Enigma machine

[Korut Zelva]

There should be a 2% chance each time a German unit is destroyed that the enigma code is cracked by the allies and the location of all german units are revealed for the rest of the game (or let's say german units that moves).

[JerseyJohn]

Enigma information wasn't a constant flow thoughout the war. At times the Germans added cyphers or altered the codes and the British would lose the information.

Much of their success was due to sloppiness on the part of German communications technicians. They did things such as end a transmition without changing their settings. That, and various other seemingly minor shortcuts that seemed insignificant and would hardly have been thought of by the operators proved to be invaluable for Blechley Park.

I'd make the chance of breaking the code much higher, but would also have a high % that the Germans would quickly plug the problem and the source would disappear again.

A reciprocol chance should exist that the Germans would know of Anglo-American moves and dispositions, especially prior to 1943, as Allied messace security was often as loose as Germany's.

The main Allied advantage lay in misinformation, such as convincing the Axis that landings would occur in Greece instead of Italy and at Pas de Calais instead of Normandy. I don't believe Germany ever had much luck in this area.

[Retributar]

Even when the Germans plugged there deficiencies in their codes...Bletchly Park was very adept at re-cracking them again and again through-out the war.

The allies knew most of the time what the Germans were up to...and where they were...even before many of the members of the German High Command did!.

How do you think 'Patton' could charge through the German lines with such ease?.

[arax3]

JJ: The Nazis problems stemmed from thier philosophical inclination to beleive that sub-races like the British and the Americans were smart enough to break their "unbreakable" code!! Any fool would have figured out the Allies were reading their codes. US checked to see if the Japensese were breaking our codes and then changed the code when they found they were. The German attack at Kursk was expected and anticipated by the Reds; the Italian supply shipments to N. Africa were almost always sunk. This code breaking process contributed more to the defeat of the Axis than any other one single factor.

[Edwin P.]

Perhaps the game engine will allow for a random event, based on intelligence tech, that allows you to see the location of enemy units for 1 turn.

For example:

UK: Event1 ((Your Intelligence Tech Level less Enemy Intelligence Tech) x 2%): UK spots all Italian Units for 1 Turn.

Thus with UK Intelligence Tech 1 and Italian Tech Level 0 the UK has a 2% per turn to spot the location of all Italian Units for 1 turn.

With UK Tech Level 5 and Italian Intelligence Tech Level 2 this chance increases to 6% per turn ((5-2)x 2%).

2% = 1 in 50 Turns

4% = 1 in 25 Turns

10% = 1 in 10 Turns

PS: If I had a choice I would have the event reveal only a percentage of enemy units - say 50% at most, as no intelligence is perfect.

[ August 07, 2004, 04:07 PM: Message edited by: Edwin P. ]

[John C]

Trying to put enigma failures into the game is very realistic and not much fun. Personally, I would rather the game be balanced without having this quite significant and completely random event. If it must be done, Edwin's method that allows anyone to do it and bases the chance of success upon a player's commitment to technology spending is by far the preferable approach in my mind.

[Retributar]

For playabilities sake i agree with you John C

Trying to put enigma failures into the game is very realistic and not much fun.

( added>:NOT TO USE ULTRA ) ... if we could use ULTRA or the ENIGMA MACHINE as was used historically...then all German Troop deployments and intentions would be understood...through-out the game with little to no-surprises!.

It was only for example in the Battle Of The Ardennes...that the allies were caught off-guard, only because 'Hitler' insisted on 'Strict Radio Silence' - 100% SILENCE!!! and that only certain individuals would have the need to know!.

[ August 08, 2004, 07:53 AM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

[JerseyJohn]

Originally posted by Retributar:

Even when the Germans plugged there deficiencies in their codes...Bletchly Park was very adept at re-cracking them again and again through-out the war.

The allies knew most of the time what the Germans were up to...and where they were...even before many of the members of the German High Command did!.

How do you think 'Patton' could charge through the German lines with such ease?.

There were a number of factors involved, one of which was the role of air recon; Patton and all the other American generals of the late war action knew more from normal air photos than they did from information given them by the cryptogographic service.

Some Allied generals, such as Montgomery, refused to use information that he didn't know the source of and that included Ultra info.

There were long gaps where Enigma devices were not being read by the Brits. They ended when a full machine with the last model was captured on a U-boat. Other machines were captured on weather ships.

In addition to Ultra the Allies recieved info from turned spies and also from underground sources, Germany had nothing comparable going for them but the British for their part, were very careless in their own information and the Germans also knew much of that.

