Grenadier Ridge

[Kingfish]

Have been bitten by the "big maps of Tuscany" bug again, and would like to do two new scenarios depicting the fighting there in late July / August '44. All this is inspired by my copy of 'After the battle magazine', which is a treasure trove of info for CM-sized scenarios.

Anyway, the two scenarios I am wanting to do are 'Romola' and 'Grenadier Ridge'. The first is fairly easy to get info on, since it is the battle for the town of the same name and involved the Kiwis of 22nd battalion.

The latter is a different story, and here is where I am hoping someone can lend a hand. All I know is that the allied unit involved was the 6th Grenadier Guards of 24th Guards Brigade, itself attached to 6th South African Division. The name 'Grenadier Ridge' was given to a series of peaks just south of the town of Greve in Chianti, on route 222 midway between Florence and Siena.

Does anyone have any more info on this battle? As best I can determine the German unit was 356th ID.

[kawaiku]

Found this: OOB for Army Group C italy(I think)

Hope it helps somewhat

[Kingfish]

Thanks, but by late July that OOB list was juggled quite a bit. For instance, I Parachute Corp was defending the southern approaches to Florence, but only one of the divisions listed in the May list was still there.

[kawaiku]

List the websites that you have tried (besides google and wikipedia). That way when I get the chance to do some real searching I know which ones too not look for(although Ill look anyways). I have heard about this battle, although it was just faintly. You may wanna try and reach the guys at World War Two History and WW2 magazines too see if they have anything on it(if you can get them at all). And if you get any answers I'd love to see them.

[Kingfish]

The South African military History Society

Feldgrau.com

Axis History.com

6th South African Division OOB

Military Archives Depot, Pretoria

and of course 'After the battle Magazine', but they only have a very brief mention. I should add that "Grenadier Ridge" is not an actual location per se, but just a series of lower peaks somewhere around Monte Dominici(sp?).

[Kingfish]

Correction - the unit listed in the after the battle magazine is the 5th Grenadier Guards, not the 6th.

[kawaiku]

I found this but that is all right now.

http://www.feldgrau.com/InfDiv.php?ID=245

[JonS]

Kingfish - do you have access to the British OHs? If not, I'll hunt down the relevant one, but it'll be a while before I can get to a library with one.

[Kingfish]

Unfortunately no. Apart from the online sources I listed I've also e-mailed the webmaster of the Grenadier Guards assoc website, but so far have not had any response.

If you happen to find the time and can get it I would be most appreciative. No rush at all, I'm taking my time with the Romola map anyway.

[JonS]

... which reminds me - Google Earth and Google Maps(?) are both kinds-useful sources for mapping.

[Kingfish]

Yep, got those. I Also have this excellent site. The problem is where exactly is the area known as Grenadier Ridge?

[JonS]

It's was a lovely day today, so I went for a walk to the library, where I discovered it was the forst day of the annual book clearance/sale there. So I picked up copies of 'Mulberry' (Michael Harrison), 'The fatal decisions' (ed. William Richardson & Seymour Freidin), and 'Stand by to beach' (Gordon Holman) for NZ$4 each. There was also a book there on documents relating to the Revolutionary War.

Then I went looking for the British OHs, with a view to checking out the appropriate one. Of course, with typical perversity, the library has all the Med and Mideast volumes covering the period up till 4th June, 1944. And nothing after that.

There is a local university that I'm pretty sure has the full set, but it is more inconvienient to get to, so will take a bit longer again.

What was the exact date sequence that the Grenadier Ridge battles occurred over?

Jon

[kawaiku]

Here is the province it might have been in: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Umbria

A map of August 25th 1944. Look at the center thrust. The 1st Preht Corps has the 356th at the right attacked by the 8th Indian Division(I think).

http://members.aol.com/ItalyMap/ArmyMap1.jpg

There might be somthing useful here. I haven't read all of the war through but it might help:

http://www.larchivio.org/xoom/gerhardmuhm2.htm

Picture of Region:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Rural_Toscana.jpg

Heres the last link I found. It is a great read but no info on GR, but it mentions the 356th including the corps it was in and the Fourteenth army which it fought under. I skimmed through it rather fast so I might have missed something. This seemed to be a little more usefull though it may take a lot of reading.

http://www.mtmestas.com/Military/Italy/NorthApennines/NorthAppinines.htm

Good luck with your research. And let me know if you find anything since you got me hooked on this damn battle.

