"First Clash at Cambes" : historical outcome

[Kwacker]

Following on from my last topic posted "Reckless Abandon - Montrevel : does anyone know the historical outcome", I'm also playing "First Clash at Cambes" by e-mail. The same questions :

1) How close is the scenario to the historical action in terms of terrain and order of battle?

2) If the scenario is close to the historical event, what was the outcome?

Any info much appreciated.

[Moon]

Hi Kwacker,

the terrain is as close to historical representation as I can get it. I've used 1:25,000 topo maps (contemporary) as well as historical pictures and an aerial photograph from the area from 1949. The OOB's for both sides are very accurate also; I've taken them from the official history of the "Hitlerjugend" division (a 100 US$ mega-book with detailed maps, descriptions and strength reports, which treats the "enemy" almost as accurately as the German forces).

In other words, Cambes is what I would call a historical scenario. It's not 100% certainly, but then probably no one battle can be.

Historical outcome: the Allies took Cambes after heavy house-to-house fighting eventually.

[Kwacker]

Great stuff - thanks!

It is a pleasure to play these carefully researched and constructed historical scenarios - it really is the icing on the CM cake for me!

Your efforts are truely appreciated - I look forward to seeing how it plays out!

[Simon Fox]

There was another thread on this one a while back in which I posted a British account of the battle, I will try to dig it out. I have a few issues with it being historical spot on. For one it should be "2nd clash at Cambes". The town was flatened by British naval cruiser fire IIRC.

[Simon Fox]

Well that damned search function has stymied me once again. Anyway I had that account still on file so I will post it again.

?was believed that Cambes was lightly held, but as the two woods surrounding it were themselves surrounded by walls some ten feet high, it was not possible to observe the enemies actual dispositions.?

On the afternoon of 7th June 1944, D company The 2nd Bn. The Royal Ulster Rifles with support of one Sqn East Riding Yeomanry attacked Cambes and the woods, although gaining entry into the woods strong enfilading MG and mortar fire made the position untenable and they withdrew to attack 2 days later with better support.

The picture was as follows: Cambes and Galmanche (another small village some 800 yards south of Cambes), thought to be lightly held by the enemy, were defended strongly as outposts. Buron and St Contest, two villages a further 1000 yards or so south and south west of Galmanche were strongly held. On the east side, La Bijude, some 800 yards south east of Cambes, and Epron, some 500 yards south of La Bijude were held by the enemy with unknown strength.

For the attack on Cambes Wood 9th June, 1944

The 2nd Bn. The Royal Ulster Rifles had additional troops as follows:

Under Command:

one section Field Ambulance.

In support,

one 6? Cruiser, Royal Navy,

the whole of the Divisional Artillery,

two troops Anti-Tank (RA) ? one ordinary and one self propelled.

One company 4.2? mortars,

one company Medium Machine Guns;

one regiment of Sherman tanks (East Riding Yeomanry)

Royal Engineers in the shape of assault demolition and mine clearance teams, with five Armoured Vehicles Royal Engineers in support.

?It will be recalled that the ground from Anisy to Cambes is open, its distance being approximately 1500 yards, and its width approximately 800 yards. A dusty track with no bordering or fence of any description runs straight from Anisy to Cambes.

The intention of the Commanding Officer was simple and direct; ?2nd Bn. The Royal Ulster Rifles will capture and consolidate Cambes?. The plan was as follows: The advance from Anisy to Cambes over the open ground was to be carried out with B Company on the right, A Company on the left with their left on the track, D Company supporting B Company, and C Company supporting A Company, the advance to be carried out under cover of an artillery barrage. The advance was to be in open order, with A and B Companies clearing the front edge of the village and guarding the flanks, and with C and D Companies passing through and capturing the far edges of the village, the whole operation requiring both wood and street fighting.