Arax3

The Italians for most of the North African Campaign did a fine job of delivering supplies to North Africa. The main problem was that neither Benghazi nor Tobruck were suitable for shipments due to the frequent battle damage both recieved and shipments went to Tripoli, which in reality is a port of course. When Rommel was at El Alamain his supply line stretched by land back to Tripoli and was exposed almost all the way after Tobruck.

He added to this problem by sending his most important transmissions via Enigma. Ironically, the Italian Naval code was secure!

All right, so let's say this idea is adapted, that means if the Allies hit they see everything the Axis has for the remainder of the game? Make it an option because I wouldn't want to use it.

-- The Enigma didn't tell the Brits about the Bismark breaking into the Atlantic, nor the Gneisnau and Scharnhorst earlier in the year. It didn't tell them about the 1942 Channel run of those two battle cruisers and the Prinz Eugen. There were frequent gaps in the flow of information, to treat it as a constant source would be historically inaccurate.

[ August 07, 2004, 05:06 PM: Message edited by: JerseyJohn ]

[arax3]

JJ: Thanks for the Info. A3

[JerseyJohn]

A3, A pleasure and likewise.

[Retributar]

I realize that there was more to it than my simple statement...but, on the whole...the Allies were much in the know of what the Germans were doing and where they were...it wasnt much of a secret most of the time... AGAIN i'll say that i would prefer not to have ULTRA in this game as it could be a game-spoiler!.

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Enigma and Ultra- the Cypher War < Great Article!.

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/atlantic/enigma.aspx

From the second half of 1941 onwards, information from "Enigma" was one of the key factors enabling the Royal Navy to divert convoys away from waiting wolf packs.

Not all of this improvement could be put down to Ultra and SIGINT. Among other factors involved were the diversion of U-boats to the Mediterranean and Arctic, and increasingly effective Allied air patrols. It was also fortunate in the long term, if the Germans were to remain ignorant of Allied success in breaking "Enigma", that inability fully to understand a newly introduced code meant that not all merchant shipping could avoid U-boat ambush

Throughout the war there would be occasional breaks in the flow of information, when the Germans changed some of the cyphers, but these were usually solved either by the increasingly sophisticated "bombes", by the growing experience of the cryptologists, or by further captures of enemy material. Even so, such breaks could cause serious problems; one such temporary inability to decipher enemy signals played an important part in the heavy losses suffered by Arctic convoy PQ17.

The "Enigma" material, known as "Ultra", was, of course, combined with intelligence from a wide variety of other sources, including HF/DF and wireless intercepts and reconnaissance reports, into a body of information known collectively as "SIGINT".

Though there would be other short breaks in the ability to decipher the Naval "Enigma", by now the worst of the U-boat threat was over. None of the interruptions lasted for long.

By the time of the D-Day landings, the Naval "Enigma" was being broken almost instantly by the improved knowledge of the codes and the greater number of "bombes" available in the UK and USA. Only in the very last days of the war did the Germans introduce another code variation which threatened Allied supremacy in this field, and by then it no longer mattered.

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ULTRA AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE U-BOATS IN WORLD WAR II

http://www.mei1940.org/newoii/navy.html

Page 31 CHAPTER V CONCLUSION

It is without doubt valid to state that Ultra was to some degree an effective tool for the Allies in the Battle of the Atlantic. Whether or not the war was shorter because of it can only be speculated.

Had it not been for the British and the fact that they were involved against the U-boat long before the United States entered the war, progress toward ultimate victory would have been far slower. Without a doubt the capture of the Enigma machine from U-110 by the British was the big break in Ultra in the early war years. The British efforts at Bletchley Park and at the Admiralty Tracking Room gave the United States a head start in organizing at C0MINCH and must have influenced the internal workings of OP-20G.

The cooperation that was evident at all other levels and in all other endeavors between the United States and the British during the war must have existed between OP-20G and Bletchley Park. No evidence to substantiate the degree of cooperation was found during this research. It is known that a secure link via trans-Atlantic cable existed between the Admiralty Operations Intelligence Center Tracking Room and COMINCH Combat Intelligence Atlantic Section. Each of these tracking rooms was securely linked with their own code breakers respectively. Thus, the communication links were available for tremendous amounts of cooperation. Moving convoys and sinking submarines are not simple tasks under the best of circumstances and it would appear logical that the greater the cooperation between Allies, the better. Agreement on the locations, numbers and dispositions of the U-boats would facilitate coordinated efforts to sink them

[ August 08, 2004, 07:50 AM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

[Retributar]

Breaking Germany's Enigma Code in World War Two - By Andrew Lycett

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwtwo/enigma_03.shtml

Ultra's role in the Battle of Britain was limited: better grade intelligence came from prisoners, captured documents and improved air reconnaissance.

