acrashb

Unlikely.

Three cheers. They're no better than Quislings. Many served Ukraine originally - making them no better than Benedict Arnolds.

Agreed - why not provide a 100-year lease for them to save face? And put the tonnage / weaponry / inspection clauses in the fine print. As often, a lot to unpack in your post. What if the time is now? Will the Crimea issue age like a fine wine, or like Thunderbird? "the Donbas and the Crimea are net drains on national coffers [...] from a pure economic standpoint letting Russia keep them for now means Russia is saddled with money sucking provinces when Russia is economically weaker than it has been since the 1990s. " Agreed, while adding that economics are only part of it. The two extra parts are a) the national mythos of Sevastopol - the_capt said that losing Sevastopol would be felt in Russia something like losing Norfolk (I think he said that) b) Crimea loss creates another chokepoint - Kerch strait - blocking Russia from blue water. A historic strategic problem for Russia has been the potential for landlock. So I don't think they will lose interest over time - which supports the the Thunderbird theory. "Who thinks Russia is going to prioritize Donetsk over Kursk or Belgorod? [...] it will be the usual Russian smoke and mirrors thing where they build something new and shiny while everybody is eats moldy cabbage 3 meals a day." Agreed, and this supports the fine-wine theory. "At some point Russia will either lose interest in keeping these territories or there will be a breakup and the choice removed from the Kremlin. " Fine wine vs. Thunderbird vs. taking a baseball bat to the wine rack. For strategic and emotional, not economic, reasons I don't see the interest waning - see my previous comment(s) on Sevastopol. If Russia was all realpolitik they would still want Crimea, and when you layer in the emotional parts, I don't think they'll let go. "Having Ukraine standing by to take them back into Ukraine, perhaps even through military means, isn't a bad plan" They're kind of standing by right now... the necessary military supports may not exist in future, for example Western ISR is impossible for them to replicate and easy to take away. As Ukraine could readily be painted as the aggressor, Western politicians could be under tremendous pressure to de-support. 1) agreed re: doctrine; Steve and others are concerned about doctrinal goal-post moving. It's not likely, but not impossible. 2) first, thanks. Second, fully agreed about not right now on referendum - I figure about five years, not 25, but that's partly driven by the populace. That leaves non-military (emotional and strategic) value, which I think looms large. Too much to unpack, so I'll address just the above. First part - do the RU Nats get more, or less, sane post-conflict? If more sane, it's fine wine time. If less, it's Thunderbird time. Given that Russia has already lost and will lose more, I think they'll get less sane. Thunderbird! The second part is Crimean populace support for Russian vs. Ukraine nationality. That's the big question - which I propose to answer post-Ukraine re-uniting / post-Ukraine-driven reconstruction. He might. No more outside-the-box than crypto currency in RRSPs (retirement funds, for our non-Canadian friends) - and I say that as someone who voted for him in the leadership contest

Your ability to rapidly find relevant, but highly-obscure video 'memes' is - both awesome and disturbing.