Prior to Zero Hour, the Naval Cruiser gave a five minute concentration onto the village, followed by the Fd Arty giving a series of concentration, behind which the Battalion were to advance. The anti-tank gunners were to protect the flanks, and the East Riding Yeomanry tanks were also to assist. The assault companies, A and B, were each given a demolition and mine clearance team for use until their final objectives, when they were to pass these on to the supporting companies, C and D. The Armoured Vehicles Royal Engineers were to move forward with the Battalion ready to deal with any strongpoints.

The 4.2? mortars were given two tasks of crumping onto A Companys first objective, and then to transfer to C Companys final objective. The Medium Machine Gun Company were (1) To cover the left flank, and (2) To consolidate on the final objectives in order to deal with counter attacks.

The Battalions own 3? Mortar Platoon were to be prepared to fire on call from the Assault Companies, and then from the two Supporting Companies.

The Carrier Platoon under command of 5 Company Commander, Major C. R. P. Sweeny, MC, were to remain at Anisy and be prepared to ferry up ammunition or any other requirements to the objectives.

The anti-tank platoon were given protective tasks once the objective had been gained. and the Pioneer Platoon, whose Commander, Lt D. Greer, had left the Battalion on the 7th June to collect some stores from a dump and had not since returned, were to be ready should the Royal Engineers not be in a position to fulfil their commitments.

At 1515 hours 9th June, A and B Companies crossed the start line followed by the Battalion O Group behind A Company. The men were well spaced out and advanced in good order, direction being steadied by the Commanding Officer from the left. As the Companies reached the ridge some 1100 yards from the objective, whence they could be permanently observed by the enemy they came under a heavy barrage of mortar and shell fire accompanied by machine gun fire. The Commanding Officer of the East Riding Yeomanry, who had fought with the Guards, observing the advance from the start line, said to himself ?This is where they get to ground, and the attack is held up?. To his astonishment however, the Battalion continued to advance in open order keeping perfect distance. Certainly there is no doubt that the Companies advanced through what appeared to be an impassable barrage with the same unconcern as that shown on a company field firing exercise. Men were dropping all round, but still the advance continued. A Company under Major W. D. Tighe-Wood were particularly unfortunate, losing all three of their Platoon Commanders, Lt R. S. Hall being killed, and the other two, Lt D. Walsh and Lt J. St. J. Cooper being wounded in such a way that they could not carry on. Further, one Platoon Serjeant was also knocked out. But Major Tighe-Wood, despite these difficulties, succeeded in establishing his Company upon the objective and inspired all ranks by his example of cool and determined leadership. Cpl OReilly finding himself the senior person left in his platoon, took command and did very good work during the difficult period of consolidation which followed.

In the same Company, Rfn Miller finding his section leader-less, took over command and led his section with great initiative. L/Sjt McCann, A Company, was badly wounded in the face, but refused to drop out of the fight until his Platoons objective had been obtained. B Company on the right, under the command of Major J. W. Hyde, came under heavy mortar and machine gun fire from the flank about 400 yards from the near edge of their first objective. With great presence of mind Sjt Kavanagh of 11 Platoon engaged the machine guns with his Bren groups and also directed the attention of a tank on to the trouble. Subsequent patrolling located several enemy dead in the target area. The first objective was quickly taken, 10 Platoon passing with great speed through the village to the church. their final objective. One German, an SS sniper was wounded and taken prisoner.

A and B Companies reached their first objective by 1630 hours. In passing through A Company, C Company, who by this time had the Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers tanks under command, lost these to German 88 mm guns firing from La Bijude. These tanks manned by Royal Engineers had done great work, their crews having shown a strong desire to get to grips with the enemy, carrying out tasks which strictly they were not intended to do. the history of the 79th Armd Div has something uncomplementary to say about this misuse of ARVEs around Cambes However. C Company Commander, Major J. C. S. G. de Longueuil, could not communicate with them during the battle, and they fought until their tanks were knocked out underneath them. When C Company with great vigour and dash, had fought their way through the wood to their final objective, they were unfortunate in losing one of their Platoon Commanders, Lt R. C. Diserens, who regardless of his own safety, was running about in the open under fire, putting his platoon into position. This very enthusiastic young officer was severely wounded and died later from the effects, a great loss to his Company and to the Battalion.

