Spook

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by rexford: Some ace crews have unbelievable accuracy, that is the point.<hr></blockquote> But why is this point raised, unless you think that crew quality effect on accuracy isn't properly captured in the present CM system? I don't think anyone here is disinclined to believe that the Soviets had their own ace tank crews in the course of WWII.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: LOL! Yeah, yeah, 352...you knew what I meant! <hr></blockquote> Actually, I wasn't sure. A recent endeavor of some WWII aviation historians has been to review & revise earlier victory claim records. So I didn't know if you stumbled on a revised claim for Hartmann. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr> Mama Mia, give me a break! I finally got the first 6 episodes of BoB in the mail - I had stuff on my mind!<hr></blockquote> OK, my anal mode is disengaged again. (I'll have to latch onto a set of BoB soon also. I'm among the heathens who didn't get to watch it the first time on HBO.)

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Andrew Hedges: I don't mean to downplay the importance of suspension: the T-34 had a very good suspension, which gave it good cross country flotation. Much of this is due to Christie's ssupension; some of it is due to the soviet designers being smart enough to choose a wide track width. The Sherman would have been better off with a Christie style suspension than with the horizontal volute suspension they started off with. <hr></blockquote> On that note, I returned to Amedeo's linked article relating Aberdeen trials of the T-34. (BTW, Amedeo, good link for the overall site. I gotta bookmark that one before CMBB rolls out.) This is what was claimed to be said of the optics: "The general opinion: the best construction (please notice - the best construction doesn't mean the best at all - Valera) in the world. Incomparable with any existing tanks or any under development." Interesting. Definitely fuels the fire, so to speak, as to seek out more information on relative quality of the optics for the Soviet 76mm gun. (It doesn't help a lot, though, in that specific details or quotations of test officials are not shown.) But here is what is said of the T-34 suspension: "On the T-34, it is poor. The Christie's suspension was tested long time ago by the Americans, and unconditionally rejected (American 'Shermans' and 'General Lees' had very poor suspension as well. At the same time the British used Christie's suspension and were quite satisfied - Valera). On our tanks, as a result of the poor steel on the springs, it very quickly (unclear word) and as a result clearance is noticeably reduced. On the KV the suspension is very good." Hmmmm. Poor suspension? It seems to be argued so above on the premise that poor manufacturing practices would result in low vehicle ground clearance. However, this statement doesn't clarify as to if the suspension would've been sufficiently effective with better manufacturing control. On such a note, this further calls to question as to how well assessed the added statements really are on the T-34 gun optics, in this particular article. IMO, there isn't as much "clarity" as I would prefer in describing either technical issue about what was right or wrong. (BTW, Andrew, as a niggle, the production Shermans first used vertical-volute suspension, not horizontal or HVSS which came later.) [ 10-26-2001: Message edited by: Spook ]</p>

It's been my usual generalized view that Soviet WWII ordnance was pretty good, in fact having some of the very best in AP penetration like the 100mm AT gun. Here's what is related in the linked pdf file about the 45mm gun of the T-26B: "The main armament of both the T-26 and BT-5 was the standard Soviet 45mm antitank gun M-1932/35, which fired an AP round with a muzzle velocity of 820 m/sec." That shot velocity seems to match well with those of the better German guns in CMBO. (I don't know what it is comparably for the muzzle velocity of the 76mm gun on the early T-34/76 models, though.) I'm less certain, however, as to the relative effectiveness of optics for Soviet tank guns (or even for towed AT guns). That the 45mm gun's sight provided a sight mark for 3000m doesn't tell me enough as to how accurate that sight was, or how many shells on average were needed to be fired to hit a target that far. Of better use might be gun trial reports. In the past, Soviet gun trials have been cited here on Soviet gun penetration of German armor at some given range. Does someone here know of WWII-era trials as to indicate relative accuracies certain Soviet guns at various ranges? [ 10-26-2001: Message edited by: Spook ]</p>

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: As for "hundreds of kills", we all know the Blond Knight "only" had 262 or so, so even the greatest scorer in history "only" had 250+, not "hundreds" of kills to his credit. (Technically 262 counts as "hundreds" - two hundreds to be precise, but the quote is a little misleading).<hr></blockquote> "We" all know? Insofar, all the websites I've reviewed all have Erich Hartmann at the score I've always recalled---352. If his score really was 262 instead, then how would the scores of Barkhorn, Rall, & Kittel now be revised to (priorhand also indicating over 262 kills in each case) if Hartmann is still rated as the top German ace? Just curious to your reference(s).

