kipanderson

Hi, For me the series of Battle of the Bulge scenarios that were designed by McAuliffe and came out soon after the release of CMBO, really set the standard. You cannot do better than follow the above link to his tips on scenario design. Very much looking forward to seeing what McAuliffe will getup to in CMBB, particularly the maps. All the best, Kip.

Hi, Go to http://www.cmmc2.org for the latest. There is no formal recruiting just yet, but the build up to the Eastern Front version has started. However, it will be a few months before the game gets underway. All the best, Kip.

Andreas, You put us all to shame! You just go on pouring out scenarios; I do not know how you do it, but good fun for the rest of us to have a constant stream for great scenarios. All the best, Kip.

Hi, When it comes to the number of Panzers and Panzer divisions on the Eastern Front at any one time, happily, the information is readily available. All the information below comes directly from German records. The first scan is self explanatory, the later ones dealing with numbers come from the books of Thomas Jentz. In his books he explicitly states that he has inferred nothing, all the stats come straight out of German records and that he even tries to format the information as the original document. First, German assessments of their own forces in the spring of 43. At the bottom of the image you will see a total of 22 Panzer Divisions and around 1300 Panzers. The number in brackets is for panzers in theatre but not operational. For more detail on the number of operational Panzers on the Eastern Front in 43, look below. For the number of Panzers on the Eastern Front in May 44, see below. Note, once again it is the number of operational Panzers that counts. Also, you can see that once again the number of Panzer Divisions, including Panzergrenadier Divisions, is in the low twenties. The other formations, such as Tiger battalions, would be attached to the Panzer Divisions. As all the above sources make clear, an assumption of between 20-25 Panzer Divisions with around 45-50 operational Panzers in each divisions, was about the average. Of course, 45-50 is only the average in a very wide range of possibilities. Some will be asking “why only count actual Panzers, what about all the other AFVs.” The reason is that both the Germans themselves, and the defending Soviet forces were only really concerned with counting AFVs that may be used in attack. You could call them “offensive AFVs”. Things like Marders and other defensive AFVs could not be used to take the initiative. They would be used to defend against Soviets attacks, not to attack in the first place. The Soviets were concerned with choking off Panzer Divisions so as to maintain the initiative. However, if you wish to include the StugIIIs as offensive AFVs then their numbers are given below. The average total number of operational Stugs and StuHs is 590. Now, why is TM 30-430, the manual form which the information on the tactical use of Soviet AT battalions was taken, a lot more than just a theoretical doctrine paper? There are a number of reasons. The most obvious is to look at the Handbook on USSR Military Forces as part of a series. The first in the series to really hit the standards one would now expect from a manual produced by the modern Threat Support department of the DOD was Handbook on Japanese Military Forces published in the spring of 44. The next in the series was Handbook on German Military Forces published in January 45, in fact a bit late to make any real difference. However, if we take the Japanese volume it is worth considering what its purpose was and on what it will have been based. Its purpose was to help train and inform US military personal so as to improve their combat effectiveness against the enemy. So as to help them achieve their objectives with minimum casualties. It was not a theoretical paper; it was practical book to help in real situations. It will have been based on captures documents and real world experience; they will have used all the sources open to them. It will have been the mother of all after action reports on how the Japanese actually do things. The same goes for the German volume. Its aim was to help American service personal in real situations. The idea that the authors of the Handbook on USSR Forces did not ask this very question of General Gehlen, “is this how it actually happens, this is how the Soviets actually do things?” is not credible. The manual was to prepare US forces for what may turn into a hot war against the new potential enemy. Also consider the manual from the stand point of General Gehlen and his staff. They will have been collating all this information so as to help the German army in its war against the Soviets. So as to help the German army achieve the best possible result. The idea that it was simply a regurgitated version of soviet manuals without any reference to what actually happened is, again, not credible. So from the German point of view it was also the mother of all after action reports on how the Soviets did things. Lastly, the material produced by General Gehlen has recently been tested for its validity by the Research Institute for Military History in Potsdam, authors of the Germany and the Second World War books, and found to be of as high quality as it was always credited with. When it comes to the graphics in the extract I posted earlier, the maps in TM 30-430 sometimes have no scale, and when they do it is only to draw attention to one particular feature. However, if one looks at the other maps, it is clear that all are drawn to scale, they are not out to confuse. That the maps in the section on AT units should be any different is highly unlikely. From the narrative in the posted section it is also clear that the fig34. the Firesack would indeed fit very happily in 2km CM map. Then there is the matter of an After Action Report for some major German armour action. As it happens, the most recent Soviet General Staff Study I read deals with just such a matter. Again, Soviet General Staff Studies are very good examples of AARs, but scaled up and filtered. They are based on the study of all sources of information on given battles and analysis of what actually happened. The following extract relates to the fighting in the Sandomierz bridgehead resulting from the L’vov operation. The L’vov operation took place in late July 44 and resulted in a bridgehead across the Vistula a couple of hundred km south of the more famous Destruction of Army Group Centre battles. The following gives a good enough idea of what was going on. “The fighting on the Sandomierz bridgehead was very intense. While repulsing continuous counterattacks by large enemy tank and infantry forces, the 1st Ukrainian Front's forces continued to fight to enlarge the bridgehead. The enemy counterattacked from the Shidluv and Rakuv region on 11 August with forces from the 3d and 16th Panzer Divisions. This German counterattack apparently had the aim of cutting our forces advanc- ing on the Vistula River's western bank in two. Although it failed to achieve the desired results, the German command did not cease its attempts to clear our forces from the Vistula's western bank. Having regrouped his forces, on 13 August the enemy launched an attack in the region west of Stopnitsa and further north, employing four panzer divisions (the 1st, 3d, 16th, and 24th) and one panzer grenadier division. As a result of the six days of fierce fight- ing, the German tank grouping suffered heavy equipment losses and halted its attacks. Forces from three panzer divisions launched the next large-scale German attacks from the Ozharuv region.” The next section comes from the “conclusion” chapter where there is a summing up of lessons learnt. The small part dealing with AT artillery is clear. “ Around 10,000 guns and mortars were available for artillery support of the L'vov-PeremyshI' operation. The presence of this mass of artillery weaponry reliably supported forces at all stages of the operation. It should be noted that, as a result of the fighting by the reconnaissance and forward detachments in the 3d Guards and 13th Armies' sectors, it was necessary to introduce substantive corrections into the plan for the artillery offensive. In these armies' offensive sectors, the artillery had to change its combat for- mations and carry out the artillery preparation against the enemy's second defensive belt. The change in the artillery's combat formations was carried out on time, and the artillery supported the forces when they penetrated the Germans' second defensive belt. The plan for artillery support of the com- mitment of the tank armies into the penetration was also substantively changed. In view of the fact that the tank armies were committed into the penetration in a completely different situation than foreseen by the plan, principal attention was focused on the support of the tank and mechanized corps by mobile army units and on solid support of their flanks. The artillery played an especially great role in the repelling of counter- attacks by enemy tank groupings in the Zborov region and in the battles for the Sandomierz bridgehead. The timely movement of antitank artillery brigades and regiments forward into the 'Koltuv corridor' had great significance in protecting the flanks of the 3d Guards Tank and 4th Tank Armies as they entered the penetration. In the Sandomierz bridgehead, the artillery also executed its main mission of fighting against counterattacking enemy tanks. “ I am not sure there is a great deal more that can be said. Above what they are saying is, “yup, AT doctrine and the use of separate AT units was fine, not one of the things to change.” The numbers of separate AT units and type of guns was discussed way back in the thread. The numbers of German “threat” or offensive AFVs has been dealt with. The question of the tactical use of separate AT regiments had been dealt with, TM30-430 makes clear that the densities were typically one 24 gun regiment to a 2km frontage, to which one would have to add a few guns from supporting infantry units. The following passage, although relating to very start of the war, also gives a clear and unambiguous view of Soviet thinking on density, from the Dunn book. “In the early months of the war, Russian antitank guns were spread evenly over the front in a thin defensive zone, six to nine guns per km in a depth of 2 or 3 km.15 There were too few guns at any point to stop a German panzer attack. The shortage of guns was partly responsible, but a doctrine of spreading the guns out at the front rather than concentrating them in large numbers at likely points also was faulty. In reaction to the threat posed by massed panzer attacks, the Russians had formed independent antitank brigades. On April 24, 1941, ten antitank brigades were formed with two regiments each with 24 76mm guns, a battalion with 12 107mm guns, two battalions with 12 85mm guns, an antiaircraft battalion of 8 37mm guns and 36 machine guns, and an engineer mine-laying battalion. The ten antitank brigades were assigned to the three border military districts in June 1941. The antitank brigade provided an antitank gun line for 5 or 6 km of front with from 20 to 25 guns per km, three to four times the density achieved by spreading out the guns evenly.” I could also quote passages that say densities of 6 to 9 guns per km were far exceeded in practice and so on… The Soviets estimated that two thirds of German panzers destroyed, were destroyed by towed AT guns. All of the above helps to explain why. All the best, Kip.

