Knaust
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Posts posted by Knaust
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per adesso io penso solo a ricevere la mia copia!
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Many thanks Marty..pits I'm going to vacation till July 15...hope this interesting thread will continue...we need to put the fog of war button off!
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lol@PIP (Potential Italian Player)
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Jackhammer for President!….you receive a deciphered message and say “This is war!”….then….”Have we to inform our main base (your words!) field commanders?…nope…they have already received numerous warnings!”
Spook, glad to see we have found an agreement….on FDR’s gross negligence…..Marshall’s too I think anyway….but I consider that they were too much clever guys to be found guilty of gross negligence!
Now all FACTS are on the table…everyone may draw his own conclusions.
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io a Rivoli vicino a Torino
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si...io...dove abiti zanzarina?..e quando lo hai ordinato?...io l'ho ordinato a Dicembre!
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Spook the reference is The West Point Military Series “The Second World War, Asia and the Pacific”, Griess Editor….it seems quite an authority book!
Pg.47 for the 14-part of Japanese message
Pg. 50 for Hull’s reply to the last Japanese diplomatic proposal
Pg. 51 for Lieutenant Lester R. Schulz (sorry I miswrote Schuls) carrying the Japanese message to FDR in the night of Dec 6
Pg. 52 for the events in Washington in the morning of Dec 7 and the futile attempts of Bratton to reach Marshall as early as possible
And now from the same reference an answer to those of you, who are dubious about believing in 1941 on the possibility of a Japanese surprise strike at Pear Harbour (pg.47)
The central assumptions of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Hawaiian Department and the 14th Naval District) approved on April 11, 1941 were:
1. omissis
2. In the past [Japan] has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.
3. A successful sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Ohau might prevent offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.
4. omissis
Major General Frederick Martin and Rear Admiral Patrick Bellinger implemented the Joint Defense Plan with a most interesting estimate. They assumed that:
(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:
(1) a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area
(2) a surprise attack on Ohau including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor
(3) A combination of these two
(
It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Ohau would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside three hundred miles.Kimmel sent this plan to Admiral Stark who approved it on Sept 9.
There is no doubt that in the early months of 1941 the Army and the Navy commands in Hawaii, as well as officials in Washington, believed that the Japanese would strike at Pearl Harbor, doing so with a surprise attack……..In Washington, at the same time, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox said that bombing and torpedo attacks against the fleet were highly probable.
Now Spook, it is a FACT that the Secretary of Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations thought the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor highly probable….yes…we have no evidence that FDR and Marshall agreed on that….but ….
Now I agree that we cannot know what was the mental status of FDR…but I think that it is very negligent not to send the information of an impending war to your field commanders as fast as possible!(yes or no?)
At least FDR was as negligent as the poor Kimmel!
Finally a consideration….we have to praise Franklin D. Roosevelt….maybe if USA would not have entered war Mr.Hitler would have won his war and all of us in Europe would have to speak German…to say the least!…as to those poor 2008 souls in Pearl Harbour this is another question.
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To add some more stuff to this...look at this witness of Lt Schuls, who brought to FDR the japanese message in the night of 6 Dec:
The President said "This means war". Hopkins agreed and observed that since war was surely coming at japanese convenience, it was too bad that the United States could not strike first and prevent surprise. Roosevelt nodded but said that since Americans were a peaceful people such a move was an impossibility.
Spook, that FDR wanted the Japs strike first is witnessed by FDR himself.
And as to the place where the Japs would strike, time and date of the 14-part reveal it. A surprise strike always is at dawn...now the 14-part (clearly a war declaration like the poor Bratton was convinced and fully troubled about time and date)was to be presented to Hull at 1:00PM Washington time. Now look at the map and tell me when at this same time is dawn!
These are FACTS, not conjectures.
Please someone has to tell me why on the hell in the morning of Dec 7 Marshall lost 3 precious hours and later said that it would be more probable that Japs would attack Panama than Pearl Harbour...it is nonsense!
A war is impending with a likely surprise attack and no Washington authority remembers that they can use the telephone...it's nonsense!
Many times Kimmel and Short were previously be informed about war possibility...ah ok..sure...but now on the night of Dec 6 "This is war"..a little different from a war possibility!....but Stark is at theater...this is important!
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oh...maybe I'll get my copy ordered in December here in Italy
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Spook in my previous psts you will find an answer to your questions...yes...FDR wanted war with Japan...Hull answered the final Japanese message with such a tough note that even Americans were worried!
