Soviet Intelligence, Lucy, and Ultra

[Wojtek]

Originally posted by Chad Harrison:

What amazes me is that the Germans never caught onto the fact that we could break most of their codes/coding machine language. Does anyone know if the Germans ever suspected it?

The British were always very careful in their use of Ultra intelligence, rightly reasoning that the source itself was far more important than any one piece of information. For this reason, it was usual to ensure that the Germans believed there was another reason for the intelligence before an attack was made.

For example, in the North Atlantic, this would mean flying a reconnaisance plane over a target before attacking, so that the Germans would think that they had been spotted by the plane rather than that some other means of intelligence was available.

IIRC there was one occasion on which the Kreigsmarine believed that their code was broken, based upon the fact that all but one of their U-boat resupply ships were sunk in the space of a week. In fact, although the locations were all known to Ultra, the sinkings were a coincidence, the result of local action rather than Ultra information. The resulting KM investigation concluded that their cipher security was intact.

There were many occasions on which Ultra intelligence was not used, because using it may have compromised Ultra itself. I believe that Crete was one of these.

I'll try to get references for this (I'm at work just now) but IIRC most of the info comes from Simon Singh's The Code Book.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Flesh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Flesh:

Well, the amount of secrecy that surrounded the German preparations for the Battle of the Bulge suggests (at least to me) that they had started to smell a rat...

I question that. Barring anything specific that you can cite, I would say that it was due simply to the standard Wehrmacht practice of giving preference to teletype and landline as the means for transmitting operational orders when ever that was possible.

The times when Ultra was most fruitful were when a landline was not available. These included transmissions to sea, to Africa, whenever landlines had been cut either by air attack or partisan activity (such as was the case during the Normandy fighting), or during situations where the fighting was particularly fluid, either advancing or retreating rapidly. Obviously, a set piece attack following a period when the front was stable, such as the BotB, would have had landlines readily available.

Michael</font>

[Flesh]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Flesh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Flesh:

Well, the amount of secrecy that surrounded the German preparations for the Battle of the Bulge suggests (at least to me) that they had started to smell a rat...

I question that. Barring anything specific that you can cite, I would say that it was due simply to the standard Wehrmacht practice of giving preference to teletype and landline as the means for transmitting operational orders when ever that was possible.

The times when Ultra was most fruitful were when a landline was not available. These included transmissions to sea, to Africa, whenever landlines had been cut either by air attack or partisan activity (such as was the case during the Normandy fighting), or during situations where the fighting was particularly fluid, either advancing or retreating rapidly. Obviously, a set piece attack following a period when the front was stable, such as the BotB, would have had landlines readily available.

Michael</font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Flesh:

Anyway, over the years, I've come across lots of accounts that mention that the Germans enforced strict radio silence during the preparations for the BotB.

So have I and I have no reason to doubt that they are true. My point was that this was not necessarily unusual and to explain why not.

Also, some accounts mention that they even falsified radio traffic, just as the Allies did before D-Day. I don't know much about WWII German signals, but I've always wondered why they would falsify radio traffic that was probably encrypted.

You may have misunderstood what was being alluded to. I am not familiar with the particular case, but what I suspect (and what was usually done) is that radio operators (who each have a recognizable "fist") were left behind when their formations moved into attack positions. They then broadcast notional traffic which was triangulated by Allied receivers, giving a false impression of where their units were located.

This ruse was not entirely successful however. Patton and his staff were able to keep good track of which units had been pulled out of the front opposite 3rd. Army. It was not especially difficult to then speculate where they were being sent and where they would strike next. Those speculations proved in the event to be correct and enabled Patton to respond to the German attack about 48-72 sooner than anyone had thought was possible. This savings in time was useful in the relief of Bastogne.

Michael

[Enoch]

Thanks for the follow-up replies. It looks like there is some interesting stuff out there on Soviet espionage during WWII.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Enoch:

Thanks for the follow-up replies. It looks like there is some interesting stuff out there on Soviet espionage during WWII.

Oh, we've hardly scratched the surface of that topic. The Soviets throughout their rather dismal history were not very good at quite a few things that are required to run a successful modern state, but at the intelligence game they were generally superb. There is a lot more to be heard on this subject. Stay tuned.

Michael

[Chad Harrison]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Oh, we've hardly scratched the surface of that topic . . .

Dang! And we thought we were getting smarter here!

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Chad Harrison:

Dang! And we thought we were getting smarter here!

Clearly you've never heard of the Law of The Conservation of Intelligence.

It has, however, been great fun. As you might gather, it's a subject that I find occasionally fascinating.

Michael

[Firefly]

Originally posted by Wojtek:

There were many occasions on which Ultra intelligence was not used, because using it may have compromised Ultra itself. I believe that Crete was one of these.

A minor clarification, Kippenberger (Sp?), the commander on Crete, did have Ultra information on the German invasion, but he made the decision not to redeploy his troops because the need for security had been impressed upon him. See Beevor's Crete.

One instance where Ultra intercepts were not used for security reasons, and one for which Churchill has been retrospectively crticised, was the bombing of Coventry.