Finding the Enemy

[Guest Pillar]

Posted by Jason Cawley:

I start out by noticing one unmentioned issue in this whole discussion - the difference between tactical recon (or less flamboyantly, finding out where the enemy is in CM games) - on the offense and on the defense. Some things may remain the same, but many things change, in my opinion. I am one who believes that the largest edge the defender has is the sighting differential that a properly planned defensive scheme can help bring about, and I also have forcefully expressed my belief that the defender must manuever, indeed can't afford to remain stationary.

The defender has fewer forces to play with. Losses matter relatively more. An OP line set up along the lines of historical doctrine can use up a quarter of a defender's force in a small engagement. The danger of the attacker coming on warm-place for leather is greater, and if the defense is scattered (including front-to-back) and that occurs, the result can be defeat in detail even with fine information on enemy routes of advance, etc. These constraints do not operate on attackers, in the same way anyway.

The attacker has, in principle, a greater appetite for information and can spare men to go get it. He cannot always spare time to get it and to react to it in other than minor ways. But e.g. a probing wave and a reserve, then backing success, is a standard tactic. The weight of the two things can be varied, and that may by one of the "control knob" variables involved in your scouting ideas.

An example - everything is better with examples instead of abstractions. In Valley of Trouble, which I presume everyone has played because it is one of the demo fights, the U.S. has a sum total of five infantry platoons. 3 starting rifle, 1 starting engineer, and 1 reinforcement. The reinforcement must act as a reserve, that is obvious. The deployment boxes prevent grouping the entire force, and time it not unlimited. The realistic options for "up" vs. "back", therefore, are 2 up 3 back, 3 up 2 back, or 4 up 1 back. Otherwise put, the U.S. can hold one, or two, of his starting platoons in reserve, or he can send all four in the "first wave".

The benefit of additional platoons held back is, of course, that the lay of the defense can be mapped out somewhat before the axis of advance of these platoons is decided upon.

The natural balance to me seems to be 3 up and 2 back, and that is what I used the first time I played it. It worked OK, but I sent the engineer platoon as one of the "ups" (the center one), and it might have been better as the additional reserve platoon. The reason I sent it is that I wanted them not only to scout, but to eliminate obstacles if possible, along the line of advance I expected to use as my main avenue, if it was clear enough.

I did have an overall initial plan. Rather than commit nowhere until after a recon, I decided on the basis of terrain analysis to make the initial main effort of wide left hook. This advance was made by two platoons, infantry on the outer part of the hook and the engineers on the inner part; one of the Sherman 105s supported the outer, infantry platoon.

The other platoon designated "up" was conducting a sort of recon, pretty much exclusively. It was not expected to charge and seize some objective, but only to probe - but to do so as a platoon. Its job was to either serve as a diversion and cause confusion about my main effort, or if the enemy reacted to my main effort correctly, to find a weak spot for a secondary effort.

Since I had 2 other infantry platoons and a flock of tanks present or on the way, that seemed like an eminently flexible plan. Yes I had chosen an axis of advance. If things proceeded well along it, I could commit to it all of my armor and 80% of my infantry by half-way through the battle. If enemy reactions made that a poor choice, I would have probed for weak spots elsewhere, and could throw at such a weak spot almost all of my armor and more than half of my infantry.

Now, just exactly what am I going to get in the way of greater flexibility, by *not* choosing that first axis of advance? If I send only 2 up, then I am probing everywhere, broad-front recon. I commit to nothing, and presumably do not reveal anything about axes of advance. But in return, at the pointy end I've got 90 guys, and the Germans have an entire company defending the valley. I can ID positions and arty them, sure. But I am not going to secure anything more, really.

Whereas, with the choice I made, I had a Sherman 105 and two infantry platoons more or less on line (the engineers not entirely free to manuever because of pillbox observation zones, it is true), when I ran into the German's right flank platoon in a patch of woods. I easily shot the heck out of them. Then the Sherman 105 easily blasted a log MG bunker. The German right flank was then gone, and I could turn the line of pill boxes, and as planned threaten to attack south rather than east - or both.

The Germans committed their reserve of course, and the opening stages did not decide the whole battle. The point is simply that the natural seeming 3-2 preserved great flexibility while also allowing enough up front to overwhelm a single-platoon German position. Whereas, a 2-3 long recon beforehand, would not have appreciably increased total flexibility in my opinion, while it would have reduced my ability to blast my way through the German right flank position rapidly and cheaply.

Do you agree? Is 3-2 the obvious way to go in "Valley of Trouble", from the standpoint of your recon ideas? It might help if you explain exactly how you play "Valley of Trouble" as the U.S., and especially how you to the recon.

I agree with your distinction between recon on the offensive vs. recon on the defensive. The defender can trade terrain for information, the attacker must gain terrain to do recon.

As for the control knob aspect, the force ratios, I use less than you for recon. I don't have a set ratio, I just use the least amount of men possible to cover the necessary terrain that needs to be spotted.

What I see in your Valley of Trouble example, is what was intended to be a reconaissance turning into a full attack simply because the recon was so strong it broke through the enemy defense. If I used your tactics and my recon had met a strong enemy resistence, I would only have two platoons (plus the other recon platoon in whatever sector the committed in) to attack the enemy with. If the recon platoon in said sector took heavy casualties due to something as simple as that 150mm infantry gun, then I might only have *two* platoons to carry out the attack with.

Instead, I think the same things can be accomplished using only one or two platoons in the recon role in this scenario. True I will probably not break through anywhere in my reconaissance (unless a significant enemy weakpoint is found) BUT I will break through in whichever sector I finally do decide to attack on, since my main body is at almost full strength.

For me, the point of the recon is to find enemy resistance and leave any break through to the main body. If they get a breakthrough it probably won't be anything to do with their own combat capability, but rather enemy weakness. When you said "I can ID positions and arty them, sure. But I am not going to secure anything more, really", I reply "Exactly!"

One other point: The recon doesn't have to spot all the enemy positions to be useful. I just learned this recently. If you get a good idea what the superficial enemy disposition is, terrain analysis and enemy capabilities can fill in the rest and give you a good idea where things are.

So to take the standard METT-T analysis and adapt it to what I like to do, you'd get MRETT-T, with the R being Tactical Broad Reconaissance.