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: Bump out of respect for JasonC's birthday. Your education is our gift to you, my brother.<hr></blockquote> Good spirit, Michael. (I hope that Jason drops in to read.) Jason, you may post on this BB like the "forum encyclopedia"; and per the earlier Firefly discussion, an encyclopedia with potential "errata." But....you're our encyclopedia!! Make sure to treat yourself today.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Simon Fox: I fail to understand why the "Ami's" would need King Tigers. When any Pfc with a tin and a bit of string can call down a ToT from 2 battalions of heavies faster than a KT can rotate it's turret 360 degrees, who needs 'em.<hr></blockquote> It's simple, Simon. The tank is for the guy calling in the ToT to hide in, just in case he transposed one of the coordinates or some other SNAFU that gets the ToT dropped on him instead. Of course, the guys sitting on top won't be so thrilled. Pictures like that above remind me about Willie's comment in one "Willie & Joe" cartoon: "I'd rather dig. A moving foxhole attracts the eye."

One veteran poster here, "Bullethead," brought up an interesting point that may happen when targeting on or near a target reference point marker (simulating "preregistered" fire). If, on a later turn, the target line is adjusted by even a small distance, the "clock" may reset to its maximum delay, although the "green line" is still showing. I never got around to confirming this. But if true, it does seem a bit ludricous. At least per Bullethead's added argument, if moving off of a target reference point is going to is going to cause a "re-clock," at least show a blue line instead of a green line. Bullet's final point, however, was that under such a circumstance, target reference points are thus of minimal utility. One could apply with the hope that enemy troops come nearby, but often is the case that they don't come close enough without some targeting adjustment. Therefore, one just might as well not bother to use, and plot instead on nonregistered areas that are easier to adjust from. All of the above is given with some speculation, because again, I haven't confirmed yet. But I think it timely to mention it here in this topic, if someone else has seen this behavior, and to discuss if future CM versions will rectify this. (BTW, Slap, nice sig, though it would more qualified to be called "Ezekiel 25:17 per Samuel Jackson." )

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JonS: In science and technology they were well ahead of the curve. Sure, its easy to make jokes about the Empire, the class system, and the Royal Family (all of which tends to colour thinking about Britain in general) but during WWII they had many very smart cookies, most of whom were roped into the war effort.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Of course. Some examples that jump out to me: ---UK/Commonwealth developments on radar, for land, air, and naval systems. ---Bletchley (sic?) Park & "Enigma" code-breaking efforts ---superb technology for piston engines, like the Rolls Royce Merlin; licensed version powered the later P-51 models ---provision of VHF radios for US aircraft operating in England ---the 17-lbr; superb as armor-piercing ordnance ---the "Funnies" Just a few examples. And for some of these or others, US R&D could provide comparable alternates, like pacing naval radar development. But certainly, I've always rated the Commonwealth of WWII to be "front-line" in the "technical war."

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Brian: *SIGH*, Spook, I would ask you to find a quote from myself where I made that claim, because I cannot remember making it. What I did do was utilise those pictures to illustrate that the tripod was in fairly widespread use, across a longer period than even I myself had believed them to be. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Agreed that you didn't specifically say what I had put in quotes. Rather, the statement, "Here's one picture of a tripod-Bren setup. Here's another showing it set up in combat conditions. Thereby, they were commonly used in NW Europe in WWII," was a "quote for effect" to summarize the earlier discussions. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> I was derided for that, but as soon as Ben Hall posted his information, which was basically the same as both Michael Dorosh and I had posted, it appears that the critics went pretty much quiet, all of a sudden. Funny that, hey? <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Ben's comments were helpful, and actually helped the argument move along better than from the photos, because his father's recollections was one case of specific usage in NW Europe. Good example of a supportive 1st-person account. But is that enough to go on alone? It can suck as to how much "legwork" research has to go into proving or disproving a historical issue, especially just trying to find enough supportive material in the first place. But for the matter at hand, that may be still a necessity. What was provided so far has helped IMO, but the central question remains: was it enough, to BTS? Bottom line, Brian: if the case isn't made strong enough to BTS, then the tripod-Bren won't get into the CM II engine. And IMO, it still isn't strong enough. If BTS concurs, then what to do? More research before then, or sit back and burn acid later on over BTS's stance? <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> As I kept saying, I was arguing from the viewpoint that this piece of equipment existed. It was in fairly widespread use. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> It's that latter statement that asserts how I was using that earlier "quotation for effect." The "widespread use" in NW Europe wasn't demonstrated yet. Occasional use, yes. Potential availability (loaded on platoon trucks), yes. Widespread usage----not yet. But by all means, Brian, keep at it if it's important to you. From my own end, I'm still dwelling on how to argue that standard infantry rifles (including the Enfield) could stand to be improved in mid-range effectiveness. (I've assembled a spreadsheet graphic to help for my argument to be "visualized" too.) The "aimed fire" issue is to be broached also as a possible CM mechanic. The problem is, it's all "warm-fuzzy" for now. In a couple of weeks, I hope to have something together that can broach the subject, but even then, it won't be enough as to argue convincingly for a change in rifle firepower, rather than to stimulate discussion. [ 10-22-2001: Message edited by: Spook ]

