British and CW infantry training (US question too)

[Dandelion]

I'm stuck and I have two questions.

First. I have not quite figured out the relationship between British, Empire and Commonwealth forces yet. This keeps confusing me. Having finally gotten my hands on "Infantry Tactics" (1939) and "Infantry Training" (1944), and am awaiting "Operations" (1942), I now note that these are all "British" army publications. I have previously learned on this forum that this is not synonymous with "concerns all men with flat helmets".

My question is simple - can one presume, as in take for granted until otherwise proven, that imperial and commonwealth troops abided by the same doctrine (ahem, well, say tactical principles) as outlined in these British manuals? That they used the same manuals to organise and execute infantry training? That they had parallell development and introduced tactical novelties at about the same time, all of them? Of course I realise that Canada and India introduced nothing at all in 1939, but I am particularly interested in the significant changes of primarily 1942 and 1944.

Secondly, and I turn now to US grogs - the British (and CW? and Imperial?) "Hate Training" courses that were held in late 41 and early 42 - were there any such deliberate campaigns in the US Army with the same intent? If so, were results any different from the UK experience?

Yours Sincerely

Dandelion

[JonS]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

I have not quite figured out the relationship between British, Empire and Commonwealth forces yet.

British forces were under the complete sway of their local army commanders. Indian forces were effectively part of the British army, so the same held for them. I understand that pretty much the same held for the South Africans, except they were only to be used on the African continent (a new law was required to allow 6th Armd to go to Italy later on). Freyberg early in the war saw some looming problems in his dual role as a div commander, and the commander of 2NZEF - essentially NZs complete field army. As a result he negotiated a charter between himself and the NZ Govt which gave him special privileges and powers far above that of an ordinary div GOC. Essentially, he could refer back to the NZ Govt whenever he wanted to, and could refuse to commit NZ fces on his own volition*. I understand that the Australians had a similar arrangement, but since they had more than one div, there was a separation between the div GOCs and the holder of the charter. I think the Canadians sat somewhere between the NZ model and the Indian model.

can one presume, as in take for granted until otherwise proven, that imperial and commonwealth troops abided by the same doctrine (ahem, well, say tactical principles) as outlined in these British manuals?

Yes, but. To take one example; as a result of CRUSADER in Nov '41 the British became enamoured of the Bde Battle Gp idea - 3 inf bns, a regt of arty, plus a leavening of A-Tk, LAA, Engrs, etc. As a result of this dispersion centralised control of artillery all but broke down, and the position of CRA at division and corps was in serious jeopardy of being disestablished. This was the official doctrine of 8th Army, and enforced as such. It affected any British and Indian infantry divisions, and I believe the South Africans too. Minor nations forces (Poles, French, Greeks) didn't have much choice but to play along since they didn't have full divisions anyway. However, Freyburg strongly disagreed with the policy, and as a result of this, and other, disagreements - and the urgent need to rebuild the Div after the losses of CRUSADER he told 8th to jam it and buggered off to Syria to play with 9th Army for a while. There his CRA reinforced his position and role of centralised arty control, and developed techniques to make it a viable doctrine. Meanwhile, in England, a similar process of strong centralisation was also under way I believe.

So we have a situation where doctrine being developed and rolled out in England was being ignored by the only British Army actually engaging the Germans, who were in turn being ignored by at least one of it's sub-fmns.

Later, after centralised arty was seen to be The Way, and 8th Army started enforcing that instead, there were still divergences in how this was actually applied on the battlefield. 4th Indian Div, for example, 'only' used planned concentrations in it's fireplans, eschewing creeping barrages. The Canadians in Italy did likewise, though for a different reason I think. The NZ Div and 'most' British fmns, on the other hand used creeping barrages, supplemented to a greater or lesser extent by concs, depending on the tac situation, the ground, and the CRAs predilections.

These are obviously arty examples, while you were asking about inf really, but hopefully you get the idea.

That they used the same manuals to organise and execute infantry training? That they had parallel development and introduced tactical novelties at about the same time, all of them?

Yes, I believe so. At their base, all CW nations used the same pams.

Glad to see you back after a while. Be cool

Jon

* There is some info on the GOCs Charter here. Scroll down to charter. The actual text of the charter can be found here

[Pzman]

Originally posted by JonS:

I think the Canadians sat somewhere between the NZ model and the Indian model.

I believe so, but even then the 1st Canadian Army was never all that independant. Being under Mongomery in NWE, and the Canadians in Italy were likewise under British command. I'm sure Mr.Dorosh could tell us more about that though.

[Guest Mike]

I read somewhere that het NZ Division sorted out the classic "fire and movement" drill for infantry a year or 2 before the Brits did (1941 viz 1943??) - is this true, and, if so, how did it happen if they're all reading from the same book?

