad.

Or when you are fighting an encirclement battle while your infantry divisions are 100km+ behind your panzer/mot spearhead, and the pesky Russian refuses to accept that he has been beaten and insists on fighting on. That's when this comes back to hurt you in a bad way, because you can not lock them in due to lack of infantry. The French and the Polish did not fight on to the same degree, so the wrong lessons may have been learned and applied for the war in Russia. Michael, I agree - I think this 'cumbersome' argument was just used to make it sound nicer. The real reason may well have been the quick expansion, and the need to 'stiffen' the newly created units, although in the case of 13. ID (mot) IR 33 was split and went to 2. PD (one BN) and 4. PD (Rgt Staff and 2 BN).

Mike, I have seen references to the use of Recce Regiments as flank protection in Normandy, so that seems to have happened. They were pretty useless otherwise then anyway. The use of Beobachtungsabteilung 34 as infantry was to protect the only supply road of 49.AK in the Stalino area 'infanteristisch' (like infantry) against Soviet raids. This flank was left open because of the failure of the Italian corps to pull their finger out and close up. The pioneer stuff I can't find now, but it referred to their use as leg-infantry in combat that brought unnecessary losses and prevented them from upgrading the supply road or building fortifications.

Hehe, yep. Good thing too, because otherwise everybody could figure it out and discussing it would not be fun. I think my point was that the Germans for some reason or other seemed to believe they could get away with motorised corps structures that contained only 14 battalions real infantry (if it was 2 Panzer and 1 ID mot). Plus 3 Pioneer, 3 Recce, and probably 3 Replacement battalions, neither of which was meant to work as infantry. As a consequence, the specialist units had to work as infantry. Something they were never intended to do doctrinally, and which also cost the Germans to waste a stock of trained specialists that could never be replaced. In the 49. AK (Gebirgs) in late autumn 1941 (the GJ Divisions were also 2 regiment structure) things were so bad that flank protection was provided by a Beobachtungsabteilung (hardly good use for some very skilled folks), and the Aufklärungsabteilung. Pioneers and replacement battalions (the latter were meant to front-train recent arrivals) ended up in the line. The two regiment structure was a non-starter, and IMO materially contributed to the failure to close pockets off completely.

Jason, that is a wrong statement. I am looking at the Kriegsgliederung of 13. ID (mot) in 1939, based on Mobilisierungs Plan (Heer) 1939/40 and it gives it 3 infantry regiments. The book ('Die Magdeburger Division') then goes on 'With the same OOB and TO&E, three more motorised infantry divisions existed (2. 20. 29. ID). 13. ID had IR 33, 66 and 93. The change only happened after the war against Poland. In 13.ID (mot) IR 33 (mot) was taken away. The official reasoning was that the 3 regiment structure was too cumbersome. They also lost their integrated Beobachtungsabteilung then, and the artillery regiment was restructured. The pioneers were not meant as infantry in early Barbarossa. I have a statement from GHQ 1. GD from Oct/Nov 41 ordering that they were not to be used as such since they were too valuable and it was impossible to get the trained replacements.

Please use the correct terminology... 'Tiger Bait' Certainly. Just got an e-mail from Rune... haven't opened it yet, but it smells like a steaming pile of Croda, so i assume it has one of his scenarios attached</font>

I was looking for some info on HE availability and manufacturing dates for 6-pdr tank gun HE, when I came across this site, which may well solve the riddle of who the hell had Challengers, and how many, at least for 1945. Someone has been to the PRO, it seems, and started digging. An admirable trait.

Well, very interesting, excuse me while I yawn. Who gives a flying monkey's over whether you like somefink or someone. Why don't you close your eyes for a while and marvel at all the people who like you (those would be the ones you see with your eyes close)? Now, to borrow a turn of phrase. Shut your festering gob, if you please.

Mus have been the same bug that affected the outcome of our game as well. *ponders* Mace</font>

More like a bug in your (ab)use of the T34... You have much to learn. Care for an attempt at revenge?

Have not read it, someone care to comment? My just war Airwar: Swastika in the gunsight And of course Loza. Others maybe The Italians Few returned and The Sergeant in the snow The Germans With our backs to Berlin and Through Hell for Hitler (I have read that one, not sure I trust the guy too much, just a nagging feeling though), and Condemned to live Have not read any of these except for Metelmann and would be interested in opinions.

Hey Berli, how about you post the score in our little PBEM? Would that make you feel better?