And for the record: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Ogadai: As Spook has suggested, the problem with your picture is that it is merely that, a picture. It does not support your argument at all. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Ogadai, Slapdragon simply posted that picture to parodize the way that "photographic evidence" was used to make a case in a prior specific discussion thread. I saw it right off that the coastal artillery gun photo had nothing to do with the subject of artillery fire control. So of course, it doesn't support Slap's arguments on this subject. But it wasn't intended to. And yes, my response was to Brian. Again, I don't fault the usage of photographic evidence. In fact, if relevant to the subject at hand, photos can be quite helpful. The trick to understand is that photos can help support an argument, but are not necessarily the foundation of the argument (unless the photos are of Nessie, UFO's, and those odd occasional crop circle patterns ).

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by ASL Veteran: As much as I know you Canadians enjoy beating your chests and singing your praises , (my goodness, it is almost as bad as those darn Aussies and Finns) I think it is safe to assume that the Germans first developed the so called Stormtrupper tactics. The first recognized experimentation was on 30 December 1914 by the elite "Garde - Schutzen" battalion in the Vosges. The Garde Schutzen was the premier Jager battalion in the German army and the Fifth Army authorized this battalion to develop new offensive tactics. Colonel Bauer, the German General Staff's siege warfare expert, wanted to give the battalion a 37mm light gun to play with, but Major Calsow was never able to use it to advantage, so he was sacked. A Captain Rohr was then placed in command and the battalion was turned into a hybrid Jager/Pioniere battalion equipped with a machine gun platoon, a mortar platoon (which the Germans invented BTW), and a flamethrower platoon (which the Germans invented), along with a bunch of infantry who viewed the new grenade (which the Germans also used first) as the primary offensive weapon rather than the rifle. This unit was then titled "Sturmbattalion Rohr" and was the official German test bed for new and innovative infantry tactics. :cool:<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I guess you could call that the first "experiment" in which the concept was able to catch on later. BUT.....one prior experimentation of the "stormtrooper" concept actually happened before WWI. Ironically, it was near the end of the ACW: the Confederate assault on Fort Stedman, 25 Mar 1865. But in that case, the lessons weren't learned or "developed" on afterwards.

Perhaps this shouldn't be dwelled on, but this comment rises to the surface for me: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Brian: Slappy, your problem is that I have, when posting a serious picture, always offered an explanation to accompany the photo concerned and my line of reasoning as to why it did constitute evidence.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I suppose this regards the "tripod Bren" and pictures of same posted to advocate inclusion into CM's future. One picture, IIRC, showed the tripod-Bren set up as apparently on a training exercise. Another showed a similar setup in combat conditions, but in a static trench position during the Korean War IIRC on that also. There was no fault in posting these pictures, or using them to HELP make a case. What the fault was at the time was this line of thinking: "Here's one picture of a tripod-Bren setup. Here's another showing it set up in combat conditions. Thereby, they were commonly used in NW Europe in WWII, and MUST be included in a future rendition of CM." This, in effect, was a "leap of logic" to surmise that two pictures alone suffice to demonstrate "common" usage of the tripod-Bren. Perhaps their usage indeed was more than occasional in WWII NW Europe, but the prior topic threads never reached that stage of compelling proof. That argument COULD reach a compelling level someday, after a sufficient array of first-hand accounts are researched to correlate to a trend in usage. After that, then it becomes a matter of how BTS regards that issue in its order of coding priorities.