[JonS]

The British Army had 'fire and movement' in it's infantry pams before 1914.

[Michael Emrys]

Didn't the Australians and New Zealanders work out any special tactics for employment in the Pacific?

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

Secondly, and I turn now to US grogs - the British (and CW? and Imperial?) "Hate Training" courses that were held in late 41 and early 42 - were there any such deliberate campaigns in the US Army with the same intent? If so, were results any different from the UK experience?

I can't really compare the procedures of the two parties, but the US forces did have "Know Your Enemy" type training films, printed booklets, lectures, etc. In other words, there was plenty of motivational material.

Michael

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

Didn't the Australians and New Zealanders work out any special tactics for employment in the Pacific?

Michael

Probably. I was eliding that point deliberately.

[Guest Mike]

Originally posted by JonS:

The British Army had 'fire and movement' in it's infantry pams before 1914.

At het section level - the work I read this in was referring specifically to the fire group/assault group split of a standard rifle section equiped with a LMG - I don't think that would have been in a 1914 drill!!

And regardless of ewhat was written, did they actually do it??!

[Dandelion]

[reading with great interest and patiently waiting for everyone to have time to contribute...]

[hoolaman]

Why don't you just say: "*bump*!!!"

[Michael Emrys]

Because he has more class than that.

Michael

[cassh]

I think that British Battalions in India (British), and Indian Army Battalions were not strickly under the same doctrine/training regime (although in reality almost identical). It was a hangover from the distinction between East India Company Regiments and British Line Regiments serving in India. The Army Council I believe did not have direct control over Indian Regiments recruitment and training (I shall go away and confirm this and get back to you), although it would seem likely that given a unified theatre command in war this political delineation were meaningless.

Hate training - IIRC Denis Forman's book "To Reason Why" on Lionel Wigram and the battle school movement talks about lectures on the evils of the Nazi regime being given at Barnard Castle and Warminster as the bits and pieces of information about concentration and death camps filtered back from the continent.

Wigram, being a Jew himself, became extremely hateful towards the Nazis according to Forman, and tried to pass on his loathing of the Nazis and all they stood for to the training course cadres that were passing through the School of Infantry's hands. It was part of the overall process of motivating the troops and giving them the belief that not only could they win, but that they had to win as a much higher purpose was at stake than found in war between nations. It was a war between tyranny and freedom, good and evil. Whether these lectures transposed into section battle drills and bayonet training etc I don't know.

[cassh]

Oh, yeah, forgot to say - actual method for fire and movement at the minor tactical scale in written doctrine I believe did not exist until Paget took up Alexander's I Corps "Tactical Notes" training pamphlet for the entire Army in 1941. Prior to this I believe most Army training publications were broad and non-specific in their description of fire and movement. The onus was on the COs to know about minor tactics and train their subalterns and field officers accordingly.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by cassh:

Oh, yeah, forgot to say - actual method for fire and movement at the minor tactical scale in written doctrine I believe did not exist until Paget took up Alexander's I Corps "Tactical Notes" training pamphlet for the entire Army in 1941. Prior to this I believe most Army training publications were broad and non-specific in their description of fire and movement. The onus was on the COs to know about minor tactics and train their subalterns and field officers accordingly.

I don't know what you mean by "minor tactical scale", but F&M within the platoon using the Lewis gun as the main source of covering fire (albeit only in the special case of attackign a pillbox) was recommended in SS143 of Feb 1917. Clearly one cannot do gun group/rifle group F&M until there is a sufficient scale of issue of LMGs to have one per section, and the scale in 1917 was more likely to be one or two per platoon. F&M at the platoon scale was certainly published doctrine by the end of WW1 as part of Maxse's "soft-spot" tactics. The article "The Once and Future Army" in British Army Review no. 120 gives an account of these, illustrated with drawings from contemporary manuals.

You mentioned Wigram, and the latest BAR has a 4-page piece on him which is worth a read. Mike asked whether people actually did what it said in the manuals, and, it seems pretty clear, they often didn't. On the one hand, "Doctrine is no use if it remains in books. It needs to be lodged in the minds of soldiers, who will then use it" (Maj. D. Fitzgerald, also writing in BAR 120), and, on the other, I find that most doctrinal publications these days are prolix pabulum. This is apparently not a new problem -- I can't resist quoting a stanza quoted in Paddy Griffith's "Battle Tactics of the Western Front" from a comic song at the inauguration of the Inspectorate of Training in 1918:

"...And while the mad medley was gaily galumphing

The Persons Above Them were steadily bumphing.

Shades of St. Rollox, of Castor and Pollux,

You never espied such a powerful tide,

Such a merciless flow of grandiloquent bollocks,

Pamphlets, oh dear, 300 a year,

And nobody looked at them, no bally fear..."