Another topic that may be of interest to this discussion is the duality of the recon forces which I propose. That is, that reconaissance forces should also be highly mobile security and surgical units which can both stop enemy recon forces (or hinder them) and counter attack enemy rear areas. What do you think of that idea?

- Pillar

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 01-27-2001).]

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

OK, that does help me to get a much clearer sense of your preliminary recon ideas. It would have been nice to have an example in the level of detail of "the scout platoon HQ went here, and its first squad split and went there, ...", but I understand your meaning.

As for my approach being a "recon that turned into an attack because it was strong enough", that is sort of right, except that it was not a "turning into" really, because it was the point and plan all along. Call the initial 2-platoon+tank left hook a recon in force if you like. To me it was my main effort, but I was retaining the flexibility to shift my main effort elsewhere in the form of a reserve.

The point about the possible losses to from e.g. a gun, to me support my approach a bit more than yours. Wouldn't the loss of a half-squad or two tend to create a hole in your recon screen? Perhaps you don't care, you've found the enemy in that case. But if the loss is at range (like the gun example, typically, in VoT) then you lose a bit of time getting a replacement 1/2 squad to a missing, assigned "scouting route".

What actually happened with the gun on my first outing, was that it saw the trailing men of the engineer platoon, and blew up their MMG and zook for not running previously. Then the 105mm off-map artillery nailed it. The actual squads and the HQ in the engineer platoon were untouched. The platoon had lost some of its capabilities, but was still recognizably a platoon on the attack (as with demo charges, still had some remedial AT capability - the result could have been worse to a rifle platoon).

But those are minor points. I want to discuss your "recon thin, big reserve" idea, still in the context of the attack. One obvious difference to me is that your approach ought to be more vunerable to enemy use of an OP line than my way. It also may be more susceptible to defender deception and manuever, in certain ways. I will explain.

If the defender string out a line of OPs - half-squads and 2-3 man MG teams and snipers - then your recon guys, "as few as needed to cover the terrain", will run into and find these OPs. In the nature of the case, they generally will not find holes, since you don't have to leave holes in a screen that thin. They might find mispositioned defenders, or places covered only by mines, certainly. But an OP line across the frontage is not going to leave areas of pure "air", uncovered by their fire. Simple enough.

And when your scouting half-squads find the enemy OP line, they are unlikely to shoot their way through it. Indecisive skirmishing is the likely immediate result. You might call down your arty on his "identified positions", but those wind up being tiny units either in their forward foxholes, or in cover farther forward even than those, to which they then presumably retire (if shelled I mean).

But the enemy main positions, the places he has actual platoons in command-control and mutual-support distance from one another, and is thus thick enough on the ground he is either in this place or that place, in this "defender uses OPs" case, remains largely hidden to your half-squad scouts. Those positions are screened, and moreover they may change from the time your scouts ID any of them or allow you to deduce any of them, and the time your attack arrives.

Compare scouting by full platoons with a full squad on point, the rest in overwatch a ways behind, OK? When I run into half-squad positions, those are going to skedaddle or they are going to die. I am not going to stop for OP screens. One MG on a flank is not going to stop the recon advance until arty plasters it. I expect to find the enemy's main positions, because only main positions are going to make me slow down. They will probably hurt my point squad and make it withdraw too, but it will be supported after it gets into its first really heavy firefight, right away.

Now, it seems to me this can become something of a "head game". If you scout "thin" with half-squads, I want OPs across my front and flexible main positions well behind. It is true there is not always room for this in some set-up scenarios, but usually there is. The "affair of outposts" will then eat up some of your time on the clock, not really tell you where my main positions are, and perhaps you will kill a couple of half-squads with whole fire missions. I'll take that; good deal for the defender.

Compare what happens with an OP line vs. the platoon-and-point approach. Not all of the OPs are going to be run into. The ones that are, are going to run, and some of them won't make it and will get killed. The enemy will know there is a platoon here, and a platoon there. He gets info on the attack, certainly. But that is because there is one, if you get my meaning. His OPs get driven in, and he still certainly does not know which probing platoon is going to have the final main effort behind it - because the attacker doesn't even know that yet, and has a reserve.

I can see only one real weakness to the platoon-and-point approach compared to the lots-o-little long recon, based on the above analysis. The platoon-and-point approach gives the defender better potential targets for his artillery or mortars. His OPs give him information on possible lines of advance, which may have been obvious to him from terrain alone. But he also has the more solid info that "there is a platoon in those woods", which is a target. I don't think this is a great drawback, especially if the platoon-and-point group can keep moving.

Now, lets compare what happens if the defender *doesn't* use an OP line, and instead stages elaborate ambushes with his main forces, does not strng forward much in the way of scouting positions, then clams up until anybody gets close. Then either method will find him. Yours may find gaps between his ambush positions or around his flanks more easily. If he isn't using "hide" orders and exercising fire discipline, then your way may even spring his ambushes prematurely, for trivial cost to you, and then let you dump arty all over him. And if he does, you may run right over him, and at least find a squad or two (one squad, if he knows what he is doing and sneaks a tasked-squad out to bushwack a prying team that is set to literally walk over them). He might also shift to secondary positions, but then you've certainly accomplished something for little more than time.

In the ideal case for your method, a defender uses main position ambushes without OPs ahead and then has poor fire discipline and shoots the first thing that comes into sight, and moreover does not move around but sits in place to shoot it out. There is no question such a defense is extremely vunerable to light recon, then combined artillery pasting plus flanking efforts by a main force reserve.

Let's look at how platoon-and-point works against such a defense. A platoon directions might find an actual hole, but the defender has chosen his ambush zones trying to predict attacker avenues of advance. That is the usual defenders vs. attackers "head game", but there is no doubt the defender has the edge at it. If 2-3 platoons are probing in different areas, the likely outcome is that one finds the backside of an ambush position (meaning, finds men without entering the ambush zone), while another walks into an ambush zone.

Again, fire discipline will matter here. If he shoots early vs. PnP, he will at best nail and more likely break the point squad, and get little else. He then gets into a firefight with the rest of the platoon, with an initial edge certainly. Both sides dump arty on each other. Meanwhile, when a PnP finds the backside of an ambush, instead of one squad coming out and waylaying them, it gets into a firefight on even terms. Then the attacker sees which is which and backs the guys doing better, with his reserve.