Cheers, kawaiku

[Kingfish]

July 23rd/25th, but not all was on Grenadier Ridge. The 23rd saw the 3rd Coldstream Guards and Pretoria Regiment capturing Monte Domini, then the 5th Grenadier Guards capture the lower peaks - Grenadier Ridge - the next day, followed by an advance to Monte Collegalle on the 25th. So in a way it was a 3-day running battle.

Don't worry about it, I can swing it with what I have here. I'll just add your name to the list of references to give it that stamp of historical accuracy. Works everytime

[Dook]

I found this document , an MID WW II chronology for July 1944. The section on the Med. theater has the following details:

On the 23rd, "6th SA Armd Div meets stiff resistance and heavy shelling as German troops continue to hold positions on slopes

of M. Fili, W of Greve."

On the 24th, "units of 6th SA Armd Div capture Li. Domini, 7 mi. N of Radda, and occupy town of Greve against stiff opposition."

On the 25th, "24th Guards Brig of 6th SA Div pushes to Pt. 621, E of Greve, against heavy opposition."

On the 26th, "in vicinity of Greve, fierce enemy resistance prevents advance of 6th SA Armd Div, which repulses number of strong enemy counterattacks."

This web page suggests the Germans might have been the 29. PzGr Div.

[JonS]

Got it, although not nearly as useful as I thought it might be. Will scan and post within the next couple of days-to-a-week.

[JonS]

Taken from: The Mediterranean and Middle East, .v. 6. Victory in the Mediterranean, pt. 2. June to October 1944 / by Sir William Jackson with T.P. Gleave.

The relevant bit is on page 90, the rest is added for background detail and peripheral info.

#################################

84 THE APPROACH TO THE GOTHIC LINE

Ancona was a great prize. It provided the Allies with a large port on the Adriatic second only in size to Bari, and it was to prove an invaluable base for further operations in northern Italy.

(vi)

It is time to see what had been happening in the air as the Germans fell back on the Heinrich Line. The main characteristics of this Third Phase, dawn 3rd to dawn 17th July, was the rise in sorties flown and bombloads dropped in the battle area to a level almost comparable to the halcyon days of the First Phase, immediately after the fall of Rome, and described in Chapter IX. An estimated total of 3,407 sorties was flown within the battle area and some 1,670 tons of bombs dropped. Of these totals, about 1,720 sorties (663 tons) were flown against M.T. and roads. M.A.T.A.F.'s fighter bombers made the greatest contribution. Against guns D.A.F.'s fighter bombers delivered most of the 587 tons of bombs.(1) Of the remaining targets bombed, 134 tons of bombs were dropped on ammunition and fuel dumps. Understandably there were few attacks on railway targets and even fewer on towns, troops and miscellaneous targets. The most significant changes came from the introduction of the 'Dixie' system. After Kesselring had won some freedom of action from Hitler he adopted in early July, as we have seen, the technique of a slow fighting withdrawal in which the main bodies of his divisions fell back through a series of closely spaced delaying lines, while their rear guards pulled back, even more slowly, using still more closely spaced positions. It gradually became apparent to 8th Army and D.A.F. staffs that the German habit of fighting rear guard actions by day and withdrawing to a new line of defence each night meant that the Allied troops were frequently unable to make contact until late afternoon because of the extensive German demolitions. On those occasions when contact could be made early in the day, the Germans were usually forced to withdraw before dark and then

THE APPROACH TO THE GOTHIC LINE 85

targets became available for the fighter bombers. The new system, called 'Dixie', was introduced to make the best use of the few hours of daylight left. When enemy targets appeared a Corps was to call for Dixie, which would normally be available from 7 to 8.30 p.m. During this period a tactical reconnaissance aircraft, in V.H.F. contact with Rover David and the fighter bombers in the Cabrank, was to be over the forward area for the entire time and more tactical reconnaissance aircraft were to be made available if necessary. The tactical reconnaissance task was to find suitable targets for the fighter bombers and report them to Rover David, the controller when in doubt referring them to the leading brigade. Responsibility for the order to attack remained with Rover David. It was for the tactical reconnaissance aircraft pilot, or pilots, to confirm that targets found by ground troops were suitable for air attack. Throughout the Dixie period fighter bomber aircraft were to be kept in the Cabrank in successive formations of six. The Cabrank was refilled every 15 minutes.

