Will there be a shortage of Russian 76.2 mm AP rds in 1941?

[James Crowley]

Whilst there are some general references to a lack of AP rounds, and ammunition in general, for soviet tanks in June 1941, it is very difficult to locate any quantifiable evidence to that effect.

Also many accounts relating to that period do not mention those shortages.

IMHO I think it would be a mistake to hard code that into CMBB. Perhaps, in QB's, some sort of random variable could be included to allow for this possibilty to occur; otherwise best left to scenario designers ( who would need to be very carefull - easy to unbalance battles with nil AP loadouts)

[Scott B]

Originally posted by Grisha:

True, effective Soviet combined arms attacks in June/July of 1941 were rare, but effective defenses were not.

Oh, I'd agree with that - German casualties were very high (for them, anyway) during this period as well, although again obviously not nearly as high as that of the Soviets. I'd also point out that Rokossovsky was not just a good commander but an exceptional one, and in refusing to attack apparently risked execution by one of Beria's henchmen, if Erickson's Road to Stalingrad is to be believed. Given the odds against them and the problems within their own forces, defending was probably a better choice than attacking in many of the cases where Soviet forces were ordered on the offensive. While some of these costly attacks did buy the Soviets valuable time, by and large that's looking on the bright side of a train wreck.

Scott

[Grisha]

Oh, I'd agree with that - German casualties were very high (for them, anyway) during this period as well, although again obviously not nearly as high as that of the Soviets. I'd also point out that Rokossovsky was not just a good commander but an exceptional one, and in refusing to attack apparently risked execution by one of Beria's henchmen, if Erickson's Road to Stalingrad is to be believed. Given the odds against them and the problems within their own forces, defending was probably a better choice than attacking in many of the cases where Soviet forces were ordered on the offensive. While some of these costly attacks did buy the Soviets valuable time, by and large that's looking on the bright side of a train wreck.

I agree, Rokossovsky was very probably the Soviet Union's best operational(Front) commander in WWII. And, incidently, that he had just been released from imprisonment in 1940, speaks of the conviction of his decision to not repeat a wasteful counterattack.

I do think that Sharp's statement on German tank losses in July-August 1941 is quite telling wrt Soviet antitank artillery capabilities. It begs the question, could 76mm/85mm HE rounds be responsible for 1500+ German tank losses in July-August 1941?

However, the Soviets wasted away way too many resources counterattacking the Germans, but that's hindsight talking.

[ April 24, 2002, 12:02 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Grisha]

Another thing I'll need to check on is whether 76mm and 85mm HE rounds are supersonic.

[Skipper]

Yelnya

As you all know (all?), in August 1941 german AG Center assumed defensive stature in the area of Yelnya. Both tank groups were detached from 4th army, and army corps were attached to it instead. Frontline was bulging eastward (see the map).

Until the end of August, RKKA was counterattacking in the area, hoping to recapture Smolensk.

Yelnya operation was commanded by G.K.Zhukov. Defending the bulge were 6 german infantry divisions (15, 137, 78, 292, 268, 7). Zhukov had 8 divisions, including 5 rifle (107, 100, 19, 120, 303), two mechanized (106, 103) and one tank (102).

Yelnya bulge has formed in mid July, as a result of breakthrough by german 2nd armored group south of Smolensk. Yelnya was captured by germans on 19 July. This bulge presented a very good starting for a possible flank attack on Western front, that would help germans to advance on Moscow.

Main idea of the Yelnya operation was a decisive operational maneuver - simultaneous strikes from north and south at the base of the bulge, encirclement and elimination of german forces within the bulge. At the same moment, offensive activities from east were supposed to freeze german force, split it and eliminate in parts.

Despite the roughly equal ratio of forces in the area (NB: soviet division was smaller than german), the front commander [Zhukov] managed tio gain significant superiority in manpower and firepower in the areas of main effort.

STAVKA VGK DIRECTIVE #001253

To the commander of Reserve front

On preparations to the operation for elimination of enemy's Yelnya group

25 August 1941 02:35

... on 30 august left flank 24th and 43rd armies go on offensive with objectives:

put an end to enemy;s Yelnya group and afterwards, attacking in the directions of Pochinok and Roslavl', by 8 September 1941 to reach the line of Dolgie Nivy, Hislavichi, Petrovichi. For that purpose:

a) 24th Army, consisting of 8 rifle divisions, 1 tank division and 1 mech division - by concentric strikes to destroy enemy's Yelnya group and by 1st September to reach the line of Bol;shaya Nezhoda station, Petrovo, Stroina; afterwards, developing the advance, to deliver a strike in the direction of Pochinok; having captured the latter, by 8 September, to reach the line of Dolgie Nivy, Hislavichi.

43rd Army, leaving 22nd and 53rd divisions on the currently assumed defensive positions, and the main forces of the army on the defense of Spas-Demensk and Kirov positions, by 2 rifle divisions and 2 tank divisions on 30 August to go on offensive in the direction of Roslavl, and having captured Roslavl, by 8 September to reach the line of Hislavichi, Petrovichi...

On 30 august, after a brief preparatory artillery strike, troops of 24th army, commanded by K.I.Rakitin started the offensive; in spite of spirited resistance broke through the german fortified defense and by 6th September created a threat of encirclement to german Yelnya group.

German high command sent to battle for additional infantry division, but all their counterattacks were defeated, although several quite critical situations have occurred.

Fearing the encirclement, german high command started hasty withdrawal of troops from the bulge.

Following the withdrawing enemy, our troops advanced for 25 km, liberated Yelnya and defeated a very dangerous enemy group. Only extremely limited availability of armor and combat airplanes prevented our troops from completing the encirclement and eliminating Yalnya group of german-fascist troops.

Unlike earlier localized offensive operations of 1941, where passive posture of soviet troops on the nearby parts of the front allowed the enemy to shift forces from other directions and localize our offensive, in Yelnya operation, to assist the 24th Army and ensure operation success, offensive actions were carried out by troops of 16th and 20th armies of the Western front on Smolensk direction and 43rd Army of Reserve front on Roslavl direction.

Our losses were 31,853 men, including 10,701 KIA and MIA and 21,152 wounded.

Zhukov delivered to Stavka a summarized report on the outcome of the operation. On its basis, Stavka VGK and General HQ issued an order and directives, summarizing the lessions learned from Yelnya operation, for information of the whole Red Army.

To raise the offensive spirit in the army, institute of Soviet Guards was established. 100th, 127th, 153rd and 161st rifle divisions have become first guards units.

Yelnya operation, despite the fact that the target of encirclement and elimination of german troops was not met, was the first successful offensive operation of front scale in the Great Patriotic War.

Translated from: http://www.shortway.to/1941/eln.htm

As far as I understand, this text was originally taken from the "Great Patriotic War" encyclopedia.

[Andreas]

Thanks Skipper, very informative.

[Lee]

Is there any more evidence for this shortage? Time is running out.

[Lee]

Last chance, guys. Bring forth another source to back this up now, or be forced to wait

for a patch, if you come up with further evidence later.

I would have thought more sources could have been found by now to present to Steve.

[rexford]

A T34 or KV-2 armed with HE shells is still going to overpower the armor on the PzKfw III's, IV's and 38t's that are met during 1941 battles. Given the face-hardened armor used on IIIG, HE shell hits might be even more lethal than AP or APBC due to the splintering effect when hard armor is defeated.

Armor penetration figures for HE shells fired by T34 76.2mm and KV-2 152mm are up to the task against 30mm armor.