But if the defenders get lucky on PnPs entering the zones, or do a good job with fire discipline and catch an entire platoon, not just the point, in such a zone, then the defense can work much better against PnP. They can break a platoon, and since that is forward and the reserves would rather go to the place that is doing well, that may overrun the broken guys and wipe them out to a man. Sometimes a less experienced attacker will even be tempted to reinforce failure, and send a reserve to protect a broken platoon and get it out of danger, which can wind up defusing the overall attack via one successful ambush.

So, what is the upshot of all of the above, on PnP vs. broad many-little recon approaches? That it comes down to a head game with the defender. Like paper-scissors, in a certain sense. If the attacker picks "broad, many-little" and the defender picks "use OPs", the attack gains little and loses time. If the attacker picks "broad, many-little" and the defender picks "main ambush zones", then the attacker can do very well. If the attacker chooses "PnP" and the defender chooses "use OPs", then the attacker will do very well, overrunning OPs as well as finding the enemy. If the attacker chooses "PnP" and the defender chooses "main ambush zones", then the attacker could do poorly.

Each recon tactic has its counter. Each counter idea has difficulty handling the kind of recon that is best against it, but can try things to adapt. E.g. OPs can rapidly run from scouting "PnPs", or call down arty on them. While ambush defenders can e.g. go to secondary positions, bushwack intruding scouts before they reach the ambush zone, or exercise tight fire discipline, against a thin recon.

I hope this is interesting.

[Guest Pillar]

Jason,

This sounds *so* familiar to me I remember having this same debate with myself a few months back for the exact same reasons! My broad-thin recon wasn't being supported properly and hence I ran into the dillemma you have illustrated beautifully in your post -- half squads unsupported get killed by OPs.

So to start off, we are in complete agreement on that point. Your analysis is commendable.

So the next point then obviously to tackle is to try and find a way to take advantages of both and combine them. The force-efficiency (economics) of using half squads with and the supportive firepower of "PnP" would make a great recon method, right? Less artillery targets for the enemy in a given concentration, more firepower on the enemy SRE or OPs.

What it comes down to is our previous lengthy debate on the concept of "mass".

What I do to solve the problem and attempt to get the best of both worlds, is while I use split squads they *support* one another AND I support the recon with overwatch from my main body.

For a specific example, check out the Open Terrain AAR by Fionn. In it he uses split squad reconaissance supported by a small vehicle (Panzer III), plus artillery, plus long-range DF HE from MBT's. There you have firepower "mass" with a nicely spread out recon force.

Even against enemy OP's I've managed to smash through them. Nothing short of the MLR or a heavily supported OP is going to stop this recon from moving forward. Even if he drops artillery, the physical dispersion of half-squads (another advantage of not using a fully formed platoon) makes this negligable, while still maintaining the exact same amount of firepower a full platoon would be able to offer.

To summarize: Same amount of guns. Less physical concentration, and hence less platoons needed to screen a front, meaning more men for the main body.

I'm glad you've given me the opportunity to go through this and really clarify what I have in mind when I talk about "broad front tactical recon"... It seems to be a highly misunderstood topic.

So what next?

I could talk about the only method I know of that beats this kind of broad-based yet highly massed firepower reconaissance if you like... Though I alluded to it heavily in my Defense Article. (MOBILITY!)

Looking forward to your thoughts on how a defender might handle it.

PS -- I know you'd like some specific detailed examples. As soon as I get home tonight I'll fire up CM and work through some, and then post what happened for you. Sorry I can't do this sooner.

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 01-27-2001).]

[JoePrivate]

I think, Pillar, it appears to be a misunderstood subject because you seem to be saying contradictory things, to me anyway. Your clarifications regarding supporting your recon with your main body seem to confirm what ScoutPl and others have said before, ie you are simply conducting an attack. Your distinctions may very well be 'doing' the same things after all.

1. Your main body can't be everywhere at the same time to support your broad-front recon platoons. You *must* have selected initial avenues of approach to begin with and pre-committed to them.

2. You say you will break through in whatever sector your recon discovers to be weak, however there is very little room for the attacker to adjust his attack laterally in a typical CM game. There is usually not enough time, the terrain does not always favor such movements and the defender will probably have a better sighting picture and will 'see' your move in advance.

3. You mention mobilty as a method for the defender to counter the attacker, yet a properly thought out attack will negate that. The attacker has the advantage of planning where he will attack and when, he has enough assets to isolate a portion of the map with direct and indirect fire, stopping any significant mobility on the defenders part. You mention also the tactic of conducting a pre-emptive or spoiling attack by the defender, unless the attacker is sloppy in security then this is a large gamble for little payoff, IMO.

4. No where do I recall you mentioning deception, from my experience it is the *key* element for both sides as good tactics are a given between two experienced players which leads me to...

Jason wrote:

That it comes down to a head game with the defender. Like paper-scissors, in a certain sense.

I agree 100% that is the case between two equally skilled opponents. Against a weak opponent just about anything can work. My thoughts for the evening....

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

If the entire attacking force can "overwatch" the entire defending position, then you can "scout" with old ladies using walkers. But such a "defense" position is pretty darn dumb, and rare (outside of unusual terrain locations, like deserts, and even in that case it isn't that simple because deserts are neither completely flat, there is dust and haze, etc).

Defenders want locations in which the body of their force is hidden from LOS - reverse slope deployments or generalizations thereof. Scouting would not be an issue at all, if regardless of formation, every important weapon in the attacker's force could fire at any defender's location. The fact that terrain breaks up the battlefield into regions of differential sighting, is the whole reason such things matter in the first place.

So I hardly think your "example" says very much. Sure, aim every gun at the defender's head, then send grandma (or an empty truck) up to say "boo" (an old gamey item from Panzerblitz BTW). This is not difficult. It is hardly an attack, or a battle.

But it will not work when the Germans have their line of SMG squads one layer of buildings back in the village, and 5 meters lower, with the crestline within Panzerfaust range. Then grandma dies at the crest line, nobody else has LOS to the shooter, and the artillery rounds fall among stone buildings with little effect.