Hi, When it comes to the number of Panzers and Panzer divisions on the Eastern Front at any one time, happily, the information is readily available. All the information below comes directly from German records. The first scan is self explanatory, the later ones dealing with numbers come from the books of Thomas Jentz. In his books he explicitly states that he has inferred nothing, all the stats come straight out of German records and that he even tries to format the information as the original document. First, German assessments of their own forces in the spring of 43. At the bottom of the image you will see a total of 22 Panzer Divisions and around 1300 Panzers. The number in brackets is for panzers in theatre but not operational. For more detail on the number of operational Panzers on the Eastern Front in 43, look below. For the number of Panzers on the Eastern Front in May 44, see below. Note, once again it is the number of operational Panzers that counts. Also, you can see that once again the number of Panzer Divisions, including Panzergrenadier Divisions, is in the low twenties. The other formations, such as Tiger battalions, would be attached to the Panzer Divisions. As all the above sources make clear, an assumption of between 20-25 Panzer Divisions with around 45-50 operational Panzers in each divisions, was about the average. Of course, 45-50 is only the average in a very wide range of possibilities. Some will be asking “why only count actual Panzers, what about all the other AFVs.” The reason is that both the Germans themselves, and the defending Soviet forces were only really concerned with counting AFVs that may be used in attack. You could call them “offensive AFVs”. Things like Marders and other defensive AFVs could not be used to take the initiative. They would be used to defend against Soviets attacks, not to attack in the first place. The Soviets were concerned with choking off Panzer Divisions so as to maintain the initiative. However, if you wish to include the StugIIIs as offensive AFVs then their numbers are given below. The average total number of operational Stugs and StuHs is 590. Now, why is TM 30-430, the manual form which the information on the tactical use of Soviet AT battalions was taken, a lot more than just a theoretical doctrine paper? There are a number of reasons. The most obvious is to look at the Handbook on USSR Military Forces as part of a series. The first in the series to really hit the standards one would now expect from a manual produced by the modern Threat Support department of the DOD was Handbook on Japanese Military Forces published in the spring of 44. The next in the series was Handbook on German Military Forces published in January 45, in fact a bit late to make any real difference. However, if we take the Japanese volume it is worth considering what its purpose was and on what it will have been based. Its purpose was to help train and inform US military personal so as to improve their combat effectiveness against the enemy. So as to help them achieve their objectives with minimum casualties. It was not a theoretical paper; it was practical book to help in real situations. It will have been based on captures documents and real world experience; they will have used all the sources open to them. It will have been the mother of all after action reports on how the Japanese actually do things. The same goes for the German volume. Its aim was to help American service personal in real situations. The idea that the authors of the Handbook on USSR Forces did not ask this very question of General Gehlen, “is this how it actually happens, this is how the Soviets actually do things?” is not credible. The manual was to prepare US forces for what may turn into a hot war against the new potential enemy. Also consider the manual from the stand point of General Gehlen and his staff. They will have been collating all this information so as to help the German army in its war against the Soviets. So as to help the German army achieve the best possible result. The idea that it was simply a regurgitated version of soviet manuals without any reference to what actually happened is, again, not credible. So from the German point of view it was also the mother of all after action reports on how the Soviets did things. Lastly, the material produced by General Gehlen has recently been tested for its validity by the Research Institute for Military History in Potsdam, authors of the Germany and the Second World War books, and found to be of as high quality as it was always credited with. When it comes to the graphics in the extract I posted earlier, the maps in TM 30-430 sometimes have no scale, and when they do it is only to draw attention to one particular feature. However, if one looks at the other maps, it is clear that all are drawn to scale, they are not out to confuse. That the maps in the section on AT units should be any different is highly unlikely. From the narrative in the posted section it is also clear that the fig34. the Firesack would indeed fit very happily in 2km CM map. Then there is the matter of an After Action Report for some major German armour action. As it happens, the most recent Soviet General Staff Study I read deals with just such a matter. Again, Soviet General Staff Studies are very good examples of AARs, but scaled up and filtered. They are based on the study of all sources of information on given battles and analysis of what actually happened. The following extract relates to the fighting in the Sandomierz bridgehead resulting from the L’vov operation. The L’vov operation took place in late July 44 and resulted in a bridgehead across the Vistula a couple of hundred km south of the more famous Destruction of Army Group Centre battles. The following gives a good enough idea of what was going on. “The fighting on the Sandomierz bridgehead was very intense. While repulsing continuous counterattacks by large enemy tank and infantry forces, the 1st Ukrainian Front's forces continued to fight to enlarge the bridgehead. The enemy counterattacked from the Shidluv and Rakuv region on 11 August with forces from the 3d and 16th Panzer Divisions. This German counterattack apparently had the aim of cutting our forces advanc- ing on the Vistula River's western bank in two. Although it failed to achieve the desired results, the German command did not cease its attempts to clear our forces from the Vistula's western bank. Having regrouped his forces, on 13 August the enemy launched an attack in the region west of Stopnitsa and further north, employing four panzer divisions (the 1st, 3d, 16th, and 24th) and one panzer grenadier division. As a result of the six days of fierce fight- ing, the German tank grouping suffered heavy equipment losses and halted its attacks. Forces from three panzer divisions launched the next large-scale German attacks from the Ozharuv region.” The next section comes from the “conclusion” chapter where there is a summing up of lessons learnt. The small part dealing with AT artillery is clear. “ Around 10,000 guns and mortars were available for artillery support of the L'vov-PeremyshI' operation. The presence of this mass of artillery weaponry reliably supported forces at all stages of the operation. It should be noted that, as a result of the fighting by the reconnaissance and forward detachments in the 3d Guards and 13th Armies' sectors, it was necessary to introduce substantive corrections into the plan for the artillery offensive. In these armies' offensive sectors, the artillery had to change its combat for- mations and carry out the artillery preparation against the enemy's second defensive belt. The change in the artillery's combat formations was carried out on time, and the artillery supported the forces when they penetrated the Germans' second defensive belt. The plan for artillery support of the com- mitment of the tank armies into the penetration was also substantively changed. In view of the fact that the tank armies were committed into the penetration in a completely different situation than foreseen by the plan, principal attention was focused on the support of the tank and mechanized corps by mobile army units and on solid support of their flanks. The artillery played an especially great role in the repelling of counter- attacks by enemy tank groupings in the Zborov region and in the battles for the Sandomierz bridgehead. The timely movement of antitank artillery brigades and regiments forward into the 'Koltuv corridor' had great significance in protecting the flanks of the 3d Guards Tank and 4th Tank Armies as they entered the penetration. In the Sandomierz bridgehead, the artillery also executed its main mission of fighting against counterattacking enemy tanks. “ I am not sure there is a great deal more that can be said. Above what they are saying is, “yup, AT doctrine and the use of separate AT units was fine, not one of the things to change.” The numbers of separate AT units and type of guns was discussed way back in the thread. The numbers of German “threat” or offensive AFVs has been dealt with. The question of the tactical use of separate AT regiments had been dealt with, TM30-430 makes clear that the densities were typically one 24 gun regiment to a 2km frontage, to which one would have to add a few guns from supporting infantry units. The following passage, although relating to very start of the war, also gives a clear and unambiguous view of Soviet thinking on density, from the Dunn book. “In the early months of the war, Russian antitank guns were spread evenly over the front in a thin defensive zone, six to nine guns per km in a depth of 2 or 3 km.15 There were too few guns at any point to stop a German panzer attack. The shortage of guns was partly responsible, but a doctrine of spreading the guns out at the front rather than concentrating them in large numbers at likely points also was faulty. In reaction to the threat posed by massed panzer attacks, the Russians had formed independent antitank brigades. On April 24, 1941, ten antitank brigades were formed with two regiments each with 24 76mm guns, a battalion with 12 107mm guns, two battalions with 12 85mm guns, an antiaircraft battalion of 8 37mm guns and 36 machine guns, and an engineer mine-laying battalion. The ten antitank brigades were assigned to the three border military districts in June 1941. The antitank brigade provided an antitank gun line for 5 or 6 km of front with from 20 to 25 guns per km, three to four times the density achieved by spreading out the guns evenly.” I could also quote passages that say densities of 6 to 9 guns per km were far exceeded in practice and so on… The Soviets estimated that two thirds of German panzers destroyed, were destroyed by towed AT guns. All of the above helps to explain why. All the best, Kip.

JasonC, I will bother to post up more data, I was not going to but I will, from equally high quality sources as my previous data. They will cover the number of Panzer divisions, and if you wish to count tanks, the number of individual Panzers on the Eastern Front, all the German High Commands own assessment of its own numbers, even in German in an original document. And, yes, they will agree 100% with my numbers, that’s because that is one of my sources for my numbers. I will also explain why TM30-430 is lot more than a theoretical doctrine paper or what ever you seem to think it is. Plus one or two other points. After my next post, in few days time, leave it alone, you will only dig yourself in deeper, all my views come from source material that is, quite literally, of the very highest quality by world standards. Much of it open to all who know where to look, some I am very lucky to have found hidden in archives. The way I do things is read source material, then form views based on that source material, hence I have sources to justify everything. Of a quality that can only ever be equalled, not surpassed. Also, all sane people have now moved on to the CMBB forum, so no one cares any more, even if they ever did. But I will post in a few days. All the best, Kip

JasonC, I will bother to post up more data, I was not going to but I will, from equally high quality sources as my previous data. They will cover the number of Panzer divisions, and if you wish to count tanks, the number of individual Panzers on the Eastern Front, all the German High Commands own assessment of its own numbers, even in German in an original document. And, yes, they will agree 100% with my numbers, that’s because that is one of my sources for my numbers. I will also explain why TM30-430 is lot more than a theoretical doctrine paper or what ever you seem to think it is. Plus one or two other points. After my next post, in few days time, leave it alone, you will only dig yourself in deeper, all my views come from source material that is, quite literally, of the very highest quality by world standards. Much of it open to all who know where to look, some I am very lucky to have found hidden in archives. The way I do things is read source material, then form views based on that source material, hence I have sources to justify everything. Of a quality that can only ever be equalled, not surpassed. Also, all sane people have now moved on to the CMBB forum, so no one cares any more, even if they ever did. But I will post in a few days. All the best, Kip

Frunze, You wrote, “Seems to me, Kip, that this would apply only when the Red Army knew the time and place of a tank attack. And even though they placed a high priority on recon/surveillance/razvezda, and in some (not all, maybe not most) situations the terrain dictates a limited number of good routes of attack, still surprises and chaos are part of the nature of war, and nothing ever goes entirely according to doctrine.” That surprise and chaos are a part of war I certainly agree with, and if I suggest otherwise I did not mean to. However, there are two reasons why it is still the case that the sort of densities of guns I describe will have been the norm, but again, with a very wide and flat bell curve. Firstly, the location of German Panzer divisions. During the war in the east the Germans had around 25 armoured divisions at any one time. Importantly, and for the reasons I gave above, at any one time the great majority were in the frontline. Added to this, the Soviets, just like the Germans and the Western Allies, will have very carefully tracked German Panzer divisions and there numbers. By the second half of the war, in fact well before, they will have known how many Panzer divisions were likely to be around at any one time, with eh odd one turning up from Germany, now and then. So if on a given date there were nineteen Panzer formations in the line, and they knew where another two were refitting some 40km behind, they would know that around 90% were likely to be accounted for. The second point is the numbers game regarding Soviet guns. Against the above figure of say twenty odd German armoured divisions in the line, the Soviets had 50 odd AT brigades of three regiments each, plus another 150 odd independent AT regiments. Even though some will have been being rebuilt, and some held back for “surprises”, this is more than enough to achieve a concentration opposite each Panzer division that would mean “most” approaches and location were choked off according to doctrine. If you count the Soviet AT brigades in terms of their number of regiments, the Soviets had a total of around 300 independent AT regiments, of mostly 24 guns, to counter 20 odd German armoured divisions in the line, with may be another five or so Panzer divisions somewhere behind the line. It is an unequal numbers game. All the best, Kip.

Frunze, You wrote, “Seems to me, Kip, that this would apply only when the Red Army knew the time and place of a tank attack. And even though they placed a high priority on recon/surveillance/razvezda, and in some (not all, maybe not most) situations the terrain dictates a limited number of good routes of attack, still surprises and chaos are part of the nature of war, and nothing ever goes entirely according to doctrine.” That surprise and chaos are a part of war I certainly agree with, and if I suggest otherwise I did not mean to. However, there are two reasons why it is still the case that the sort of densities of guns I describe will have been the norm, but again, with a very wide and flat bell curve. Firstly, the location of German Panzer divisions. During the war in the east the Germans had around 25 armoured divisions at any one time. Importantly, and for the reasons I gave above, at any one time the great majority were in the frontline. Added to this, the Soviets, just like the Germans and the Western Allies, will have very carefully tracked German Panzer divisions and there numbers. By the second half of the war, in fact well before, they will have known how many Panzer divisions were likely to be around at any one time, with eh odd one turning up from Germany, now and then. So if on a given date there were nineteen Panzer formations in the line, and they knew where another two were refitting some 40km behind, they would know that around 90% were likely to be accounted for. The second point is the numbers game regarding Soviet guns. Against the above figure of say twenty odd German armoured divisions in the line, the Soviets had 50 odd AT brigades of three regiments each, plus another 150 odd independent AT regiments. Even though some will have been being rebuilt, and some held back for “surprises”, this is more than enough to achieve a concentration opposite each Panzer division that would mean “most” approaches and location were choked off according to doctrine. If you count the Soviet AT brigades in terms of their number of regiments, the Soviets had a total of around 300 independent AT regiments, of mostly 24 guns, to counter 20 odd German armoured divisions in the line, with may be another five or so Panzer divisions somewhere behind the line. It is an unequal numbers game. All the best, Kip.