Crimea, like any other piece of land, belongs to "those who reside there", not based on any written constitutions (which in theory codify both natural principles and operations / administration to enact those principles) but on the overall natural principle of self-determination. This has been discussed; some more perspective and addressing of topics below. In Canada, Quebec (a large province) has had two referenda on separation. The last one - 1995 - was on the brink of success, and as a result there is now a federal law on the conditions for separation, called the "Clarity Act". What about the portions of a province that don't want to secede? For example, in Quebec there are many regions / enclaves who wish to remain in Canada - mostly Anglo, but not all. What about the various indigenous groups, most governed by the Indian Act, that prefer to be part of Canada vs. part of Quebec? What about the people who have been run out of the province? Various pieces of legislation have pushed mostly-Anglos out of Quebec for about fifty years (I don't have a reference for that, but I recall kids in high school who exited with their families as a result of concern about their social and economic future). Should they get a say in the next referendum, if there is one? Why do lines on a map matter? Because they set boundaries for social, economic and legal systems and opportunities, and strategic risks and opportunities. They matter a lot. If an American crosses the border to Canada with a restricted (in Canada) firearm (and no paperwork), serious consequences. If a Canadian lands in Singapore with a joint - very serious consequences. Applying this to Crimea / Donbas: most importantly and differently from the Quebec example, they were taken forcibly and recently by a foreign state, so they should be returned "to" the original government to prevent the moral hazard where, in future, other states nibble provinces from each other. If something is successful, it will be repeated. Having said that, the costs and risks of returning them to Ukraine will be and are being weighed against the moral hazard issue by Ukraine and its supporters. The Ukraine government's maximalist position of all of the Donbas and Crimea is either a firm position or setting a stance for eventual negotiation - no way to tell. once returned: do the people in those regions want to be part of Ukraine? If after a few years of stabilization, rebuilding, return of kidnapped and displaced persons, purging of RU agents and land occupiers (people who moved on to stolen land vs. purchased a nice house voluntarily on the market), there is overwhelming support for separation, what then? The two basic alternatives are the use of force, which always results in insurgency and civil war, or a negotiated handshake and well-wishes with post-separation cultural, political and economic ties maintained. On the first, perhaps civil war / insurgency is worth it in return for keeping the Russian Armed Forces physically further away from the rest of Ukraine - or not. On the second (and the first ,for that matter), for the minority who wish to remain "in" Ukraine - sucks to be you, see the Quebec example above. So there is no simple answer, and no risk-free way forward. I'm on the "return them and them sort it out in a few years" camp because on balance, I think that that minimizes total (present, near-future and mid-term future) risk and maximizes 'fairness', which means different things to different people but unites the people (not governments) of the West. "Fair" and "realpolitik" are not always the same thing - when in conflict, choose realpolitik and try to turn it into fair later, but fair should weigh in. One issue that hangs over all of this is the Western idea that every problem can have a good solution with sufficient good will and energy applied to same. History, the present, and common sense tells us that not all problems have a solution that rises above neutral. The current problem has, I think, at best a neutral outcome and likely only choices between bad, really bad, disastrously bad, and catastrophically bad. Or, between ungood and double-plus ungood. Going back to uncertainty, the Russian state could suffer a near-term peripheral collapse which would change the calculus entirely - my prediction on this is early 2026. But it could be earlier, later, or not at all. Someone - possibly the_capt - said that one good alternative is to leave the post 2014 borders, wait for Russian to collapse and / or to abuse and neglect Donbas / Crimea and then try to re-unite them with Ukraine. Not a bad idea - but strike while the iron is hot, and if not hot enough now, then make it hot by striking. If we wait, apathy and inertia set in and the status quo gets entrenched - and Russia will never respect the will of the regions, so if in future they wish to re-unite it will be bloody regardless. I get more "likes" from memes than from determined typing, so here is a meme :

Also try Explore the Map | Freedom House Suggesting that the UK is a "semi democracy" is risible. In many ways, it's more democratic, whatever that means, than Canada, even though they have the same score in the Democracy Data explorer. I say this because Canada's governance is highly concentrated in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), reducing the role of Ministers and Members of Parliament.

In lighter news, Microsoft has announced a new version of Windows for the Russian market: Seriously, this thread is well inside my OODA loop. By the time I have absorbed and considered, someone has already either a) said what I had in mind or b) answered the question in my head.

That was Huba's idea, and it may be correct. Having said that, Novorossiysk is still available - assuming it can service subs - and the range of the Kilo-class subs suggests that they could sally from there. At about 400 km+ from the front, it seems safe enough.

Sure After mulling this over with some local politicos, I think Putin will be gone by the Ides of March 2023, plus or minus 90 days. The Russian Federation will have broken up partially (in a way that is noticeable) by March 2026, plus or minus six months. My stock-picking record is pretty good, as are my mid- to long-term political predictions. We'll see in a few years about this one. There are any number of off-ramps for both of the above things, but by observation many of those off-ramps have narrowed or closed since this all got started. Putin's and Russia's decision space is, through a combination of Ukrainian, Western, and own-goal actions, shrinking steadily. The current mobilization-by-stealth (which will shortly shed it's cloak) is more evidence of that. So if I'm off on the timing, the above events have gradually - or rapidly, by the standards of geo-political timing - become more inevitable.

And in other, non-political news: Russia removes submarines from Crimea to avoid Ukraine’s firepower, UK says – POLITICO Kilo-class submarine - Wikipedia Ukraine must have something that threatens shallow-water subs and gets more threatening as the front moves closer to the black sea. I thought the only things that threatened submerged subs were other subs and ships, so either the RA expects Ukraine to soon increase it's surface fleet presence (which seems unlikely), or there is some land air launched missile that can hit a sub. Could be one of those stealth deployments that we hear about after something goes boom, because I've not seen anything in the news.

Steve, thanks. That was both comprehensive and colourful. So when Grigb says "RU Nat forces around Lyman" I'll take that to mean elements of the RA that have volunteered, rather than been drafted, and are aligned with the RU Nat commentators we've been hearing from. One assumes the elements can cluster by asking for transfers to parts of the RA aligned with their views. Strikes me as an internal fifth column, and the most likely contender for post-Putin leadership. Because they appear to be more organized than the opposition, and that is how you win. See any number of states in turmoil - or see Lenin. And on the Russia surviving pool: As defined by Russia still having an ISO-3166 country code, I'm in the Russia will still be around in ten years camp. I think it will be greatly diminished, a rump state; the CSTO will be gone or exist only on paper; current restive regions with physical distance from Moscow (leading to command and control issues - shipping and supporting troops to quell disturbances or goods and services to placate a populace and their power brokers becomes expense across distance) will be gone and China encroaching on the areas with ethnic Chinese (Han?) majorities. I don't think it will devolve into warlord regions, there appear to be power structures in waiting to prevent that. If you disagree and I'm wrong, look me up in ten years and I'll buy you a beer or sumfink.

