Gary T

howardb - I haven't got my copy yet. I doubt anyone outside the States has. Do you fancy a double blind game? How about Elsdorf, you can chose the side. E-mail me if you're interested. ------------------ *I laugh in the face of Fear and tweak the nose of Terror* (Edmund Blackadder circa 1570).

...at some point next week, hopefully. Unless of course Customs decide to inspect it which case you can add another two weeks on. Believe me I know from experience. Anyhow, seeing as all (sorry, most) of the US lot will have been playing for over week or more I was wondering if any of my European comrades would be interested in organising any double-blind ganes in advance. I've listed all the scenarios below. Obviously some are out (Riesberg, CE etc) but if anyone would like to pick one to play against me then I'll make sure I don't play it the minute CM drops on the mat. I'll play any side. If your interested e-mail me or better still post it on here. A Walk In Paris Aachen All or Nothing Bruyeres Chambois Chance Encounter Clash Of Eagles Drop To Destiny Elsdorf Fear in the Fog Fire and Movement First Clash at Cambes Grafenwohr Grosshau Ridge Ham and Jam Hamminkelm- We Start Here Kommerscheidt L'Abbey Blanche L'Elle River Crossing La Fiere Last Defense Le Lorey- A Hard Stand Merry X-mas at Hemroulle Move it or Lose it Night at Cheneux Nijmegen One Long Cold Day Paratroops on Parade Polish Airborne at Arnhem Red Devils Riesberg Saarburg- A Way Out Sherbrooke Fusiliers Singling Shootout Small Gain Son South of Sword St. Anne's Chapelle The Sunken Lane Valley Of Trouble Villers Bocage- Tiger! Westwall Wiltz Cheers, Gary.

Not as rare as Jadgtigers - and they're in.

I have a cunning plan. Why not delay the dispatch of the game to North American customers for a week or two, while sending the European and Worldwide customers their copies immediately? Then everyone will get it at the same time. Problem solved. I'm sure our Trans-Atlantic friends won't mind waiting an extra week. ------------------

Just to throw my 2 pence in. I have believed for sometime years now that Waffen SS performance, certainly in comparison to regular Wehrmacht divisions, has often been massively overstated especially by English language publications. Alot of these publications are just re-hashes of Waffen SS unit histories written by the veterans themselves with absolutely no attempt to question the actions at all (this in some regards holds true for the German view of the Eastern Front as a whole). The performance of Heer divisions, especially Panzer divisions, was at least equal, and in some cases better than the W-SS but this is completely overlooked. How many Heer Panzer division histories are there in English? I'm also not sure about the claims that W-SS performance increased until 1944. I would argue for a decrease from March 1943 onwards (after the Kharkov counteroffensive). It was at this point that Luftwaffe ground personnel began to be transferred en-masse to the so-called 'elite' Waffen SS divisions. Senior army officers were highly critical of W-SS leadership (particularly the junior officers) during the Kursk battle and during the Mius operation later on in July 1943. The criticism exactly mirrors that posted by Tommi. Indeed in the latter operation it was the exhausted Heer 23. Panzerdivision that was the mainstay of the counter attack and not 'Das Reich' or 'Totenkopf' despite those divisions being given LAH's tanks and equipment before it left for Italy (not to mention the 2 extra PzG battalions and Stug Abteilung per division). This is not to say that the W-SS did not produce some fine soldiers - it did. No doubt someone will point out the excellent performance of the W-SS in Normandy especially, as rightly pointed out, some of them had had a massive influx of new recruits. However, look at 352. ID on D-Day. It too had had a massive influx of recruits built up around a hardcore of veterans. I would argue that its performance, especially given the circumstances and its TOE, was just as noteworthy. Finally one must remember that the W-SS performance was an excellent DEFENSIVE one - they certainly did not achieve that much in the attack. It is in the attack that a formations real quality comes out. A formation with high morale but poor training or leadership can perform superbly well on the defensive - an excellent case in point is the Red Army in 1941-43. They were atrocious in the attack but damned good in defence. Why are the W-SS held in such high esteem these days? A number of reasons IMHO. One the aforementioned almost 'hero worship' English language books. Two their image (loads of tanks, camo uniforms, extreme bravery (some would say fanatical), being present at major operations. I also think that they have been played up to some extent so as to divert attention from the Aliies own serious military shortcomings in NW Europe. Sorry to ramble, Gary.