Hi, At this stage in many threads what seems to happen is that people just shout past each other and there is an endless circular argument, with all just repeating the same point. I will now fall into the same trap, in part anyway, but to everyone’s relief will try to close off my side of things one last hit. I will start by making a few general points, may be some responses to things JasonC has written, but will round things off with a reasonably detailed account of what life was really like for a Panzer Division on the Eastern Front from mid 43 onwards and why the scenario I gave above as “typical”, is just that. First some useful sources. From those that really want to know about the Soviet way of war in WWII there is no replacement for http://www.frankcass.com. For English speakers there is really no substitute, just other sources in addition. Also, as all say, go for the David Glantz books, including the popular ones. Now for some of JasonC’s comments. JasonC wrote, “Possession of strategic or operational initiative has nothing whatever to do with inability of armor to launch counterattacks, or to break through the frontline when it does.” What the above shows is a lack of understanding of what operations, and more specifically, The Soviet Operational Art is/was. The reader will not be surprised to learn that operational initiative has a great deal to do with the ability of armour units to launch counter attacks and break through lines. It is this lack of understanding of such matters, namely operations, that is one reason why the second half of the war in east was so unevenly matched, but, of course, not the only reason. The Germans had very similar view of operations to JasonC. Hence they were constantly out fought by their Soviet counter parts. I will just briefly explain what operations and the Soviet Operational Art are. In the study of operations people normally start with a definition of what operations means. The most commonly used definition, and a perfectly workable one it is too, is “operations are having the right battalions, in the right place, at the right time”. Hence you use your infantry, armour and, yes, AT assets in the right place at the right time given their capabilities. All very obvious. The stricter Soviet definition is “two engagements, separated by time and place, where the outcome of one engagement affects the outcome of the other”. An example would be to send a battalion combat team to capture a road junction in the rear of a German defensive position, cutting the supplies. Clearly the battle for the frontline positions would be effected even thought it was happening in a different place and at a different time. The Soviet Operational Art goes one step further. The example that is normally used, because it is “the” classic example, is the way the Soviets organised their artillery assets and, yes, you guessed it, their AT assets. The Soviets called them tank destroyers. One of the facts that set the Soviets apart is that they realised that the most efficient use of the large mounts of artillery they had, both indirect fire and direct fire, i.e. AT assets, was to concentrate them where they were most needed. If the Soviets had been like all the other major players, they would have increased the AT assets of each frontline unit, spread them along the front as JasonC mistakenly believes they did. The British, who also had very large numbers of AT guns, did just that. This was how all the major players went about things, expect the Soviets. Contrary to JasonC’s belief, the entire reason for being of separate AT units was to concentrate them opposite German Panzer units, or where attacks by Panzers were anticipated. There is a lot more to the Operational Art then separate artillery and AT units, but if you go back to the first definition of operations, “having the right battalions in the right place at the right time” you can see that by going for this unique organisation they had already taken operations to a level above the rest. They had seen things others did not think of. I will explain more about the Operational Art later. There is a lot of overlap between what is today called “Doctrine” or “unified doctrine”, operations and the Soviets Operational Art, although they are not exactly the same thing. Reading the US Army FM 105 would give a good feel for operations. Now some more on the numbers game. JasonC’s figures for the production of AT guns and Field guns I would agree with. They are not exactly the same as I would go for, but these things never are as people use different cut off dates and such, anyway they are very close. The AT guns are made up of 45mm AT guns, 57mm AT guns and a very small number of 100mm AT guns. Of the 57,000 odd AT guns produced just under 50,000 were 45mm guns, and 85% of the remainder 57mm guns. Of the Field Guns, the great majority were one model, the much mentioned 76.2mm Model 42. In fact around 60,000 were that model. Having established the numbers, it is time again to consider their use. First, the specifically named AT guns. The 45mm guns were mainly used in the frontline divisions, but not exclusively. During 1944 the 76.2mm Model 42 guns started to replace the 45mm guns in divisional AT units. About one in four 76.2mm Model 42 guns were used in the artillery units of frontline divisions. However, remember quite a number of them were also used as direct fire artillery and AT guns, but their primary use was as artillery. For three quarters of the 76.2mm Model 42 guns their primary role was as AT guns. If you look at the table below, let’s go for January 44, you will see were many ended up. Lets go for January 1944, 75% of the guns in the separate AT units were the 76.2mmModel 42. (Extreme apologies for the quality, but if you look carefully you will see the numbers.) It’s worth just making a few comments on the way the Soviets used direct fire artillery. Both the guns specifically called AT guns, and the 76.2mm Model 42 guns, were used in the same way. Both were, what may best be called, general purpose direct fire artillery. Their primary role was AT guns, but this really means it was their “top priority use”. If they were needed as AT guns, that is what they would do first. Lets take an example of the use of the 45mm AT gun , a Standard Operating Procedure, SOP, use of the gun, nothing unusual. If there was going to be an infantry attack on a section of German held line one or two 45mm AT guns would be moved into an overmatch position the night before, to provide dedicated over watch for the coming assault. A squad of engineers, two squads of SMG and a pair of AT guns, would then carryout the assault, after smoke and artillery fire, all the usual stuff, under the watchfully eyes of the two 45mm AT guns. The above just being a small local assault. But the above method, was very much SOP for the Soviets. Hope this gives a feel for how they were used. In German jargon, they were used as infantry guns most often, the Germans had very few armoured units, but AT guns when needed. So, I hope without being too long winded, what is the context in which my typical scenario, as given in the original post, might be set, i.e. why do I believe my “typical scenario” is “typical”. Remember this is all set in the second half of the war, when separate AT units were up and running in quantity. Let’s take a Soviet Front, by German standards a small army group; and assuming that within that Fronts sector the Soviets know of four German Panzer divisions, in two Panzer Corps. One Panzer division is believed to be some 30km to the rear and being re-equipped. Before being withdrawn from the lines a week ago it was a mauled wreck down to around 15 operational Panzers and hardly enough Panzergrenadiers to man one full battalion. Soviet experience has taught them that such mauled Panzer divisions normally take a month to reappear, and then it may still be in reduced form. Of the other three Panzer divisions all are in contact with Soviet forces. Two are engaged in defensive operations, one is attempting to attack the flank of an advancing Soviet Tank Army. All understand fully that the two Panzer Divisions holding the line in defensive operations should not be do so, in the perfect world. However, there are no other units to take their place. The reality is, as it so often was in the east, and often in the west for that matter, the Germans had no alternative but to use Panzer divisions to hold the line. They did not have enough infantry divisions. From the Soviet side the Army and Front commanders have four AT separate AT brigades and fourteen separate AT regiments under their command. In sound Soviet SOP one separate AT brigade and two separate AT regiments are dispatched to ensure there is not too much trouble from each of the three Panzer divisions. One of the purposes of the separate AT units was to free up the mobile armoured units, so that the armoured units could be free for offensive actions and not have to responds to German armoured attacks. i.e. so that the Soviets were more likely to keep the initiative. This is another example of the Operational Art; the Germans have to spend their time responding to Soviet moves, not the other way round. Of course, the Soviets were great believers in the use of combined arms. But you see how, what today would be called “doctrine”, the Soviets called it the Operational Art, all comes together, and does impact directly on what happens at the battalion level. How you came use your battalions. The follow chart is something like this. The Soviets know it costs ten times more to produce a T34/76 than a 76.2mm Model 42. (This the real figure by the way. And , yes, they did price things in roubles so as to measure the resources used.) However, experience has taught them that a T34/76 is nothing like ten times more affective then a 76.2mm Model 42 gun in defence. So for defence, produce huge number of 76.2mm Model 42 guns. Next, the Soviets see that given the limit on the number of AT guns you have, you want them opposite the small number of enemy Panzer divisions. Hence they concentrate them in separate AT units. This in turn frees up your armoured units to take the initiative, it is also very cost effective in resources. It is all a seamless whole. This rational way of doing things was a click above all others at the time. If we now focus in on one of the defending Panzer divisions. All its battalions are at around two thirds strength, and it is attempting to hold a 12km section of the line. It is attempting to do this by sharp counter attacks. However, the overall operation and tactical situation is not so simple. In one sector a large village is crucial given the terrain and road system. In that village there is an ongoing struggle between a combined arms team of one Panzergenadier battalion supported by the MarkIV battalion, all at two thirds strength, and two regiments of a reduced Soviet infantry division of 4,000 men. The Soviets in the village are supported by a regiment of 20 SU 76s. The Germans know they should not use the MarkIVs in this way, but withdraw them, and the village is lost for certain. A crisis now develops in another region of the 12km front. The much reduced Panzergrenadiers company holding the 2km sector under new attack, has to rapidly give way, or be over run. The Soviets take a position that is a perfect jump off point for further attacks. All this happened at night. The Germans plan a counter attack for the following afternoon with their thirty strong Panther battalion plus one reduced company of Panzergrenadiers. The other Panzergenadier units must, some who, try to hold the rest of the line. At this stage, remember the Soviets have an AT brigade and two AT regiments in support of the Soviet line formations, totalling 100 guns. The Soviet line formations, two infantry divisions at 4,000 men each, have some eighty 45mm AT and 76.2mm Model 42 guns between them. All, including the Soviets, are well aware the Germans will feel the need to try and retake the newly overrun position, or withdraw the entire line. When the thirty strong Panther battalion attacks, it is faced by a regiment of guns from one of the five AT regiments in the area, plus some from the division the Soviet infantry regiment in question comes from. A total of 30 AT guns. If the Panther battalion had taken another avenue of attack, they would have meat the same resistance. The reason is that the avenues of attack are as obvious to the Soviets as to the Germans, and the Soviets have a lot more than one regiment to assign to this mission. The Germans soon discover that they are up against too strong resistance, but unlike the average CM player, after the loss of four Panthers, call it a day. In the above, note the importance of initiative, the Germans are forced to play to the Soviet tune, and the Operational Art in general. Having the right battalion, in the right place at the right time, requires a doctrine from production line, through organisational decisions to the battlefield. I do agree with JasonC that the AT guns would not just be lined up at the front, far from it. My favourite CMBB map would be 2km wide by 3km in depth, and then play a CM operation. Now I will move to close things off and leave you all alone. I will post a longish extract detailing the actual SOP of Soviet separate AT regiments, in narrative form. The detailed account of the Soviet SOP for AT regiments comes from TM 30-430, November 1945, Handbook on USSR Military Forces. The information in the manual comes from the records of General Reinhard Gehlen, head of Foreign Arms East in Germany during the war. General Gehlen and all his staff, plus truck loads of records, surrender in one group to the US forces. General Gehlen was no master of predicting what the Soviets would do, but when it comes to what the Red Army “was”, its organisation, and how it did things, its SOP, he has no equal. The way it was done is that all captured Soviet documents were meant to end up back with his department. In a war of this scale, the manuals and documentation of all frontline units, and up to a very highly level, are captured on a regular basis, as you would expect. Documents such as SOPs, or the Soviet version there of, for AT units, routinely so. The validity of the Gehlen documentation has recently been confirmed by the authors of what some believe is, and will be when completed, the finest single work of military history. Germany and the Second World War. One click up from the very fine Green Books. Who knows, we all have our favourites. The point is that the German authors have spent much of the last ten years in the Soviet archives. One of their conclusions, given in either volume IV or VI, I forget, is that the Gehlen documentation is spot on, a 98% correlation, if I remember correctly. TM 30-430 is simply and translation of Gehlen’s Soviet documents. (Interestingly, the narratives in the famous pamphlets produced by the US in the fifties and written by ex-senior German officers on the subject of the war in the east, turn out not to be accurate.) When it comes to density of guns we may as well get it out of the way, but none will be surprised. If you look at figure 33 the AT guns are the ones with the strange line coming out of the circle at their rear. On around an 1100m front you will find fifteen guns., making close to 30 to a 2km front. If you look at the Firesack diagram, the E shapes are four gun batteries. I can also tell you that it would fit every nicely into a CM map with a 2km by 3km CM map. In TM30-430 all the maps and diagrams are “typical” for what they illustrate, that is the purpose of the manual. Of course, the density of guns would vary with threat assessment, some times less dense, but sometimes more. When it comes to the threat assessment there is a strange feature of Soviet WW2 SOP that must be remembered. It was Soviet SOP to assume all German units were at full strength. No doubt this was a result of the problems they had in early years, better safe than sorry. I am sure they did not always keep to it. But an artillery officer doing a recce of the coming location will more often than not have assumed in his assessment that the opposing Panzer Divisions was at full strength. Clearly, this means that many reduced Panzer divisions, and most were at around two thirds to half strength, will have got some very unfortunate surprises. A force of 12 Panthers attacking over a CM map of 2km will have run into 30 odd AT guns, as often as 4 AT guns. The number of possible scenarios is huge and varied. But a typical ratio of 1:1 is about in the centre of a very wide and flat bell curve. The ratio of 1:1 is not at the extreme end. From TM30 -430 “Artillery Anti-tank Tactics. The destruction of tanks and self-propelled guns is the primary or secondary mission of all artillery and Red Army crews on all types of artillery are trained in direct fire. The antitank defensive barrages of medium and heavy artillery have been described above under the discussion of types of targets. The primary tank-destroying weapons are,however, towed antitank guns: 45-mm, 57-mm, 76.2-mm, 85-mm, and 100-mm guns are found in organic and GHQ antitank artillery units. Self-propelled artillery often supports towed antitank guns, particularly in mobile corps; self-propelled artillery tactics are described under section III, Armored and Mechanized Forces.Antitank artillery regiments are often attached to rifle corps and division commanders for the protection of primary sectors. Part of the antitank artillery must always be kept by the Commander of Combined Arms as a reserve. For example, one- fourth of the antitank guns of a rifle division, including regimental and battalion weapons, are held in the mobile divisional antitank gun reserve. Coordination between antitank artillery and other arms, especially field artillery, mortars, engineers, and infantry, is of prime importance. Antitank artillery regiments are also used as tank support in the area of the main effort. Antitank artillery is usually employed in echelons,with weapons of varied caliber in each to insure equal distribution of fire power. Light and medium antitank artillery is supported as a rule by heavy antitank artillery, such as the newly developed 100mm gun, for fire against heavy enemy tanks. Lighter guns are emplaced as far forward as practicable, although normally not before the second line of infantry trenches. Well dug-in and camouflaged positions, protected by infantry and antitank rifles,are mandatory. Each battery must have at least one alternate position. When this is occupied, the original position is maintained as a dummy position. Change of position usually takes place at night. Antitank guns in each position are placed in rhombus pattern to obtain all-around fields of fire. The fire plan of Soviet antitank artillery is carefully worked out, with particular attention given to the natural tank approach routes. The fire of the antitank guns is usually coordinated with a system of ground obstacles erected under engineer control; constant liaison and coordination between antitank artillery and combat engineers is therefore mandatory. Also, minefields normally are laid to protect the gun position itself (fig. 33). The Soviets compute the minimum required den- sity of antitank weapons in defensive sectors on the basis of the suspected number of enemy tanks, the number and characteristics of tank approaches, and the average number of rounds necessary for a tank kill. On the basis of experience against enemy armor, the Red Army figures on six rounds of fire from 76.2-mm antitank guns, or 12 rounds from 45-mm antitank guns, for the destruction of one medium tank. Antitank fire is directed not only against tanks,but also against accompanying infantry. Such antipersonnel fire is usually supported by mortar units and automatic weapons in coordination with the antitank artillery. Antitank guns continue firing until overrun, since the Red Army considers that the destruction of a large number of enemy tanks represents the successful execution of the mission even when all of its own pieces are lost. The Soviets consider that each antitank gun is capable of destroying an average of 2 to 3 enemy tanks before it is put out of action. As a rule, antitank guns fire at ranges of 550 to 660 yards in order to avoid revealing prematurely the location of positions. However, when a so called "firesack" is prepared, a limited number of guns (usually flank pieces) open fire at the first enemy tank wave at 1,650- to 2,200 yard ranges, attempting to channelize the enemy tanks into the area of the prepared concentration. Reinforcing self-propelled artillery fires at the tanks from concealed positions; supporting artillery, such as 152mm howitzers, fires from positions to the rear and flanks of the antitank guns (fig. 34). The mobile antitank artillery reserve usually consists of one battery from each regiment. It is located to the rear, in the center, and on the flanks of the defense sector under the centralized control of the Commander. Artillery reserves are committed by platoons against enemy tank attacks at the flanks.One platoon will open fire immediately while another moves to a more favorable position, pulled over short distances by the gun crew.A secondary mission of antitank artillery is its employment in support of infantry and tank attacks,with the bulk of the antitank artillery committed in the first assault echelon.” All good fun, All the best Kip. [ August 30, 2002, 12:41 PM: Message edited by: kipanderson ]

