pamak_1970

o.k. This is my first campaign in the CM2 series. I normally play games requiring minimum micromanagement, but I wanted to try this game and eventually found time to do it. I played all the missions of the first German campaign (Conrath's counterattack) and now I see a huge map for the last mission. Personally, I think that without a LOS fan to check the visibility conditions of each location (or unit) the game becomes unmanageable with big maps (and yes, I have tried also the mods with the gridded ground). Anyway, the CM2 engine is still impressive. One question: Before I spend my time with this huge map, can somebody tell me if the Germans can actually win the last battle? I read this thread and noticed that some players managed to get a draw in the last battle and a minor defeat in the campaign? Can somebody actually win the last battle (and the campaign), or is it supposed to follow the historical result?

Thank you for the link. Yes, I was aware of it and it is a useful source of information. Regarding the OR studies, their results regarding the effectiveness of airpower on ground targets naturally weren't welcomed in the air force. On the other hand, the last used OR to quantify results, like the effectiveness of AA fire and there are some very interesting studies in this area. They set the foundations for what was called "flak analysis" which was used by the bomber command to pick the best avenues of approach or the size and seperation between air formations to minimize losses.

Right on target! This is exactly what I was looking for. I really appreciate that you took the time to browse the reports to find what I asked for. You are my Santa Clause, lol. Have a happy holidays!

Perfect! Take your time. By the way, the worst thing was that I didn't let this book go. It was lost together with my suitcase in one of my trips. Now try to imagine that! :mad:

Hello everybody, I came here cause I recall there were certain members who owned this magnificent book which unfortunately I don't have any more, so maybe somebody can help me trace a piece of information from inside the book. I recall there was a certain study inside examining the effects of artillery fire on wire communications. It was a case study of artillery bombardment on German positions and the authors calculated a rule of thumb about the intensity of fire necessary to disrupt wire communications after an hour of bombardment. If I recall correctly, they had the size of the area under bombardment and the tons per hour of ammunition expended in order to destroy wire communication in an hour. Can somebody give me these figures- approximate size of area under fire and ammo expenditure? Thank you

This is an interesting link quantifying combat damage, bogging and mechanical breakdowns during the course of a few days of combat operations in difficult ground conditions http://www.royaltankregiment.com/9_RTR/tech/reichswald/Reichswald%20Report.htm from the above link Tank Casualties, own troops By Enemy Action Mines 5 Bazzoka 3 HE 5 AP 2 Total 15 By other causes Turret segment 13 Mech failure 20 Clutches (total failure) 3 Bogged 32 Total 68 i.e. A total casualty for two regiments of – 83 At some point it states that at any time only 7% of tanks in the forest were immobilized. The conditions in the forest were actually better compared to the ground outside of it.

related to immobilizations. Tanks in mud and forest fighting (operation veritable). The link below is very interesting. It includes a detailed description of operations, terrain appreciation and casualties with detailed description of the causes. http://www.royaltankregiment.com/9_RTR/tech/reichswald/Reichswald%20Report.htm from the above link Tank Casualties, own troops By Enemy Action Mines 5 Bazzoka 3 HE 5 AP 2 Total 15 By other causes Turret segment 13 Mech failure 20 Clutches (total failure) 3 Bogged 32 Total 68 i.e. A total casualty for two regiments of – 83 Note: It is estimated that only 7% of the tanks in the forest were bogged at any one time. ( It will be seen that, although casualties through enemy action were low, the overall wastage was extremely high. This was due in part to the absence of fitters but chiefly by reason of the abnormal ground and weather conditions and the rough usage unavoidable in forest fighting, especially by night. 3. Main Concerns (a) Turret Segments There were two reasons for the damage to segments. These were:- (i) Turret or gun being struck by trees. While every care was taken by tank commanders in this respect it was impossible, when fighting, to avoid it at all times. (ii) Mud, undergrowth and small branches packing between skid rails and lifting the track to a point where the turret is heaved from its ring. Despite mud ploughs and stripper bars this happens in certain conditions of going and the result is exactly similar to ice trouble already well known. ( Mechanical failure Many of the tanks that failed mechanically were very old and were in any case due to be back-loaded for rework. During the period under review the tank crews had neither time nor the facilities to carry out the constant maintenance required by these old tanks. It is considered unnecessary to enumerate the various causes of failure. © Clutches The clay sub-soil, sometimes under water, together with the general forest conditions, put a severe strain on clutches. Attempts to get forward when bogged were perhaps the greatest single factor causing failure. While 3 was the number of total failures a great many more gave considerable trouble. (d) Bogging This was inevitable and it is considered that only a Churchill tank could have operated over the ground encountered in certain places during the advance. The prohibition of the axis to all tanks made difficult the recovery of tanks bogged – eventually all but two, which required workshop assistance, were recovered by units. (e) Electrical Systems Complete failure of the system was prevalent in tanks with damaged turrets. The connections in the junction box were broken by the wrench as the turret was lifted by packed mud.