That doesn't mean many-few recon may not still work in that more realistic case. It well might. But it will not work simply because "the whole force is in overwatch", by a wave of the magic wand, because the ground is flat as a pool table and the defenders somehow hadn't noticed.

To actually overwatch the areas that a forward, scouting unit can see and thus be seen from, generally requires manuevering forward oneself, often quite close to the scouting unit. And one has to decide which one, or by reserve placements, which ones after how long a delay (with the number of choices going up with the delay).

But one certainly does not have the option of being in overwatch locations for every scouting unit at once, with the entire force. If one did, then the scouting would be practically unnecessary, since by construction the whole force can already see everything.

[Guest Pillar]

Joe,

I emailed you to try and help you out regarding how I might support a recon and how a lateral shift might be accomplished.

I didn't want to post a lenghty response here since I seem to be coming to a consolidation with Jason, and I don't want that to get off-topic.

- Pillar

[ScoutPL]

Pillar, for a good example of what Jason is talking about, go back and read my Infantry in the Attack tutorial. I'm saying the same things (with pictures), that he is in this discussion. Which also happens to be what the US infantry school teaches, FM 7-8, 7-10. Plan your attack on what you know (as little as it may be) but put some flexibility into it and be prepared to fight hard when you engage the enemy. Put good security out to your main effort's front and flanks and GO! If you understand how to maneuver your sub units correctly so that they are always mutually supporting and have constant overwatch then you should have the mass to handle anything you run into, including (surprisingly enough) your main objective! I'd also like to know if when you're "experimenting" if you use realistic combined arms force TO&E's or if your forces look like a hodge podge of the best and brightest, like Fionn's usually do.

Also I'd be interested in hearing what sorta "feel" for the battlefield you'd get with your broad front recon on my defense tutorial. By pushing forces toward gaps I think you'd end up having to fight through the first BP just because its the only route for vehicles. Then you might try to push dismounts through the central woods, but they would get chewed up on the other side by dug in infantry and a reserve counterattack. That would leave you massing against the gaping hole on the north side, which happens to be my main effort's engagement area. By following your reinforce success model, you would first divide your forces (losing the combined arms aspect), then risk losing most of your combat power in an area that I hoped you would come into. Not very successful. Actually the AI often attacks like this. It moves forces to the flanks of any strong resistance it encounters, particularly obstacles (both natural and man-made) and ends up getting its butt handed to it.

If you can come off your morale high ground for a little while to answer these points I promise not to tell you what I'm really thinking when I respond next time. I'd hate to let you think I'm oversensitive or overreacting. I actually lost sleep over your last post.

Great posts Jason. You come across as a man whose done some writing before and demonstrate a maturity in your thinking that most of us surely lack.

[Guest Pillar]

Jason,

But it will not work simply because "the whole force is in overwatch", by a wave of the magic wand, because the ground is flat as a pool table and the defenders somehow hadn't noticed.

Correct. And the only way to support recon is often with light artillery and MG's, and on the attack this includes light armored vehicles. There is almost never going to be a situation where your whole force can support your recon, at least not after the first phase line. (Usually a tree line)

Especially in wooded terrain, one must make sure not to spread out ones recon teams too far from one another that they cannot coalesce to form a potent fighting unit when the enemy is found.

And indeed, there are rare situations where the terrain is so damn close (like forested mountain regions) where you might not want to spread out even beyond normal platoon regions and normal squad composition. In this case, you just have to use more men in the recon role and keep the patrols in tight with one another.

What I meant by "Same amount of guns" wasn't the whole battalion, I just meant the same amount of guns in the platoon. I like my recon squads to be able to support one another, *or*, be able to recieve support from heavier units in the rear, or both.

Did you not think the Open Terrain AAR was demonstrating that?

- Pillar

[Epée]

Anybody got Diplomacy, by Hasbro?

I really love the board game, but honestly, can artificial intelligence get any worse than that on this game? No wonder Squad Leader (also by Hasbro) failed so miserably at even resembling anything fun and enjoyable.

Gamespot gave it a review score of 4.0. But wait, just checked out the score for Battlecruiser 3000: 2.6

here is an excerpt:

"We will probably never know. Battlecruiser 3000 A.D. is now out, and as one of the games with the longest development periods in computer history (seven years), it will go down in legend as the most bug-ridden, unstable, unplayable pieces of software ever released. (And, yes, I'm counting Falcon 3.0 and Patriot.)"

Seems I was lucky to bypass this one completely!

Epee

[Beer_n_Pretzels]

Pillar and JC,

Very valid theoretical and practical discourse about recon in the CM environment. Throw in ScoutPL's excellent infantry Attack Tutorial and this thread is liquid gold. However I have two contributions, so I hope you don't mind this intrusion. Firstly, I feel the goal of recon in CM is not only to provide information for your side but also, with full fog or war, to misinform your opponent of your strength and intentions. Secondly, Playing CM against a human opponent is a match of psychology as well as who has the better doctrinal 'toolkit' to counter unexpected situations.

PLAYER PSYHCOLOGY AND DOCTRINE

Player psychology is understanding that your opponent may have:

1. an affinity for a certain type of unit (ie. Panthers) or

2. or be demoralised by a certain situation (ie. last tank is lost)

3. or react to a particular action. (ie. showing some artillery 'teeth' by bombarding an infantry platoon in a supposedly safe hide).

This can, and must be exploited to achieve victory.

For example, The loss of powerful tanks or artillery spotters is one situation where an inexperienced player may throw in the towel. Experienced players are more likely to accept the loss, assess the situation, and either reduce the mission objective or change the mission.

At the doctrinal level, adapting to unexpected change, and battle casualties in particular is one part of an experienced CM player's toolkit. IMHO Recon is not an end in itself, but the means to achieving the mission with the forces at hand. Both broad front and narrow front recon (a gross simplification of your excellent discourse) are valid in certain situations. I define broad front recon as the committment of split squads across a wide area with the minimum of support. I define narrow front recon as committing platoon or company strength force along a small part of the front with plenty integral support.

Broad front recon provides the best chance of discovering enemy postions and intentions across the whole front. In this way a commander, each turn, can collate information from multiple sources and assess the threat potential to achieving the mission objective. The commitment of reserves, artillery or smoke may then be committed to eliminate or neutralise the threat. The disadvantage of broad front recon is that forces are committed piecemeal and may be eliminated before significant intelligence is gained.