Hi, At this stage in many threads what seems to happen is that people just shout past each other and there is an endless circular argument, with all just repeating the same point. I will now fall into the same trap, in part anyway, but to everyone’s relief will try to close off my side of things one last hit. I will start by making a few general points, may be some responses to things JasonC has written, but will round things off with a reasonably detailed account of what life was really like for a Panzer Division on the Eastern Front from mid 43 onwards and why the scenario I gave above as “typical”, is just that. First some useful sources. From those that really want to know about the Soviet way of war in WWII there is no replacement for http://www.frankcass.com. For English speakers there is really no substitute, just other sources in addition. Also, as all say, go for the David Glantz books, including the popular ones. Now for some of JasonC’s comments. JasonC wrote, “Possession of strategic or operational initiative has nothing whatever to do with inability of armor to launch counterattacks, or to break through the frontline when it does.” What the above shows is a lack of understanding of what operations, and more specifically, The Soviet Operational Art is/was. The reader will not be surprised to learn that operational initiative has a great deal to do with the ability of armour units to launch counter attacks and break through lines. It is this lack of understanding of such matters, namely operations, that is one reason why the second half of the war in east was so unevenly matched, but, of course, not the only reason. The Germans had very similar view of operations to JasonC. Hence they were constantly out fought by their Soviet counter parts. I will just briefly explain what operations and the Soviet Operational Art are. In the study of operations people normally start with a definition of what operations means. The most commonly used definition, and a perfectly workable one it is too, is “operations are having the right battalions, in the right place, at the right time”. Hence you use your infantry, armour and, yes, AT assets in the right place at the right time given their capabilities. All very obvious. The stricter Soviet definition is “two engagements, separated by time and place, where the outcome of one engagement affects the outcome of the other”. An example would be to send a battalion combat team to capture a road junction in the rear of a German defensive position, cutting the supplies. Clearly the battle for the frontline positions would be effected even thought it was happening in a different place and at a different time. The Soviet Operational Art goes one step further. The example that is normally used, because it is “the” classic example, is the way the Soviets organised their artillery assets and, yes, you guessed it, their AT assets. The Soviets called them tank destroyers. One of the facts that set the Soviets apart is that they realised that the most efficient use of the large mounts of artillery they had, both indirect fire and direct fire, i.e. AT assets, was to concentrate them where they were most needed. If the Soviets had been like all the other major players, they would have increased the AT assets of each frontline unit, spread them along the front as JasonC mistakenly believes they did. The British, who also had very large numbers of AT guns, did just that. This was how all the major players went about things, expect the Soviets. Contrary to JasonC’s belief, the entire reason for being of separate AT units was to concentrate them opposite German Panzer units, or where attacks by Panzers were anticipated. There is a lot more to the Operational Art then separate artillery and AT units, but if you go back to the first definition of operations, “having the right battalions in the right place at the right time” you can see that by going for this unique organisation they had already taken operations to a level above the rest. They had seen things others did not think of. I will explain more about the Operational Art later. There is a lot of overlap between what is today called “Doctrine” or “unified doctrine”, operations and the Soviets Operational Art, although they are not exactly the same thing. Reading the US Army FM 105 would give a good feel for operations. Now some more on the numbers game. JasonC’s figures for the production of AT guns and Field guns I would agree with. They are not exactly the same as I would go for, but these things never are as people use different cut off dates and such, anyway they are very close. The AT guns are made up of 45mm AT guns, 57mm AT guns and a very small number of 100mm AT guns. Of the 57,000 odd AT guns produced just under 50,000 were 45mm guns, and 85% of the remainder 57mm guns. Of the Field Guns, the great majority were one model, the much mentioned 76.2mm Model 42. In fact around 60,000 were that model. Having established the numbers, it is time again to consider their use. First, the specifically named AT guns. The 45mm guns were mainly used in the frontline divisions, but not exclusively. During 1944 the 76.2mm Model 42 guns started to replace the 45mm guns in divisional AT units. About one in four 76.2mm Model 42 guns were used in the artillery units of frontline divisions. However, remember quite a number of them were also used as direct fire artillery and AT guns, but their primary use was as artillery. For three quarters of the 76.2mm Model 42 guns their primary role was as AT guns. If you look at the table below, let’s go for January 44, you will see were many ended up. Lets go for January 1944, 75% of the guns in the separate AT units were the 76.2mmModel 42. (Extreme apologies for the quality, but if you look carefully you will see the numbers.) It’s worth just making a few comments on the way the Soviets used direct fire artillery. Both the guns specifically called AT guns, and the 76.2mm Model 42 guns, were used in the same way. Both were, what may best be called, general purpose direct fire artillery. Their primary role was AT guns, but this really means it was their “top priority use”. If they were needed as AT guns, that is what they would do first. Lets take an example of the use of the 45mm AT gun , a Standard Operating Procedure, SOP, use of the gun, nothing unusual. If there was going to be an infantry attack on a section of German held line one or two 45mm AT guns would be moved into an overmatch position the night before, to provide dedicated over watch for the coming assault. A squad of engineers, two squads of SMG and a pair of AT guns, would then carryout the assault, after smoke and artillery fire, all the usual stuff, under the watchfully eyes of the two 45mm AT guns. The above just being a small local assault. But the above method, was very much SOP for the Soviets. Hope this gives a feel for how they were used. In German jargon, they were used as infantry guns most often, the Germans had very few armoured units, but AT guns when needed. So, I hope without being too long winded, what is the context in which my typical scenario, as given in the original post, might be set, i.e. why do I believe my “typical scenario” is “typical”. Remember this is all set in the second half of the war, when separate AT units were up and running in quantity. Let’s take a Soviet Front, by German standards a small army group; and assuming that within that Fronts sector the Soviets know of four German Panzer divisions, in two Panzer Corps. One Panzer division is believed to be some 30km to the rear and being re-equipped. Before being withdrawn from the lines a week ago it was a mauled wreck down to around 15 operational Panzers and hardly enough Panzergrenadiers to man one full battalion. Soviet experience has taught them that such mauled Panzer divisions normally take a month to reappear, and then it may still be in reduced form. Of the other three Panzer divisions all are in contact with Soviet forces. Two are engaged in defensive operations, one is attempting to attack the flank of an advancing Soviet Tank Army. All understand fully that the two Panzer Divisions holding the line in defensive operations should not be do so, in the perfect world. However, there are no other units to take their place. The reality is, as it so often was in the east, and often in the west for that matter, the Germans had no alternative but to use Panzer divisions to hold the line. They did not have enough infantry divisions. From the Soviet side the Army and Front commanders have four AT separate AT brigades and fourteen separate AT regiments under their command. In sound Soviet SOP one separate AT brigade and two separate AT regiments are dispatched to ensure there is not too much trouble from each of the three Panzer divisions. One of the purposes of the separate AT units was to free up the mobile armoured units, so that the armoured units could be free for offensive actions and not have to responds to German armoured attacks. i.e. so that the Soviets were more likely to keep the initiative. This is another example of the Operational Art; the Germans have to spend their time responding to Soviet moves, not the other way round. Of course, the Soviets were great believers in the use of combined arms. But you see how, what today would be called “doctrine”, the Soviets called it the Operational Art, all comes together, and does impact directly on what happens at the battalion level. How you came use your battalions. The follow chart is something like this. The Soviets know it costs ten times more to produce a T34/76 than a 76.2mm Model 42. (This the real figure by the way. And , yes, they did price things in roubles so as to measure the resources used.) However, experience has taught them that a T34/76 is nothing like ten times more affective then a 76.2mm Model 42 gun in defence. So for defence, produce huge number of 76.2mm Model 42 guns. Next, the Soviets see that given the limit on the number of AT guns you have, you want them opposite the small number of enemy Panzer divisions. Hence they concentrate them in separate AT units. This in turn frees up your armoured units to take the initiative, it is also very cost effective in resources. It is all a seamless whole. This rational way of doing things was a click above all others at the time. If we now focus in on one of the defending Panzer divisions. All its battalions are at around two thirds strength, and it is attempting to hold a 12km section of the line. It is attempting to do this by sharp counter attacks. However, the overall operation and tactical situation is not so simple. In one sector a large village is crucial given the terrain and road system. In that village there is an ongoing struggle between a combined arms team of one Panzergenadier battalion supported by the MarkIV battalion, all at two thirds strength, and two regiments of a reduced Soviet infantry division of 4,000 men. The Soviets in the village are supported by a regiment of 20 SU 76s. The Germans know they should not use the MarkIVs in this way, but withdraw them, and the village is lost for certain. A crisis now develops in another region of the 12km front. The much reduced Panzergrenadiers company holding the 2km sector under new attack, has to rapidly give way, or be over run. The Soviets take a position that is a perfect jump off point for further attacks. All this happened at night. The Germans plan a counter attack for the following afternoon with their thirty strong Panther battalion plus one reduced company of Panzergrenadiers. The other Panzergenadier units must, some who, try to hold the rest of the line. At this stage, remember the Soviets have an AT brigade and two AT regiments in support of the Soviet line formations, totalling 100 guns. The Soviet line formations, two infantry divisions at 4,000 men each, have some eighty 45mm AT and 76.2mm Model 42 guns between them. All, including the Soviets, are well aware the Germans will feel the need to try and retake the newly overrun position, or withdraw the entire line. When the thirty strong Panther battalion attacks, it is faced by a regiment of guns from one of the five AT regiments in the area, plus some from the division the Soviet infantry regiment in question comes from. A total of 30 AT guns. If the Panther battalion had taken another avenue of attack, they would have meat the same resistance. The reason is that the avenues of attack are as obvious to the Soviets as to the Germans, and the Soviets have a lot more than one regiment to assign to this mission. The Germans soon discover that they are up against too strong resistance, but unlike the average CM player, after the loss of four Panthers, call it a day. In the above, note the importance of initiative, the Germans are forced to play to the Soviet tune, and the Operational Art in general. Having the right battalion, in the right place at the right time, requires a doctrine from production line, through organisational decisions to the battlefield. I do agree with JasonC that the AT guns would not just be lined up at the front, far from it. My favourite CMBB map would be 2km wide by 3km in depth, and then play a CM operation. Now I will move to close things off and leave you all alone. I will post a longish extract detailing the actual SOP of Soviet separate AT regiments, in narrative form. The detailed account of the Soviet SOP for AT regiments comes from TM 30-430, November 1945, Handbook on USSR Military Forces. The information in the manual comes from the records of General Reinhard Gehlen, head of Foreign Arms East in Germany during the war. General Gehlen and all his staff, plus truck loads of records, surrender in one group to the US forces. General Gehlen was no master of predicting what the Soviets would do, but when it comes to what the Red Army “was”, its organisation, and how it did things, its SOP, he has no equal. The way it was done is that all captured Soviet documents were meant to end up back with his department. In a war of this scale, the manuals and documentation of all frontline units, and up to a very highly level, are captured on a regular basis, as you would expect. Documents such as SOPs, or the Soviet version there of, for AT units, routinely so. The validity of the Gehlen documentation has recently been confirmed by the authors of what some believe is, and will be when completed, the finest single work of military history. Germany and the Second World War. One click up from the very fine Green Books. Who knows, we all have our favourites. The point is that the German authors have spent much of the last ten years in the Soviet archives. One of their conclusions, given in either volume IV or VI, I forget, is that the Gehlen documentation is spot on, a 98% correlation, if I remember correctly. TM 30-430 is simply and translation of Gehlen’s Soviet documents. (Interestingly, the narratives in the famous pamphlets produced by the US in the fifties and written by ex-senior German officers on the subject of the war in the east, turn out not to be accurate.) When it comes to density of guns we may as well get it out of the way, but none will be surprised. If you look at figure 33 the AT guns are the ones with the strange line coming out of the circle at their rear. On around an 1100m front you will find fifteen guns., making close to 30 to a 2km front. If you look at the Firesack diagram, the E shapes are four gun batteries. I can also tell you that it would fit every nicely into a CM map with a 2km by 3km CM map. In TM30-430 all the maps and diagrams are “typical” for what they illustrate, that is the purpose of the manual. Of course, the density of guns would vary with threat assessment, some times less dense, but sometimes more. When it comes to the threat assessment there is a strange feature of Soviet WW2 SOP that must be remembered. It was Soviet SOP to assume all German units were at full strength. No doubt this was a result of the problems they had in early years, better safe than sorry. I am sure they did not always keep to it. But an artillery officer doing a recce of the coming location will more often than not have assumed in his assessment that the opposing Panzer Divisions was at full strength. Clearly, this means that many reduced Panzer divisions, and most were at around two thirds to half strength, will have got some very unfortunate surprises. A force of 12 Panthers attacking over a CM map of 2km will have run into 30 odd AT guns, as often as 4 AT guns. The number of possible scenarios is huge and varied. But a typical ratio of 1:1 is about in the centre of a very wide and flat bell curve. The ratio of 1:1 is not at the extreme end. From TM30 -430 “Artillery Anti-tank Tactics. The destruction of tanks and self-propelled guns is the primary or secondary mission of all artillery and Red Army crews on all types of artillery are trained in direct fire. The antitank defensive barrages of medium and heavy artillery have been described above under the discussion of types of targets. The primary tank-destroying weapons are,however, towed antitank guns: 45-mm, 57-mm, 76.2-mm, 85-mm, and 100-mm guns are found in organic and GHQ antitank artillery units. Self-propelled artillery often supports towed antitank guns, particularly in mobile corps; self-propelled artillery tactics are described under section III, Armored and Mechanized Forces.Antitank artillery regiments are often attached to rifle corps and division commanders for the protection of primary sectors. Part of the antitank artillery must always be kept by the Commander of Combined Arms as a reserve. For example, one- fourth of the antitank guns of a rifle division, including regimental and battalion weapons, are held in the mobile divisional antitank gun reserve. Coordination between antitank artillery and other arms, especially field artillery, mortars, engineers, and infantry, is of prime importance. Antitank artillery regiments are also used as tank support in the area of the main effort. Antitank artillery is usually employed in echelons,with weapons of varied caliber in each to insure equal distribution of fire power. Light and medium antitank artillery is supported as a rule by heavy antitank artillery, such as the newly developed 100mm gun, for fire against heavy enemy tanks. Lighter guns are emplaced as far forward as practicable, although normally not before the second line of infantry trenches. Well dug-in and camouflaged positions, protected by infantry and antitank rifles,are mandatory. Each battery must have at least one alternate position. When this is occupied, the original position is maintained as a dummy position. Change of position usually takes place at night. Antitank guns in each position are placed in rhombus pattern to obtain all-around fields of fire. The fire plan of Soviet antitank artillery is carefully worked out, with particular attention given to the natural tank approach routes. The fire of the antitank guns is usually coordinated with a system of ground obstacles erected under engineer control; constant liaison and coordination between antitank artillery and combat engineers is therefore mandatory. Also, minefields normally are laid to protect the gun position itself (fig. 33). The Soviets compute the minimum required den- sity of antitank weapons in defensive sectors on the basis of the suspected number of enemy tanks, the number and characteristics of tank approaches, and the average number of rounds necessary for a tank kill. On the basis of experience against enemy armor, the Red Army figures on six rounds of fire from 76.2-mm antitank guns, or 12 rounds from 45-mm antitank guns, for the destruction of one medium tank. Antitank fire is directed not only against tanks,but also against accompanying infantry. Such antipersonnel fire is usually supported by mortar units and automatic weapons in coordination with the antitank artillery. Antitank guns continue firing until overrun, since the Red Army considers that the destruction of a large number of enemy tanks represents the successful execution of the mission even when all of its own pieces are lost. The Soviets consider that each antitank gun is capable of destroying an average of 2 to 3 enemy tanks before it is put out of action. As a rule, antitank guns fire at ranges of 550 to 660 yards in order to avoid revealing prematurely the location of positions. However, when a so called "firesack" is prepared, a limited number of guns (usually flank pieces) open fire at the first enemy tank wave at 1,650- to 2,200 yard ranges, attempting to channelize the enemy tanks into the area of the prepared concentration. Reinforcing self-propelled artillery fires at the tanks from concealed positions; supporting artillery, such as 152mm howitzers, fires from positions to the rear and flanks of the antitank guns (fig. 34). The mobile antitank artillery reserve usually consists of one battery from each regiment. It is located to the rear, in the center, and on the flanks of the defense sector under the centralized control of the Commander. Artillery reserves are committed by platoons against enemy tank attacks at the flanks.One platoon will open fire immediately while another moves to a more favorable position, pulled over short distances by the gun crew.A secondary mission of antitank artillery is its employment in support of infantry and tank attacks,with the bulk of the antitank artillery committed in the first assault echelon.” All good fun, All the best Kip. [ August 30, 2002, 12:41 PM: Message edited by: kipanderson ]