...but I digress. Back to Wigram. I recently found in an old posting to rec.miniatures.historical by Martin Rapier what appears to be the complete text of his famous letter giving an account of his Sicilian experience. I have tidied up some of the more obvious OCR boogers, and include it below. When I get the chance I shall is I can find the original at the PRO and establish an authentic text.

Of particular interest to me are the way F&M is conducted, if it is conducted at all, at the platoon rather than section scale; and the division of infantrymen into fighters, sheep and cowards, prefiguring and corroborating the publication of S.L.A. Marshall's work on participation rates.

All the best,

John.

- - - - - - - - - - cut here - - - - - - - - -

Dear Brigadier,

As requested I am appending a report of the lessons of the Campaign in SICILY as they have occurred to me. As you know owing to the kindness of the Div Comd I was allowed to come over to SICILY as an observer at the beginning of the Campaign, subsequently rejoining 78 Div on its arrival. As a result of this I was able to see some eight or nine different Bns in action, and to study and compare their various methods. I was also able to meet a very large number of old students from BARNARD CASTLE of all ranks. I was able to discuss all the points I am making below with a large number of officers with considerable experience in battle, and I find that there is general agreement. As you know it also transpired owing to the fortunes of war that I found myself at different times commanding a Section, a Platoon, a Company and finally a Bn, and I was thus able to get first hand experience of many of the matters to which I refer.

1. ATTACK BY INFILTRATION

The Germans have undoubtedly in one way scored a decided success in SICILY. They have been able to evacuate their forces almost intact having suffered very few casualties in killed and wounded. They have inflicted heavy casualties on us. We all feel rather irritated at the result, well as we have done.

Why has this happened? One hears it said on all sides that the country is mountainous and difficult, and therefore ideal for defence, impossible for attack.

In my view this is a completely erroneous impression of the country. It is true that the country is mountainous but it is everywhere close. Every hill is covered with olive groves, plantations standing crops etc, and in

addition the system of irrigation by deep ditches, high stone walls and a great number of ditches and wadis makes the country perfect for individual infiltration. It is quite easy for the Germans to defend by maintaining a very thin screen of MGs and gunner and mrtr OPs sited on the reverse slope of the hills and to get magnificent cross-fire shoots both by day and by night. If we attack such positions frontally even with Hy Arty Supp we play

right into his hands. He maintains his screen until the last moment inflicting heavy casualties, then as our attack pushes in, pulls out to take up a further position in the rear. So we find invariably that he has gone,and the small number of dead bodies found and the small number of Prisoners taken tell their own story.

To my mind we have not yet in our training put into practice the lessons learnt in the Battle of FRANCE, and more especially in the battles of MALAYA against the Japs. In MALAYA our own position was very similar to that of the Germans in SICILY. We had prepared our withdrawal from hill to hill expecting the Jap to attack us. He did nothing of the kind. By employing minute parties of specialist tps armed with TGs and MGs he filtered through the cover by night in ones and twos and was able every morning to establish road blocks in our rear to shoot up our tpt and communications, to pick off OPs and W/sets, and so to disorganise us that we were compelled to withdraw in disorder from position to position without getting a sight of the enemy: His tps who carried out this work suffered very few casualties.

I think that the whole key to our future success in the coming battles of EUROPE will lie in the organisation of similar forces. From now on the Germans are going to fight a series of rearguard battles wherever they happen to be. If each Bn could produce one or two Pls trained, I suggest, to work in threes, each group of three carrying one MG and one TG and each being prepared to work entirely on its own, the problem would be solved. As soon as contact is gained these tps would be sent out at dusk and would be in position behind the enemy by first light. This would invariably compel the enemy to withdraw.

I make the following points in regard to these suggestions:

(i) I am convinced that we have been too ambitious in trying to teach each soldier the art of infiltration. Even fanatics Like the Japs and Germans found that only a few men could be trusted to do this job, and they have

always left it to specialists. It is an impossible ideal to hope to train the Army as a whole in it.

(ii) yet our men can do this job. Instance the Bn I am at present commanding, at RIVOGLIA Bn HQ was being constantly menaced by enemy snipers and MGs hidden in the rocks and trees at the foot of Mt. ETNA. I sent off a young Pl Comd to deal with the matter. He first of all tried to use his whole Pl but subsequently picked four men and with them fought an individual infiltration battle against the Germans which lasted the whole day. The result of the battle was as follows

- Our casualties nil Germans 3 killed for certain, 6 prisoners captured.

German equipment captured - 2 heavy MGs and large quantities of sniping gear.