In contrast, the role of narrow front recon is to test part of the suspected enemy line and commit to an attack, either by itself or with the commitment of reserves. However an additional advantage of narrow front recon can be composed of a combined arms force that can provide mutual support. The disadvantage of narrow front recon is that in most CM games lots of artillery is available and that a narrow front recon would be an inviting target.

RECON = INFORMATION AND MISINFORMATION

I find it useful to look at a battle from your opponents side of the map. Your opponent may see a unit with the label Infantry?, then a Mortar? and AT Infantry? I suspect that an inexperienced player may believe that this is a full American platoon. However, it maybe a split squad, a mortar and a bazooka. Is this worth calling in an artillery mission?

I suspect that with a broad front recon effort, your opponent would see a lot of infantry figures or symbols across the whole front. Until they can positively identified, they are multiple threats. In contrast to a narrow front advance your opponent sees the threat to one part of his line and can act to counter it. However could be used as a diversion, while another narrow front recon is the real attack.

I hope you accept my apology that my contribution to this thread is a gross simplification of the well-argued concepts by Pillar and JC. If you want my humble opinion (instead of fence sitting) then the Narrow front recon is more realistic, but the broad front recon is more likely to win you more games. The value of the broad front recon is that you will get more information quicker without the need to make part of your force an inviting artillery target.

cheers

BnP

[ScoutPL]

BnP, the easiest way to avoid the problem with "narrow front recon" in CM is decide with your opponent before hand (if you're playing a QB) to set realistic limits on arty purchases. Say, one or two mortar observers per rifle company and maybe two arty observers if you have a bn on the field. This kind of scarcity in arty assets is much more realistic to the time period. The other way around it is to find a scenario designer who designs realistic scenarios and just play them. Players who show up on the board with a tank platoon, a rifle platoon and 4 indirect fire observers, are just taking advantage of the game, rather then trying to play it real. I know many find that more rewarding, but it is possible to play a good realistic game and have fun too!

[Guest Pillar]

The disadvantage of narrow front recon is that in most CM games lots of artillery is available and that a narrow front recon would be an inviting target.

One 81mm offmap battery, and maybe an MG or a single squad of infantry (SRE) is enough to stop a platoon operating narrow in the recon role.

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 01-28-2001).]

[Wisbech_lad]

I know that this was debated ad infinitum, but:

Broad front:

Did squads have two radios? (i.e. should a split squad be able to report back decent recon...) Purely personal view, I think it is taking advantage of CM spotting and LOS coding.

The "thin broad front" recon doctrine is scaled down from Russian Divisional doctrine. I've seen no evidence that a Russian Co. or Bn. level attack/ defence would use a thin line of skimishers in this same way - (in fact their horrendous losses in Chechnya and Afganistan argue the opposite, at a tactical level they are going straight into very defendible territory with tanks and APC's first, and no dismounted infantry scouting ahead)

What I'm trying to say is that you are able to use CM "foibles" to recreate on a tactical scale, with a split squad, what the Russians are doing by using whole recon companies and platoons working together, with the full C&C network, at an operational level.

The fact that CM allows a split squad (or single scout car) the same information gathering strength (on a tactical lvl) as a BDRM or Humvee recon platoon (on a operational level) has led to an operational level doctrine being used at a tactical level (and very effectively IMHO) Guess we'll have to wait for relative spotting to sort this out.

Must admit broad front usually wins in CM, but not convinced we are getting close to reality as BTS would like... (If only the Allies had sent split squads running and zig zagging from likely ambush spot to likely ambush spot Market Garden would have been a huge success...)

On another issue. In "Real Life" do platoon commanders assume the same position as mine always seem to do in CM (i.e. sitting the length of the command radius behind the squads) or does the "command team" attach itself closely to a squad?

[Guest Pillar]

The "thin broad front" recon doctrine is scaled down from Russian Divisional doctrine. I've seen no evidence that a Russian Co. or Bn. level attack/ defence would use a thin line of skimishers in this same way - (in fact their horrendous losses in Chechnya and Afganistan argue the opposite, at a tactical level they are going straight into very defendible territory with tanks and APC's first, and no dismounted infantry scouting ahead)

And they learned hard from that, didn't they?

There is nothing unrealistic about a platoon spreading out to conduct reconaissance.

The game mechanics of "split squads" might be adding confusion. Don't think of it as split squads, just think of it as the man to man, shoulder to shoulder distance of the men in the recon platoon being spread out.

Instead of Normal Platoon: ***

Recon platoon: * * *

With each star being a man.

Or similarly, read Jason Cawleys post on Platoon OP's and just imagine it being a little more spread out.

Broad front recon is really just many route recons.

[Wisbech_lad]

Pillar,

Yes, but surely only one man in a WW2 squad (or even platoon?) would have a radio. So yes, your 30 men are advancing on a broader front, (say 150m across) and as a group are more likely to spot something or draw fire, but that means the individual who spotted the enemy is going to be further way (on average) to the man with the can? This is going to make early war CM doubly difficult to simulate, where many tanks don't have radios, and many armies relied still on runners or fixed links. Plus many troops green/ conscript - will be very difficult to alter plans!

At the CM level your idea of "highly mobile surgical & security units" (elite/ Vet gerbil units perchance) as recon, is a great idea, but, again, taken from a higher level of doctrine, where recon battalions/ companies as a whole are normally seen as highly mobile, have special equipment (armoured cars, light tanks) & are trained for the role. NATO had tripwire forces up close to the Iron curtain for exactly that reason, buy some time, disrupt the Warsaw Pact timing and try and work out which 3rd Shock Army is headed.

But in CM scale, you are either fighting with an entire mechanised recon unit essentially as your main force, or you have a plain vanilla line TO&E. It would be very rare (for example) for a line battalion/ company commander to have one platoon specialised as "rangers", if anything he would be careful to rotate platoons on point for morale and fatigue reasons

One problem may be time scales. Recon patrols would be sent out before the attack to check out likely enemy locations, route recon etc. (remember in real life you don't have a detailed map...) But said patrol would return back with that info, and commander would plan his attack based on it, rather than acting as skirmish line and being followed straight away by an attack minutes later (as happens in CM) Probably more realistic for an operation, where you can simulate a recon element entering first, followed up by the main body (A Day in the Cavalry is like this), rather than a single battle.