Guys, Just a quick point to try and clear up the Kursk losses discussion. I agree 100% that the figures in the Dunn quote are too high, all such figurers on all sides were exaggerated, not intentionally, but for all the very human reasons I am sure we all understand. The Glantz and House book on Kursk is the best, in my view. Point was, that even at Kursk, were the main choke off method used by the Soviets was armour; a majority of German losses were accounted for by direct fire artillery. Will try to clear up my side of the general discussion later today, when I have time, hopefully, without sending too many people to sleep. All the best, Kip. PS. The Dunn book really is very fine piece of research. Even in the short passage I quoted, there are three or four numbers to notes giving the roll of micro-film the data came from and such.

Guys, Just a quick point to try and clear up the Kursk losses discussion. I agree 100% that the figures in the Dunn quote are too high, all such figurers on all sides were exaggerated, not intentionally, but for all the very human reasons I am sure we all understand. The Glantz and House book on Kursk is the best, in my view. Point was, that even at Kursk, were the main choke off method used by the Soviets was armour; a majority of German losses were accounted for by direct fire artillery. Will try to clear up my side of the general discussion later today, when I have time, hopefully, without sending too many people to sleep. All the best, Kip. PS. The Dunn book really is very fine piece of research. Even in the short passage I quoted, there are three or four numbers to notes giving the roll of micro-film the data came from and such.

JasonC, Always more fun to have someone that disagrees, but it is a bit difficult to know where to start, could go on and on and send all, including myself, to sleep. Will do my best to keep it short and to the point. Firstly, the scenario that I suggested above was set in CM terms, scale. I may not have made that clear enough, do not know. Most CM battles are at a scale of around a company of attacking tanks, so I attempted to fit in with this scale. Battles on the scale of my scenario certainly will have happened, however, if you wish to double all the numbers, fine. If you wish a battalion of 24 Panthers against twice the Soviet forces I listed, making 28 AT guns, then go for it. Map size remains the same. (BTW, many Panther battalions did only have 24 operational tanks on a given day.) There is also something that puzzles me; you go on a lot about Kursk. I thought I specifically kicked that one into touch, knowing some would mention it, by saying that at Kursk the Soviets choked off German armour with the use of tanks, not AT guns, so not quite sure why you are attempting to argue with me on that one. You also make some factual mistakes; the really big ones I will deal with at the end, but for now will just give a flavour. In your post you wrote, “And it isn’t any different later on in the few German offensive attempts like Korsun. Again it is mostly the Russian armour that stops each German drive. The German do not have any problems with initial break ins, as though the Russian front line positions are too thickly studded with guns for concentrated tanks to take them out.” I can only assume you were just scanning my post and not concentrating, I do it all the time. If you go back and re-read the quote covering the attack by the 61 strong Panther battalion, the single most powerful German unit to take part in Korsun, you will see it was stopped in the initial break in, break ins do not get more “initial”, and in good part by the cross fire of AT guns. No matter. On a related point, you seem to go on a lot about “initial break ins”. You also suggest that during the second half of the war, which is what we are taking about; German Panzer Divisions were free to concentrate their Panzers for “initial break in” after “initial break in” as though this were the norm. You will have Soviet Marshals of the Great Patriotic War turning in their graves! One of the main achievements of the Soviet Operational Art was that the Germans had the initiative ripped from them. German Panzer Divisions spent the great majority of their time being forced to respond to Soviet moves, even at the level of the divisional fight/ armoured corps fight. In today’s jargon, one would say that the Soviets were inside the German’s decision loop. German Panzer Divisions spent the great majority of their time manning sections of front line and responding to short term crisis after short term crisis. Often on the scale of my scenario. Also, very often, the Soviets knew where the Germans would counter attack because to both sides there was no rational alternative open to the Germans. This is what the Operational Art is, ripping away the initiative and forcing your enemy to respond as you anticipated. With both sides, the Germans too, knowing what was going on, but having no choice but to act as expected. However, I promised not to go on for too long, so let’s get to the heart of things. You state the following, “Armor reserves are what stopped breakthroughs, not ATGs, ATGs were modest help.” I could quote endless facts, from many sources in response. However, the following quote will do the job just fine and says it all, so why bore people too much. “Imported American trucks improved the flexibility of the tank destroyer regiments. Regiments using American trucks were completely mobile with the guns towed at high speed on paved roads and then directly into positions cross country, using the six-wheel drive of the American trucks. The mobility provided by the American trucks was essential. During the war two-thirds of the German tank losses resulted from the direct fire of antitank guns and artillery. This achievement resulted from several improvements in policy: massing antitank forces in the decisive sectors, increasing the depth of antitank defence, increasing the activity of each antitank gun, and integrating all of the arms into a single battle formation. The tank destroyers were effective. At Kursk the artillery accounted for 1,900 tanks of the 3,000 destroyed, according to Soviet sources. The importance the Red Army placed on towed tank destroyers was indicated by the division of the available 76mm guns and 100mm guns. By the end of the war,73% of the artillery regiments were primarily antitank, compared to 27% whose primary function was divisional artillery. For each divisional artillery regiment, there were about three antitank regiments.” All the best, Kip PS. The above quote comes from Hitler’s Nemesis, The Red Army, 1930-1945 by Walter Dunn. Best single source on what the Red Army was. Even better than the full version of TM 30-430, the real Handbook on USSR Military Forces from November 45. Dunn has re-examined the material from General Gehlen, and recent Soviet archive material in stunning detail. All based on original source material. I recommend the book to any one.

