Counterbattery at Yelnia 1941

[Andreas]

I thought I post this, since it shows quite well the situation in the Yelnia salient, where the Wehrmacht received its first operational defeat since the start of the war in 1939.

Yelnia was Zuhkov’s first victory over the Wehrmacht, made possible because the Wehrmacht very seriously underestimated Soviet reserves, and because its armoured forces were stretched to the limit. The Germans held on to the salient in the face of heavy Soviet attacks for almost two months. When the armour of Guderian’s Panzergruppe 2 was withdrawn to assist in encircling the Kiev pocket in mid-August, the time was up, and on 4th September the salient had to be given up.

A measure of how desperate things were can be read in the history of B17 (in Froben): ‘OP crews repeatedly fought off infiltrated Russians and tanks. Almost on a daily basis, T34, and once a 52-tonner (KW1 or 2) broke through to the battery positions and had to be destroyed by direct fire or Stukas. On 24th and 25th July, the crew of the analysis post ‘Sound’ (AW-Stelle Schall) destroyed 4 tanks with magnetic mines (Haftladungen). Early on, Soviet FOOs were still hidden behind the German line and directed fire on anything that moved. The OC and his 2i/c of B7 from Munich got treated to this when visiting B17. When artillery ammunition ran low for a while, Stukas attacked targets registered by the detachment (B17).’ (p.252)

This map shows the position of various counter-battery units in the salient. There were four different units in the salient:

SS Beob.Batt. of 2.SS "Das Reich"

Beob.Batt. 90 [322] of 10. PD

Beob.Batt. 27 [337] of 17. PD

2. Beob.Abt. 17

Beob.Abt. 20

A special unit in the salient is Arko 101 (CP NE of Yelnia). As far as I understand, Arko units were special fire direction commands that had the ability to deliver concentrated fire of a whole Corps’ (or higher?) artillery onto important targets, and would only be used at critical points. I would be grateful if someone could let me know if this interpretation of their role is correct.

The number of special artillery and counter-battery observation units in the salient itself can be seen as a measure of the strength of Soviet artillery lying on it, I guess.

The western-most line of sound ranging posts (just E of Babarkin Cholm) was where B17 moved to after the German retreat.

Some explanations: the Ops (Meßstellen) are the circles with the line on them, to show their facing, I guess. Flash-ranging is colour-coded (Rot, Gelb, Weiss and Schwarz), and has an ‘L’ in the circle. Sound ranging is coded by letters (A, B etc). Advance warning posts for sound ranging are small circles with a ‘V’ in them (look for them on the south-eastern edge of the map). I believe that the gridlines in the SE and NW corners are the German army's grid system numbers, from which the position of batteries and units relative to an axis could be derived.

Some interesting stats. By 1st August 1942, B17 had reconnoitered 1,362 targets by sound, and 188 by flash-ranging. Of these, 214 (15.7%) and 130 (69.1%) were attacked. The ammunition for this was 9,279 rounds, an average of 27 rounds per target.

B17 was then almost destroyed in the encirclement of Welikije Luki in December 1942 (this was a smaller operation in conjunction with ‘Mars’, the attack on the Rhzev salient.

[Durbish]

Thank you Germanboy for another cool tidbit.

[Runyan99]

Andreas,

You and I seem to share an interest in the early battles, and in the Smolensk/Yelnia operation. So, I'll bump this one. I do not know diddly squat about counterbattery fire, so I have nothing to add.

I will comment on spelling. Adding to the difficulty in reading historical accounts by different authors from different nations, it can sometimes be difficult to figure out exactly where things are happening. This is exacerbated by the phoenetic translations of Russian place names, which are often very different depending on author.

I bring this up because Yelnia is a good example. I have seen it in different sources several different ways, including:

Yelnya

Yelnia

Ielnia

Those off the top of my head, and and in this account as Jeljna.

(And what is the Cyrillic version?)

This particular village is famous enough so that there is no confusion, but for lesser known villages, it can sometimes be difficult to realize that Yelnia and Jeljna are in fact the same place.

[Firefly]

Originally posted by Runyan99:

Andreas,

I will comment on spelling. Adding to the difficulty in reading historical accounts by different authors from different nations, it can sometimes be difficult to figure out exactly where things are happening. This is exacerbated by the phoenetic translations of Russian place names, which are often very different depending on author.

This is also a problem when reading the history of the war in Greece. It wasn't until I checked the map in the book, that I realised that the town Anthony Beavor referred to as Canea in his Crete was the town referred to in holiday brochures as Chania and transliterated by the Greeks themselves (on road signs etc.) as Hania.

I can imagine the war in China provides similar if not more difficult examples.

[ August 05, 2002, 07:41 AM: Message edited by: Firefly ]

[Doodlebug]

Hi Andreas.

Thanks for the interesting detail in your post. I can't help wondering though that the defensive setup you've given seems a very structured one. It struck me that as you're talking about a relatively early engagement you must therefore must be talking about the deployment of intact German Divisions, although depleted perhaps, rather than Kampfgruppes bodged together from all and sundry. I was intrigued as to how this sort of tactical system fitted into a Kampfgruppe situation or a fluid battle. I'm guessing it doesn't being more suited it seems to a static (and organised) front. Any details or observations on more fluid or later situations

[freaky ol'man w/very long wings]

Hi,

I have something to add to the topic. It is an excerpt from Alexander Werth's "The war in Russia. 1941-1945".E.P. Dutton & CO., INC. New York,1964.

He comments that althought the Battle of Yelnya in the month of August; "was not a major battle of the Soviet-German war, and yet one has to live back into the fearfull summer of 1941 to realise how vital it was for Russian Morale."

In one interview the author had with General Sokolovsky, "at that time General Konev's Chief of Staff", the author mentions that; "He (G. Sokolovsky) thought German communications were being seriously interfered with by the partisans in the enemy rear. He also thought that Russian artillery was greatly superior to German artillery. Thought he admitted that the Germans still had great air and tank superiority."

I'm hoping this little tidbit adds to the general idea of the Yelnia salient battles. The interview was held in Vyazma, in the Smolenk Front sector at the time. The athor sees this as a Russian victory, although he mentions events would change "for the worst" for the defendants of the salient, later, for they would be encircled.