civdiv

To All, I disagree with most of your points. 1. The Stryker Brigade may be part of a huge transformation, but it is just an interim design until more capable equipment can be developed. It went waaaay over budget and didn't satisfy the initial criteria for its implementation (more on that later in this post). 2. The Stryker, in Iraq, is almost solely road bound. Its cross-country mobility is very much jeopardized by the bar armor. 3. So, integrated log train and support elements, big deal, Marine Corps has been doing that for years, as has the army with cross attachment, and seperate Brigades. And the mpg of the Stryker, cross-country is 1.5 mpg. The mpg of the M2/M3 series (A2/A3) is what, 1.5. I'm not sure if that is road or cross-country or a combination. And most of the savings in terms of the log train is due to arming the Stryker ICV with a .50 cal, as opposed to an really effective weapon such as a 20, 25, or 30mm autocannon. Sure, .50 cal ammo is a lot smaller and lighter. It's perfectly adept at punching through the building materials of the region. But as an old and salty Gunner told me once; 'The .50 cal is a lousy anti-personnel weapon as the ROF is too low. Against troops I'd rather have a M60 with a nickle in the gas chamber.' 4. Actually the Strykers have not been reliable as all of the extra weight pays a heavy toll on their drive train and suspension; from: http://www.defensetech.org/archives/001923_comments.html I, by the way, deal directly with those in the Stryker Program Manager's Office, and can say with first-hand confidence that the Stryker is a pig on wheels, and that the Army is already having "buyers remorse" over many of the variants it chose to rush into production. There is a lot of evidence out there that the Army 'cooked-the-books' during the operational evaluation. 5. The standard Stryker varient has a woefully inadequate armament for anything besides COIN. And the fact that you have to leave the vehicle to load the ammo makes it that much worse. 6. Driving LAVs around against the Taliban is not quite the same as driving a massively overweight Stryker around against Syrians with ATGMs. Neither is occupying Kosovo after the withdrawal of the Serbs. 7. Deployability. The Current ICW Stryker base model already cannot be carried by a C-130 outfitted for combat (a program requirement) as it is over the 16 ton payload of a C-130 with a full fuel level. I believe it is around 3 tons too heavy. And the new C-130J carries even less. So it failed to be what it was originally designed to be. And that is w/o bar armor. And that is for one of the lightest varients, the IGS weighs several tons more. http://www.gao.gov/htext/d04925.html 8. The bar armor was installed to deal with the Iraqi insurgents. I have read that it is very likely the Syrians have RPG warheads that bar armor provides no protection against; http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1128709/posts I would be interested in any data on bar armor against ATGM systems, especially the more advanced versions bought in small numbers by the Syrians. Not meaning to flame anyone, just simply disagreeing. I'd much rather have an LAV or M2/3 when faced by a BMP-1 or an ATGM, rather than a Stryker. civdiv [ March 09, 2007, 05:14 PM: Message edited by: civdiv ]

I would think the units that would invade Syria would be pretty heavily 'meched-up' until they got the urban areas. The Stryker is designed for COIN and mostly for urban terrain. It is first a troop transporter and then a weak fire support vehicle. Yes I know there are anti-tank and mortars varients but I would expect, at least initially, that M2s and M3s would be more prevelent than Strykers. civdiv

I think you can tell the incredible velocity of these rounds by how high the plumes of water are. Based on a LC being about 40 feet long (total swag on my part) some of those plumes appear to be like 120-150 feet high. civdiv

I think you can tell the incredible velocity of these rounds by how high the plumes of water are. Based on a LC being about 40 feet long (total swag on my part) some of those plumes appear to be like 120-150 feet high. civdiv

The first photo with the guys with cheesy mustaches and the one guy with the bad haircut. The caption says; "Left, Hotchkiss 47mm cannon in the nose of a French Tellier flying boat." That gun is a lot bigger than a 47mm. Looks to be a 75. civdiv

The first photo with the guys with cheesy mustaches and the one guy with the bad haircut. The caption says; "Left, Hotchkiss 47mm cannon in the nose of a French Tellier flying boat." That gun is a lot bigger than a 47mm. Looks to be a 75. civdiv

John, That is not a 47mm in the second link you posted, it looks like a 75mm. Not your mistake, theirs. But very intersting article, thanks for posting it. civdiv

John, That is not a 47mm in the second link you posted, it looks like a 75mm. Not your mistake, theirs. But very intersting article, thanks for posting it. civdiv

March 2nd, 1150 PM, EST; I will do additional reseach into what program it was. But the program claimed that 'more artillery [projectiles] had been fired during the Korean War than in WWII'. Can we support this claim? Seems a bit exagerated given the longer duration of WWII, especially given the massed arty barrages of the latter.