somehow i think we got distracted I will post a link trying to steer the conversation to the original path http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/drew1.htm from the above link Then the authors give an example of how the French doctrine counting on WWI experience became irrelevant because of the interwar tech advancements. The above shows that doctrine is affected by technology and this is why i mentioned the radical different characteristics of Helos and TDs. This is why i said it is a stretch to argue both doctrines are the same. And i have to point something else which i didn't have time to address before. The AT helo was a a design of the late 70s-80s. The TD doctrine in the US army died way before the first appearance of the Apache. Now i understand you find similarities between TDs and modern AT helos and it is not surprising. All different doctrines have common roots. The deepest one of course are related to what we call "principles of war". Here is one principle- "security", you want to avoid surprise. Now the next level of abstract doctrine (the article compares the different levels of doctrine to a tree) puts more details into the picture. So when you advance for example, you lead your troops with an advanced guard. Then you have more specific doctrine-say TD doctrine which will state for example that during marches of TD units you have recon and advanced or flank guards at such a distance so that you can have security. Eventually you become more specific. There is an area where doctrine overlaps with tactics. The above of course is linked to various factors including technological ones. If your unit needs x time to react-deploy and the enemy is capable to advance with an Z rate then you calculate how far the advance guard should be (and how strong) in order to delay him x time and give the opportunity to the main body of friendly forces to react. Then you take in consideration other needs, like the need to preserve the advanced guard and delay the enemy without being decicively engaged and destroyed, support or communications and finally you have a manual saying that the leading element marches say 10 km or 2 hours ahead of the main body. Now it doesn't matter of you advance with TDs or infantry, or tanks. All are going to use some type of guard and try to "satisfy" the security principle of war. Does this "similarity" imply they are all the same? Another example: take for example modern cavalry. Its mission is similar to the one of the traditional cavalry in wwi and wwii. Basically security of larger units. Does the modern Armored cavalry regiment use the same doctrine as the American cavalry units in wwi or wwii? Or let's take the French or other countries who actually deployed horses for securing larger units during wwii. Can we argue that their modern mechanized cavalry doctrine is the same to the one they had in wwii simply because both had the same mission? Before you reply, i encourage you to read the link and before you try to counterargue that all these technical details are related to tactics and not doctrine, i will post the following from the same link note that the TD doctrine is an organizational doctrine. In addition if you read read the FM 18-5 /TD manual 1942- title: "organization and tactics of tank destroyer units", it says in the forward section "This manual contains doctrines for the training and combat employment of tank destroyer battalions and groups" Well these "doctrines" certainly discuss tactics. Just read the manual and see it for yourself. All the above explain better what i meant before when i argued that i saw your definition of "basic doctrine" as very basic indeed. Yes when you strip a subject from all technical details, you can find at the core some basic unified military theory. It is just that i see this as a very weak assosiation to argue that both doctrines are the same I will end the discussion here because i will not have time the next few days to participate. You are welcome to reply and disagree. I still think it was an interesting conversation.

It is not the limitations themselves i pointed. Every system has limitations and yes you want to minimize them through combined arms. No argument here. I mentioned the totally different characteristics of the systems. They apply so different tactics, including basic ones-which is why i mentioned defense,because of their different limitations i find it a stress to argue they both come from the same TD doctrine. Ok, everybody wants to use superior speed and firepower to destroy the enemy. We find the same objective in many different "doctrines". This doesn't mean that all are the same. I guess in theory we can say there is an overall military doctrine which links all together, but this is a very weak assosiation.

first of all there is no black and white. Their primary purpose in theory was of course to actively seek and destroy. They did this by occupying first advantageous positions and by using this they certainly denied the enemy an advance. The AT helicopter can't stay too long in the battlefield to have similar effects. They will find the enemy, destroy some tanks and when they return back, the rest of the enemy force may still continue its advance. It depends on what portion of his force is intact. You can't do this against a ground force. I think this is obvious.

and i would like to add something else. The vision of TD use didn't relate to combined arms operations. I am not sure why you mention it did, perhaps you read somewhere a proponent talking about "combined arms", but i prefer to let actions speak for people's intentions. Look for example the design of the TD platform. The M10 turret was topless. The board's official reason was that increased observation and reduced weight, both important in their vision to seek, find first enemy tanks and favorable firing positions, and use speed to occupy them, gain an advantage and defeat enemy armor. It seems to me they underestimated the threats from multiple sources in a combined arms enviroment. It still worked against a desperate enemy attacking carelessly with minimum artillery support- often as a result of poor observation conditions since he tried to avoid CAS, but NATO didn't expect Russians to employ armor the same way.

I guess it is a matter of what you mean by "basic doctrine". If we want to simplify the subjects, totally ignore different characteristics of the platforms and their different strengths, limitations and so on, we can find "basic" similarities among everything. You can find similarities at the most basic level between CAS and artillery doctrine too if you want. I think we have to see the whole picture, including tactics techniques and procedures used to exploit the "high maneuverability and speed" of AT platforms against enemy tanks. I can't ignore the fact that AT Helos are simply incapable to defend a locality, due to their limitation of staying in the battlefield for a long time, or the fact that they have different threats against them. Nor i can ignore the fact that even modern theory of AT helicopter use, doesn't believe that these assets can free firendly tanks from the need to defeat enemy armor, which was one of the pursued objectives of TD doctrine in the beginning.

Yes!! Thanks

There was a misunderstanding I talked about a tread (misspelled as thread ) which continued after wwii. We all know mechanization didn't start after wwii. But i think we agree that the level of mechanization continued to increase after wwii. And when all infantry in US army became mechanized, it was logical to see their supporting weapons - including AT assets to become fully mechanized too. The fact that we see AT assets on vehicles after wwii, is not a sign that the TD survived after wwii. It is just a result of the above tread. But all these assets continued to function in the same way AT assets did during wwii, meaning supporting infantry and not riding ahead trying to locate and destroy enemy armor, which was the TD dogma objective.

ok, but i don't see them as descendants of TD doctrine. Even during WWII we had an attempt to use air assets to fight tanks and often we had dedicated tank busting units. These units and their tactics are not related to TD doctrine. The last is basically the product of a debate between more protection or more maneuverability-power. The application of airpower on the battlefield is not related to this dillema. But on a broader front, we still find a type of debate which is somewhat similar to the one we saw in the TD doctrine. Can airpower by itself confront and defeat enemy armor? or is it still necessary to confront enemy tanks with friendly armor?