For me, and likely others who are not 'tuned in', what is an RU Nat? Google gives me this guy - nAts - VALORANT Esports Wiki (fandom.com) - who, while he may well have been press-ganged into being a drone operator, is not single-handedly holding back the UA at Lyman. I thought the "RU Nat"s were a movement, political philosophy, loosely-affiliated birds-of-a-feather, but apparently they are much more than that. Are they: their own thing, self-sufficient armed forces with it's own chain of command? If so, who pays and arms them? What is their citizenship? How do they derive legitimacy and/or not get unwanted attention from the Russian security forces? a chunk of the Russian armed forces with command elements staffed - infiltrated? - by people sympathetic to RU Nats (whoever they are) goals? Again, how do they avoid disappearances and balcony falls? a political party with its own armed forces? That would be odd, and they don't show in this. If the answer is lengthy and there is some internet reference, happy to have that and I'll read up. They mean this Kiev:

For the right kind of person. Highly quotable, Peter Weller absolutely owned his character Speaking of which, "Character is what you are in the dark". To this day if I need a bunch of random names for a project... https://www.figmentfly.com/bb/badguys3.html

Awesome gaslighting.

Out of likes, so +1 on that - funny and true. If RA actually does try mass use of helos for resupply, the plentiful manpads will once again show up in videos. PS: so we can add Dune analogies to the LOTR ones? Does that make Zelensky into Paul Atreides?

And now they are arrested. But they weren't disappeared or suicided. Still significant. Five Russian officials arrested for proposing to remove Putin from power, charge him with treason | Fox News

Someone earlier said it was a nothing council in a suburb (or something like that), Steve replied that it was tea leaves. I think that what it means is: some people, reasonably plugged in and informed, have decided that Putin hasn't the energy, loyalty, or bandwidth to have them killed. Once others see this and follow, the dam bursts, and nothing Putin wants happens. At that time, as you say, regional governments can just do what they want without serious fear of retribution. In the West there is a mesh of governance - someone doesn't want to play ball? Seize their bank accounts. Or somefink, many options - sue them civilly, bring criminal charges at different levels of government, withhold highway funds, and so on. In Russia, I have the impression that governance is centralized, so when the centre gives orders and they are ignored, there is less of a plan B.

In the midst of jubilance due to the apparent success of the UA offensive, someone has, as of yesterday, posted names / info purportedly of the Wagner group's in-theatre troops: https://sarahashtoncirillo.substack.com/p/update-monsters-wagner-mercenary It passes a virus scan on my computer. Thought someone here might have a use for it. As for the rest of this thread:

There's so much wrong with that. Again, we need tank riders in the next version of CM - how else will someone do a ByteBattle(™) of this Russian-style Thunder Run? Note that they are wearing the crème-de-la-crème of ballistic eye wear, the Smith Optics Aegis Echo II. So they are well-funded and equipped. see comment below Even if they do, what percentage of their missiles (AFAIK the only viable delivery options) have been shot down throughout the war, and in the last month or so given improvements in AD? The likelihood of a given nuke getting on target is low; the humiliation - and negative effects close to those of a successful detonation - of having one shot down and debris recovered is high. So they would need to do volleys, which would ratchet up whatever response would come from a single detonation. As long as there are rational actors giving orders, no tactical nukes will be in play.

We need to bring back tank riders. At least in CMBS as Americans, I can't place even an two-man FO team on a tank and charge them forward.

For those interested in the war(s) following this war: Putin Approves New Foreign Policy Doctrine Based on 'Russian World' (usnews.com) "President Vladimir Putin on Monday approved a new foreign policy doctrine based around the concept of a "Russian World", a notion that conservative ideologues have used to justify intervention abroad in support of Russian-speakers." "Moscow should further deepen its ties [...] as well as the two breakaway entities in eastern Ukraine, the self-styled Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic." As others have noted, they appear all-in for Donetsk and Luhansk.

Ukraine has been doing just that, and pretty clearly, for example: Zelenski says Russia’s war against Ukraine must end with liberation of Crimea (msn.com) Zelensky Pledges ‘Liberation’ For Crimea After Russian Warplanes Are Destroyed (forbes.com)

This 'thread' (so large we should maybe now call it a 'rope' instead) has often commented on Russian infiltration of political and civil groups in the west - more evidence now in Czech Republic.

Yes, and so no.

It does raise some interesting ethical and perhaps legal issues - all of which I'm comfortable with - but it is not an 'assassination'. There is a difference between this and war bonds, but I think not material. It (sponsoring a grenade and seeing the people it attacks) does strike me as bloodthirsty, but there is some latitude for this. Perhaps we should consult Chidi? Although the war could be over by the time he opines