The Basra area USED to be calm and quiet. It's a nightmare now and the Iranian-backed insurgents pretty much control the area. There are even areas where harsh semi-Sharia law has been imposed. You don't hear a lot about Southern Iraq, what with what is going on in Baghdad, Ramdai, and Falluja, but it's hardly 'mission success'. The Brits are pulling out because their military is on it's death bed due to constant deployments. And as NATO now pretty much owns Afghaniland, they figure they need more troops there such that they cannot sustain their Iraq commitment. Maybe they think we should save at least one country. But don't see in the British withdrawal that things are all rosy in Southern Iraq. Iran esentially controls the area with its surigates. Shoot, for a while one of the provinces down their was totally controlled by Shia militia for a week or so.

I am just blessed as I have access to the Pentagon library. I haven't even made it through the 'new books' section and it has been 6 months!

I've read Thunder Run, it's pretty good. The part that pissed me off is the list of medals awarded at the back of the book. Officer medal giveaway. A friend of mine's actions in the book are described in detail. He continually exposed himself to fire on the ground and didn't get squat, while a bunch of officers, some of whom never left the COC, got silver and bronze stars. Look at the list of awards and who got what. Positively criminal.

I have spent time with all three weapons I was always a big fan of the M-16. I found it a little uncomfortable to handle and a little too unbalenced due to its length. But I was impressed with its accuracy and range. With the 40mm grenade launcher I found the weapon to feel alot more solid and better balenced and was a very stable firing platform. The M4 I do not have alot of experience with. It handled well but I found the recoil to be pretty awful and very hard to keep the 'floating effect' from throwing off my aim when I had it in full auto. Even in short controlled bursts the weapons barrel constantly drifted upwards because of severe recoil. It was accurate as well for a carbine. But the range despite being listed as close to the M16s range, I found the drop off to be pretty severe past a certain range. The rounds spin started to fall apart after a few hundred meters and its accuracy was almost useless at that point. In an urban enviroment that would matter little however. I am probably very biased when it comes to the G36 I have fired probably 20,000 rounds from that weapon. I found it to be an extremly solid weapon. Very comfortable to hold in any posistion, very well balenced and the recoil was manageable enough in full auto mode if you limited your bursts. It was also very accurate and with the standerd 3x optical site you could engage targets with reasonable accuracy out to medium ranges. You also get a red dot sight with 1.0x magnification and you use that site with both eyes open which makes it perfect for controlled shots while on the move and in short range situations like urban combat. It works both in daytime and is battery illuminated at night. Penetration is about the same as the M4 and M16. It leaves something to be desired since it it a 5.56mm round but is decent enough. One final thing is that in a few minutes you can convert the weapon into a faux LMG by adding a bipod and 100 round box magazine. It does not excel in that role but in Afghanistan we had two kits per platoon in addition to our MG3s. At medium ranges we could put alot of rounds at a target and the bipod kept recoil pretty well controlled. The box magazines led to a few more jams and the barrels are not made for that kind of abuse. But when needed it let us convet a carbine into a decent LMG to increase our firepower. Like all H&K weapons it is pretty lavishly manufactored. The parts fit together perfectly and we had to send back very very few back due to defects. It took abuse pretty well, but the weapon does not like sand or dust at all. Matinence is very important to keep the weapon in working order. The only real flaw we had was early magazines tended to wear out quickly and warp due to heat and stress. They changed the plastic composistion on them and that solved many of the problems. One final story before I move on. In my first ever full gear practice jump we parachuted over the DZ. Our platoon drifted a little and we fell in a wooded area. I ended up falling into a tree and as luck would have it I got pretty well snagged about 30 feet off the ground. Its not that uncommon so I was not that bothered by it. I pulled out my knife and began to cut the chute straps so I could climb down and get on with the mission. Well I must of been full of adrenaline and nerves because I cut my rifle strap. Oops The weapon fell and never hit a branch on the way down. I got down to the ground about 10 minutes later and went to get the rifle. The stock was broken and the barrel was slightly bent So here I was, green as grass and having to explain to my platoon and company CO why I had a broke ass rifle. The company CO was an easy going man and was pretty good about it. My platoon CO gave me hell about it for the next three days. He assigned me to the 40mm GL and I had to haul around about a 1000 rounds of 7.62 for the platoon MG3 on top of 12 40mm gernade rounds and the launcher After three days I thought the muscles in my legs were going to explode. There were still lots of G3s floating around as well when I was serving. I loved that weapon and we got ahold of as many as we could to take to Afghanistan. Most of them had bipods and 6x scopes on them and made a pretty dependable and cheap 'sniper' weapons. The penetration was very good and the power of the 7.62mm round was something you could count on to bring down a target and makesure it stayed down. Plus the accuracy was the best of any assualt rifle I have ever used or seen in action. Simply amazing what you could do in single shot mode with the weapons sighted properly. You could also beat the hell out of them. Many of them had lots of nicks and fairly serious dents but they still hardly ever jammed. </font>