I saw these men when they returned, they said they had been very frightened at first, but as the day wore on and they realised what rotten shots the Germans were they got a feeling of superiority and towards the end were thoroughly enjoying themselves.

I think that every Pl could find a few men like these.

(iii) All the evidence points to the fact that the Germans at any rate in SICILY do not withdraw on a timed schedule but `under pressure'. There is no recorded instance of them standing to fight to the last round and to the last man. They always cleared out as soon as they were really menaced, and the morale of those captured was decidedly low. This strengthens my view that they would clear out even more quickly if attacked from the rear (or

merely threatened from the rear).

(iv) It has several times been suggested that the same object could be achieved by infiltrating whole Bns round to the rear. This may be so, but I do not think it would be nearly as successful and it would result in heavy casualties as the German always protects his flanks by MGs and gunner OPs. I do not think that even a Coy or a Pl could do it successfully except on very favourable grd.

(v) Until we have these little groups trained I do not think Comds have any option but to continue the present costly methods. The matter is just one of training and I am sure it would only take a few days. I would very much like to have the opportunity of training and organising a force of this kind. There are all sorts of small points - camouflage, admin, comns etc.

2. ATTACK - BATTLE DRILL

It was my chief concern to see the application of Battle Drill to battle and I watched it very closely. I have come to the conclusion that a number of revisions are necessary if we are to deal with realities.

There is nothing wrong with Battle Drill in theory, but it presupposes that you have a Pl team in which every individual knows his job and his place, and in which every man is brave enough and experienced enough to do as he is told. Of course in practice you have no such thing. Probably about half the Pl really understand the Battle Drill thoroughly, and as I shall show below in any case quite a number of the men in the Pl cannot be relied upon. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that Battle Drill as at present taught is very useful training, and will give first-class results when

applied by regular Bns who have practised it for many months, but we need something very much simpler for this war.

I want first of all to describe how Pls are fighting at the moment. Attacks are invariably carefully prepared, the tps go forward under arty concentrations or a barrage. When the barrage lifts (if the enemy has not

gone) he opens up with his MGs, and it is here that the Pl battle starts and it is here that the battle itself is lost or won.

In very rare instances Pl and Coy Comds have applied some sort of Battle Drill to knock out these enemy MGs. Where they have done so they have invariably succeeded in taking the position with very few casualties.

But, in the very large majority of cases, no sort of Battle Drill is used. No attempt is made at Fire and Movement. The positions are taken by what I call 'Guts and Movement'.

The battle goes something like this:-

Enemy MGs open fire, the whole Pl lie down except the Pl Comd and three or four gutful men. Five or six men start making tracks for home, meanwhile the gutful men under the Pl Comd dash straight in to the enemy position without any covering fire and always succeed in taking the position. In some instances some positions are taken by as few as two men, and every Bn Comd will confirm that it is always the same group of nine or ten who are there first, and on whom the battle depends.

I have personally seen this method of attack used in all, except one, of the battles in which I took part, and this explains one of the mysteries I have never been able to solve before - that is the saying of many experienced soldiers that `you must never allow men to lie down in a battle'.

This method of attack is peculiarly British and from the point of view of sheer courage it really has no equal. I am convinced however that we can find other and better methods, and I make the following observations:

(i) Some Comds say that this method is successful with few casualties. This is true if you speak of casualties in quantity, but it is far from true if you speak of casualties in quality. The Pl in action is almost invariably twenty-two strong and of whatever Regt good or bad, every Pl can be analysed as follows:

Six gutful men who will go anywhere and do anything, 12 'sheep' who will follow a short distance behind if they are well led, 9-6 who will run away.

I have discussed these figures with many people and they all agree, although there is some slight disagreement on figures. These figures are roughly accurate as shown by the number of Court-Martials for running away that follow every Campaign. Every Bn has between forty to sixty and there are, of course, many others who aren't caught.

Looking at these figures it will be seen that the group from which casualties cannot be spared is the gutful group, yet I would say that casualties in this group are often 100 per cent per month. We must find a method of fighting which is more economical.

(ii) Battle Drill or Fire and Movement is not applied because in its present form it is too complicated, and it presupposes that when a Section is told to do a thing that it will do it whilst in actual fact, as the above Pl figures show, they will probably do little or nothing.

What we need is an extremely simple Battle Drill which takes cognisance of the fact that there are only 9--6 men in the Pl who can be absolutely relied on to do as they are told under enemy fire.

The following is my suggested drill:-

(a) Night attack behind arty concs or barrage (commonest standard stroke employed out here).

The Pl of 22 men is divided up as follows:-

1st group - All the riflemen under the Pl Comd.

2nd group - 3 Bren groups (3 men to each gun) comd by the Pl Sgt.