D Company, which it will be remembered was sadly depleted, went through B Company, and almost immediately, two of its remaining three officers were wounded, Captain J. Montgomery the acting Company Commander, though wounded twice in the leg, carried on throughout the battle, and Lt Lennox, after leading his Platoon with great determination was severely wounded and could not carry on. Had D Company not secured its objective, it is possible that the enemy could have used this portion of the village and wood to make a very vigorous counter attack. In this battle D Company lost a further two killed, fifteen wounded, and one missing.

Immediately the leading companies had reached their first objectives, the Anti-Tank Platoon under command of Captain C. R. Gray was ordered to move forward to assist in consolidation. All gun detachments moved forward in the face of an accurate 88 mm and mortar fire, and succeeded in being manhandled into position with the exception of one detachment. This was commanded by Cpl Boyd and received a direct hit from an 88 mm shell which besides knocking out the carrier, wounded Cpl Boyd and Rfn Heald and killed Rfn Bingham. Rfn Walton the remaining member of the crew escaped without injury. The gun itself was later recovered and manhandled into position. Whilst consolidating against a probable counter attack, the enemy subjected the position to a vicious attack of mortar and shell fire which lasted for five hours, so that the digging in was carried out under the greatest difficulties. During the consolidation, Captain M. D. G. C. Ryan, Headquarter Company Commander, was severely burnt in the hands by the explosion of a Phosphorous Smoke Bomb, and evacuated, and Major Brooks, MC, the very popular commander of the RA Battery which had supported the Battalion since 1939, was killed.

At the end of the day, the Battalions total casualties were three Officers and forty one Other Ranks killed, seven Officers and one hundred and thirty one Other Ranks wounded and evacuated, three Officers and three Other Ranks wounded but not evacuated, one Officer and ten Other Ranks missing, making a total away from the Battalion of eleven Officers and one hundred and eighty two Other Ranks. Many of the wounded had been amazingly cheerful, joking in the face of the most frightful wounds. The Medical Officer, Captain C. R. Wright, RAMC, and his staff of medical orderlies and stretcher bearers had been a pillar of strength, dealing with patients with the same calmness and a good deal more humour than was normally shown on the non operational sick parade. Mention has already been made of Captain Aldworth and Lt Diserens. Lt Hall had not been with the Battalion for as long as them, having joined in January from the Coast Artillery, but he was already marked out for promotion by his ability and excellence as an officer, while to his many friends, his death meant the loss of one for whom loyalty and reliability were always paramount virtues and for whom gaiety and good humour were as essential as the breath of life.

Morale in the Battalion never faltered from the beginning. The Battalion took its victory and its wounds as if they were normal everyday occurrences. After consolidation, the Officers and Men soon learnt the advisability of digging deep, and the Germans regular strafing was soon the cause of much laughter and singing of such songs as ?Run Rabbit Run?. Cambes was not liked, but it was looked upon as a stepping stone to bigger things, and in order that the Germans could know this too, strong fighting patrols soon took up the offensive. When the 2nd Battalion was ordered to move forward again, it was not weaker owing to Cambes but stronger, and the Germans soon learnt to recognise the strong fighting spirit of the Royal Ulster Rifles.

It was learnt later that as a result of this operation, Major W. D. Tighe-Wood, Captain J. Montgomery and Lt S. M. Lennox had been awarded the Military Cross, Cpl OReilly the Distinguished Conduct Medal, L/Sjt McCann, Rfn Long (who as a Signaller with C Company had attended a wounded man under severe shell fire with complete disregard for his own safety) and Rfn McGlennon (who as D Companys runner had maintained personal communication throughout the worst phase of the battle) the Military Medal.

