Idea: Off-Map Japan & Diplomacy

[Shaka of Carthage]

Shaka of Carthage, what I am looking for is a historically possible way for the USA player to directly affect the conditions surrounding his entry into the war with diplomatic chits and to make the result somewhat unpredictable. Randomization of USA entry is already included in the game to a certain extent with Axis and UK actions affecting war readiness.

The method I propose would allow the USA player to effect their entry into the war, to a limited extent (ie no later than Dec 1941) if they are willing to take a calculated risk.

Thus American entry into the war can be affected by British, Axis and American actions.

Edwin,

Thats exactly my point. There is no way for the US player to affect the US entry into the war, without you modeling the Japanese. Thats outside the scope of a ETO game. The actions of the British and Germans had little relevance to the Japanese.

You also didn't understand my reference to randomly determining when the US enters. What I was referring to was an addition to the method currently used in SC. Something that would expand the probabilities of an earlier entry (or an later entry).

[Hubert Cater]

Pretty interesting ideas here as well but unfortunately at the moment there are no plans for this.

[Lars]

Originally posted by JerseyJohn:

Lars,

You're right, that never occurred to me. I don't remember ever reading about such an arrangement being considered. Do you think it had a chance of happening? Is there an historical basis for the idea?

I'm not asking those questions to be sarcastic, it would have been a great idea historically.

Generally the Japanese, at that time, didn't do things that way, which doesn't mean it couldn't have been done. The main problem was the shots were being called by either the army or the navy, and they never needed to think outside of their own warlike mentality.

I'd say Washington would definitely have put pressure on the UK to prevent any deal that would have circumvented the U. S. embargo, so it would have needed to be arranged in secret.

There's also oil in Asiatic Russia, I think this was known at the time and those fields were being worked. If so, it would also have made sense for the Japanese to have traded for it as part of their non-aggression pact.

Interesting possibilities.

The Tripartite Pact grew out of the Comintern Pact of 1936 which was aimed at the Soviets. Even though the Germans violated the agreement when they signed a separate secret deal with the Soviets, the Japanese decided to sign the Tripartite anyway. What the heck, the Germans were winning at that point and Japan was getting so military tech from the Germans.

And of course, the Japanese violated the Tripartite in spirit when they failed to declare war on France and Britain. Double dealing all around by all parties and not a very well run alliance.

For what they got out of it, the Japanese would have been better off to sign a iron clad deal with the Soviets over Manchuria to settle that issue, get Dutch oil by hook or by crook, continue with the Chinese invasion, and then dealt with whoever was left standing in Europe later.

But that's hindsight for you ;^)

[JerseyJohn]

Shaka,

I agree. I'm sure whether we've mentioned China or not, but looking back, FDR and his foreign office either had no idea what the Japanese were about, or they were trying their best to force a war! To me the American moves in the Pacific during 1940 and 41 are all but incomprehensible in light of the claims that it was Germany FDR was looking for a war with and not Japan. I believe he wanted a war with both, and go it.

In the Atlantic he also did his best to force the issue, but the American public had almost no reaction at all to two destroyers being sunk in action. The reaction must have jolted the administration, it was something like, "How come Navy destroyers were sent out on convoy duty? We aren't at war!" There was a similar reaction to two American gunboats having been bombed by the Japanese on Chinese rivers, something like, "Why are they there in the first place?"

America was solidly anti-war and FDR was convinced (probably rightly) that eventually we'd have to fight the Axis in both Europe and Asia.

In many ways I admire FDR, but I don't think we'll ever know what he was really thinking. He was too smart to have not understood that he was forcing Japan's hand.

People debunk this by making fun of conspiracy theories. Well, it's perfectly conceivable that he didn't intend to have Pearl Harbor attacked while at the same time doing his best to force a war with Japan.

[JerseyJohn]

Lars,

I agree 100%.

It isn't so much hindsight, I think what you're saying makes perfect sense. The problem was with the Japanese, they didn't have the same people running things from one month to the next, so it was impossible for them to keep a consistant diplomatic agenda in place.