3rd group - two-inch Mtr team follows up in rear of group 1.

The leaders of the above three groups have absorbed three of the reliable men in the P1. The other three reliable men will act as 2nds in comd to take over if the leader is killed or wounded.

The method of movement is simple as the Pl is handled as a Section. The rifle group will be in fairly tight night formation (patrol). (This is essential to make sure that nobody drops out.) The Bren groups will be in a similar formation and the two groups will move side by side (preferably Bren groups a little to the rear) with a gap of about 50 to 100x (according to the visibility between the two groups). The two-inch mrtr group keeps about 50x in the rear of the Rifle group.

As soon as the barrage lifts and the Rifle group is fired on, the Rifle group goes to ground. The Pl Sgt (who can really be relied on) at once gets his three Brens into action shooting at the enemy MG or MGs. This will invariably silence the enemy guns for the time being. I have made particularly careful observation on this point and have checked it up with a large number of Pl Comds. As soon as our MGs open up the Germans (who are always using tracer) stop. I think they do this because they are nervous or in order to observe our fire. They always keep quiet until we have finished our hate, then as soon as there is a lull they open up again. One almost never sees or hears Spandau and Bren firing together at the same time. It is always one followed by the other. Even inaccurate fire from our Brens will quieten the Spandaus until we have finished firing.

As soon as the Brens have quietened the enemy MGs the Pl Comd gets on his feet, persuades all the rest of the riflemen to do likewise, and leads them straight into the enemy position under cover of the Bren fire. He may tell the Mrtr to put down a bomb or two also if necessary. He will nearly always be able to make the enemy position in a single bound as the Germans, as a rule, hold their fire (particularly at night) until we are within 200x. If he cannot make it in a single bound he will have to lead his men forward into cover, open up with his two-inch mortar and get his Brens forward in this manner. This will complicate the operation but will rarely be necessary.

( Day attack with Arty concentrations

Same method of grouping, but groups move much more dispersed, men being at 5x intervals. If forward movement is across country likely to be covered by enemy the Pl Comd tells the Pl Sgt to position his Bren groups before moving himself, and the Pl advances by Fire and Movement handled as a Section in every way.

c) Day attack, little battle without Hy Arty concs (e.g. A single Coy sent up to picket a height.)

All Pls in the Coy will be organised as suggested above, and the leading Pl will move forward as described in (.

If the leading Pl comes under fire from more than one enemy MG post it will be regarded as pinned and the Coy Comd will deploy the rest of his Coy round whichever flank offers the best cover. This sort of battle requires the most inf skill, and it should be practised at home as I think it will be often needed.

NOTES (i) There is this further practical point on grouping the Brens collectively. In hilly country the speed of the Bren is far different from the speed of the rifleman with the result that it almost always happens that when the riflemen are caught under fire there is a frantic scream for the Brens who invariably are found to be a long way in the rear. With the system advocated the Pl Comd can watch the progress of the Brens so that he does not get out of touch with them. It may be argued that the Section Comds should be able to do this but, in fact, they are not able to do so.

Team work between the Pl Comd and the Pl Sgt is about 10 times more likely to succeed than team work between the Sects - that is my strong point for this very simple drill.

3. BATTLE INOCULATION

The Battle Schools have not gone far enough into this important subject and have missed the big point of it.

Even tps who have been in quite a number of battles are unable to distinguish between Bren and Spandau fire, between the whistle of our own shells and those of the enemy. They go to ground as soon as there is any noise of firing, although it is not directed at them. This often disorganises an entire battle, especially at night.

Comds come back to find their men, but they are seated at the bottom of deep holes and their Comds cannot find them and, because of the noise, they do not answer when called. This problem of offrs and NCOs losing all or a substantial part of their men in night attacks is a very real one and it happened in all the Bns I was with at some time or other. Tps coming up from the rear e.g. tpt, A tk guns etc, ordered to be up for consolidation at first light were particularly bad - there were often considerable delays because of the mere noise of firing.

It is only fair to say that the German appears to be the same. The noise of firing keeps him quiet for a very long time.

(a) I suggest that at all Battle Schools there should be the following duty Battle Inoculation. Every student to listen to the noise of the Bren; Spandau; Schmeiser and Tommy-gun.

( Advancing men to have firstly fire not directed at them, then directed over them, so that they acquire sufficient skill to know whether or not they are being shot at.

© It must be impressed on the men every day that they have got to learn the difference between the mere noise of battle and fire directed at them. The have got to learn to keep moving fwd as fast as possible despite any noise so long as they themselves are not the target.