Only in 1941 did Enigma decrypts pay dividends. In the spring they provided evidence of a German military build-up prior to the invasion of Greece

In March, Bletchley's reading of the Italian navy's Enigma material helped Admiral Cunningham's Mediterranean fleet defeat the Italians at the Battle of Matapan. And in the autumn, the cryptanalysts broke ciphers used by Marshal Rommel's Panzer army, both within its own units and in communications with Rome and Berlin, giving the Allies an important advantage in North Africa.

By then the greatest threat to the Allied war effort came from attacks on their ship convoys in the North Atlantic. As a result, Bletchley's resources were concentrated on breaking Enigma codes used by German U-boats in this sphere of war. If the Allies could find out in advance where U-boats were hunting, they could direct their ships, carrying crucial supplies from North America, away from these danger zones.

A break-through came in March 1941, however, when the German trawler Krebs was captured off Norway, complete with two Enigma machines and the Naval Enigma settings list for the previous month. This allowed German Naval Enigma to be read, albeit with some delay, in April, by codebreakers at Bletchley.

In February 1942 the Germans hit back by introducing a new fourth wheel (multiplying the number of settings another 26 times) into their Naval Enigma machines. The resulting 'net' was known to the Germans as 'Triton' and to the British as 'Shark'. For almost a year Bletchley could make no inroads into Shark, and Allied losses in the Atlantic again increased alarmingly.

In December 1942 Shark was broken, but German innovations meant that the Allies had to wait until August the following year before Naval Enigma was regularly read again. By then the Americans were active combatants, providing much-needed computer power to Bletchley.

By how much did Ultra intelligence, gained from reading Enigma ciphers, shorten the war? Harry Hinsley, based at Bletchley during the war, suggests it was a significant asset. If it did not keep Rommel out of Egypt in 1941, it certainly did so the following year, by preventing him exploiting his victory at Gazala.

As General Alexander put it, 'The knowledge not only of the enemy's precise strength and disposition, but also how, when and where he intends to carry out his operations brought a new dimension to the prosecution of the war.'

The loss of Egypt in 1942 would have set back the re-conquest of North Africa and upset the timetable for the invasion of France. According to Hinsley, Overlord would probably have been deferred until 1946.

Enigma successes always needed complementing with other intelligence material, but the fact that the Allies kept Enigma secret until 1974 shows how much it meant to them.

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ULTRA vs. ENIGMA - Ian Cohen

http://cghs.dadeschools.net/normandy/deception/ultra_enigma.htm

ULTRA AND THE BATTLE OF NORMANDY

By February 1944, Ultra had worked with several Allied commanders, including Generals Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Patton-who used Ultra intelligence to "bust open the enemy every chance he had (Winterbotham, 122-123). This cooperation was essential to carrying out the Normandy invasion successfully.

In March 1943, Ultra discovered Hitler's plans for a secret weapon in the works called the V1 flying-bomb (what they found out about it, such as location of the test-sites and results, has not been revealed yet). By April 1944, Hitler was preparing launch sites on the French coast. Ultra intercepted Hitler's orders about establishing a headquarters near Amiens to control the V1 operation. The headquarters was named the 155th Flak Regiment. Colonel Siegfried Freiherr von Watchel was in command. That meant that "Overlord," the Normandy invasion, had to take place as soon as possible (Winterbotham, 119-121).

In May 1944, Ultra intercepted a message from Watchel to General Heinemann, commander of the LXVI Corps (and administrator of the V1 headquarters), saying that fifty sites on the French coast were ready. That meant the Allied attack could not take place any later than June. It was a smart move. On June 6th, D-Day, Watchel was ordered to launch an all-out offensive with the V1s on June 12 (Winterbotham, 121).

A dispute between Hitler and his top generals, during the spring of 1944, would end up providing the most important clue about the German defenses at Normandy. Rommel wanted his panzer divisions directly behind the beach defenses. Hitler, who trusted Rommel's judgement, went with his recommendation. But another general, Heinz Guderian, felt that the panzers would be wasted on the beaches. Hitler began to grow uncertain and suggested that the two generals talk it out. Guderian was backed up by General Geyr von Schweppenberg, who commanded the panzer group in France. Rommel adamantly refused to give in. He sent a message to Hitler, reinforcing his plans to have the panzer division behind the Normandy beaches. He felt that the superior Allied air power would severely hamper the movement of the tanks (Winterbotham, 125-127).