Off topic, Don't think the Russians learned anything from Chechnya, it was a bad example, as a thinly spread recon team in an urban area wouldn't work due to the C&C difficulties (unless they check behind every window, a disciplined RPG team will wait for the tanks, and use snipers to pick off the infantry/ officers). What did the US learn from Hue/Aachen, or the Russians from Berlin apart from plaster the place with arty, then some more, then accept lots of you will die? Or just don't bother and go around the city.

[Guest Pillar]

Well considering all members of the platoon can see one another (or at least a good portion), it isn't unreasonable to suggest that the platoon HQ might have a radio to transmit findings.

Yes, I see your point about force limitations. Indeed there aren't always the right circumstances to have an aggressive 'active' SRE. Sometimes it is just better to go with standard OP's like the ones Jason described in the other thread....which is why I think it's such a great thread.

I'm not going to change my mind anytime soon on the value of broad recon. I do however recognize that different terrain and different force assets means going about the methodology differently.

I'll even go so far as to say that sometimes a broad front recon comes after an initial seizure of land. For example, if you have a forested approach and an open approach, with an all foot battalion, you will obviously try and take the forested area simply for deployment purposes. There is no sense sending a recon platoon across the open ground knowing it's just going to be killed by MG fire.

In this case, you would simply have a security screen and as Scout has said "go for it". The broad front recon would come AFTER you had seized the necessary terrain and had some decisions to make.

But that isn't usually the case. Usually right from deployment there are many different AOA's available. Even a platoon of regulars can help immensely in the decision.

Ideally, as you point out, I would have a whole specialized recon company at my disposal, but in CM's usual scale I simply don't. This is why it is crucial to any army that all dismounts have some rudimentary reconnaissance training so that the commander has that added flexibility.

- Pillar

[Beer_n_Pretzels]

QUOTE]Originally posted by ScoutPL:

Players who show up on the board with a tank platoon, a rifle platoon and 4 indirect fire observers, are just taking advantage of the game, rather then trying to play it real.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

One MG or one squad will not stop a single platoon conducting recon by the point-and-platoon method. And 81mm mortar barrage will certainly mess up a platoon, on recon or not, if it hits them. But they are not going to slow down until something stops them, and one squad or one MG will not do it. If you call a mortar mission on them sans LOS from the FO, you will be walking the shells up and hoping you've got the right place.

As for the issue of the realistic amount of artillery support, the number of light mortar FOs (3 inch or 81mm) that is realistic, is 1, for any unit of battalion size or smaller. That FO is firing the battalion mortars. That is why they are always available, more or less. But the battalion does not have two mortar batteries.

The number of additional FOs that is realistic, if paid for I mean, is 105mm battery for the Americans for any size battle, and for others only more in battalion-level engagements. Then the Brits should have 25 lber, and the Germans may take 120mm mortar or 105mm artillery. The Germans may also take 75mm artillery or 150mm rockets (only those ones, though), realistically. When a full battalion is present, the Americans might swing a second battery of 105mm.

To make those limits more flexible, one might simply cap the number of FOs at 3 for the US and 2 for the others, with only one the light mortar variety, and the other(s) taken from the common varieties mentioned above. Incidentally, it is my opinion that these common types are the most effective anyway.

In CM, the 4.2 inch mortars are popular on the Allied side, but in fact those were fairly rare (they are the "chemical" mortars). If one takes 3x4.2 inch and 1x81mm and consider the latter "for smoke", one is definitely being "gamey". But you knew that, LOL.

I fully expect enemy mortar fire to be effective against my infantry, whenever and wherever he expends the rounds. If I had my druthers, I'd prefer he fire at me #1 with smoke rounds or #2 at areas he "suspects" I'm in or #3 while I am "traveling" or #4 early on in the fight. I think 2-4 are reasonably likely in PnP recon method, if he drops mortars on me.

Why do I prefer those sorts of fire missions? Because the one I am actually afraid of, is the one that hits 1-3 platoons while they are in contact, and is immediately followed up by an infantry counterattack while men are still "taking cover" or worse. If someone expends 1/2 an 81mm module playing tag with an approaching platoon, I can live with it (by comparison).

Incidentally, if the hypothetical is that every PnP recon platoon is being plastered by 81mm all day, what do you suppose is the life expectancy of a half squad that dies or breaks as soon as a perfectly ordinary full squad looks at it funny from 100 yards? Obviously these things don't say very much, either way.

[Wisbech_lad]

I agree that in most cases in CM broad recon is the way to go.

My problem is that this I think is an outcome of CM's engine, rather than the way a reinforced company would have gone about its task in Europe 44/45.

CM's engine gives you much more info than a company commander would ever have had, much quicker. This allows you to use "operational" level doctrines that are very effective, but reliant on a more info and a longer decision timespan than CM tries to simulate - and then you almost end up with CM as an abstract operational wargame, rather than the sim that BTS IMHO intended.

BTS built in command delays to try and factor in some of the problems, that 20s delay is while the runner from the leiutenant explains exactly which building he wants the squad to run to.

Yes, platoon commanders have radios, but a spread out platoon in N W Europe isn't in great contact with each other, and the sort of detail that CM gives you would take a long time to filter back to the battlefield commander.

e.g. Left most squad sees something suspicious. Squad leader decides whether or not to tell platoon commander, and sends a runner (That patch of woods half way up Hill 621 looks like it has a AT gun in it sir)

Platoon commander then calls up Company HQ, and BTW, he himself doesn't have a radio, its in the hands of a radio operator. CO major is getting reports from 3/4 platoons, plus a couple of tanks, and orders are coming down from BN. He has to decide what information to pass up and down, and whether to alter his first plan, that all his platoon commanders are working to. And in CM, all this info is distributed to all participants on the battlefield v quickly, i.e squad on far right sees a gun, the armour units one KM away change avenue of approach in a minimum 90S, (if gun spotted at start of turn, plus say 30S delay) and in some cases less than 15S (gun spotted near end of turn, Vet/ elite tank with short command delay)

All this while bullets are flying and Murphy's law reigns supreme. Charge of the Light Brigade probably the most famous example, but FUBAR still exists.