Maybe the zombies attacked just as he was typing out his msg and then his spleen hit the mouse when it was on the 'add reply' button. RIP buddy!

Just picked up a couple of books from the library that are new to me; 'With the Jocks' by Peter White of 'No Holding Back' by Brian Reid Any thoughts on them?

IIRC, all M21s have polymer stocks and hand grips. If it has wood it's a M14.

Mike Dorosh, Now that is funny. Great reply!

Sorry Jason, the military did what they set out to do; namely, topple Saddam. They succeeded at the invasion and they are winning the insurgency (Based on your own argument). With approximately 50,000 insurgents killed, captured, or 'hors de combat', they are winning the fight. But it will take years to win the whole thing. State had the rebuilding and their failure led to the insurgency. And insurgency, the actual cause of it, is not a military issue, it is a foreign policy issue. State had that and fumbled. You can't have iron-fisted control over a country the size of France with some 160,000 troops (To include coalition troops plus gun toting contractors). The military's mission was to topple Saddam. They succeeded. State's mission was to rebuild the country. They failed. The insurgency came about due to State's failure. The military is winning the COIN despite having too few numbers. The military told the NCA that they needed more troops to occupy Iraq and they were ignored. In the end the military says 'yes sir' when given an order. We don't make foreign policy, we just carry it out. If the policy is flawed it is not our fault. Somolia is a good example. The military succeeded at every mission given it. And it was mistakes made by State and the UN that led to the calamity. Jason, if you send a platoon of National Guard into China with orders to take over the country and they fail, it isn't the military's fault. No one ever told Rumsfeld and/or Bush/Powell whatever that the plan was good. On the contrary the military fought them tooth-and-nail but in the end they were ordered to obey, and they said 'yes sir'.

Actually, a new, modernized version of the M14 is now appearing for CQB use. It's called the M14 Mod 0, and it is essentially an M14 with polymer stocks and hand grips, a folding stock, and an 18 or 22 inch barrel. Some special mission units are adopting it. http://www.fulton-armory.com/MARifles.htm http://www.dentrinityshop.com/pr_list.jsp?cid=AEG&bid=GP1AS