By July 3rd the geography of Cambes and its surroundings were firmly imprinted on our minds. The village itself must have held a population of some 300 before the war, but now, of course, there was none, the last civilians ? four old ladies ? being evacuated by ourselves on June 12th. The main road ran from North to South through the village from Villon Les Buissons on its way to Malon, and ultimately Caen, having Galmanche and St Contest on its right, and La Bijude and Epron on its left. North East and North of the village lay the wood, and through it into the village ran a track from Anisy, which was our main channel of supply and communication. This track was generously bordered with trenches and ditches, and many a visitor, trapped in a spell of Boche harassing fire, abandoned his vehicle for one of these. Within the framework of these roads stood the Chateau, a large white impressive structure set in what a few years before must have been beautiful surroundings. The back windows looked down an avenue which connected La Bijude with Cambes, and the front looked across the Northern stretches of the wood which contained our own Mortar platoon and half the other Battalion that was holding this area with ourselves. Some 200 yards to the West of the Chateau stood the Church, the meeting point of all roads and tracks leading into and out of the village. It was a fine old Norman church and once it had dominated the village architecturally just as its preachers and doctrines influenced the lives of all that dwelt there. Now, penetrated again and again by shells and shrapnel, its grandeur was a mere shadow of its former self. The railway followed along the Southern edge of the wood, crossed the Avenue at a level crossing and then swung South to follow a tortuous path towards Caen. Just East of the level crossing was Cambes station or halt ? a building which we would have described as a signal box.

June 9th, 1944, 2nd Battalion, Middlesex regiment, MG Regiment (Vickers and 4.2? mortars)

During the afternoon the Royal Ulster Rifles, of 9th Infantry Brigade, made an attack on Cambes Wood, supported by "B" Company and Nos. 10 and 11 Mortar Platoons. The opening barrage included both mortar and machine-gun fire, the mortars firing on the wood from Cazelle and Nos. 4 and 6 Machine-Gun Platoons of "B" Company raking the wood from the left flank with fire at a range of no more than 400 yards. As soon as they opened up they were heavily engaged by enemy artillery, losing three men wounded.

The R.U.R. advanced frontally on the wood from Anisy, down a long, open, forward slope and under very heavy fire from enemy tanks at La Bijude. As the infantry reached the edge of the wood, the remaining platoon (No. 5) of "B" Com-pany raced down the road from Anisy on a consolidation task, but at the last minute their carriers were held up by the infantry. For a few moments they were brought to a standstill, giving the enemy tank gunners a stationary target. The leading carrier was hit, fortunately without causing any casualties to the crew, but the others managed to get into the corner of the wood at Cambes, where the guns were quickly mounted to form a defensive screen.

The Commanding Officer, coming up on the pillion of a motor-cycle to the wood for a conference with the brigadier, had his cycle hit by anti-tank fire and had to crawl and run the last hundred yards, he and his driver, Sergeant Davis, both running the gauntlet of a very persistent sniper on the exposed flank.

Cambes Wood was not a healthy place for the issue of further orders, for the enemy, having themselves withdrawn, directed a heavy mortar fire on the whole area. One bomb landed on Major Passy?s carrier, killing him, Corporal Green, his driver operator, Lance-Corporal Rees, and Private Baker. C.S.M. Bell, who had accompanied Major Passy, was mortally wounded a few minutes later by another. Nor was that the full tale of the losses at Cambes, for Captain McDowell, second-in-command of "B" Company. came up to the wood as soon as he heard that Major Pause had been killed and was himself killed imme-diately on arrival.