So yes, broad recon is the way to go in CM, but I think ScoutPL is trying to make the point that in "real life" companies, in the 20 minutes allotted to them to take the hill, with 60 year old radio technology, simply don't send out an thin recon screen because there isn't the time or capability to process the info at that scale. If its is an attack on the run, even co. HQ may not have a good map, look how one scenario depicts the Poles running into the wrong village. I know my wife complains about my sense of direction, can't imagine Sherman tank drivers were much better in a country where they didn't speak the language! (Uhm, which turning should I take for the village Mr German civilian farmer?)

At a higher level, yes, recon info is collated religiously, but time scales are longer, and data more abstract (your recon company reports that the enemy is dug in along the ridge, with what appears to be signficant armour support. A soldier killed in a fire fight with an enemy patrol had SS 2nd Panzer insignia)

When I read Fionns' AAR, yes I am impressed. I also feel he would use the same techniques whatever the scale of the game, (i.e. if CM was simulating divisonal/ brigade combat) and it is the game that allows such "scalable" tactics to be so successful, rather than such tactics being used successfully in WW2

Essentially, CM assumes telepathy between your units, and the higher the experience rating the less "realistic" the game comes, because the command delays help throw sand in the works.

See the CMHQ campaign annex rules, for a realistic attempt of how to simulate the fow at a higher level, e.g. misidentification, they even have probability that your commanders get fragged by their troops, because they think he's a glory hound endangering their lives, or someone just forgot to check if safety was on...

[ScoutPL]

One more comment about the arty FO's. You guys are right on the money when it comes to limiting FO's. And Jason you are absolutely right about your distribution of mortar platoons/arty batteries. But I would up my FO numbers by at least one over the very limited ones you suggest. This is because even though the battalion only has one mortar platoon, that battalion will have multiple spotters and in the attack will probably have a good hefty stock of ammo. Thats why I suggest going with one per company. Yes they're all requesting from the same platoon, but game mechanics restrict their ammo to the point that one FO doesnt do a very good job simulating that valuable asset. I would like to see FO's having to fight over priority of fire though. What would really be great would be if in the purchasing phase you bought the offboard asset, rather then the FO. The FO's would come as part of the company command unit. In other words, your battalion commander had to spend his prescious "asset" or purchase points, dedicating the mortars to support your attack. Then he had to spend more points making sure your HQ unit was on the ground with an FO. The FO should be a seperate maneuver unit but come with the company HQ purchase. This would more accurately simulate how TO&E units operate in the field and make for a more realistic application of fires. Arty batteries and arty FO's should be tremendously expensive, thus restricting their appearance to large battalion sized battles. Even more realistic would be if you could rate your HQ units to determine who has priority of fires in the game. For example, you could have an "A-grade" HQ as your main effort and "B, C and D-Grade" HQ's in the support and reserve. Since a Mortar Platoon can really only effectively fire one target at a time, when multiple requests for fire went up, the "A-grade" unit would get priority. Does any of that make sense?

[Henri]

Originally posted by Wisbech_lad:

I know that this was debated ad infinitum, but:

The "thin broad front" recon doctrine is scaled down from Russian Divisional doctrine. I've seen no evidence that a Russian Co. or Bn. level attack/ defence would use a thin line of skimishers in this same way - (in fact their horrendous losses in Chechnya and Afganistan argue the opposite, at a tactical level they are going straight into very defendible territory with tanks and APC's first, and no dismounted infantry scouting ahead)

The manner in which Russian fights against guerillas is hardly a good indication of what their battle doctrine in open warfare is, much less of what it was in WW2...

Henri

[ScoutPL]

Well then Henri how about giving us some better examples!

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

I understand your point about multiple FOs in reality, but in CM the FO asset present on the field does not represent the only possible radi-caller, but rather the presence of the supporting artillery battery. You can call fire anywhere on the map, unobserved, and see the fall of shot as the player - for only a slightly added delay and a slight degradation of accuracy.

That is something the historical counterparts certainly cannot do, but it reflects the ability of secondary Fos or platoon leaders or tank commanders to call for fire, reasonably well. After all, you usually fire such a mission at something *someone* can see, just not the FO unit. The added delay simulates fighting over priority of fires; the degraded accuracy reflects the inexperience of ad-hoc observors, their lack of detailed maps, greater confusion about their exact location, or the confusion they can cause to the firing battery with their multiple "drop 150" or "left 200" orders, each called from a different initial location the battery fire direction center is supposed to keep clear in their heads.

What you can see, ever, is one battery firing on two targets at once. And in CM, that is something you can do only if you buy two FOs. Therefore, each FO represents the off-board battery itself, and the presence of secondary observor teams (in each company e.g., for the battalion mortars) does not need an extra FO purchase.

If a player limits himself to firing one of two indentical batteries at a time, and not only firing but requesting to begin an adjustment, and thus uses them strictly "in sequence", then buying two of the same type could simulate much greater ammo for a single battery. But this should be relatively rare, especially for non-U.S. (and even U.S. during late breakout, early westwall fighting, or early Bulge scenarios).

It is a very common experience on the actual battlefield, that the front calls for the mortar fire and in minutes all the ammo is gone. This does not mean none exists elsewhere, but the rate of fire of light mortars is essentially arbitrarily high.

It takes them about 2-3 minutes to fire a literal ton of shells (6x81mm, up to 10 rounds per minute = 60 rounds , times about 17 lbs for the standard frag 81mm round, equals 1000 lbs a minute. Some mortar shells are a bit lighter, about 12 lbs, and in that case it takes 3 minutes to fire a ton.

Although it is happening in the rear areas, those mortars are firing from within about 2 miles of the front, more commonly one mile, since they need some range into the enemy positions themselves. At that distance detection and counterbattery fire are distinctly possible. A mortar battery will often set up, burn its ammo, then move to a new location.

Understand, whereas heavier guns are protected from enemy counterbattery fire by their range, which gives them a much larger area of space to "hide" in effectively, the protection of mortars comes from their greater mobility and shorter set-up and "march order" times. Even so, they will try to dig in at each location if they expect to be there for more than one very short mission. In the lighter mortar units, the men are often carrying the dismantled weapons and the ammo themselves in these tactical repositionings, so they do not stay tied to the roads. (Near a road within a mile of the front is not a large area in counter-battery terms).