Jason, The long and short of it is that the military succeeded in their mission, and the State Dept failed in their mission. Franks warned the administration that toppling Saddam was easier than insuring the peace. He agreed there were sufficient troops to topple Saddam but he wanted more troops due, in large, to occupy the country post-invasion. Rumsfeld dictated the troops levels, and State took responsibility for rebuilding. The military toppled Saddam, State didn't rebuild the country. Shoot, the training of Iraqi police and para-militaries was a very low priority (dollar-wise) in the CPA's arithmetic. They didn't initially even envision a real Iraqi army but only a lightly armed paramilitary very reminiscent of South Korea in 1950. Remember, we had several months of relative calm after the fall of Baghdad. AQ in Iraq was a no-brainer, but the Sunni insurgency was a direct result of the CPA's misguided policies, post-Saddam. The military wanted to use about 400,000 troops for the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Rumsfeld vetoed that and defined the actual troop strengths used. And the actual numbers used was about 30,000 less than actually planned for since the 4th ID couldn't get in-country. Again, that was a gaff by State as they just started steaming the 4th ID to Turkey assuming the Turks would let them in. This 'assumption' w/o prior coordination was an insult to the Turks who blocked their entrance through Turkey, and the 4th ID had to turn around and steam back to the Persian Gulf. The Sunni insurgency AND the Shia death-squads/Iranian Qods Force supported insurgents were a direct result of the CPA and State. There is a reason Bush recently declared 'open season' on the Iranians meddling in Iraq. It was due to the fact that previously Iranian agents were 'out-of-season', and that wasn't the military's call. Your criticism of the military 'going light' holds no water. What is more effective in a COIN situation, a HMMWV or an M1? A HMMWV w/ Level II is just as protected as an M113. So the M113 can move better cross country, so what? The M113 issue is just a distractor, nothing more and nothing less. In most cases the M113 is still road bound and it tears up the road because it is tracked, and it provides LESS protection than a Level II armored HMMWV. Why? Because it is heavier. A HMMWV has more 'give' to an IED as it is lighter while the heavier M113 is more likely to allow an IED to affect the armor as it is heavier. The M113 is also less maneuverable, bigger, and louder, and as mentioned, it tears up the road. There is a reason that the Isrealis chose to ride on top of their M113s during both the 1973 war and the Invasion of Beruit in 1983. It was because they tended to die if they were inside the vehicle when it was hit by an RPG. Have you ever seen an M113 that was hit by an RPG? Because of the aluminum armor they tended to be pentrated and to burn down to a puddle of aluminum. The M113 is no panacea for the current COIN going on in Iraq. A Level II armored HMMWV is armored to withstand a Soviet 7.62 at zero range. A Marine LAV is armored to withstand a Soviet 7.62 at zero range. A M113 is armored to withstand a Soviet 7.62 at zero range. Cross country mobility (And the M113's mobility is little better than that of a HMMWV.) means little in a COIN situation. And there is little to no difference between transporting up-armored HMMWVs and M113s; it has little to with weight and deals more with volume. And this is a good example of Iraqi insurgent adaptation. They progressed from simple AT mines that killed HMMWVs to double or triple stack mines. They have since moved on to multiple 122 or 152 rounds, enhanced by natural gas tanks, and on to EFPs, the latter that can penetrate Bradleys, and in some instances, Abrams. The M113 is just as susceptible to IEDs and mines as the up-armored HMMWVs. And it sacrifices visibility and survivability, and it places more personnel in danger at one time (As 10 guys could be in a M113 while only 5 could be in a HMMWV.). [ February 21, 2007, 08:19 PM: Message edited by: civdiv ]

BF, This is marginally related to CMSF but really can't be portrayed in a game of this scale. Feel free to move this to the 'General' section as you see fit. http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/02/atCarbine070219forafmcnt/

Nader is the designation for a Iranian made RPG-7 warhead. Nothing special. The only reason I know is I once found a cache of them and someone smarter than me told me what they were.

Jason, Very valid points but you really took the topic and morphed it. You can't do maneuver warfare in a COIN operation. But I disagree with you when you say; Nothing like that ever happened. The military fought tooth and nail against the administration, and Rumsfeld to keep this war from ever starting. And then warned the troop levels were too low. Don't hang this thing on the military. Sure, the latter has made mistakes, but the administration and the State Dept are responsible for this mess. Bush, who didn't even know there was a difference between Shias and Sunnis until Feb 2003 (While watching the Super Bowl) is responsible. That complete idiot Bremer brought all his completely unqualified neocon Ivy League 'whiz kids' along and they hid in the green zone for 18 months planning in a complete vacuum, while repeatedly ignoring the military. They had meetings that Abizaid and Casey weren't allowed to attend but some Yale punk who had never had a job could. They got rid of the Iraqi Army and Police, declared no Baathe party officials could be employed, and then w/o even telling the military before-hand, shut down Sadr's newspaper against prior objections from the military. And the pompousity of him and the rest of the CPA alienated both military and Iraqi government alike. He treating the Iraqis like colinized natives. Forget what they want, we are going to teach them to be Americans. Hmmm, get rid of the only real functioning security apparatus. Check. Alienate the Sunnis. Check. Alienate the Shias. Check. Alienate the Iraqi Government. Check. Then Bremer hands the burning baby to the military and heads home to do a speaking tour at $50,000 a pop. Yeah, definately the military's fault. We fought a war we didn't want to fight. We fought it in a way we didn't want to fight. We fought it with fewer troops than we wanted to fight it with. We fought it without a post-invasion plan, something we had desperately asked for. And we had absolutely no input into the rebuilding of the country, despite having vast and recent experience in rebuilding countries (Somolia, Balkans, Germany, Japan, etc.). When the rebuilding failed, we got handed the baby and fault for the failure. And this is the same military that finally forced Bush to take nukes off the table for attacking Iran. Bush thinks nukes are just another weapon. Yeah, so is phosgene. [ February 14, 2007, 06:05 PM: Message edited by: civdiv ]