4. INCENDIARY AMN

Events in this Campaign have proved that despite 'very heavy shelling a small remnant of the Boche will stay put. It is this small remnant that causes all the trouble. I have seen a lucky shot from a 25-pr set the ground on fire. The Germans immediately went although they were well dug in. I am sure that one of our best weapons is the three-inch mrtr smoke bomb used as a lethal weapon, that is fired directly at the enemy so setting the area alight with the burning phosphorus.

If we could throw some inc amn in our 25 prs we should have no further trouble with the Boche, and I suggest that something on the lines of the RAF oil bomb would be most effective. We can't blast him out but we could easily burn him out.

5. BDE ORGANISATION

This is already out of date, and I hope the authorities at home realise it. The Bde Supp Gp is probably all right so far as the MGs are concerned although every Bn Comd to whom I have spoken would prefer to have the MGs in the Bn. The remainder of the Bde Supp Gp is unnecessary and quite useless for the following reasons:-

Four point two-inch Mortars

Very inaccurate - not as quick into action as 25 prs. There is nothing they do which the 25 prs do not do better. If OPs are difficult to come by they are yet another group of people occupying valuable space.

When suitable targets presented themselves they were far out of range, or could be adequately dealt with by the 25 prs. During a three-day battle when I was almost continuously at an OP, the 4.2 mrtrs fired no rounds during the whole period.

They have been used to thicken up fire when concentrations are being put down, but as there is nó shortage of guns it is rather a drop in the ocean to add 4.2-inch mortars to, say, 6 Fd Regts and 2 Med Regts. When they are so used they can be very dangerous as they are not accurate enough to do barrage work. During one attack of this kind we were continuously shelled by

something very heavy on our own side and we all thought that this was the 4.2-inch mrtr (this may be doing them an injustice).

20 mm A/A

General Montgomery said at the beginning of the Campaign 'I have no intention of starting the land battle until I have won the air battle.' This is obviously the policy which will be continued and as a result the 20 mm A/A is a complete anachronism. These guns were ordered at a time when our Forces in N. AFRICA were without adequate air cover and were suffering severely. This picture has now changed. These guns have hardly fired a shot and I suggest we cannot afford to tie up such a large number of men in a defensive role of this kind, whilst the inf remain desperately short in other ways.

I suggest that the bodies saved by doing away with the 4.2-inch mrtr and the 20 mm A/A gnns should be used in the following manner:

(a) to provide an establishment for Pls of Specialist Infiltration Tps as referred to above.

( to increase the size of the Section which is still always woefully short in actual fact when it gets into battle.

6. TRAINING AT HOME

My principal object was to get careful first-hand notes of actual battles with maps, copies of orders, details, history of events so that our Training Schools at home could base their training on reality. I have kept very full notes of all battles I have seen, and feel at home these battles can be practised on similar ground and the lessons learnt with an accuracy which it has not been possible to achieve in the past. I think that the Campaign in SICILY has really been ideal from a training point of view. We have had every kind of battle - the advance to contact, the prepared attack on a big scale, the Pl and Coy battle, the pursuit and even the flank protection role. In addition we have been able to study the German methods of conducting a rearguard action in detail.

7. MISC POINTS

(1) Value of Smoke

Smoke has been little used in the Campaign, I feel that it might have been a great deal of use. It was used very successfully in the battle of RIVOGLIA by your Bde as you know.

(2) Drawing Fire

If the German sees a tank or some smoke he fires everything he has got at it always. This gives us two very useful openings:

(i) a diversion

(ii) to locate his positions

I have tried out both these ideas successfully. They are old lessons but worth repeating.

(3) Patrolling.

When ordered to send out patrols to regain contact with the enemy who had retired we tried out the idea of sending with them an 18 Set, borrowed from one of the Coys, which was in communication with another l8 Set close to the gunner OP. Whilst the patrol was moving out (in daylight) I manned the OP and carefully registered all likely places where the enemy might be. As soon as the patrol came under fire they wirelessed back to me and we at once brought down the fire of one Fd Regt on the suspected place. This was always effective in silencing enemy fire, and it enabled the patrol to move forward about two miles and to occupy a good position forward of our line for 36 hrs without sustaining casualties.

(4) A Tk guns

It is almost a universal custom out here to group A tk guns under Bde collectively, and to make the Bde A tk regt comd responsible both for their training and their handling in war.

This method works extremely well and it relieves the Bn Comd, who has very many other things to do, of the job. Everyone says, also, how much better gunner A tk gunners are than the inf, and I would suggest that these facts be recognised and the guns organised on a Gunner basis entirely.

The present system creates numerous admin difficulties as the guns are handled by Bde, but administered by the three separate Bns.

(5) Three-inch Mortars and Carriers

These were hardly ever used throughout the Campaign as the country was quite unsuitable for Carriers (movement off the rds was impossible), and the three-inch mrtrs invariably found that targets offered were out of range.