But the question is...why FDR didn't advice filed commanders in the night of Dec 7 and why Marshall lost 3 hours to advice them?...and why they didn't use telephone?...
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Now let’s gain some other interesting info from West Point Military History (not some strange book….West Point you know).
Early the morning of Dec 7 the 14th part of the Japanese message was distributed to Washington authorities through MAGIC channels.
The 14th part announced :
The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that, in view of the attitude of the American Government, it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.
The President’s reaction to it was milder than his response had been to the first parts of the message the previous evening. The most involved War Department intelligence officer, Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, reacted similarly. Upon seeing the interception of a much shorter message from Tokyo to Nomura, however, Bratton was shocked into action; the message instructed the Ambassador to submit the 14-part note to Secretary Hull at 1:00 PM on Dec 7. Convinced that Japan intended to attack some American installation in the Pacific, and that time and date in the message were significant, he wanted to warn field commanders. Having no authority to send such a message, at about 9:00 AM Bratton tried to reach General Marshall. The Chief of Staff had gone horseback riding and did not return Bratton’s call until 10:30AM. Bratton then told Marshall that he had a most important message, but the Chief of Staff declined having it delivered, saying that he would shortly be coming to his office. (While Marshall later did not recall this conversation, Bratton clearly remembered it)
Marshall arrived at his office at 11:25 AM and Bratton promptly went to see him, but had to wait while the Chief digested the 14-part reply to Hull. Freeting because the minutes were slipping by, Bratton finally presented the message he considered so important.
(omissis)
The Chief of Staff then told Bratton to have the message to field commanders dispatched by “the fastest means”. By then it was almost noon.
Because atmospheric conditions had blocked the radio channel to Honolulu, at 12:17PM the War Department Signal Center sent the message through Western Union Channels. Marshall’s communications advised commanders that Japan would be presenting what amounted to an ultimatum at 1:00PM Washington time, and that her consolates were under orders to destroy their code machines at once. This warning message reached Honolulu at 7:33 AM, but the messenger making the delivery to the Hawaiian Department was caught in the rain of Japanese bombs.The message reached Short at 3:00PM.
We shall never know whether a more expedient dispatch of the final warning message might have blunted the Japanese strike at Pearl Harbor. It is clear, however, that no one in Washington seems to have considered using the telephone, which might have given Short and Kimmel about an hour’s preparation time- if it is assumed that they would have taken the message seriously and gone to full alert status at once. Likewise, the Washington authorities, including those who were most concerned about the japanese 1:00 PM message, seem to have considered Pearl Harbor an unlikely point of Japanese attack. Marshall later testified that “even if he had used the phone, he would have first called macArthur, the Panama”.
Now some considerations of mine:
- FDR in the nite of Dec 6 said to Hopkins “This means war”, but he let Stark looking the theater performance
- It seems that FDR did not inform Marshall too, considering that on that crucial Washington morning the Chief of Staff was nicely riding (very strange…a war is impending and the President doesn’t inform his Chief of Staff!)
- That Bratton guy was a bit importunate: he wanted to see Marshall immediately!..well finally Marshall agreed to send the warning message but 3 precious hours were gone away
- No one in Washington thought about the telephone (well it was only 1941!) but I would expect that with an impending war the telephone had to be used
- And last Marshall said it considered more probable a Jap attack on Panama than on Pearl Harbor (no comments!)
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Jarmo, maybe you aren't able to read....or to understand?
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To add some more info to this topic let’s look at these facts:
1. On 19Nov Ambassador Nomura in Washington received the message “Winds”, promptly deciphered by Cordell Hull’s Magic clerks. This message said that if Tokyo Boroadcasting had transmitted the message “East wind, rain” Japan would have gone into war with America.
2. On 22Nov through Magic Hull and FDR knew that last jap proposals were ultimate and last date for american reply was 29Nov.