This gave everything away to Ultra. Rommel's message revealed the locations of the panzer division on the Normandy beaches. Although Ultra did not receive Hitler's response, now they knew what to be on the lookout for. Schweppenberg gave even more away when he personally asked Hitler to keep a majority of the panzers near Paris. Hitler's response (which was intercepted by Ultra this time) was to keep four divisions, the reserve forces, would remain where they were, as an assault force. This made Overlord easier for the Allies. If Hitler had moved these divisions to the beach, the Germans would have overwhelmed the Allies at Normandy (Winterbotham, 127-128).

Ultra set the stage for the Allied victory in Normandy. They had done their part. Now it was the soldiers' turn.

[ August 08, 2004, 07:31 AM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

[Red Fleet]

I have to agree with the opponents of Enimgma in SC2. It would add realism but would cost IMO too much gameplay and fun.

There would, in respect to the U-Boats, have been easy solutions against the code crackers of Bletchley Park. The German High Command of the U-Boats signalled just too much. Why not handing in the orders in a sealed envelope? And why the status reports of the U-Boats? It just made detection and destruction far easier.

The "player" would probably act this way. With the implementation of an Enigma feature it would just repeat the errors of the Germans in the war.

I´m reading John White´s "German U-Boat tankers 1941-45" in the momemnt. It was published in 1998, the enlarged German translation was published in 2000. I just have the latter, so there is not much use citing it here. It includes many details about Enigma, the chain-of-command of the U-Boat-leadership and, of course, about the tankers. It´s detailed and nice too read.

I really have to ask myself why German historians cannot write such good books....

[SeaMonkey]

Code Breaking will be in the game, albeit abstracted, through the revelation of units in cities and other undisclosed features. Read HC's developer notes, reference to intelligence and espionage.....SC2..."its in there"

[Retributar]

Correct me if im mistaken...and really...that seems to not be a problem here!. If Bletchly Park concentrated on the U-Boat threat above all other endeavors...then whynot give the convoys an occassional break?.

For example...plan for a convoy route...then do an 'ULTRA-CHECK' at a % cost...as it takes Human resources and time to do this...if you want to...to determine if U-Boats are awaiting in ambush on your selected route. Then for the Allied player to avoid heavy convoy losses...he could elect to cancel the convoy (At a cost of a % of MPP's) or reroute it at a greater % cost of the afore-chosen quantity of MPP's to transport...or he could go for broke (No MPP % cost) and hope that the computer dice will smile on his behalf and minimize or cancel the projected losses!.

This way...there is no Free-Lunch!...you make your bets and roll the dice!. Once you select to ship MPP's by convoy...you can't just back out of the Convoy-Run and avoid any penalties or cost if ULTRA or other dectection mean's reveal a U-Boat ambush.

So to restate...you either Cancel and pay a certain % of MPP's...or reroute at a greater cost of a % of MPP's ...or go for broke and take your chances!.

[JerseyJohn]

As Red Fleet points out, the German Navy throughout the war was obsessed with being in radio contact with Germany. It actually cost them the Bismarck when instead of just sailing for Brest and safety, Admiral Lutgens had to transmit a long rambling message to HQ even while the British were triangulating his position, no ultra, just simple triangulation of a transmission.

Instead of the one-sided argument that Enigma is broken because it was broken historically, the opposite argument is equally valid, that Germany used this device properly and their transmissions would therefore be absolutely secure!

Make the possibilities run both ways instead of slavishly repeating actual events.

[Retributar]

Your right about the Germanys obsession with radio contact with the U-Boat fleet and the blabbering's by Admiral Lutgens Jersey John...i agree with that,...but i don't have enough ENIGMA knowledge to know whether ENIGMA transmissions could be 'absolutely secure'.

From my previous postings...the information shows that the Germans introduced a 'fourth wheel' into the Cypher-Machine and so...from February 1942 to Dec 1942...it seems that the ENIGMA communications were relatively secure..."to my surprise!",...as i had read the book 25 years ago...and apparently forgot that part of the story,...i only remembered that it was quite effective overall.

At this point in time only the 'Battle of the Atlantic' was the big issue...and by the time ENIGMA transmissions were finally cracked again,...the Americans entered the war...and so now ENIGMA became important for the land campaigns!.