I live not too far away from you two in Staffordshire. Near Lichfield to be precise (if you've heard of it!).

On the subject of the British argument for the Bren being a superior LMG one must remember that the British Army has always considered accuracy a more important factor than firepower. Indeed when they adopted the SLR (FN-FAL) in the 50's it was only done so on the proviso it was modified to be semi-auto only (although many of the long termer's would 'adapt' it to fire auto). On another note I read somewhere (could have been 'With British Snipers to the Reich') that the Bren was considered by the troops to be too accurate as a LMG - is spread of shot was not good for suppression. The example given was of the fighting in Norway where some German casualties were found to have been hit by the first three rounds from Bren bursts. The same still rings true today. The SA80 is, as someone else said, unreliable and unpopular with the infantrymen who have to use it but it IS very accurate. Another quick point is the infantryman's own view (in contrast to oficial doctrine)of firepower vs. accuracy/ammo use. Many of the infantry mourn the passing of the belt fed GPMG and the adoption of the LSW as the squad support weapon. The latter (even when there is two per squad) does not put down anywhere as near the same amount of firepower as the GPMG and, despite the the ammo incompatiblility, weight, extra ammo etc most infantryman would be much happier with GPMG as their squad level weapon. [This message has been edited by Gary T (edited 05-24-2000).]

Hi Lobo, I'm up for a game of Valley - I've played as US so I'm more than willing to be the Germans. Also I've only played 3 PBEM's previously. I can do about a turn or two a day - send ne the set up if you're interested and we'll get under way. Cheers, Gary.

Sosa, I had same sort of problems this morning - I didn't manage to play more than two turns consecutively. But after a bit of advice I upgraded my mouse driver (Logitech) and reinstalled my video drivers (Riva TNT) and happily I've just played an entire scenario problem free. Not sure which it was mind - could have been both. Good luck, Gary.

Fionn,Slazzari,Schrullenhaft: Thanks alot for the advice. I updated my Logitech mouse drivers to 8.32 and reinstalled my Riva drivers (I already had the latest ones). And hey presto! I've just managed to play an entire scenario no problems. I even won! Gary.

Molyneaux (not a Wolves supporter!?), I've been having similar probs in the other scenario but I've not got past turn 2 yet - see my 'for the love of God thread' for details on my crashes. Gary.

Congrats on Gold Demo - looks great etc. However….I’ve been trying to play the Gold Demo for the last hour and unfortunately have not been able to complete two consecutive turns. Every time the game has crashed but in different ways. The twelve crashes are as below: 1. Got a ding during resolution phase - game froze up. Windows still okay. 2. Got a blue screen OE - something to do with VxD but didn’t make a note (see others below). Had to reboot. 3. See 1. 4. Got a blue screen with the following: An exception OE has occurred at 0028:C02BAD57 in VxD VMOUSE (03) + 00000a17. This was called from 028:c02BAD2C in VxD VMOUSE (03) + 000009EC. Returned to game - screen had black flashing black polygons, no trees or buildings, units were still there but unresponsive. Windows okay. 5. Just froze completely - no ding - during orders. Couldn’t access Windows (Ctrl Alt Del wouldn’t work either). Had to reboot. 6. See 5. 7. See 1. 8. See 1 but happened during orders. 9. See 8. 10. Complete Crash - black screen although ambient sounds were still playing. Had to reboot as C+A+D produced nothing. 11. Got a blue screen with message: An exception OE has occurred at 0028:C0049b9BB in VxD LMOUSE (01) + 00000E87. Returned to game - screen had bick flashing black polygons, no trees or buildings, units were still there but unresponsive. Windows okay. 12. See 1. Also, because I have had to reboot every time, I have had the video check box 12 times - on two of the occasions it chose 640x480 and on the others 800x600. I exited straight after last start so it created a Pref file - then restarted but still crashed. My system is a PII300, 64MB RAM, Riva TNT 1 with 16MB (with latest Riva drivers), Logitech mouse, W95 with DX7. I have tried turning some of the graphic options down but this has made no difference. Anyone else out there (apart from Molyneaux) with same probs? TIA, Gary. PS Had no problems (apart from the same as everyone else) with the Beta Demo - managed to play all scenarios through with no crashes.