On 8th Army's front on 3rd July two calls for assistance from army formations were answered one to deal with a concentration of M.T. and the other with some heavy guns. The same day No. 24 (S.A.A.F.) Squadron, re equipped with Marauder II medium day bomber aircraft, rejoined No. 3 (S.A.A.F) Wing in D.A.F. after a spell in the Middle East. During the night of the 3rd/4th three Bostons and seven Baltimores from D.A.F. dropped 7.6 tons of bombs on troops south west and west of Arezzo, an area which was to receive increasing attention from D.A.F. until the capture of Arezzo on 16th July. On 4th July, in bad weather conditions, armed reconnaissances were flown in the battle area, and a call from the Polish Corps to attack mortar positions was successfully complied with. Next day, the 5th, heavy cloud restricted flying but six calls for assistance were answered, five against guns and one against a concentration of infantry, M.T. and guns resulting in 65 Kittyhawks and Mustangs from D.A.F. attacking these targets with 32.2 tons of bombs, mostly south west of Arezzo. On the 6th the number of calls for assistance rose to seven. The first Dixie operations took place on the 7th. In a total of five such operations the fighter bombers had to attack alternative targets in three of them, but in the last two tactical reconnaissance aircraft found 2o M.T. and tanks dispersed around a building and more of them on a road. The attacks were described as 'very successful'. Seven other calls for assistance were answered that day which included the guns north and east of Arezzo on which 56 Kittyhawks from D.A.F. dropped 29.8 tons of bombs. On the 8th the number of calls rose to nine, mostly against guns, and on those in and west of the Arezzo area 36 Kittyhawks and Mustangs from D.A.F.

86 THE APPROACH TO THE GOTHIC LINE

dropped 12.5 tons of bombs. Next day the pattern was similar with 29 Kittyhawks and Mustangs dropping 4.3 tons on the guns southwest and north of Arezzo. We have already discussed the air support given to 13th Corps in its drive on Arezzo during 10th 14th July.

On 15th July the fighter bombers of D.A.F. were fully extended in support of 8th Army. In assistance to 13th Corps in its attack on Arezzo go Kittyhawks and Mustangs bombed roads in the area with 45.6 tons of bombs while another 89 (44.8 tons) bombed guns in the Arezzo Sansepolcro area, and some Spitfire fighter bombers attacked roads north of Arezzo. During the Army's attack on Arezzo, and in supporting the New Zealand Division on the right flank, the locations of some of the targets D.A.F. was asked to bomb were again only 8oo yards ahead of the forward troops marked with coloured smoke. The Army was well pleased with the results. Also on the 15th, pre D day support was given to the Polish Corps for its attack on Ancona, Marauders and Baltimores bombing guns at lesi as already described. That same evening three Dixie operations were laid on between 7 and 8 p.m. In two of them alternative targets had to be attacked, but in the third a small concentration of M.T. which had been spotted by tactical reconnaissance was effectively bombed.

The last day in this Third Phase, 16th July, was another busy one for the fighter bombers of D.A.F. Nearly half of the 259 sorties flown were in direct support of 13th Corps or closely associated with its operations. Calls for assistance by 13th Corps included an enemy strongpoint at Chiani , directly west of Arezzo, which was bombed by 16 Mustangs with 8.2 tons and various gun positions were attacked by about 50 Kittyhawks and Mustangs dropping about 30 tons of bombs. A staging area at Agazzi, on the southwest outskirts of Arezzo, was bombed by 19 Kittyhawks with 11.4 tons, and roads to the north west and north (Route 71) by a force of Mustangs and Spitfires. As already described, a large force of Marauders and Baltimores supported the Polish Corps in its attack on Ancona. On the evening of the 16th there were no less than 14 Dixie operations amounting to 84 sorties. Targets included two concentrations of M.T., a suspected enemy headquarters, a small concentration of tanks, several groups of guns and half track vehicles.

(vii)

On the German side the loss of Ancona was quickly followed by rumours, reported on 19th July and possibly emanating from

