Various questions from Russian community

[Taki]

*bumpetybooh*

[Apocal]

snip

Dude, no offense, but I really have trouble following what you're trying to say here.

[Taki]

So we wont see any Statement on that.

Is there any chance that the Values for Russian Equipment get tweaked with Patch 1.11?

[Taki]

So now that im almost sure that there wont be a official Statement nor will there be any chance that the Russian Unit Performances get overworked (or the US C2 gets tweaked downward) im really dissapointed.

I wont buy any more Modules. Will wait for CM Normandy and see if that Game will be balanced.

Upset/Dissapointed

Taki1980

[John Kettler]

Bigduke6,

Strongly disagree with your characterization of the SA-11/Buk-M1 system. It wasn't some locally produced SA-6 tweak. Rather, it was an entirely new system, with all new radars, missiles, launcher configurations, etc., while, ISTR, still being able to use the old SA-6 missile in a pinch. There was at one time a kind of hybrid system in which each upgraded SA-6 battery had one TELAR with a FIRE DOME radar but the SA-6 missile. This alone doubled the system's firepower per Fire Unit. A standard SA-6 Fire Unit consisted of 1 x STRAIGHT FLUSH TAR/TTR and 4 x SA-6 TELs (3 x SA-6 per TEL). By contrast, the SA-11 TELAR, armed with 4 x SA-11, is BY ITSELF a Fire Unit, radically complicating the SEAD/DEAD problem. No longer is it sufficient to whack the STRAIGHT FLUSH and then kill the helpless TELs at will. Now, the preferred mode is to kill the SNOW DRIFT EW/ACQ radar, to disrupt optimum engagement, but now all the FIRE DOME TELARs (still 4 x , but now with 16 ready missiles vs. 12 for the SA-6) must be individually attacked and killed, and this is without factoring in improved range, quicker reaction time, better ECCM and capability against small, agile targets and so forth. An SA-11 battery has 4 x the firepower of a standard SA-6 battery. This is a much taller order than what, say, the Israelis faced during the Yom Kippur War, and that was daunting.

Soviet/Russian General Staff studies of WW II and later conflicts found that the surprise introduction of new weapons into the fight temporarily increased the effectiveness of the owning force by 50%, which is in line with the reports of what the SA-11 did to FA and VVS pilot morale.

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Alek,

Russia has and has had at least as far back as the Cold War, what we now call UAVs. See, for example the YASTREB discussion in Suvorov/Rezun's INSIDE THE SOVIET ARMY for one such Cold War platform. This was later discussed in JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY, but I don't have the citation handy. For more modern ones, please see the REIS-D and PCHELA-1T here. http://www.warfare.ru/?lang=&catid=324&cattitle=UAV

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

I found this thread and noticed there'd been no BFC response to numerous issues raised. It's entirely possible, given the last prior post was 2008, that the issues raised herein have long since been addressed. If so, please treat this as more of a military-technical musing.

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Further thoughts on the AT-3 SAGGER/Malyutka vs the Israelis. One of the reasons counterfire was so effective was that the AT-3s supplied to the Egyptians were what we called AT-3A or SAGGER A. This was a Gen One pure MCLOS (Manual Command to Line Of Sight) system. It required the operator to continuously joystick steer the slow (115m/s; 130m/s late improved models) missile, and anything which caused the operator or even twitch much was enough to cause it to crash or overshoot.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9K11_Malyutka

Some of the reports speak of IDF tanks coming out of the battle festooned with missile guidance wires. I very much doubt the Syrians were operating either SAGGER A or slightly improved SAGGER B. Rather, I'd expect to see the SACLOS (SemiAutomatic Command to Line of Sight) SAGGER C or later. Rather than trying to fly the missile without crashing it, tracking the missile's flare and trying to steer that to the target tank, SACLOS requires only that the gunner track the target properly, and everything else is handled inside the launcher unit. At once, that fundamentally degrades the leverage of counterfire, because now a lot more has to happen to screw up the inbound missile.

But an AT-4 SPIGOT/Fagot is by no means even in the AT-3C category. Rather, it more nearly resembles the U.S. TOW. Traveling at 180m/s, it closes on the target much faster than the AT-3 ever could, thus, reducing the time in which the target can react.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9K111_Fagot

By the time the AT-5 SPANDREL/Konkurs shows up, it's a whole new ball game compared to the SAGGER, for the missile's very nearly twice as fast (200m/s vs 115m/s).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9M113_Konkurs

If we can trust the Wiki on Syrian weapons, the AT-14 SPRIGGAN/Kornet E is the go to ATGM for the Syrians, with 1000 Kornet E in active service. Moreover, it's specifically characterized as hard to spot at launch and uses difficult to detect laser beam riding guidance.

http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=79586&page=1#.UMwBiY59nHg

Further, it's going at 300m/s or nearly thrice that of the AT-3A SAGGER A/Malyutka.

http://defencedog.blogspot.com/2011/08/kornet-em-new-capabilities-of-antitank.html

These military-technical changes, in range, kinematic performance, guidance means and much more not discussed here, are most definitely significant in terms of CMSF modeling and combat impact.

Regards,

John Kettler