I'll try again! It's at www.percy.clara.net

Hi Steve, quote: And the "13th Company" thing actually doesn't apply to *any* 1944/45 Regimental pattern since they were binary and not triangular. My brain slipped a gear on that one Actually you were correct the first time. Even after most infantry regiments went to a two battalion structure the IG and AT companies remained numbered 13./ and 14./. Tessin's books support this. Also I have a number of wehrpasses to members of such units (see my <a href="http://www.percy.clara.net/index.htm"> site</a> which you might find interesting. Cheers, Gary. [This message has been edited by Gary T (edited 04-23-2000).]

Steve, I don't want to be pedantic (although I'm going to be anyway) but the 13./ organistaion you describe is only applicable to infantry divisions - and of course the IG's would not be SP. In a Panzer Division the 75mm IG's were part of the heavy weapons companies of the PzGr battalions (usually one section of 2 (towed) to each company - could be three or four pieces depending on the division). The SPW SP 75's formed an SP gun battery of six vehicles for the SPW equipped PzGr battalion. They were however regularly 'loaned out' to their truck borne colleagues in the other battalions when the situation demanded. In Panzer Divisions the IG company you mention was exclusively 150mm SP - I would guess most would be sIG 38(t) Grille/Bison.

Fionn, I know the British Army during the early part of the troubles in N. Ireland behaved as you say. I have seen private photos from members of 1 Para of prisoners being 'interrogated'. However, the differnce between internment and shoot-to-kill policies as you describe them and what you said in your original post is immense. Internment and shoot-to-kill (which I don't recognise as being effective tactics BTW) was aimed at suspected terrorists. What you were suggesting was the eradication of the male population suspected or otherwise. Interestingly the massacre at Ascq I mentioned was followed up by a Gestapo investigation (into the sabotage). And guess what? They successfully apprehended the 8 members of the resistance responsible. All the summary shooting of 86 innocent individuals by HJ did was probably to double the local recruitment figures of the Resistance. Also you stae the villagers were guilty of not reporting partisan activity. What makes you so sure they knew anything of any value anyway? I'm pretty sure the vast majority had NO connections or knowledge of the local resistance. There is NO justification whatsoever of what happened at Oradour despite the excuses you make. If all villagers are held responsible for the actions of others then surely all members of the W-SS should be held responsible for the actions of their organisation. And no I don't believe that should be so. Yes, you are right about the 'elite' units being more brutal. There are certain units (British) I deal with on a daily basis who I believe are would be far more prone to committing war crimes than others. One only has to look at the 'elite' Canadian/Belgian/Italian forces behaviour in Somalia to see that. And they were part of the UN for God's sake! Anyway, good dicussion and as Sos says time to end it from my perspective. Cheers, Gary.

I don't normally get involved in (what are usually) these sort of discussions mainly because everyone already has their opinion and no amount of discussion will change them. However, Fionn, how can you say Oradour was 'a great piece of propaganda'? To call it such implies it did not happen or has been exaggerated in some way. Whereas your observations of shooting of surrendering prisoners etc by all armies in battle I agree with there are enormous differences where non-combatants are concerned. What you are advocating by shooting (without any trial whatsoever) all innocent or otherwise men in a village is unjustified murder. Just exactly how are the innocent villagers meant to stop the partisans form operating? Would the British Army in Northern Ireland be justified in going into every Catholic home and shooting dead on the streets every Catholic male, guilty or otherwise? I cna't believe you would support that. As Sos says such an attitude is completely and utterly counter productive anyway. There is no doubt in my mind that the Waffen-SS in particular was more inclined than either its Wehrmacht counterparts or its opponents, with the possible exception of the Red Army, to commit these sort of crimes. That is not to say that the W-SS always acted this way or that the Allies/Wehrmacht didn't. Indeed the Wehrmacht in Russia certainly did. But in Western Europe the Wehrmacht certainly did not eliminate every village/town when one of its members was killed by the local resistance. At Ascq in March 1944 when a train carrying SS-Aufkl. Abt. 12 was derailed (with no casualties) the men of this unit went on the rampage and summarily shot 86 innocent people who had the misfortune of living near to the station. Similar overzealousness was reported when LAH went to Italy in 1943. What causes soldiers to act in a such way?All soldiers from all armies WILL act in this way if they are allowed to (even against their own population). The key is if they are allowed to. The Wehrmacht behaved badly in Russia, but generally stuck to the rules in Western Europe, the reason being they were told from the beginning of the Russian campaign that a blind eye would be turned against crimes committed. No such tolerance was implemented in the west. This leaves me with the conclusion that somewhere within the Waffen-SS psyche, and it doesn't have to be within the minds of every conscript just the officers/SNCO's, was a more brutal and ruthless streak than existed in the minds of their Wehrmacht colleagues. The reasons for that? Well....I won't even go there.