Reading the other "Bad News" topic, I am mindful of Manx's comment about being reserved to receive monetary contributions to support his site. He does have a point in that he part of a larger "free" CM support community (though obviously not free to the site sponsors paying to keep their sites up). A possibility MIGHT be that a charitable "trust fund" could be sponsored in turn by BTS or by the CM HQ guys (CM HQ & co.). In regards to the latter, I am presuming that Madmatt's CM HQ costs are covered by BTS, though I could be wrong. Anyway, the notion is that CM support sites could be allowed to draw from this fund based on hosted CM material, site cost, and demand loads like bandwidth. The downside, of course, is that someone has to monitor the fund so that no one CM support site unfairly draws money from it at the exclusion of others. Perhaps too messy or complex. But a thought nonetheless. However it works out, though, I'm willing to go in for at least $40 if donations are accepted by Manx & others.

Well, then, Rok, let's then iterate your comments that kicked off the matter between you & Andreas: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Roksovkiy: By June 1944 and onwards, the allies were predominantly fighting the dregs of the German army. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> The generalization isn't invalid to pose. But it is unsubstantiated as to the proportions of "good," "average," or "bad" German troops for each of the major campaigns of NW Europe. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> The personal accounts sound a lot like they were based on fighting volksturm units....<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> "Volksturm" units did not as such exist by title until the end of 1944. As per Andreas's point, a significant bit of the 43rd's fighting was in 1944, from late June & onwards. And on Hill 112, the 43rd Division faced SS panzergrenadiers. Were those troops "dregs" at that time? <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> ....and dare I say it ‘biased’ on a hatred of the Nazis.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Jary's view of German rifleman quality is just that---a view as he thought to had seen it. Perhaps it's a generalization on Jary's part, but it suggests to me that Jary was simply comparing rifle marksmanship of what he personally saw, to what he expected as a standard from his own men. It hardly struck me as a "Nazi-hating" bent. Further, Jary's discussion on how the Germans handled their MG's----with an eye for deployment & concealment----also doesn't suggest to me that he was contemptuous of the Germans on all tactical matters. A "Nazi-hater" probably might not have even acknowledged this. Your generalized assessment of Jary is that he 1) didn't really run into any "good" German troops, and 2) he has an anti-Nazi bias. Thus, he is presumed by you as unreliable. Considering that Andreas, myself, & others here consider Jary as a credible source (leastways, I presently do), isn't it no surprise that a generalized branding of Jary as "unreliable" will be challenged? If you think that Andreas handled you too rough, it was left to you to either substantiate your argument, or to disprove Andreas's points. You did neither, instead choosing simply to brand him an "Anglophile who prefers pro-Anglo fantasies in his historical wargames." You didn't prove that either, but not that you were going to. [ 10-19-2001: Message edited by: Spook ]

Thanks. I'll have to wait until getting home tonite to read it, though.

If not too much trouble, Slap, I'd like to be cc'ed on this e-mail artillery discussion of yours. I probably wouldn't add much to it, if at all, but would like to hear some of the others' commentaries as well as yours.