JasonC, Always more fun to have someone that disagrees, but it is a bit difficult to know where to start, could go on and on and send all, including myself, to sleep. Will do my best to keep it short and to the point. Firstly, the scenario that I suggested above was set in CM terms, scale. I may not have made that clear enough, do not know. Most CM battles are at a scale of around a company of attacking tanks, so I attempted to fit in with this scale. Battles on the scale of my scenario certainly will have happened, however, if you wish to double all the numbers, fine. If you wish a battalion of 24 Panthers against twice the Soviet forces I listed, making 28 AT guns, then go for it. Map size remains the same. (BTW, many Panther battalions did only have 24 operational tanks on a given day.) There is also something that puzzles me; you go on a lot about Kursk. I thought I specifically kicked that one into touch, knowing some would mention it, by saying that at Kursk the Soviets choked off German armour with the use of tanks, not AT guns, so not quite sure why you are attempting to argue with me on that one. You also make some factual mistakes; the really big ones I will deal with at the end, but for now will just give a flavour. In your post you wrote, “And it isn’t any different later on in the few German offensive attempts like Korsun. Again it is mostly the Russian armour that stops each German drive. The German do not have any problems with initial break ins, as though the Russian front line positions are too thickly studded with guns for concentrated tanks to take them out.” I can only assume you were just scanning my post and not concentrating, I do it all the time. If you go back and re-read the quote covering the attack by the 61 strong Panther battalion, the single most powerful German unit to take part in Korsun, you will see it was stopped in the initial break in, break ins do not get more “initial”, and in good part by the cross fire of AT guns. No matter. On a related point, you seem to go on a lot about “initial break ins”. You also suggest that during the second half of the war, which is what we are taking about; German Panzer Divisions were free to concentrate their Panzers for “initial break in” after “initial break in” as though this were the norm. You will have Soviet Marshals of the Great Patriotic War turning in their graves! One of the main achievements of the Soviet Operational Art was that the Germans had the initiative ripped from them. German Panzer Divisions spent the great majority of their time being forced to respond to Soviet moves, even at the level of the divisional fight/ armoured corps fight. In today’s jargon, one would say that the Soviets were inside the German’s decision loop. German Panzer Divisions spent the great majority of their time manning sections of front line and responding to short term crisis after short term crisis. Often on the scale of my scenario. Also, very often, the Soviets knew where the Germans would counter attack because to both sides there was no rational alternative open to the Germans. This is what the Operational Art is, ripping away the initiative and forcing your enemy to respond as you anticipated. With both sides, the Germans too, knowing what was going on, but having no choice but to act as expected. However, I promised not to go on for too long, so let’s get to the heart of things. You state the following, “Armor reserves are what stopped breakthroughs, not ATGs, ATGs were modest help.” I could quote endless facts, from many sources in response. However, the following quote will do the job just fine and says it all, so why bore people too much. “Imported American trucks improved the flexibility of the tank destroyer regiments. Regiments using American trucks were completely mobile with the guns towed at high speed on paved roads and then directly into positions cross country, using the six-wheel drive of the American trucks. The mobility provided by the American trucks was essential. During the war two-thirds of the German tank losses resulted from the direct fire of antitank guns and artillery. This achievement resulted from several improvements in policy: massing antitank forces in the decisive sectors, increasing the depth of antitank defence, increasing the activity of each antitank gun, and integrating all of the arms into a single battle formation. The tank destroyers were effective. At Kursk the artillery accounted for 1,900 tanks of the 3,000 destroyed, according to Soviet sources. The importance the Red Army placed on towed tank destroyers was indicated by the division of the available 76mm guns and 100mm guns. By the end of the war,73% of the artillery regiments were primarily antitank, compared to 27% whose primary function was divisional artillery. For each divisional artillery regiment, there were about three antitank regiments.” All the best, Kip PS. The above quote comes from Hitler’s Nemesis, The Red Army, 1930-1945 by Walter Dunn. Best single source on what the Red Army was. Even better than the full version of TM 30-430, the real Handbook on USSR Military Forces from November 45. Dunn has re-examined the material from General Gehlen, and recent Soviet archive material in stunning detail. All based on original source material. I recommend the book to any one.

Mike, hi, You wrote, “Regrettably the CM series is about playable games that resemble history - this involves things like buying units to a points total, etc. With a wide map the "defender" in such scenarios as you give has a lot more troops than they would in a CM game - even the most of those troops are static and play little part in the battle - the AT guns may shoot to their flank, but the infantry associated with them or in adjacent front line units probably stays still.” I understand what you mean, but only in part. I often play games on 2km by 2km maps and have no problems. As someone else posted your comments may have something to do with QBs, but as I never play them; that is a subject that I know little about. What I do know about, on a good day anyway, is what a “typical” battle on the Eastern Front will have been, to the limited extent that any type of battle was “typical”. Although densities where sometimes very great, more typically, they were along the lines I mentioned above. If you take the Germans, a German infantry division of the second half of the war of six-seven battalions, all at about two thirds strength, would normally be expected to hold about 10km-15km of frontline. Often more like 20km. A force of around 250 men, with assorted heavy assets in support, in the German case not many of them, holding a 2km section of line would be quite routine. Let me quickly give the outlines of a scenario that would indeed by historically credible. A 2km by 2km map. Typical, Eastern Front undulating terrain with 10% forest, 10% brush and a village 500m from the Eastern edge of the map, but in the centre on the north south axis. The village and vegetation cover is mainly in the valleys and gullies. The village is the objective of a German attack. The Germans attack with a force of 12 Panthers and two somewhat reduced companies of motorised Panzergrenadiers, plus some artillery support. The Soviets are tasked with holding the village, but do not have to setup in the village if they do not wish to. The Soviets have an infantry force of 250 men. Plus a total of 14 AT guns with some additional mortar fire support. Quite a few mines around. What I described above is all very typical of the Eastern Front, very realistic. 2km north of the village in question, would be another Soviet force of similar size holding a similar frontage. I cannot see the problem. Tweaked versions of the above will have happens hundreds of times. Anyway.. one of the things about the CM series is that we all use it slightly differently. And that is as it should be. In my case I only play games that I consider historically credible. The above is, in my view. All the best, Kip. PS. yup, looks as though Treeburst and I agree on how to use the maps.

Mike, hi, You wrote, “Regrettably the CM series is about playable games that resemble history - this involves things like buying units to a points total, etc. With a wide map the "defender" in such scenarios as you give has a lot more troops than they would in a CM game - even the most of those troops are static and play little part in the battle - the AT guns may shoot to their flank, but the infantry associated with them or in adjacent front line units probably stays still.” I understand what you mean, but only in part. I often play games on 2km by 2km maps and have no problems. As someone else posted your comments may have something to do with QBs, but as I never play them; that is a subject that I know little about. What I do know about, on a good day anyway, is what a “typical” battle on the Eastern Front will have been, to the limited extent that any type of battle was “typical”. Although densities where sometimes very great, more typically, they were along the lines I mentioned above. If you take the Germans, a German infantry division of the second half of the war of six-seven battalions, all at about two thirds strength, would normally be expected to hold about 10km-15km of frontline. Often more like 20km. A force of around 250 men, with assorted heavy assets in support, in the German case not many of them, holding a 2km section of line would be quite routine. Let me quickly give the outlines of a scenario that would indeed by historically credible. A 2km by 2km map. Typical, Eastern Front undulating terrain with 10% forest, 10% brush and a village 500m from the Eastern edge of the map, but in the centre on the north south axis. The village and vegetation cover is mainly in the valleys and gullies. The village is the objective of a German attack. The Germans attack with a force of 12 Panthers and two somewhat reduced companies of motorised Panzergrenadiers, plus some artillery support. The Soviets are tasked with holding the village, but do not have to setup in the village if they do not wish to. The Soviets have an infantry force of 250 men. Plus a total of 14 AT guns with some additional mortar fire support. Quite a few mines around. What I described above is all very typical of the Eastern Front, very realistic. 2km north of the village in question, would be another Soviet force of similar size holding a similar frontage. I cannot see the problem. Tweaked versions of the above will have happens hundreds of times. Anyway.. one of the things about the CM series is that we all use it slightly differently. And that is as it should be. In my case I only play games that I consider historically credible. The above is, in my view. All the best, Kip. PS. yup, looks as though Treeburst and I agree on how to use the maps.