The enemy fire directed on to the wood at Cambers became fiercer as the evening wore on. Movement became almost impossible and the Commanding Officer was pinned down near No. 5 Platoon. Lance-Sergeant Davis, his dispatch rider, distinguished himself during the evening by the complete dis-regard of danger with which he ran messages up and down the wood and tended the wounded under heavy fire. The bar to the M.M., which he won that day, was richly deserved. Captain H. B. Neve, the mortar O.P. officer, also won the M.C. for his gallantry on this occasion. While directing the fire of two mortar platoons, he had to sit out in the open as his wireless remote control gear had been hit by shrapnel, and the coolness and efficiency with which he directed the fire with shells and bombs exploding all round him was beyond praises

At last light, the K.O.S.B. reached Cambes to reinforce the Royal Ulster Rifles. With their arrival the German fire gradually died down and the area was finally consolidated and firmly held.

[Moon]

Hi Simon,

there has been always some confusion about "Cambes", as there are at least two towns with the name of "Cambes" in the British sector in the Normandy, both of which have seen quite some action. The Cambes this scenario depicts is really just a few miles north of Caen. I believe your account is from the other town...

[Moon]

Oops, sorry, my fault. I read through your post too quickly (at work), and having come home now I can see that we're talking about the same Cambes indeed. "First Clash at Cambes" depicts indeed the first clash of June 7th and not the second clash two days later. The Hitlerjugend official history book describes this initial action in quite some detail. The walls you mention cover only parts of the "forest" (really more of a park) and - as some pictures show - have also been blasted at numerous points by arty/tanks. Here a few snippets from the book (about the action June 7th) for those interested:

***SPOILER WARNING***

"The advance (of German 1. Battalion/25th) went smoothly to the southern edge of the town of Cambes. After the Panzergrenadiers of 1. Kompanie had already pushed thourhg the section of town extending south and reached a wooded area north of Cambes together with 3. Kompanie, Sherman tanks (from East Ridign Yeomanry) appeared to the left of the village ahead of 2. Kompanie and the wooded area and opened fired. Riflemen in the trees, light and heavy machine guns made a further advance very difficult. At the same time, strong artillery and mortar fire on the wooded area north of Cambes set in."

Since both forces ran into each other while marching, both withdrew with considerable losses at the conclusion of the day and, as you pointed out, started reinforced actions two days later. Hope this clears some of the confusion.

[Simon Fox]

Well therein lies a problem Moon. Because if indeed we are talking of the first clash at Cambes then assuming your German OOB is good then your British OOB is wide of the mark. Since in fact only D Co. 2nd RUR participated in that engagement supported by one squadron of the ERY. If that is indeed the fact then historically they did pretty well if they were fighting most of a German Bn. Mind you it would be difficult to repeat that result in CM

"On the 7th June, the Battalion was ordered to move in a South Westerly direction to capture Cambes. a small village thickly wooded, and approximately six miles inland from the

coast. The Battalion moved via Le Mesnil with D Company, commanded by Captain J. R. StL. Aldworth as vanguard. it, was

believed that Cambes was lightly held, but as the two woods surrounding it were themselves surrounded by walls some ten feet

high, it was not possible to observe the enemys actual dispositions. D Company was therefore ordered to proceed forward and

capture Cambes with the rest of the Battalion closely following in reserve.About 1700 hours on the 7th June, D Company moved forward supported by one squadron of tank (East Riding Yeomanry); the rest of the Battalion remained halted at the

side of the wood. A short diversion was provided here as four enemy fighters suddenly appeared and machine gunned the rear

companies, causing no casualties. Here too, the first French people were met, who outwardly showed many signs of goodwill.

On reaching the wood — the approach having been somewhat costly due to enemy snipers on the forward edge of the wood,

and accurate mortar fire dropping onto the approach — the company split into half, two platoons under the Company

Commander attacking the village through the left side of the wood, and the other platoon and Company Headquarters,

commanded by the companys second in command, Captain J. Montgomery, attacking through the right edge of the wood.

Immediately the company had broken through into the wood, cross fire from machine guns opened up, resulting in many men

becoming casualties. The Company Commander was killed on the left, and one Platoon Commander on the right, Lt H.