"In fact, the Western Allies chewed up and spat out most of the German armor available in 1944, not the Soviets." Steve, Are you truly being serious? Even if you don't take the first 6 months of 1944 into consideration I would still argue that more German armour was deployed (and destroyed) in the East in the last six months 1944. There were twice as many Panzer Divisions deployed in the East as the West in June 1944 (and a number of these were at full strength after being refitted). In the struggle to hold the series of Soviet offensives in the summer of 1944 (from Bagration onwards) nearly all of these were severely mauled. The divisions may not have been destroted as completely as in the West but I would still say more losses occured in the East.

Fionn, I am completely aware of the myth/propaganda of the 'Jerry doesn't like it up 'em' line. I can't seem to think where I've said otherwise. However, the fact remains that the German soldier did not like close combat by his own admission - and that counts for pre-1944 as well. Why did he not like it? Not because he was lacking in moral fibre or any other such reason but from the simple fact that his training and doctrine stressed the use of firepower in the assault. This is not to say that the German soldier did not take part in close combat - of course he did and when required could be extremely efficent at it. Yes you are right about the reasons for the lack of fight amongst certain German units in NW Europe in 44-45. IMHO though I'd say that no matter what the nationality, once an attacker has broken into a defensive position the defender (if he hasn't managed to withdraw) is always likely to surrender when faced with the possibility of close combat. The momentum and psychological edge is strongly in favour of the attacker. Where surrender seems the worse option (i.e. Germans vs. Russians) or the defender has high moral then there will be vicious hand to hand fighting. I know there are many cases of bayonet fights in both world wars but these are VERY much the exception. FWIW Jary (in his other articles) is not being critical of the Germans philosophy of assault by fire. In fact quite the opposite. That technique was far more modern and forward looking that the British/Russian/Japanese method of closing with the enemy. He uses the German method to recommend the issue of squad weapons (to the modern British Army) that are capable of putting high volume of suppressive fire down i.e. belt fed LMG's and automatic grenade lauchers. Coincidentally the current standard by-the-book British infantry training method is still to close to withing grenade range and follow up with close assault. And yes they are still taught bayonet drills. Not because they'll be of any real use but because (to quote and instructor I work with) 'they create an aggressive spirit'. Now where I have I heard that before? 1914?

When Jary refers to the Germans surrendering I don't think he gets the point across very well. The way I see it was that once the MG42's had been taken out the British were then able to close assault, which they couldn't do before. I think the surrendering was due more the psychological impact of the bayonet -which after all is its purpose - rather than the loss of the MG42's. However the silencing of the MG42's remained the key. I think the psyche of the British infantry training was to close with enemy and destroy him (it fundamentally still is). I read somewhere that the German army no longer seriously practiced bayonet drills in WW2.

Andreas, The book I'm referring to is 'Battle Tactics on the Western Front' by Paddy Griffin. Yale University Press ISBN 0300066635. While some of the conclusions you may not agree with (I didn't agree with them all - I've not got a very high regard of British military leadership) its does redress the balance and provides food for thought. On the subject of Canadian success. Firstly I beleive they were (together with the ANZAC's) an all volunteer force which counts for alot. Secondly one must remember their success where the British failed was against a much weakened German army. One could also argue that that was how and why the Allies in general got the chance to refine their tactics to a fine art in the last months of the war.

Steve, The assault on Mount Pincon he mentions was on the 4th August and he referring to his experiences before that date. An interesting point is that after being pinned down all day during the initial assault by the MG42's the objective was taken by using night infiltration, a tactic he urges the modern British Army to devote training (but thats an altogether different article). In another of his articles on urban combat he states the two most important weapons in the British armoury were the Flamethrower (either Wasp of Crocodile) and the AVRE - please tell me the AVRE is going to be addedat a later date. It was certainly in more widespread use than the Jadgtiger and thats in. I shall stop grumbling now.