Hi, There has been much interesting discussion of the force ratio when the Soviets attacked. The basic story being that if they out numbered the Germans by 2:1 over a 100km of front, they would face off at 1:1 over 80km and concentrate their surplus to achieve 3:1 routinely, and quite often more than 5:1 in small sectors. However, what about when the Germans were on the attack? Specifically, what number of defending Soviet AT guns would be realistic for a given number of attacking Panzers? Clearly, it was such a vast war, that all sorts of situations did arise, now and then. But, as a general rule, what was the ratio of defending Soviet AT guns to attacking Panzers likely to have been? In answering this question I will deal with the mid and late war. In the early part of the war it is all far more unpredictable. Although it varies, throughout most of the war in the east the Germans had around twenty five mechanized or armoured divisions facing the Soviets. Each armoured division having two panzer battalions and one armoured AT gun battalion, typically, in the east MarderIIIs. There were also varying numbers of StugIII battalions and brigades; StugIII brigades were really just battalions, in terms of their numbers in each unit. If we turn to the Soviets, and for the time being deal just with specialised AT gun units, the Soviets had the units shown below. The units below are those outside of the divisional organisation. i.e. in addition to guns within infantry divisions and armoured/mechanised corps. Soviet independent AT gun units. ------------Brigades---Regiments---Battalions---- January 43----0----------176-----------2--------- July 43-------27---------199-----------44-------- January 44----50---------172-----------48-------- From January 44 onwards the numbers varied as the Soviet brought AT regiments together in brigades, but the overall number of guns in independent AT units stayed at around 8,500. A brigade was normally made up of three regiments; a regiment was made up of two battalions of twelve guns each. Thus, a brigade at full strength would be around seventy two guns depending on organisation type. At this point, as we are playing the numbers game, it may be helpful just to take a look at the Soviet production figures for the guns that interest us most. Production of main AT guns. ----------------1942------1943-------1944-------- 45mm-----------20,500-----21,500----4,100-------- 57mm--------------0--------1,900-----2,300------- 76.2mmM1942-----23,600-----16,600----17,300—----- For completeness in terms of illustrating the numbers of Soviet guns available, here are the estimates of the number of guns that Soviet had at the front on 26th March 44. The figures were produced by the German Eastern Front intelligence organisation, Fremde Heer Ost, a famously efficient punch at recording the organisation and numbers of Soviet units. Numbers of Soviet guns at the front, 26th March 44. 57mm Antitank Gun----------------2,360--------- 76.2mm Field Guns----------------9,484---------- 76.2mm Antitank Guns-------------6,424---------- 85mm Antiaircraft Guns-----------1,228---------- Note that the two types of 76mm guns listed above are the same weapon, the 76.2mmM1942 gun. To the above one would also have to add all the 45mm antitank guns at the front, probably around 20,000. Before trying to work out what the ratio of AT guns to attacking Panzers is likely to have been in typical engagement, if there ever was such a thing, we need to consider which types of unit used which types of AT gun. The AT units in infantry divisions where largely equipped the 45mm AT guns. It was only during 44 that the 45mm AT guns started to be replaced by the 76.2mm M1942 guns, within infantry division AT units. An infantry division in 43 and 44 had around 48 45mm AT guns. However, it also had around 24 76.2mm M1942 guns that would most often be used as Field Guns, i.e. as AT guns in but name. In July 43 most independent AT units had two thirds 76.2mmM1942 guns and one third 45mm AT guns. Some had 57mm AT guns in place of some of the 45mm AT guns. The number of 45mm AT guns was gradually reduced with more independent AT units becoming pure 76.2mmM1942 units, or having all 45mm AT guns replaced by 57mm AT guns. By 44 there were few 45mm AT guns in independent AT units. Now let’s return to considering the fate of the German Panzer and mechanised divisions and what the implications of the above were. The major problem the Germans had is that the shortage of infantry divisions was so acute, they held far longer fronts than was healthy anyway, that the Panzer divisions had to take their place in the line. They had to hold a section of front rather than strike through a line held by infantry, do their work, and then be withdrawn back behind an infantry screen. Panzer divisions tended to operate within Panzer Corps of two Panzer divisions and two infantry divisions. But along side the infantry divisions, rather than striking through from behind the infantry screen. The great danger in this was that the Soviets tracked the location of the Panzer divisions and would assign independent AT units to the areas in which they operated. You only have to consider the number of German Panzer divisions, roughly 25, and the number of independent Soviet AT units, to realise that the result of this was grim for German armour. German Panzer divisions would be forced to hold the same sections of the front for weeks, and would attract Soviet AT brigades and regiments on to themselves. The Soviets had two independent AT brigades plus around six independent AT regiments for every German Panzer division. The result of the above was that a German Panzer division with, say, 60 operational Panzers, about the norm, split into two battalions, would have to contend with one or more AT brigades and two or three AT regiments at a time. This would still leave a large number of independent Soviet AT units held back for unexpected eventualities, deployed in the wrong areas, or being rebuilt. A typical German Panzer division of 60 operational tanks plus 20 armoured AT destroyers, attacking over a 10km front, would typically face a force of 100 to 140 AT guns in independent AT units alone over the same frontage. If the sector was defended by two Soviet infantry divisions of around 4,000 men each with, say, 30 45mm AT guns and 20 76.2mmM1942 guns each it is all getting very challenging for the Panzers. The reason the above densities appear to be greater than those often quoted for Kursk is that the much used Kursk figures are for an entire Army frontage at a time, just before the attack. Importantly, not for the 5km -10km area around a given German Panzer division a day or two after they struck. Once a German Panzer division was committed, in place on the frontline, the independent Soviet AT units would rush to choke it off. Most Panzer divisions spent most of there time holding the line, as explained earlier. (As it happens, at Kursk the Soviets rushed mostly tank units to choke off the Panzers, but this was not the norm.) All will reach their own conclusions as to the implications for CMBB battles. However, in my view, if you take a typical CMBB scenario in which the Germans are attacking, nine times out of ten in CM battles this means a Panzer attack, what follows are the sort of forces I would expect to see on the CMBB battlefield, others will take a different view. Assume the attacking German force is made up of a company of 12 Panthers with two companies of motorised Panzergrenadiers in support. The defending Soviet force is a reduced infantry battalion of 250 men. (Remember, during the second half of the war most Soviet infantry divisions were kept at the strength of a heavy infantry brigade, artillery rich infantry brigade.) From their own divisional resources they could expect 2 45mm AT guns and 2 76.2mmM1942 Field Guns. For the reasons outlined above they could also expect a slightly reduced battalion of AT guns from an attached independent AT unit. Typically 2 57mm AT guns and 8 76.2mmM1942 guns. In total the attacking 12 Panthers would be up against 2 45mm AT guns, 2 57mm AT guns and 10 76.2mmM1942 guns. The ratio of AT guns to attacking Panzers was often around 1:1, and on a bad day there may have been very many more AT guns than attacking Panzers. Now let’s take a historical example of an attack by an elite Panther battalion, at full strength of 61 vehicles, in January 44. It is Friday the 28th of January 1944 near the town of Korsun in the central Ukraine. Grossdeutschland’s 1/Pz.Rgt.26 is at full strength just having returned from re-equipping in Germany, specifically given as 61 Panthers strong. “There, near Pissarevka, a large tank battle had been under way since mid morning, pitting the Grossdeutschland’s 1/Pz.Rgt.26 against a sizeable Soviet tank force situated amongst rolling hills northeast of the town. The Panthers attacking in conjunction with the 905.StuG.Abt, ran directly into the path of another Soviet tank attack from the direction of Ossitnyashka. Adding to the Germans' problems was that a large number of Soviet antitank guns had been sited in both Pissarevka and Tishkovka, forcing them to attack through a deadly crossfire. The situation was an ideal one for the Soviet defenders, since the Germans were forced to attack uphill most of the way and were unable to take advantage of their superior long-range tank cannon. By 1100 hours, the Panther battalion had destroyed 12 T-34s, though 15 of its own tanks were knocked out. Maj. Glaesgen, the battalion commander, was fatally wounded near Yusefovka while standing in his turret. Though an experienced commander himself, his unit's baptism of fire had come at a high price.” On the 29th things did not improve, “Von Vormann's corps was fighting a losing battle that day, and his men knew it. The Grossdeutschland’s Panther battalion again made a determined effort to link up with XI.A.K., but was brought to a halt by late morning after it had suffered heavy losses. Out of the 61 tanks it had started with, it now only had 17 operational. Of those lost, 20 were totally destroyed. In two days of combat, this unit alone had lost nearly three-fourths of its tanks. Any chance to use this unit as a battering ram were now gone, as well as the hopes to stem the tide. The weight of the second attacking echelons of the Red Army was now being felt.” In fact the Soviets could not have had more than an equal number of T34s available, if you had read the book from which this is extracted, Hell’s Gate by Douglas Nash, this would be clear. What was accounting for the Panthers was flanking fire. When I gave my view of the number and type of AT guns the Panther company in the CMBB game may be up against, some of you will have concluded that Panthers could handle such a challenge quite easily. The reason is that the 76.2mm M1942 gun is less power full than a US 57mm/6pounder and therefore against the frontal armour of a Panther what can it do? The answer is that in reality the world does not end 300m to the left or right of your Panthers. In the east, the real killer was flanking fire. Even though not all the terrain in western Russian and the Ukraine is as open as round Kursk, what you will not find a lot of the “micro-landscapes” of much of Western Europe, when often the only threat was over the forward arc due to the terrain through which you attacked. The world did not end 300m north of your attacking Panthers. 600m, 700m indeed a 1,000m north of your attacking Panthers, on a gently rolling hillside, in brush at the mouth of a gully, may be a battery of four 76.2mm M1942 guns. If they open up you can lose a platoon in 30 seconds, half a company in a minute. Turn to face them, and you expose your other flank to deadly and even closer range fire. Life was tough on the Eastern Front. Hence all those knocked out Uber tanks. I constructed just such a landscape and battle in CMBO, using 57mm AT guns to represent Soviet AT guns. The result was the same as above, mass slaughter of Panthers. In defence the Panther is unequalled, in attack, in the east, it is just another tank. All the best, Kip. PS. One of the lessons for me is, if you want realistic games, build wide maps in CMBB. We are really talking 2km in width. It has always been the case that players use the map edges for protection, in CMBB you need to be careful to avoid this possibility in your map design.