Jason, Sorry not to have responded in so long, I honestly hadn't noticed that this topic was moving along. Reading that essay Cuirassier cited, I am immediately struck by the poor format; it is awefully painful to read. I think it may be an OCR of the actual magazine article, as it seems the citations are mixed right into the article. I'll try and spend some more time decrypting it when I, in fact, have more time. But I will add several points about maneuver warfare as it applies to the USMC which may be or may not be on point in this discussion. The challenge the Marine Corps faced in the late-80s and early 90s was taking a beach given the evolution of warfare and especially, the evolution of weapon systems. The battleships were gone, or going away. The invention and perfection of the ATGM made landing craft vulnerable. MANPADS made the aging USMC helos (Primarily the CH-46) almost obsolete in an amphibious assault, not to mention the proliferation of Soviet bloc AAA systems and crew served weapons. All of these factor in plus the sophistication of mines (both land and sea) and they made the opposed, DIRECT amphibious invasion a thing of the past. As America's 911 force of choice the Marine Corps had to find a way to be relevent in carrying out the Commander in Chief's orders. Forward From the Sea came about with an almost 100% adherance to Lind's precepts of Maneuver Warfare. We couldn't fight our way ashore teeth-to-teeth with the enemy. We had to go around/over/behind the enemy. The LCAC was retroactively applied to this new strategy. The CH-53E, able to go deep, was another tool. So was the AAAV and the MV-22 Osprey. The Marine Corps could no longer 'force' itself ashore. But it could use extreme maneuver to get behind/around the enemy, and force the enemy to react to our moves. This extreme ability to manuever (via CH-53E and MV-22s) combined with the ability to hit from over-the-horizon (LCAC and AAAV) led to the continuing relevence of the beach assualt. Amphibious operations could still be conducted, but they were not conducted via brute force, but more with finesse. Seeking the best terrain to force the enemy to react to what you are doing is modern maneuver combat. Seizing Kuwait City in 1991 or Paris in 1944 is not going to force the enemy to stop fighting. The USMC version of USMC maneuver warfare progressed into the late 1990s, when Krulak wrote about littoral warfare [Opining that 70% of the world's population resides within x miles of the ocean (I don't remember the distance he cited)]. Again, it was partly an adherance to maneuver warfare and partly a way to claim the relevance of the USMC as a seperate arm. Us Marines are always aware that we need a seperate capability and/or mission set to claim a reason for our continuing existance. (Disclamier: I am not sure the next paragraph is really relevent to the discussion, but I think it provides some background.). Between the first gulf war and Afghanistan both the USMC and the US Army went through a period of change. Based on the heavy, mech battles the USMC experienced in the First Gulf War the M-1 Abrams was brought into the force structure (Stop, I know this was done during the First Gulf War), and the USMC grew heavier. The USMC insisted on keeping their artillery towed to claim an 'expeditionary capability' as they could be ferried by helo. M1 platoons became a regular part of their Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), always deployed afloat in peacetime or during wartime. Meanwhile the Army sought to become lighter and started to design the Stryker Bde concept, to be more expeditionary. So basically the USMC was seeking relevance on the traditional battlefield while the Army wanted to become more relevent in the realm of 'Small Wars'. In 2001 there was a need to create an initial foothold in Afghanistan for the influx of US Forces. Despite years of a more 'expeditionary' focus on the part of the US Army they were unable to accomplish the mission of obtaining an initial foothold in southern Afghanistan. This was a HUGE source of embarassment to them and I wish I still had the emails involved. The USMC did a deep strike to establish Forward Operating Base (FOB) Rhino near Kandahar. This occurance caused much consternation in the US Army camp because the Army proved unable to accomplish this initial seizure of land, and the Marine had to be called in. Their embarassment was partly (But inadequetly) assuaged by the fact that a couple companies of Rangers led the way in by jumping into the area. They took 30% casualties from the jump alone but it made them feel better. The Marines then established FOB Rhino. Maneuver warfare, at least as it to applies to current event really ends there. Iraq was an example of m,aneuver warfare as the US sought to cut off the head, ie; Baghdad. They succeeded, and for a couple of weeks they had peace. And then the insurgency started, big suprise there.

One C-130 hit a land mine some time ago. I don't know if it's the same incident.