Greene, was wounded and unable to carry on. Captain Montgomery, deciding that the opposition was too heavy for his

depleted company to overcome, ordered a withdrawal from the wood. Owing to the high wall and the thickness of the wood,

the supporting tanks had not been able to give any effective close support during the attack. The Company then withdrew to

the Battalion. and the Commanding Officer on the information received decided that a Battalion attack would be far too costly

without much greater artillery support. During D Companys attack, the reserve companies had suffered a few casualties from

mortar fire, amongst whom were Captain H. M. Gaffikin, the Carrier Platoon Commander, who was wounded but not

evacuated. The Battalion withdrew to Le Mesnil where it took up a defensive position. The attack had

cost D Company its Commander and fourteen Other Ranks killed, one Officer and eleven Other Ranks wounded and four

Other Ranks missing, with two Stretcher Bearers from the Medical Section killed whilst tending the wounded. The loss of

Captain Aldworth was a particularly heavy blow. He had commanded D Company for close on two years and had become

almost an institution both for D Company and indeed the Battalion. Of the many regulars of the Battalion that we were so soon

to lose he was the first, and with his passing it seemed as though the Battalion had lost part of its identity and character.On

the 8th June, the Commanding Officer made a reconnaissance for a Battalion attack on Cambes, this time attacking from the

village of Afisy, some 1200 yards to the west of Le Mesnil, and 1500 yards north of Cambes. This reconnaissance was carried

out with Lt-Colonel Hussey, commanding 33 Field Artillery who was killed later in his tank, and Lieut. Colonel Williamson,

commanding East Riding Yeomanry, protected by the Battalion Snipers under command of Sjt F. Pancott. As a result,

Company Commanders were given the plan in outline at Anisy at 1630 hours 8 June, after which they made their

reconnaissance."

[Moon]

Simon,

goes only to show how widely dispersed opinions about "historical" can be, and that it is always iffy to use just one source when designing scenarios. No one source is "the one and only". I am not sure from which source you are quoting (sounds familiar, though - is this Whitaker?), but when you compare your text with what the German history states, it becomes evident that both forces pretty much ran into each other, and the Germans certainly didn't have prepared "dispositions" around Cambes. I have a nice copy of a German situation map from the 7th, which shows that there were no German units on defense around Cambes before the 25th moved out towards the beaches.

Aaanyway... don't really want to get into a debate here which won't lead anywhere. I do not want to pretend that "First Clash at Cambes" reflects the events of June 7th 1944 one by one. Different sources always seem to differ more or less in their descriptions of a particular combat action, which, when you think about it, is really not that surprising. I have researched the battle (it's a while ago, but I used like 4 or 5 different sources) and came up with what you see. There would be no historians still researching WWII when arriving at "the one and only truth" would be that easy, though

[Simon Fox]

No doubt you are right Moon, if you'd had the same source I have (RUR regimental history) then the scenario may have been different. My main point was that you can't rely on one side to estimate the strength of the other since obviously your German history may be super accurate on their side but seems to have mixed up the British forces from the 7th and 9th. It is hardly unexpected that they overestimated the forces they bumped into if they decided to withdraw. The advantage of regimental diaries is that they don't tend to give exact details of the enemy strength but will give precise details of the friendly forces committed as well whatever support they get.

I did play the scenario against Bastables as Germans but we canned it half way through because I thought the original CM brit inf Bn OOB upon which you obviously based the brit forces was hamstringing me in a big way. Thankfully that has been fixed now.

I still think the battle could have played out like the scenario if the brit Bn commander had persisted and followed up D Co on the 7th. But I think the Brit OOB would be quite different. I might edit the Brit side and dispositions and send you the result to see what you think?

[Michael Dorosh]

I find a quick post at www.feldgrau.com can often garner you a quote or two from a German regimental history, translated into English.

I've heard some pretty bad things about Whitaker's book about Falaise (is this what you are referring to Moon)?

But since Whitaker just passed on, perhaps this ain't the time....