THE APPROACH TO THE GOTHIC LINE 87

A.A.I.'s deception plan ‘Ottrington’, that 2nd Polish Corps was about to be relieved by a British formation. As it was also suspected that 1st Canadian Corps might appear on the Adriatic coast, when Kesselring returned from Hitler's Headquarters on 19th July he authorised von Vietinghoff to extract 1st Parachute Division and to move it to Cattolica, as a long stop for 51st Mountain Corps. At the same time Lemelsen was instructed to extract 90th Panzer Grenadier Division to form an Army Group reserve, to be located north of Florence while it refitted. These measures to create mobile reserves behind the front reflected views held at OKW where, as we have seen in Chapter VI Part 1 of this Volume, it was thought in mid-July that the Allies might turn their whole strategic attention to Italy. On the 22nd Kesselring told his Army Commanders that if this were to be the case both his seaboards would be threatened. To guard the rear Adriatic sector, a Corps command under General Witthöft was assigned 98th Infantry Division, transferred from the Balkans on orders from OKW and originally destined for Istria, plus 162nd (Turkoman) Division and the cadres of the decimated 94th Infantry Division. Concern for the Adriatic sector was also evident in the decision, taken on 28th July but not implemented until 8th August, that on reaching the Gothic Line Herr's 76th Panzer Corps would change places with Feuerstein's 51st Mountain Corps. The latter would thus move into the high country north cast of Florence, and Herr would defend the coast and control operations in the open and flatter country. There is no direct evidence that anything but logical military thinking lay behind this proposal, but like all good deception plans 'Ottrington' probably reinforced ideas which were already there. We have shown in Chapter VI how fears for a landing in Genoa were also fostered by deception. For this eventuality Kesselring decreed on 31st July that the nascent Army of Liguria would be reinforced by 26th Panzer Division from AOK 14. 90th Panzer Grenadier Division, now stationed between Parma and Modena, was to be ready to move to either coast if invasion threatened, as were 15th Panzer Grenadier Division and reinforcing arms from AOK 10. Though relatively modest in scale, these precautions testify to strategic uncertainties which persisted well into August.

See Map 5

With the fall of Leghorn, Arezzo and Ancona all attention turned to the battle for Florence which was waged between Kirkman's 13th Corps, and Schlemm's 1st Parachute Corps and the western wing of Herr's 76th Panzer Corps. Since the fall of Arezzo 13th Corps' front had been widened to include the F.E.C.'s sector in which

88 THE APPROACH TO THE GOTHIC LINE

8th Indian Division had been re committed after a very short rest and refit. Kirkman's plan was to develop two strong armoured thrusts towards Florence, using his two armoured divisions with 4th Division acting as a link between them. 6th Armoured Division was to advance along the east bank of the Middle Arno which was far from attractive armoured country. There were only about four miles between the river, which was to form the Division's left boundary with 4th DIvision, and the Pratomagno massif which dominated the whole valley. 6th Armoured Division's War Diary complains:

'The valley itself was by no means flat, closely wooded in parts and criss crossed by small ravines. Not for the first time it could be said of the Division's allotted sector for advance this is no country for an Armoured Division! ... The prospect of a slow and arduous advance seemed inescapable'.

6th South African Armoured Division's axis was to be Radda-Greve on the western side of the Chianti Mountains, which are a range of steep, thickly wooded hills stretching north west through Mt Malone (Pt 812) towards Florence. 4th Division was to clear from the eastern side of the Chianti Mountains to the Middle Arno. 8th Indian Division would cover the Corps' left flank. If the Germans resisted the Corps' advances strongly, General Kirkman intended to strengthen his thrust by bringing in 2nd New Zealand Division to help 6th British Armoured Division; otherwise the New Zealanders would be held in Corps reserve.

AOK 14 fought its part of the battle on a series of map lines which led back to the position south of Florence which 1st Parachute Corps was informed on 20th July that it must defend for 'some time.' This was the 'Paula' Line, running from Montelupo at the junction of the Pesa and Arno rivers four miles cast of Empoli, across to Mt Scalari (Pt 787) and on to Figline on the Middle Arno. With 29th Panzer Grenadier, 4th Parachute and 356th Infantry Divisions under his command, on 17th July Schlemm was about to take up an intermediate line covering Castelfiorentino, Tavernelle, and the western ridges of the Chianti Mountains. On this date Mt Malone (Pt 812) became the prescribed contact point with AOK 10’s 76th Panzer Corps, which was holding a delaying line from south of Montevarchi along the Arno north of Arezzo to the Alpe di Poti.

6th Armoured Division, led by 26tb Armoured Brigade, started to thrust north west from Arezzo on 17th July making for Castiglion Fibocchi. 4th Division advanced north across the hills towards Montevarchi which it approached on the 18th. Both divisions, however, had come up against 76th Panzer Corps' Irmgard position, which was strongly held. Failing to gain Castiglion Fibocchi,

THE APPROACH TO THE GOTHIC LINE 89

6th British Armoured Division sent some tanks across the Middle Arno at Laterina but could make no progress on the west bank either. 4th Division was stopped by the newly arrived 71 5th Infantry Division holding the high ground north west of Montevarchi. 6th Armoured Division's fears were being confirmed.