Your points are taken, Jason. And you are right, playing with lower-quality troops on occasion adds variety & a greater challenge. What is problematic to the wider application of your views, however, is what the central goal is of most wargamers, even CM gamers. They are still just that: gamers. And gamers play to win first & foremost, by the most sneaky, underhanded, knife-in-the-back method allowed by the game rules if at all possible. Especially so of those who are trying to move up gamer group ladders. There's nothing inherently wrong with this, if such gamers are playing strictly from the viewpoint of "it's just a game." Of course, per your point, gamers who play like this----seeking victory through absolute optimized conditions, rather than challenging themselves on what they can do with "constrained" resources---should not presume that they can cut the mustard in a military training simulator, or that they are of comparable command skill to historical figures like Patton, Slim, Manstein, or Zhukov.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Brian: You'll note, I've been careful not to claim necessarily that the UK system was superior, merely comparable. I have noted that it appears only the British had a system which allowed a single FOO to call an entire AGRA onto a single target. If you can produce evidence that the US FO's could do the same, I'd be more than happy to accept it. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> The best historical example that comes to me is the Elsenborn Ridge battles of 2/26th Rgt., 1st Inf. Div., 19-22 Dec '44. Daniels' infantry battalion, during some of the more fierce attacks by 12th SS Panzer (esp. on 21 Dec.), not only drew from the entire 1st Division artillery of four battalions (three of 105's & one of 155's), but also from all of the 2nd & 99nd Division's artillery and some 8-inch guns at higher corps or army level. Daniels was one of the more aggressive battalion CO's of 1st Division, and probably had his CP pretty well up forward. As such, the FO for all this artillery support probably operated with him. Perhaps it was multiple FO's, but regardless, the "on-target concentration" effect was the same, and was decisive in allowing one infantry battalion to repulse the bulk of an SS panzer division. Only on 21 Dec. did the Germans unleash a bombardment of comparable strength on Daniels' men in turn, which did a good bit of damage, but his battalion still held on. The TOT concept has been detailed in several references I've read in the past, but also in Doubler's "Closing with the Enemy" if you are interested in more recent examples. Now on a follow-up edit, I recognize the point of Andreas that not just any US junior infantry officer, at platoon-level, was effective in calling & adjusting artillery. But Slap's recent post, that mentions various reference authors, gives a hint that some US junior infantry officers could indeed "link up" to some guns above battalion-level. I would surmise that platoon officers were expected more often to put their fire calls to the company/battalion mortars first, but if those mortars were already busy, or that the "threat" needed an added level of response, then the platoon officer could get lucky if he had the authorization and effective communication to the external batteries. [ 10-17-2001: Message edited by: Spook ]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Brian: Slappy, you appear to be making heavy weather of it to make your assertion, as you have that merely because of numbers that makes the US system "the best". I believe in fact the case could be made that in reality this means the US system was merely bloated, not more efficient. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> But here's your problem, Brian, and the problem of a few others, when describing relative effectivenesses of US & UK artillery. Insofar, you haven't substantiated, or cited by references, as to how the WWII US artillery fire control system in specific was "bloated" or "inefficient." The claim might have some validity, but there's no follow-through. One assertion within this thread is that many US FO's were typically "90-day wonders" who couldn't read a map to save their lives. I'm sure that extensive case-by-case studies would indeed reveal a few US FO's who were less than capable at effective artillery spotting or map-reading. But does that invalidate that many other US FO's could indeed do their job well, especially after some field experience? Now, I don't know as to the extent of how many US officers capable of FO duty were available on a company or battalion basis. But references like Zaloga's "Lorraine 1944" noted that radio communications usually were available on down to US platoons, although the "walkie talkie" link probably could get only the company CP & local mortars. Per Slap's point, the extensive US communications net is a system of "redundancy" in which any given battlefront region was more likely to have someone with an FO ability; or several, allowing that a FO team would be a favorite target of snipers & other enemy fire if it was spotted. Perhaps a specific US FO was good at the job, perhaps bad, but the greater likelihood of being available is a factor nonetheless. Furthermore, any notion that US WWII artillery couldn't "coordinate" for massed fire, similar to UK "Uncle" or "Victor" calls, is erroneous. The US Army, from Normandy onwards, had the capability for "Time on Target" or TOT, in which several batteries could be called together to deliver fire onto a target at the same time. Where or when it could be used was situation-dependent, but when used, the idea was to "stonk" a target with a large number of shells in a very short timeframe, instead of batteries just rotating their fire mission calls. UK abilities were comparable, but certainly not the Germans' on a typical basis. In effect, I regard US & UK artillery control to be comparable overall. Perhaps I'd give the UK artillery a slight edge, but a razor-thin edge on the basis of my own past historical review. In reviewing a ream of small-unit actions in the Bulge battle, the recurrent theme is that US artillery firepower & control for that battle was extremely effective & timely in its application.

I suspect where you & I first saw it, Michael, was one the earlier "ASL Annuals" that eventually came up with a "bagpipe" SMC (single-man counter) optional rule. Leastways, that's where I first encountered the term "pibroch."