Andreas, Actually, the idea that the British Army of 1918 resembled the one of 1916 is a well oiled myth. Recent studies have shown that the British Army in 1918 had extremely well developed all arms tactics (infantry, artillery, tanks and aircraft) - see Paddy Griffiths book. The fact that they promptly forgot it all and had to relearn it in WW2 is another story. What the author is referring to is squad level tactics not the strategic cock ups that the Brits are famous for. The training of individual markmanship in the British was (and still is) a vital part of infantry training - more so than in other armies. Its a matter of philosophy - in the German army the MG was supported by the riflemen, in the British the riflemen were supported by the MG. As a matter of interest (an the articles are written so as to develop and criticise modern infantry tactics) the author is fully supportive of many parts of German WW2 military doctrine including the issue of belt fed 7.62+ calibre MG's like the MG42. He is usually highly critical of the modern infantry magazine fed squad support weapons like the LSW. As he states a modern unit so equipped would be pinned down long before it closed with the MG42's.

Hi, As we all wait with baited breath for Cm to appear I though you might be interested in this extract from an article in the British Army's in house journal. The author was a platoon commander (MC) with Somerset LI from June 44 to May 45. I think I may have posted another extract from another of his articles some time back (he quite a prolific writer). Anyhow, as the teachers say at scholl when they can't be arsed to do any work - discuss. To get the ball rolling I'll say the main thing that is at odds with CM in the Beta demo is the ease with which MG's are spotted in CM. Almost instantly in most cases. Also does Cm make allowance for the special tracer he mentions? A Matter of Vulnerabilities: German Infantry Weaknesses in WWII Key Dependencies Many years ago, when I was writing '18 Platoon', I said that: 'in many attacks the prisoners we took on numbered our attacking force and Gemian units who would continue to resist at close quarters were few indeed'. Stupidly I did not expand on this statement. Recently, while dozing after Sunday lunch, my mind wandered around the extraordinary change in the fighting performance of most of the German infantry that occurred during the closing stages of a battle. German platoons, companies and battalions which, early in the battle, had fought with heartless ferocity, would surrender in aimless droves. This phenomenon happened frequently. Why was this? After pondering on this matter a factor, common to my experience in many battles, emerged. The German infantry lost heart once we had knocked out their MG42 detachments. There was undoubtedly an over reliance on their MGs both in the attack and, more obviously, in defence. I suspect that this was the consequence of the training they received which certainly dated back to the Somme in 1916 and probably before - certainly it was noted on many occasions in the 1918 battles that ordinary German infantry did not seem to know how to use their rifles. In 1944-45 their riflemen, not including their, snipers, were generally poor shots. 'They seemed to be primarily carriers of cases and more cases of linked ammunition for their MGs. (Please see BAR 114, 'Firepower- at Platoon and Company Level'). Eliminating the MG42 was our- first priority and, due to the gun's high rate of' firepower - has it ever been exceeded? - and well sited mutuallv supporting positions, it could rarely be achieved by physical assault, even using fire and movement. To knock them out we required HE, fired directly by supporting armour or, indirectly by Dennis Clarke or Bramley Hancock, our beloved FOOs. It took me until our assault on Mont Pincon on 6th August to realise what game the Germans were playing. Clearly, they did not like close combat and chose to keep its at arms length with a display of massive MG firepower. Without HE support it was almost always impossible to get close enough to assault with rifle and bayonet. Our infantry platoons could not match the firepower of the MG42. This was recognised to some extent in the training pamphlets of the time; 'The Infantry Company 1942' states that two British platoons were required to win a firefight against one German - and this was before the MG42 was on general issue. Of one thing I am certain, a platoon armed with SA80 and LSW would be stopped by MG42s well out of' range of their own platoon weapons. At this stage you had better refer again to 'Firepower at Platoon and Company Level'. But remember, there was airways the perennial problem of locating well-camouflaged MGs. The Germans were very good indeed at concealment and their tracer rounds, igniting two hundred yards from the muzzle of the gun, assisted this. For instance, during the early stages of our assault on Mont Pincon we were engaged by about a dozen MG 42s: to this day I have no idea of their position. German reliance on the MG was by no means restricted to defence. In the attack they rarely finished with an assault with rifle and bayonet preferring to deluge the opposition with a powerful display of MG firepower supplemented by machine pistols and stick grenades.

Arthur, I can't send to your stand-in e-mail address. I get the message "Exceeded storage space". Can you try and clear some out and let me know and I'll resend. Cheers, Gary.