The reason for explaining all of this, is to give some sense of why an 81mm mortar battery does not have 5 trucks carrying 10 tons of shells with it wherever it is, which is what it would need to fire continually even for 20-30 minutes. Assuming they haven't fired at anything earlier, or save anything for later.

The ~150-shell amount you get with a light mortar "module", is a perfectly respectable one ton of ammo expenditure. If you go to a U.S. 105mm battery (where, by the way, I said 2 should be allowed in a battalion level fight), and one module is more like 2 to 2 1/2 tons of ammo, or a full truckload. Those units will have more ammo overall, but there are firing all day in support of targets throughout the division, or at least regiment.

If in large battles you want to allow 2 modules not used simultaneously, that is within the bounds of credulity. More than that, or firing both at once, would not be.

An exception might be the lighter German rockets (150mm), which might indeed fire 2-3 at once, since doing so is an affair of 1-2 minutes before relocating and reloading the tubes. (Each module of that represents a battery of 4 launchers each firing its six tubes nearly simultaneously). The most you'd see of heavier stuff in the largest battle would be a battalion fire, 3 105mm or 25 lber.

So I will agree partially. It makes sense to relaxed the limits somewhat to allow the largest tactically likely concentrations of artillery fire, instead of the rule. The *rule* would be 1x81mm or 3" mortar, with occasional 105mm U.S., 25-lber British, or 75mm (regimental infantry guns firing indirect), 150mm rocket, or 120mm mortars for Germans, and only one of the above added to the battalion light mortars.

The *maximum* you'd see in a full-battalion-sized battle, might be 2xlight mortar firing one after the other but not at the same time (more ammo, same guns), and up to 3 modules of U.S. 105mm, 3 of Brit 25 lber, 3 German 150mm rocket, or 2 of Greman 120mm mortar or 105mm arty. 4.2" mortars should be rare on the Allied side and single modules, with the U.S. also sometimes having single modules of 155mm. Stay under the "3 heavier stuff" limit if using the rarer types. The Germans would only have 1x75mm if they take that, but it too might have "double ammo" firing one after the other.

These are already large amounts of artillery and would be rare, not the usual thing in battle after battle. I would not recommend more than the "rule" for quick battles. But the "maximum" level might be found in large, designed scenarios.

Another note about realism here, when using artillery in CM, and in QBs and meeting engagements in particular. The reality is that CM makes coordination with artillery much easier than it is in real life. With a single battery, or pair, and serious ammo limits, this does a pretty good job of simulating artillery's presence on the WW II tactical battlefield. But if you try to extend it upward to battalion fires and double or triple ammo loads, to say nothing of perfectly coordinating the fire of 5 batteries of mixed types, the result will become distinctly less realistic.

In reality, use of the bigger artillery units required more detailed planning farther in advance. Yes, a battalion attack might be supported by an entire 105mm battalion. But it would be firing to a fire plan, not "on call" and not coordinating the targets of each sub-battery with tiny-scale, minute by minute adjustment to real-time "borg" intel from every platoon or tank.

"Plaster the town at 0600 for 5 minutes before we go in", a battalion-level fire plan could do. Battery A break up the left flank counterattack, Battery B prep objective area two, adn Battery C smoke an enemy tank platoon, then oops scramble all those missions 4 minutes latter into other ones as intel from half-squads shifts - not on your freaking life.

Since CM players trying to win will undoubtedly employ gamey artillery tactics when they have tons of it available, and since the larger the scale employed the farther the results will be from any realism, it is a good idea to limit the total FOs. Understand, CM is simply modeling the artillery-infantry coordination in a way that makes sense for a certain *scale*. Raise that scale, and the intel and coordination problem of artillery-other arm cooperation, simply are not modeled by CM.

Realistically, the delay factors for fire missions would go up linearly, if not with the square, with the number of firing batteries. That 105mm mission would be somewhere between 5 minutes and 20 minutes away, not 2 minutes, if it was an entire battalion coordinating its fire.

"But why does it take any longer? If one battery can fire this fast...", a civilian will ask. Because the one firing battery in your single mission is drawing emergency-fashion on all the resources of its entire "parent" organization. Feeding 10 tons of shells through 18 pieces is a distinctly larger organizational job. (Who is out of what kind of fuse? Which gun has busted hydraulics? Which tube is so burnt-out from firing that its shells are landing "short" among your own guys? Who sends the detail to the ammo dump? etc).

For what it is worth...

[Henri]

Originally posted by ScoutPL:

Well then Henri how about giving us some better examples!

How about the historical example I quoted the other day where the Russians used scouts and engineers to make paths through the forest in order to bypass the strong German defenses on the road, threatening to hit them fromthe rear and forcing them to retreat?

How about the disposition of scouts, infantry and armor that they describe for scouting?

http://www.geocities.com/funfacts2001/

Henri

[This message has been edited by Henri (edited 01-29-2001).]

[ScoutPL]

Here is a reprint of my reply to you guys providing that link on the "preview" post.

Sorry but I'm still not convinced. What you have here is a commander who's first COA was to go up the roads, so he directed his reconnaissance there. They came back with the intel that showed the roads were impassable, convincing him to find an alternate route.

So he task organized his combined arms units to create a rather standard marching order for tank/infantry teams operating in wooded terrain. They advanced, staying away from the roads, with a small dismounted advance party to warn of enemy positions to the front. Look up traveling overwatch in FM 7-8. It'll look real familiar to you.

The broad flanking maneuver to the left is simply a factor of outnumbering your enemy to the point he cant cover his flanks. Since this was basically a clean-up operation of a surrounded german force, thats not surprising.

What we dont have here is a commander splitting up his infantry forces into "recon" teams, distributing them relatively evenly across his front and sending them forward to make contact with the enemy surfaces and hopefully discover his gaps. This commander had a very good idea where the enemy was located from the very beginning and developed a very sound plan on how to bypass the enemy's strength. Great read on using good intel to come up with a plan and then ATTACKING.

As far as broad front recon? Sorry, no sale.