3. Nov 26 was a highly critical day. Pearl Harbour Striking Force left the Kuriles, and Secretary Hull presented the American answer to the last Japanese diplomatic proposal. Disregarding the possibility of a truce, Hull reaffirmed the longstanding American principles which demanded that Japan give up her military conquests in China and Indochina. It was so tough a note that shocked the Japanese Ambassadors, who dared not send it immediately to Tokyo. Even Americans were taken by surprise. Army and Navy officers were still working on compromise provisions for the President. Stark was worried. (The West Point Military History Series “ The Second World War, Asia and the Pacific”, pag.50)
4. On Dec 6 the lengthy Japanese reply to Hull’s proposals arrived in Washington. American code clerks, through Magic, deciphered the message. At about 10PM Lt Lestr R.Schulz, an assistant naval aide, presented the message to FDR , who was in conference with Hopkins. FDR carefully read the long message and then passed it to Hopkins, who also read it. Then “FDR turned to Hopkins and said, ‘This means war’. Schulz was ‘not sure of the exact words’ but had no doubt about the meaning. “ The President wanted to talk to Admiral Stark, but decided not to call him out of a theater, lest such action cause undue alarm. Shortly before midnight , the two men talked, but no call for action followed the conversation.(ibidem, pag.51)
Now it seems clear that American Government decided to let Japan go to war on Nov 26 and in the night of Dec 6 it seemed to FDR most important to let Stark at theater, keeping him in the dark about Japan going to war on the next day.
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Nice to see many americans arguing about this topic...that's why USA is a really democratic nation!
As to carriers someone forgot that Japanese were searching for them...and after only 6 months Midway was the turning point!
Many strange things happened about Pearl...last but not least...the final message to Adm. Kimmel was sent by civil wire without any priority!
The Trilateral Berlin Pact didn't consider the declaration of war to USA but FDR did know what on 29 Nov the jap ambassador Oshima in Germany had telegraphed to Tokyo referring its debate with Ribbentrop.
To the question "What will Germany do with countris aiding Great Britain?" Ribbentrop replied to Oshima "It's clear:if Japan will be engaged in awar against USA, Germany will aid Japan". (Shirer "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich")
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Who was the spy in the German High Command?
When the germans striked at Kursk they found a very well organized defensive line that broke up the armoured spearhead, wiping out last armoured resources of Germany.
Now Stalin knew the german plan Operation Zitadelle in early April (!) by the Soviet spy Lucy in Switzerland, who had access to daily informations on decisioons of the OKW.
In early April there existed only 13 copies of the Operative Order no.16, with access onlt to superior german commanders!
So the question is “ Who was the spy in OKW?”…..Canaris?
I would be very grateful to get some more info and opinions about this topic
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Did Roosevelt know that Japs were to strike Pearl Harbour?
It is a well known fact that Americans had broken the japanese diplomatic code and that the message sent to Jap Embassy to declare war was decrypted byAmerican government well before jap clerks did at the Embassy.
Moreover the jap ambassador was left waiting for more than a hour…just in time to have jap planes strike Pearl before war declaration….and strangely the two carriers, always in harbour in the weekends, were in mission at sea that day.
Now for more details read Pearl’s scapegoat Admiral Kimmel’s book…”Admiral Kimmel’s Story” (Henry Regnery,1955) and Rear Admiral Theobald’s “The Final Secret of Pearl Harbour” (Devin-Adair, 1954).
Roosevelt had well understood that after WWII USA would replace Great Britain in ruling the world and needed a fact to inflame anti-war public opinion to enter the war.
I would be very grateful to get some more info and opinions about this topic.
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No chance for Germans to beat the Amis in CE...I played 5 times and beat always my german opponent.
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damn..I'm so anxious to get DA GAME
and now that Berli has defied me this is much more troublesome! 
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I'm italian...many people say we aren't able to fight....we lost the war....but nowadays pizza is ruling all over the world!
Anyway if you want to know more about jews and Germany read "Hitler's Willing Executioners" from Goldhagen, professor on Government and Social Studies at Harvard University.
BTW...anyone must appreciate that Germany is nowadays a perfectly democratic nation, able to learn from its past!
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damn....and in Italy?...maybe it will arrive in the next Millennium
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hey guys!...stop posting...my copy has arrived!....
lot of people here expecting enviously!
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hey man....i'm Italian too....just pre-ordered a copy in December....it costed me some 60 bucks....damn!...anyway my e-mail address is roby@teleion.it...living near Turin
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hehe..iggi...I said:
Germans simply CAN'T beat the Amis in Chance Encounter
ok....if you wish...I will take the Amis..send me your file bud!
anyway I can't assure you to end before the end of June coz in July, August and September I will be on vacations...
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<Credit cards have been mostly all charged>
Hehe...I already paid bucks to your Bank!
It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Ohau would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside three hundred miles.
My 2 cents!!
in Combat Mission Archive #2 (2000)
Posted
IDF....are you IDF?