Our three-inch mrtrs (5 Buffs) did not fire a single rd throughout the Campaign.

(6) LOB

Whatever we say about it at home the facts are that a Bn leaves a certain nucleus out of battle.

This usually comprises the 2 i/c, 2 i/cs of each Coy, and about six NCOs or men per P1. This practice should also be recognised at home, and Bns handled in training minus these percentages.

The size of the Sec should be increased if possible to allow for it as the present size was determined on the assumption that there would be no LOB.

(7) Panic and Hysteria

When heavy shelling or mortaring starts it is not unusual to find some men here and there who lose complete control and start to clear out. These men are invariably known beforehand. Their actions may often have the most demoralising effect on the whole P1, which would otherwise behave very well.

I used to think that it was right to make chaps like this go into battle and take their medicine like everyone else, but I am quite sure now that I was wrong. They are too dangerous and can do too much harm.

Nearly every Bn has now come to this conclusion. They know they have about, say, 20 men who are definitely unreliable and they leave them right out of battle. This will now have the effect of greatly reducing the number of Court-Martials in this Campaign but it has not really solved the problem. I feel that a Bn Comd should be able to get rid of men like this simply by certifying that in his opinion X is not suitable for front-line inf fighting.

(8) System of Reinforcement

I do feel that this militates against highly skilled inf methods. Men an first dumped into reinforcement pools, then drafted anywhere. If this system is essential, it very much strengthens my case for specialist infiltration tps.

8. TAKING THE LESSONS HOME

The Div Comd has agreed to allow me (subject to tpt difficulties) to use the present lull to go back for a few days to explain the lessons and to bring out training both in N. Africa and in England into line. Would you be kind enough to let me have your own frank comments on the above together with any additional points so that I can be quite sure that we are really training a the right lines.

Yours

(Sd) L. Wigram, Lt-Col.

Comd 5 Buffs, 36 Bde

CMF

In the Field 16 Aug 43

[Dandelion]

This fellow sounds awfully German I must say.

To attempt to summize then, would it be truthful of me to claim that:

a) Official published British army doctrine can be assumed to have been taught in all armies concerned at roughly the same time. Even though not all forces in the Commonwealth or Empire were obliged to follow British manuals. They by and large chose to do so anyway. Not only the official manuals, but a disturbing amount of "pamphlets" seem to have circulated, affecting actual practice.

By and large doctrine appears to have been applied by the forces taught. Although apparently it didn't work out as imagined, and forces can be relied upon to adjust methods when found non-functional. A note here is that Wigram writes this before the release of the 1944 manual, which I imagine must have been much more to his taste, given what he explains here.

c) We cannot apply these statements on the forces operating in the Pacific.

- On the Hatecourses -

My reason for asking was initially a rather amusing anecdote from Dr Bull on these courses. Apparently the British army felt it a problem that the men weren't taking the war seriously enough, and there seems to have been a similar attitude among the officers that needed outrooting. Hence the courses that took place in late 41 and early 42. However, according to Dr Bull they turned out farcical, and the men giggled their way through them. They were thus quickly dropped.

I also know of the much later, rather ferocious hatecampaigns to foster the British army of occupation (which included the KZs). That all ended with the Welsh in my sector building football courses for the locals, arranging schoolbuses and violating the ban on fraternisation every day. A total flop as it was.

I also came to think of a specific HJ hatecampaign directed at the British in late 1944, triggered by the discovery of pro-British "cultural leanings" (this is Axmann speaking) among the population in general and youths in particular. The campaign was a total flop and also became the subject of much humour.

Finally, I vaguely recall reading material on the US Army Rangers, as the word "Hate training" echoed familiar - but I am not sure. I basically wanted to find out if any government attempt at creating hate where there was previously none ever succeeded.

So did the US troops, specifically those who had no previous problem with Germans, actually become hateful after such "Know your Enemy" courses? Because if they didn't, my belief in a Governments ability to foster new* hate is severely battered.

Cheerio and much thanks (we're not finished yet tho)

Dandelion

* Not the same as exploiting existing hate/prejudice.

[JonS]

'Pams' in B&CW armies is a fairly generic term. It can mean anything from the 60-odd pages in Infantry Training, Vol 1, Infantry Platoon Weapons, Pamphlet No.9, Part II, 3.5-Inch Rocket Launcher, 1953, all the way up to the DM69 - Manual of Armed Forces Law (which runs to several thousand pages, as you'd imagine). In my experience there is no functional difference between the way 'manual' and 'pam' is used, especially in spoken conversations. Yes, there are a god-awful lot of them, but any given soldier is only likely to be concerend with a fairly small subset - in particular those pertaining to his particular pieces of equipment or weapons, and stuff like 'field craft' or 'gun drills in action'. And tactics of course.