No it is not. Being Swedish does not make an excuse for being ****. Although Swedish women can do whatever they like in my book. Now I just remembered that Harv is not the only semi-pathetic figure populating this thread, there is also you. Since you are the forum's Kurt Wallander lookalike, and I quite enjoy reading about the miserable sod's dreary life, I thought I brighten up your's by offering you the same deal as Harv. If you can take your eyes of 'Wet Attack' that is. You know what to do, and I will be sitting here practising my CMBB tactics, ready to chew you up and spit you out at a mere moment's notice. The rest of you verminous low-life scum, well, you know the drill...

Harv, the only reason you are not a sheep-shagger is that court order they put onto you, abolishing your rights to animal husbandry, since you would not get the actual meaning even when the judge hammered it into your demented farmboy head. I am sure you can hold the fleece for Mace anytime though, I noticed the shine in his eye at your last post. Anyways, the purpose of my post is of course not reinterating what everybody here knew already. In actual fact, I am looking for someone to carve up post 20th September, and your last desperate email is still making me chuckle. So I thought I'll ask you for a waltz round the Steppe. Here is how it will work. You order the game, receive it, ask your wife to unpack and install it for you, fire it up (the game!), start a QB, and send me the setup. You are free to choose what you like, with the following restrictions: variable rarity, max. 1,000 points, choose a big map. AAR to be provided here. The rest of you tossers can go and get stuffed for the time being.

John, thanks a lot. That was exactly what I was after. My question arose from a comment in a Beobachtungsabteilungs unit history given in 'Aufklaerende Artillerie', where the author thinks the Red Army did not use sound ranging because of the special interest the German sound ranging equipment attracted when the unit surrendered in May 45 in Kurland.

While I am not sure about AT minefields, there are numerous accounts of British infantry in NWE finding mines the hard way - by taking casualties from them. In particular the German Schu-mine (spelling?) was a nasty device, in a wooden box (i.e. not detectable other than by probing), with just enough HE to rip off the foot by the guy who stepped on it. Clearing minefields to prepare deliberate assaults was often done the night before, or by specialised engineer equipment, i.e. flail tanks of 79th Armoured in the Commonwealth or mine-rollers in the Red Army. In the case of the flail tanks it was still a long process, since the speed was not high. I do not know the operating speed of mine-rollers, but guess they went faster. Red Army WW2 assault mine-clearing doctrine can be read up in current US Army FMs (forgotten the number, Kip would know it, it is the 1996 FM on handling the tank platoon). The M1 mine-plough is basically the modern version of the T34 mine-roller (picture). The doctrine is the same, to all intents and purposes. Arguably, clearing mine-fields by hand is really not in the scope of the game. It is unfortunate that CMBO does not include flails. That does not mean that mines should be excluded though, since there are numerous examples of infantry units running into them and taking casualties. There simply was not always time to make sure there were no mines in the path of the attack. Infantry ran into mines, took casualties, and their COs probably cursed the fact that their superiors did not give them time to clear the mines. In CMBO, infantry runs into mines, takes casualties, and players curse BFC. Not much of a difference it seems to me. Clearing mines in the rear areas was a major task, and it is my understanding that a lot of German POWs were used for that duty. Seems right to me, they just cleared up the mess they made in the first place.

Alastair, thanks. I wonder why all the stuff on the Waffen SS has to have 'Steel' in it... Why not Hamster? 'Hamster Storm', 'Men of Hamsters', 'Hamster Inferno'. Now that would be a nice touch. Anyways - I posted the numbers from Ripley because those are the ones I have. I think he is probably referring to strength returns from before the operation started, and probably from before they were assembled (hence my 'on the move'). I would expect that this strength goes down dramatically on day one, if not earlier.

tero, finally got round to digging it up. It happened to the lead company of his Kampfgruppe at Paislinis, close to Rossienie. His KG was an armoured regiment plus a tank battalion plus bits & pieces. How close he was depends on how much he liked leading from the front. Judging by his writings, a lot I guess. P.33 Panzers on the eastern front, ed. Tsouras. Greenhill 2002.

tero, finally got round to digging it up. It happened to the lead company of his Kampfgruppe at Paislinis, close to Rossienie. His KG was an armoured regiment plus a tank battalion plus bits & pieces. How close he was depends on how much he liked leading from the front. Judging by his writings, a lot I guess. P.33 Panzers on the eastern front, ed. Tsouras. Greenhill 2002.

tero, sorry for the delay. Things have been busy of late. No I am quite uncertain that the timeframe is alright. Haupt seems to have used a lot of private pictures, or his own collection, and he and his editors have made their share of mistakes. I think the locality is most likely correct, but the time-frame may well be off. Now - anyone got the answer on the Soviet use of sound-ranging?

In the absence of a flowchart or Ganttchart, I think yes.

Or, the savage Kite...