Meanwhile the halfwit generals were making their own policy in Manchuria with the central government powerless to influence them -- was ever a goverenment of a major country so inept?

[Edwin P.]

JerseyJohn,

I agree with you, especially since the US government (the Army and Navy staffs in the Pacific at the very least) began preparing for a Japanese attack after the American Oil embargo was declared. I think that although the US government expected to be attacked they never expected that it would occur at Pearl Harbor as the documents below show:

http://www2.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/Sp1941-42/chapter4.htm - Interesting information on how washington begain preparing for a Japanese invasion of the Phillipines after Roosevelt ordered the oil embargo of Japan.

The President, meanwhile, had announced that he wanted trade with Japan put under a comprehensive controlling order by which he could at will reduce or increase oil shipments to Japan. On 26 July he issued an executive order from Hyde Park freezing Japanese assets in the United States and halting all trade with Japan. The American press welcomed the President's order as an "oil embargo," and as time went on without any export licenses for oil being issued, it became evident that, whatever Stark and Marshall may have believed the President was going to do, he had in fact imposed an embargo on shipments of oil to Japan. The Dutch and British also joined in freezing Japanese assets. On the assumption, then generally accepted, that Japanese oil reserves would give out near the end of 1942, it could be expected that Japan would shortly be forced to resolve any remaining internal disagreements on policy, between giving in or carrying out the planned offensive southward. 6

The Singapore Conversations

During the months immediately following the ABC -1 conversations it was not the planners in Washington but the Army and Navy staffs in the far Pacific that first took part in an effort to draw up an allied operational plan against the contingency of a Japanese attack. In April, as agreed between Stark and Marshall, on the one hand, and the British Chiefs, on the other, the British Commander in Chief, Far East, convened a meeting in Singapore of military representatives of the Netherlands, American, Australian, and New Zealand Governments for the purpose of devising such a plan under the terms of ABC-l. 7

The American-Dutch-British ( ADB ) meetings conducted in Singapore from 21 to 27 April were based on the following assumption

Our object is to defeat Germany and her allies, and hence in the Far Fast to maintain the position of the Associated Powers against Japanese attack, in order to sustain a long-term economic pressure against Japan until we are in a position to take the offensive.

[ April 01, 2005, 12:32 PM: Message edited by: Edwin P. ]

[JerseyJohn]

Edwin,

Great Going! :cool:

I've seen these things paraphrased very often but this is the best I've read on the subject. It cuts right to the chase.

The USA, for it's part, was plying so many angles to it that ultimately it failed completely to anticipate that either the Phillipines of the Hawaiian Islands were about to be attacked.

MacArthur was put on alert as a result of the earlier attack on Pearl and told to send his B-17s off to attack Japanese airfields at Formosa. Instead he withdrew for the remainder of the day (he did exactly the same thing when The North Koreans crossed the line eight years later!). When he emerged, Japanese bombers from those same Formosa fields were getting in a very late first strike at his own aircraft, destroying it on the ground.

The United States didn't yet have an effective espionage and OSS in place to handle such policies of deception, but the Roosevelt administration acted as though it had. What it amounts to is that the politicians were doing things inviting a war that they didn't want their own generals and admirals to be privy to!

And that's the real reason we had those initial fiascos, not because either Short or Kimmel were derelict in their duties, they made the correct moves based on the information they'd been given. Short was told to defend the Hawaiian Islands against attack -- obviously meaning an imphibious invasion. Nobody bothered to advise him about aircraft carrier capabilities. Kimmel was given similar vague and often misleading information -- the false alarms in late November didn't help much either.

Meanwhile, the U. S. was expecting a move they'd see coming far in advance, and sending the Pacific posts most likely to be attacked the second string equipment that wasn't good enough to be shipped to Great Britain.

Tragic from one end to the other.

[Shaka of Carthage]

Edwin and JerseyJohn, your last few posts on the subject are exactly to the point.

One bit to add to this, which may help explain why the US was focused on the Phillipines and not Pearl Harbor.