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy: Spook - actually, both the 7th and the 51st had very serious problems in Normandy. The usual explanation is that they were not used to this kind of fighting, and they were of the opinion that they had 'done their bit. Divisions like 11th Armoured and 43rd performed better because they had trained in England for two-three years, and had not seen what HE or an 88 penetration can do to the human body.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Point taken about the "done their bit" factor, although I'm uncertain as to how much of an effect that was specifically to the 50th Division on D-Day, or for the noted divisions after the Normandy campaigns. What Aacooper has posted as a follow-up, however, approaches closer to my point. While units like the 43rd & 11th Armored trained for multiple years, they hadn't any prior combat experience on a divisional scale. That can allow that units like the 43rd are more willing to "stand & take fire" because they are not "old lags" like the 50th & 51st. But that doesn't quite answer as to what relative combat proficiencies the newer units had in Normandy, in terms of combined operations, artillery usage, specialized tactics, operational command, etc. Further, on the US side, the "veteran" units certainly seemed to do better in Normandy, at least having a better handle on combined arms. The 9th Division, with prior experience in NA & Sicily, gave one of the better Normandy performances, dismantling 77th Division in the Cherbourg drive and repulsing Panzer Lehr near St. Lo a few weeks later. My prior reading of UK units in Normandy, over the years, was really only "source-skimming," and as such, was often contradictory in relating which were the "effective" ones on an objective basis. For example, you've related how the Germans especially feared the 43rd Division. I've seen one source relate how a special fear was attached to the 49th "Polar Bears" (prior assignment was the Iceland guard) which the Germans were alleged to nickname as the "Butcher Bears." Or perhaps this was overstated. Another example relates how the 15th "Scottish" Division had a special "pibroch" about it, although its performance in Epsom doesn't seem overly outstanding. Further, given the 43rd's losses at Hill 112, that would've been enough to shear off the "youthful spirit" you've inferred earlier, although the combat experience of the survivors could have proved enough to compensate. I guess the "safe" path would be to allow that each UK division had its unique abilities. But on a removed objective scale, if one was trying to design a WWII game that had to weigh operational effectivenesses of these divisions against each other, then I'm still uncertain as to how these divisions would "rate" against each other through the progression of the NW European campaigns. Granted, perhaps not an easy query to answer.

Actually, Andreas, it's interesting how you relate about the 43rd Division being one of the better UK outfits. Not to debate it, but I would've presumed, in earlier times, that more "veteranized" units like the 7th Armored, & 50th/51st Infantry Divisions would've been more consistent performers. It's a tricky thing to broach, but for those in the "know" regarding UK division histories of the NW Europe campaigns, which really seemed to be the "better" divisions on a regular basis? And which seemed to perform under expectations?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy: Spook, it is actually le Plessis Grimoult on today's map. Well, for showing me up so badly, I now shan't send you my historical battle based on this action. So there. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Funny that you should mention. Recently, I've done an extensive "retooling" of "Crown of Thorns" which I got earlier from your Kessel site. When done, I'm sending back to you & the original author for review or perhaps another revision cycle.

As typical, whenever "nationality" comes up here, many of the viewpoints start getting polarized. As Andreas can also recall, there was a heated debate earlier about the utility of "primary sources," or veterans' accounts, for WWII historical review. What can be recognized about one veteran's account is that it can be useful to relate experiences that might otherwise be missed in postwar assessments. (I think one or two posters even labeled Andreas as a "Anglophobe" in those earlier debates. How off-target can one get? ) Now, looking at the recountings of Jary (the "18 Platoon" author), he relates the following key points: 1) From his tactical encounters, his typical experiences was that German infantry would lose "effectiveness" if their MG's were KO'ed. Well, no kidding, given that German squad firepower in an ordinary rifle squad maintained the MG42 as its "base of fire." 2) Jary further relates that getting to the German MG's was a difficult task, given that the Germans he encountered made great efforts for MG concealment. Therefore, HE support from tanks or FOO's (artillery) was very helpful. 3) Infiltration ability was needed for surprise attacks; and also from Jary, it was "easier said than done" to pull off effectively. Excellent points in all. Now, when going further to look at Jary's assessment of German "quality," here's where more discernment is needed. First off, remember that Jary's view is only one veteran's account. One. Consider further that the relative "quality" of German divisions in Normandy & afterwards was highly variable. Some were not so good, some were even piss-poor, but others would've likely forced Jary to "reassess" the generalization that "Germans didn't seek close combat." Some FJ units, or veteran panzer troops with more of the automatic small arms per squad, would probably had been more willing to "close." It was very unit-dependent & situation-dependent. That doesn't invalidate Jary's accounts; he's relating what he experienced. Rather, Jary's account is included in larger correlations of veteran accounts, both British & German, if one is really trying to seek a "trend." I'm sure that some German veterans might have believed, in turn, that British/US troops had little stomach for close battle from his own experiences. (Some East Front vets might've been even more likely to feel this way.) This would then be diametrically opposed to Jary's overall view. BTW, Andreas, you motivated me enough to look up "Les Plessis Grimault." But it's "Le," not "Les," you git.