Hi, There has been much interesting discussion of the force ratio when the Soviets attacked. The basic story being that if they out numbered the Germans by 2:1 over a 100km of front, they would face off at 1:1 over 80km and concentrate their surplus to achieve 3:1 routinely, and quite often more than 5:1 in small sectors. However, what about when the Germans were on the attack? Specifically, what number of defending Soviet AT guns would be realistic for a given number of attacking Panzers? Clearly, it was such a vast war, that all sorts of situations did arise, now and then. But, as a general rule, what was the ratio of defending Soviet AT guns to attacking Panzers likely to have been? In answering this question I will deal with the mid and late war. In the early part of the war it is all far more unpredictable. Although it varies, throughout most of the war in the east the Germans had around twenty five mechanized or armoured divisions facing the Soviets. Each armoured division having two panzer battalions and one armoured AT gun battalion, typically, in the east MarderIIIs. There were also varying numbers of StugIII battalions and brigades; StugIII brigades were really just battalions, in terms of their numbers in each unit. If we turn to the Soviets, and for the time being deal just with specialised AT gun units, the Soviets had the units shown below. The units below are those outside of the divisional organisation. i.e. in addition to guns within infantry divisions and armoured/mechanised corps. Soviet independent AT gun units. ------------Brigades---Regiments---Battalions---- January 43----0----------176-----------2--------- July 43-------27---------199-----------44-------- January 44----50---------172-----------48-------- From January 44 onwards the numbers varied as the Soviet brought AT regiments together in brigades, but the overall number of guns in independent AT units stayed at around 8,500. A brigade was normally made up of three regiments; a regiment was made up of two battalions of twelve guns each. Thus, a brigade at full strength would be around seventy two guns depending on organisation type. At this point, as we are playing the numbers game, it may be helpful just to take a look at the Soviet production figures for the guns that interest us most. Production of main AT guns. ----------------1942------1943-------1944-------- 45mm-----------20,500-----21,500----4,100-------- 57mm--------------0--------1,900-----2,300------- 76.2mmM1942-----23,600-----16,600----17,300—----- For completeness in terms of illustrating the numbers of Soviet guns available, here are the estimates of the number of guns that Soviet had at the front on 26th March 44. The figures were produced by the German Eastern Front intelligence organisation, Fremde Heer Ost, a famously efficient punch at recording the organisation and numbers of Soviet units. Numbers of Soviet guns at the front, 26th March 44. 57mm Antitank Gun----------------2,360--------- 76.2mm Field Guns----------------9,484---------- 76.2mm Antitank Guns-------------6,424---------- 85mm Antiaircraft Guns-----------1,228---------- Note that the two types of 76mm guns listed above are the same weapon, the 76.2mmM1942 gun. To the above one would also have to add all the 45mm antitank guns at the front, probably around 20,000. Before trying to work out what the ratio of AT guns to attacking Panzers is likely to have been in typical engagement, if there ever was such a thing, we need to consider which types of unit used which types of AT gun. The AT units in infantry divisions where largely equipped the 45mm AT guns. It was only during 44 that the 45mm AT guns started to be replaced by the 76.2mm M1942 guns, within infantry division AT units. An infantry division in 43 and 44 had around 48 45mm AT guns. However, it also had around 24 76.2mm M1942 guns that would most often be used as Field Guns, i.e. as AT guns in but name. In July 43 most independent AT units had two thirds 76.2mmM1942 guns and one third 45mm AT guns. Some had 57mm AT guns in place of some of the 45mm AT guns. The number of 45mm AT guns was gradually reduced with more independent AT units becoming pure 76.2mmM1942 units, or having all 45mm AT guns replaced by 57mm AT guns. By 44 there were few 45mm AT guns in independent AT units. Now let’s return to considering the fate of the German Panzer and mechanised divisions and what the implications of the above were. The major problem the Germans had is that the shortage of infantry divisions was so acute, they held far longer fronts than was healthy anyway, that the Panzer divisions had to take their place in the line. They had to hold a section of front rather than strike through a line held by infantry, do their work, and then be withdrawn back behind an infantry screen. Panzer divisions tended to operate within Panzer Corps of two Panzer divisions and two infantry divisions. But along side the infantry divisions, rather than striking through from behind the infantry screen. The great danger in this was that the Soviets tracked the location of the Panzer divisions and would assign independent AT units to the areas in which they operated. You only have to consider the number of German Panzer divisions, roughly 25, and the number of independent Soviet AT units, to realise that the result of this was grim for German armour. German Panzer divisions would be forced to hold the same sections of the front for weeks, and would attract Soviet AT brigades and regiments on to themselves. The Soviets had two independent AT brigades plus around six independent AT regiments for every German Panzer division. The result of the above was that a German Panzer division with, say, 60 operational Panzers, about the norm, split into two battalions, would have to contend with one or more AT brigades and two or three AT regiments at a time. This would still leave a large number of independent Soviet AT units held back for unexpected eventualities, deployed in the wrong areas, or being rebuilt. A typical German Panzer division of 60 operational tanks plus 20 armoured AT destroyers, attacking over a 10km front, would typically face a force of 100 to 140 AT guns in independent AT units alone over the same frontage. If the sector was defended by two Soviet infantry divisions of around 4,000 men each with, say, 30 45mm AT guns and 20 76.2mmM1942 guns each it is all getting very challenging for the Panzers. The reason the above densities appear to be greater than those often quoted for Kursk is that the much used Kursk figures are for an entire Army frontage at a time, just before the attack. Importantly, not for the 5km -10km area around a given German Panzer division a day or two after they struck. Once a German Panzer division was committed, in place on the frontline, the independent Soviet AT units would rush to choke it off. Most Panzer divisions spent most of there time holding the line, as explained earlier. (As it happens, at Kursk the Soviets rushed mostly tank units to choke off the Panzers, but this was not the norm.) All will reach their own conclusions as to the implications for CMBB battles. However, in my view, if you take a typical CMBB scenario in which the Germans are attacking, nine times out of ten in CM battles this means a Panzer attack, what follows are the sort of forces I would expect to see on the CMBB battlefield, others will take a different view. Assume the attacking German force is made up of a company of 12 Panthers with two companies of motorised Panzergrenadiers in support. The defending Soviet force is a reduced infantry battalion of 250 men. (Remember, during the second half of the war most Soviet infantry divisions were kept at the strength of a heavy infantry brigade, artillery rich infantry brigade.) From their own divisional resources they could expect 2 45mm AT guns and 2 76.2mmM1942 Field Guns. For the reasons outlined above they could also expect a slightly reduced battalion of AT guns from an attached independent AT unit. Typically 2 57mm AT guns and 8 76.2mmM1942 guns. In total the attacking 12 Panthers would be up against 2 45mm AT guns, 2 57mm AT guns and 10 76.2mmM1942 guns. The ratio of AT guns to attacking Panzers was often around 1:1, and on a bad day there may have been very many more AT guns than attacking Panzers. Now let’s take a historical example of an attack by an elite Panther battalion, at full strength of 61 vehicles, in January 44. It is Friday the 28th of January 1944 near the town of Korsun in the central Ukraine. Grossdeutschland’s 1/Pz.Rgt.26 is at full strength just having returned from re-equipping in Germany, specifically given as 61 Panthers strong. “There, near Pissarevka, a large tank battle had been under way since mid morning, pitting the Grossdeutschland’s 1/Pz.Rgt.26 against a sizeable Soviet tank force situated amongst rolling hills northeast of the town. The Panthers attacking in conjunction with the 905.StuG.Abt, ran directly into the path of another Soviet tank attack from the direction of Ossitnyashka. Adding to the Germans' problems was that a large number of Soviet antitank guns had been sited in both Pissarevka and Tishkovka, forcing them to attack through a deadly crossfire. The situation was an ideal one for the Soviet defenders, since the Germans were forced to attack uphill most of the way and were unable to take advantage of their superior long-range tank cannon. By 1100 hours, the Panther battalion had destroyed 12 T-34s, though 15 of its own tanks were knocked out. Maj. Glaesgen, the battalion commander, was fatally wounded near Yusefovka while standing in his turret. Though an experienced commander himself, his unit's baptism of fire had come at a high price.” On the 29th things did not improve, “Von Vormann's corps was fighting a losing battle that day, and his men knew it. The Grossdeutschland’s Panther battalion again made a determined effort to link up with XI.A.K., but was brought to a halt by late morning after it had suffered heavy losses. Out of the 61 tanks it had started with, it now only had 17 operational. Of those lost, 20 were totally destroyed. In two days of combat, this unit alone had lost nearly three-fourths of its tanks. Any chance to use this unit as a battering ram were now gone, as well as the hopes to stem the tide. The weight of the second attacking echelons of the Red Army was now being felt.” In fact the Soviets could not have had more than an equal number of T34s available, if you had read the book from which this is extracted, Hell’s Gate by Douglas Nash, this would be clear. What was accounting for the Panthers was flanking fire. When I gave my view of the number and type of AT guns the Panther company in the CMBB game may be up against, some of you will have concluded that Panthers could handle such a challenge quite easily. The reason is that the 76.2mm M1942 gun is less power full than a US 57mm/6pounder and therefore against the frontal armour of a Panther what can it do? The answer is that in reality the world does not end 300m to the left or right of your Panthers. In the east, the real killer was flanking fire. Even though not all the terrain in western Russian and the Ukraine is as open as round Kursk, what you will not find a lot of the “micro-landscapes” of much of Western Europe, when often the only threat was over the forward arc due to the terrain through which you attacked. The world did not end 300m north of your attacking Panthers. 600m, 700m indeed a 1,000m north of your attacking Panthers, on a gently rolling hillside, in brush at the mouth of a gully, may be a battery of four 76.2mm M1942 guns. If they open up you can lose a platoon in 30 seconds, half a company in a minute. Turn to face them, and you expose your other flank to deadly and even closer range fire. Life was tough on the Eastern Front. Hence all those knocked out Uber tanks. I constructed just such a landscape and battle in CMBO, using 57mm AT guns to represent Soviet AT guns. The result was the same as above, mass slaughter of Panthers. In defence the Panther is unequalled, in attack, in the east, it is just another tank. All the best, Kip. PS. One of the lessons for me is, if you want realistic games, build wide maps in CMBB. We are really talking 2km in width. It has always been the case that players use the map edges for protection, in CMBB you need to be careful to avoid this possibility in your map design.

John, hi, It seems not all writers of reports agree on these matters. There does seem to be agreement that the Bren was the more accurate. To be even more specific, in the report I read it was made clear that, in the LMG role, the reason for the lack of accuracy with the MG42 was uncontrollable recoil. Also, the book I have on Small Arms from Shrivenham, in its section on the problem of heat, seems to set the limits rather lower than your chaps. It agrees with your figure of 200 rpm, but, without a spare barrel, that is more or less your lot after just one minute for that gun until it has cooled. To give one specific figure from the table and stats that stuck in my mind, the maximum average rate of fire over fifteen minutes, without a barrel change, is just 50 rpm. Note, within that there is very little room for “mad minutes” that go over 50 rpm. Up that ROF to, say, 70 rpm, and it is all over in half the time. When I have unpacked all my books I will no doubt produce a bunch more stats. It is a great section with graphs on rates of cooling and all sorts. What normally happens is that people lock on to different figures, stats. I am sure the MG 3 is a very fine gun, but at the lower rate of fire, at 1200 rpm it is just wasting every ones time. Hence, my point about the US, Soviet and FN post-war GPMGs not even having a 1200 rpm option. That is what makes life fun, we do not all agree! All good fun, All the best, Kip.

Hi, “Was the MG42 really the right weapon for the job of "squad automatic"? Do you really want something pumping out 1200 rounds a minute on the attack, or was a Bren-type weapon far more suitable?” Got it in one. No, it was not a suitable LMG for the reasons implied above. I have read a British, 1950s report that reaches just this conclusion. Contrary to popular belief, the MG42 was not considered the ideal squad LMG, by all the major powers, post WW2. Note that all the new General Purpose Machine Guns developed by the top players in the 1950, the US, Soviets and FN of Belgium, had a ROF of between 550-750 rpm. There is along list of very good and important reasons for this. The report I read was designed to address the question of the type of weapon the British should adopt as a LMG for the new NATO 76.2mm round. The conclusion was to use a new version of the Bren. Later they used the FN GPMG. The MG42 is rightly famous, and regarded as a classic, for being the first truly successful GPMG. That “could” be used as both a LMG and a HMG. With quick change barrel and all the rest. However, the feature it is most famous for, it high ROF, was regarded as a weakness by those tasked with studying this matter post WW2, on both sides of the Iron Curtain. People tend to forget or understate the problem of the heat generated by rates of fire, of say, over 50 rounds per minute. I have the statistics on heat accumulation and ROF from a text book produced by the staff at the Royal College of Military Science at Shrivenham, they make very interesting reading. Even using two quick change barrels the maximum “useable” ROF of MGs is very far below the “cyclical” rate that is always quoted. All the best, Kip. PS. When fired from a bipod the MG42 was also less accurate than wished for. It was its high ROF, and low accuracy from the bipod, that dammed it in British eyes as a LMG.

Andreas, “Regarding the statistical research by Dupuy. I am not sure what the unit of analysis is in there, is it the squad, or something higher?” The statistical analysis done by Dupuy was designed to work best at numbers between 10,000-30,000 men. However, it can work reasonably well, and was used to analyze battles, down to battalion combat team. He some times gets a lot of stick; however, his work was accepted by both the US DOD and UK’s Operational Analysis units in the 1970s. The final acceptance test for the US military was to enter all the mass of information known about the Battle of the Bulge, run his equations, and see what the result was. You will have guessed that the result was the same as it had been in reality and all involved were converted to his work. When it comes to German combat effectiveness in the late war, and we are now talking genuine “combat effectiveness” not “combat power”, hence one side having more artillery is fully accounted for as is one side having Uber tanks, the evidence is very powerful that German combat effectiveness did not decrease until 45. Dupuy was tasked with the specific job of studying this question and the conclusion was clear. German combat effectiveness was still higher than US combat effectiveness during the Battle of the Bulge. Also, by a margin that is consistent with Normandy and the war as a whole. As all combat effectiveness is relative it is possible that German combat effectiveness during the Battle of the Bulge had decrease from the early war in absolute terms. However, this is only possible if US combat effectiveness decreased over the first six months of the war in NWE. If you consider that even more US units were green during Normandy, also if you read books such as Closing With the Enemy, is it my view that it is highly unlikely that US combat effectiveness decreased over this period. I have the full explanation by Dupuy of German combat effectiveness during the Battle of the Bulge and will be happy to let you borrow it when I have unpacked all my books. All good fun, All the best, Kip.

Hi, When it comes to relative combat effectiveness, in fact we are really talking “combat power” but why argue the point, the figures are known with reasonable certainty. The reason I say this is that the casualty ratios, and force ratios are now known with “reasonable” certainty. Anyway, using the casualties and force sizes reported in the latest Glantz books for the Soviets you will find that relative combat effectiveness, the “lower” the figure the better, are, Soviet to German, 6:1 for the first year of the war in the east and 1.15:1 during the last two years of the war in the east. The casualties suffered by the German army are only counted up to the end of March 45, i.e. not the round up during the last six weeks of the war. What these figures mean is that during the first year of the war in the east, a combat team of just 1,000 Germans could sometimes hold its own against a force of 6,000 Soviets. The stories one reads from the German side of single German battalions holding off one or more regiments did in need happen at times. However, during the last two years of the war in the east, a German combat team of 1,000 men would, on average, generate the same combat power as a Soviet force of 1,150 men. It is also clear that this is not due to a decrease in the combat power of the Germans. A study of German combat effectiveness during the Bulge showed it to have been the same as during Normandy, and Italy a year earlier.( Unless US combat effectiveness decreased over the same period, unlikely in my view as they gained in experience.) It did not decrease until January 45. (PS. All armies always complain about the replacements not knowing what they are doing, no doubt with good reason.) What happened is that Soviet combat effectiveness improved immeasurably between June 41 and the autumn of 43. Given the massive, in fact tragic amount of experience, the Soviets had accumulated over the first two years the above relative combat effectiveness figures for the second half of the war are not a surprise. In retrospect anyway. All the best, Kip. PS. Just to give one detail that gives a favour to what was happening. In 43 the Soviet annual intake of recruits was greater, just, than their “irrecoverable losses”. PPS. The German high command, including Hitler, realised they had lost the war in September 42. Before Stalingrad or Alamein. This was "the crisis" month for the German high command. Post September 42 it was a case of damage control.

Hi, All sounds great, just the sort of features I was hoping for. Will certainly be up for a copy when it is released. We all differ on this, but my experience of CM is that live internet play is “the” way to play wargames. The mixture of a highly realistic wargame, the CM series and TacOps are certainly that, plus live play, makes for a great couple of hours of fun. All the best, Kip.

Terry, hi, All good stuff, useful to have it all in one place. Interesting to see they even had a symbol for “snow plough” units! Hope all is well, All the best, Kip.