The mindset of the top ranking military officers of the day, was that aircraft could not sink naval ships. So when the US military looked at a map of the Pacific, the Phillipines was threatned because of its position along the Japanese sea lanes and its close proximity to Little China (ie Fr IndoChina). Pearl Harbor was "safe" from the viewpoint that the Japanese couldn't get thier capital ships (ie battleships) there, nor was Japan in a position to do an amphib landing on Pearl. The Japanese carriers were not considered a threat, since they were great for recon value, but where a nothing more than a nuisance otherwise.

So when the Japanese struck Pearl, like all peacetime Generals or Admirals (who really are more politicians than warriors), the first thing they did was cover thier rear. Thats why you have reports that Short and Kimmel screwed up.

[Edwin P.]

Shaka of Carthage, thanks for the background information. I never realized that this was the mindset of military officers of the day and how this effected their thoughts re: Pearl Harbor.

Since Sc2 will not have the proposed events in the initial release it looks like I will have to create a few interesting events to create this possiblity;

Random Event 5%, 1 in 20 games, for a Dec 1941 Event

Popup: "Japan agrees to American demands and withdraws from the Axis while announcing troop withdrawal from China" - USA war readiness declines by 20% and UK receives reinforcements from Asia as they no longer need to maintain a strong garrison in this region.

This scenario shows what could have happened if the Japanese agreed to American demands for lifting the oil embargo against them and did not attack Pearl Harbor.

This should be a relatively balanced option although the amount of decline in USA war readiness and the units that the UK receives will have to be adjusted after playtesting & historical research.

This event unexpectedly (only happens 1 in 20 games) switches the focus of the campaign from American entry into the war to Egypt where the British reinforcements will arrive. Thus, affecting both Allied and Axis strategic planning.

One question for the designers. If this event is triggered can the arrival of UK reinforcements to the Middle East be staggered over several turns? Example: Turn 1 - Popup announces event; Turn 2 - UK Battleship Fleet (Prince of Wales) arrives in Red Sea from Singapore; Turn 3 - 1st Australian Corps ( I Corps) Arrives in Egypt; Turn 6 - 2nd Australian Corps Arrives in Egypt; Turn 8 - 3rd Australian/New Zealand Corps arrives in Egypt.

[ April 03, 2005, 07:39 PM: Message edited by: Edwin P. ]

[JerseyJohn]

Shaka,

Interesting points about the perceived role of Aircraft Carriers at the start of WWII.

What makes it all the stranger is that throughout 1940 the British proved over and over that even the Mediteranean a fleet at sea without air cover was a huge disadvantage to one that had it. Mussolini felt aircraft carriers were unnecessary in the Mediteranean. He said, "Italy itself is our aircraft carrier!" An insight that ranks right beside his brilliant move of attacking Greece through rugged mountain passes with the roads flooded in October! Yeah, they had the element of surprise on their side, the Italian Army was surprised as hell when the orders were issued!

Regular admirals, even British, were always eager to downplay the role carriers played. In the Bismarck pursuit, for example, it was obsolete torpedo planes that disabled the great ships rudder and set it up for the kill. Yet, as it sat dead in the water, with torpedo planes already in the air, the British admiral sent a cruiser instead to administer the torpedo coups de gras. That was deliberate, he wanted the entire final action to be carried out by surface vessels with no mention of aircraft in the final report.

That was after the losses of capital ships to German aircraft off Norway, the "Italian Pearl Harbor" that took place at Taranto a year ahead of it's much more famous counter part (and using only a small number of obsolete swordfish!) and numerous other successful actions in which aircraft triumphed unassisted over surface vessels.

All of which goes to prove exactly how little peace time generals and admirals stay in touch with the actual developing technology of warfare. As you said earlier, they tend to be politicians in uniform.

The real officers emerge -- more correctly, are revealed -- when the shooting begins.

[Lars]

Random Event 50%, 1 in 2 games, for a Dec 1941 Event

Popup: "US decides it doesn't give a damn about Little Yellow People and tells the Japanese, "Have at it, there's only a billion of them!!!". Ships arms secretly to the Chinese on the side."

I like that one better. Ah, politics, ya gotta love it..

[JerseyJohn]

Lars

To quote that old Hawaiian Punch commercial, Thanks, I needed that!