6th South African Armoured Division fared rather better. It had advanced on a two brigade front during 16th July on the axis of the Castel di Brolio Radda road, 12th Motor Brigade astride the road and 24th Guards Brigade protecting its right flank along the western slopes of the Chianti Mountains. The Guards made good progress on 17th July and Radda was entered that night, when 1st Parachute Corps withdrew northwards because of 5th Army's pressure on 14th Panzer Corps. The South African advance was then directed to securing the main features in the Chianti range: Mt Malone (Pt 812) and Mt S. Michele (Pt 892) both over 2,000 feet high. 24th Guards Brigade took the former by a surprise night march on 18th/19th July and went on, ably supported by the tanks of the Pretoria Regiment, over the forested hills to take S. Michele on 20th July. 12th Motor Brigade advanced over equally rough country on the left to Mt Querciabella (Pt 845). The Division had captured the highest points in the Chianti Mountains from which the ground sloped steadily down to the Arno valley and Florence. The loss of these dominating peaks by 715th Infantry Division forced 76th Panzer Corps to withdraw to its next delaying position covering S. Giovanni.

General Kirkman appreciated that some hard fighting lay ahead of his Corps before it could reach the Lower Arno and his main objective, Florence. He had become disenchanted with the Middle Arno valley. Besides being unsuitable for an armoured thrust, it was being tenaciously defended by 76th Panzer Corps, although the newly arrived and inexperienced 715th Infantry Division was making a poor showing in the Chianti Mountains. Kirkman therefore decided on 20th July to concentrate his effort on 6th South African Armoured Division's front, stating his intention as follows:

13 Corps will make a powerful thrust to seize the crossings over R. Arno at and west of Florence.

To do this he decided to bring 2nd New Zealand Division out of reserve and into the line between the South Africans and 8th Indian Division as part of the relief of the F.E.C. It was to thrust northwards on the axis S. Casciano on Route 2 to the Lower Arno crossings at Signa, five miles west of Florence. 6th South African Armoured Division was to continue its advance up the road axis Radda Greve Impruneta with 4th Division on its right. On the flanks of this two pronged thrust 6th Armoured Division, in the

90 THE APPROACH TO THE GOTHIC LINE

Middle Arno valley, and 8th Indian Division, in the Elsa river valley, were to push forward as opportunity offered.

This revision necessitated some changes in the F.E.C. relief plan. On 21st July the New Zealand Division moved a brigade forward ready to pass through the right flank of the F.E.C. while 8th Indian Division moved up north of Poggibonsi through the F.E.C. centre and left. A large proportion of 13th Corps artillery, which now included both 1st and 6th A.G.R.A., was decentralised to manage a front which was forty miles wide. Two medium regiments and one S.P. gun regiment were placed under command of 2nd New Zealand Division, one medium regiment under 6th South African Division, and one medium regiment under 4th Division. To 8th Indian Division was given one S.P. gun regiment and to 6th Armoured Division one regiment of field artillery. 1st and 6th A.G.R.A. retained between them two heavy and two medium regiments.

6th South African Division continued its advance from Mt S. Michele (Point 892) during 21st July against stiffening resistance. Using its two infantry brigades forward, the division pressed on towards the Mt Fili (Pt 554) high ground just south west of Greve. The approaches were heavily mined and a number of the tanks were lost. Nevertheless most of the high ground was secured on 22nd July except Mt Fili itself. A further attack with full divisional artillery support was put in on the morning of 23rd July. This was successful but 1st Parachute Corps continued to counterattack throughout the day before withdrawing during the night 23rd/24th July. 11th South African Armoured Brigade passed through and thrust towards Mercatale the next day, against strong rear guards of 356th Infantry Division supported by Tiger tanks. At dusk on 26th July the Brigade entered Mercatale. It was then checked on the River Greve by units of 4th Parachute Division fighting on the right of 356th Infantry Division.

Meanwhile the New Zealand Division on the left of the South Africans began to make its presence felt. Stubbornly opposed by 4th Parachute Division, which was well supported by artillery and mortars and, on occasion, by Tiger tanks, the division advanced on Tavernelle on Route 2 which was in New Zealand hands by 23rd July. Continuing their advance on the 24th the Division reached the vicinity of Fabbrica, to which the Germans were clinging stubbornly. However, outflanked by the advance of the South African Division on Mercatale, the paratroopers withdrew during the night 24th/25th to a new delaying position which in their sector covered S. Casciano on Route 2.