And yes. JJ i would prefer not to 'slavishly repeat historical events', although permit them to occur...but, not so as to be a necessity or a given in the game.

We already understand enough of WW2 to the point where we already have to a degree the advantage of having De-Cyphered the ENIGMA machine. If that is the case,...then we don't need to incorporate ENIGMA as it was historically.

[ August 08, 2004, 04:19 PM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

[JerseyJohn]

Retributar

Sounds reasonable to me. It would be very difficult to incorporate all the various aspects of code breaking and misinformation into the game. I'd like to see these things reflected, but in a way that the player or players can regulate from zero code breaking to full, where practically anything could be unexpectedly revealed.

We've had discussions in the past, I think Edwin came up with the idea of having an inteligence and counter-inteligence research area. I'm not sure if that went anywhere in SC2 development.

Incorporating it into a game is a hard call. As you said, it's difficult to say any system would have been absolutely secure. Enigma might have been except machines were periodically falling into Allied hands and there was also the careless handling of transmissions by operators.

[ August 08, 2004, 08:55 PM: Message edited by: JerseyJohn ]

[Edwin P.]

Here's an idea, that was mentioned before - allow each side to build Dummy Corps, say 2 units - for 25MPP each (even playwood tanks cost money). These units vanish if a land unit approaches within 2 hexes of them or they are attacked, but appear to be a normal unit to air units and to the Intelligence Screen.

As for intelligence tech in the current game, from my readings of this forum, it will allow you to see units that are in a city hex (TILE!) or adjacent to a city hex (TILE!).

No information on whether an enemy's Intel Tech Level will reduce your effective Intel Tech Level.

[winkelried]

Originally posted by arax3:

The German attack at Kursk was expected and anticipated by the Reds;

The operation "Zitadelle" was made known to the Soviets through their "normal" espionnage channels. I don't think that "ULTRA" played any significant role in this.

[Retributar]

winkelried...i know that ULTRA information was passed on to the Russians about the German Build-up at Kursk.

I just can't find any information on the internet to confirm it!.

All i have found are some vague references to ULTRA regarding Operation Zitadelle...nothing worth posting here!.

When and if i find that information...i will post it here!.

-----

No sooner hath i spoken and it is then revealed!.

http://zhukov.mitsi.com/Kursk.htm

From the Elite Forces of the Third Reich Website

http://www.forces70.freeserve.co.uk/index.htm

"The Russians without a doubt knew of the impending German offensive with the massive build up of German armor and troops around the salient and through their "Lucy" spy network in Germany and also from ULTRA codes intercepted by the British and passed on to Stalin."

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http://www.flamesofwar.com/article.asp?articleid=30

"German operations started on July 5. Unfortunately for them the Soviets were ready. Intelligence gathered from prisoners and Allied intelligence agencies (interceptions of German radio traffic decoded by the British "Ultra" operation) meant the Soviets were well prepared for the German offensive."

[ August 09, 2004, 08:19 AM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

[Red Fleet]

A side note:

In the already mentioned book by John White is written:

The German Navy and the U-Boats were supplied the same weather reports. The U-Boats coded by ENIGMA the Luftwaffe without coding. So while just ckecking the two reports it was a lot easier for Bletchley Park to construct the semi-automatic bombs for decoding.

The RAF had orders not to shoot down the German recon planes north of Scotland, because ULTRA needed the weather reports.

[JerseyJohn]

The Soviets acted on almost never trusted intelligence that was offered them by the Western Powers. They had the best spy system on earth and half the time they didn't even trust their own sourches!

[winkelried]

Retributar the main source was this guy Rudolf Roessler (alias LUCY). Ultra info was not really considered by Stalin. Although there is an interesting theory about Lucvy's ring being fed by Ultra information. Ultra :

"A most intriguing alleged, and still open, use of Ultra information may have been in the Lucy spy ring. This was an extremely well informed, and rapidly responsive, ring which was able to get information directly from the German General Staff Headquarters -- often on specific request. The allegation is that it was, in major part, a way for the British to get Ultra information to the Soviets in a way which appeared to have come from highly placed espionage, and not from cryptanalysis of German radio traffic. The Lucy ring was operated by, apparently, one man, Rudolf Roessler, and was initially treated with considerable suspicion by the Soviets when it began to operate. The information it provided was accurate and timely, and Soviet agents in Switzerland (including Alexander Rado, the director) eventually took it quite seriously"