Although, having said that, I think the pams are technically meant to be the smaller, single-subject publications.

Then again, the number of times these things are even referred to - again in my experience - is vanishingly small. Usually instruction is by monkey-see monkey-do, or via an instructor who will have (hopefully ) sucked the goodness out of the relevant pams and then pass it on to the students.

Jon

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

- On the Hatecourses -

My reason for asking was initially a rather amusing anecdote from Dr Bull on these courses. Apparently the British army felt it a problem that the men weren't taking the war seriously enough, and there seems to have been a similar attitude among the officers that needed outrooting. Hence the courses that took place in late 41 and early 42. However, according to Dr Bull they turned out farcical, and the men giggled their way through them. They were thus quickly dropped.

I vaguely recall that Churchill in his memoir mentions this, and that he may have been the one to initiate it. That could be my mistake however, and I only bring it up as something you might want to look into if it interests you.

Michael

[JonS]

There is something similar in Evelyn Waughs Sword of Honour trilogy (Men at Arms, Officers and Gentlemen, Unconditional Surrender). Though fictional, some of it is based - loosely - on his own wartime experiences.

[throwdjohn]

since when do americans need to be taught hatred? we ALWAYs exhibit a xenophobic hatred towards any and all foriengers.

[JasonC]

John - an excellent and highly realistic document, thanks for posting it. Several points that stand out -

(1) the small group rushing successfully even without covering fire, is presumably well aware of the ground, and using all available dead ground to reach the shooter safely. Notice the part of the later recommended drill, that says do go to ground if you are the actual target of the fire, but not otherwise.

(2) the shooter is effectively distracted by the sheep, whose main role seems to be to draw fire not to provide it. He wants to replace this by "suppressed by the Brens", which sounds perfectly sensible. It is strange that they didn't manage this more often in practice, according to his account.

(3) from WW I accounts, this all fits the cult of the bomb, as it was called in early WW I. In that case, those leading aggressive men ran forward with grenades and tossed them everywhere, rapidly. Always from dead ground themselves, wherever possible. All the Lewis and line rifles had to do was drop Germans the grenades flushed like quail.

(4) it is noteworthy how little use the heavy weapons seemed, the mortars in particular. They just called div arty for 25 pdrs. No scarcity of them, better range than the mortars. Interesting how much that was amplified by hill country, without easy access close. But a gun 10 km away can reach into the hills - the road net is good enough for that.

[Zveroboy]

It is really surprising indeed that they didnt fire a single round of 3" mortar during the whole campaign but instead seemed to rely almost exclusively on 25 pounder for HE.

The bit on morale was pretty interesting too.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Zveroboy:

It is really surprising indeed that they didnt fire a single round of 3" mortar during the whole campaign but instead seemed to rely almost exclusively on 25 pounder for HE.

Indeed. On the one hand, the Royal Artillery had by that time adopted the Parham system, and so could provide fire pretty dam' fast. On the other, this would be before the intermediate charges where introduced into the 25-pdr's charge system, so I should have thought it would have had trouble with very hilly terrain. I'm not familiar with the topography of Sicily, so maybe the slopes were gentle enough for this not to be a problem, but I was told by a mortarman many years ago that a good way to annoy Gunners is to go up to them and say "crest restrictions".

All the best,

John.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

On the other, this would be before the intermediate charges where introduced into the 25-pdr's charge system, so I should have thought it would have had trouble with very hilly terrain. I'm not familiar with the topography of Sicily, so maybe the slopes were gentle enough for this not to be a problem, but I was told by a mortarman many years ago that a good way to annoy Gunners is to go up to them and say "crest restrictions".

Would it have worked to crank on something like maximum elevation and maximum charge to get up and over the crest and descend in a near-vertical trajectory?

Michael

[JasonC]

It sound like angle of fire was not the issue, range and access was. High country is poorly served by roads, and without them ammo resupply is impractical. If a road doesn't run within 2 miles of the target location, medium mortars are going to be less useful than longer ranged guns. The road net of an underdeveloped country with lots of hills is going to allow guns within 10-15 km of anything, but not within 2-3 km. Nobody wants to man-pack thousands of rounds up 2000-4000 foot hills.

As for Sicily topography, Mt. Aetna is 10,000 feet. The majority of the center and north of the island is seamed by hills and steep cuts in from the coast, with the elevation changing from sea level to 500 meters to 1000 meters to 500 meters again, in the space of 10 miles. The southeast is lower and flatter, as is the gulf of Gela on the southwest coast - which is why the Allies landed there. But the Germans contested the north coast, northeast center of the island, and the east coast from the Aetna mass northward, precisely to exploit the high terrain.