On 13th Corps' eastern flank the advance of 6th Armoured Division lagged behind the rest of the Corps, as its axis was

THE APPROACH TO THE GOTHIC LINE 91

dominated by the slopes of the Pratamagno massif.(2) 4th Division, which was attempting to clear the west bank of the Arno, entered S. Giovanni on 23rd July, but 76th Panzer Corps was not much perturbed by this and 4th Division found it difficult to develop its subsequent operations against Figline. On 13th Corps' western flank, the progress of 8th Indian Division's advance north of Casteltiorentino met little opposition before 25th July, when it was halted by 29th Panzer Grenadier Division of 1st Parachute Corps, holding positions between Montespertoli and Cambiano in the Elsa valley. On the 26th Kesselring commended to OKW the powers of resistance and discipline shown by Schlemm's divisions in the blistering July heat, against an enemy with overwhelming superiority in artillery and air support. AOK 14 confirmed that the morale of 1st Parachute Corps had been raised by its defensive successes, but stressed that numbers were seriously depleted by casualties and heat exhaustion. Schlemm was authorised to retire into the Paula Line during the night of 26th/27th July, and to help him fulfil the order that this was to be held for several days, the flanking 14th Panzer Corps took over a part of his sector. Lemelsen reckoned that the battle for Florence had now opened in earnest, and its progress was closely followed by Kesselring who believed that 8th Army attached 'much more than average significance' to the capture of the city.(3)

The South Africans, New Zealanders and Indians followed up Schlemm's withdrawal and by the evening of the 28th were in contact with the Paula Line over most of the front. 4th Division was given the unenviable task of clearing the high, trackless area of the Scalari massif which gave excellent observation over the south eastern approaches to Florence. Advancing from Dudda on the southern side of the feature on 27th July, its 12th Brigade established itself on the southern slopes, but 28th Brigade was held up. Next day neither brigade was successful and so 12th Brigade's reserve battalion was brought forward with orders to pass through and clear the summit. 6th Black Watch attacked on 29th July and after fierce fighting succeeded in reaching the summit and

********************

(1) The areas of responsibility of the various subordinate air formations of' M.A.T.A.F. for attacks on the enemy's L. of C. were redefined on 2nd July, to be effective next day, as follows (see Map 4):

US. XII TAC (Other than US. 87th Fighter Wing)

All land and sea communication within the area bounded on the cast by the Florence-Prato Bologna Ferrara railway line and on the north by the Po river and on the West by the Pavia Genoa railway line.

US. XII TAC (US. 87th Fighter Wing)

All land and sea communications within U.S. XII T.A.C.'s area but north of the line Spezia-Bologna.

D.A.F

All land and sea communications within the area east of but exclusive of the Florence Prato Bologna-Ferrara railway line and south of the Po river.

(2) On 24th July Major General G.W.R. Templer assumed command of 6th Armoured Division, replacing General Evelegh, who was to take up the appointment of A.C.I.G.S. Unfortunately Templer was seriously wounded as the result of a mine explosion on 5th August.

(3) During the morning of 26th July 13th Corps was visited by H. M. King George VI, who drove through the areas held by 6th Armoured Division, 4th Division, 6th South African Armoured Division, and 8th Indian Division. At 4th Division and 8th Indian Division investiture parades were held for the award of the Victoria Cross. Kesselring attributed heavy fighting on 28th July to the visit of the King, who had, Kesselring claimed, ‘pointed to Florence and asked for its capture'. This image of George VI emulating his ancestors' military command in the field gave colour to Kesselring's belief that Florence was needed by the British as a 'prestige success' to offset the Americans' capture of' Rome.

#################################

Two maps to follow in due course.

Jon

[ May 14, 2006, 03:21 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Kingfish]

Interesting that some of the excerpts from the above transcript (which I appreciate you posting, BTW) are word for word indentical to what you find in the ATB mag.

The artillery distribution is very interesting

[JonS]

I thought the Dixies - and the reasons they came about - were interesting too.

[kawaiku]

Nice read JonS. Thanks for that. It seemed like there were a lot of Tigers prowling around on the battlefield(surprising the air corps couldn't take any of 'em out). Was a heavy abieltung(probably spelled wrong) depolyed to Italy at that time?

[Kingfish]

Yes. The 508th was deployed south of Florence as a reserve for I Fallschirmjager Korp. Both the South Africans and new Zealanders had run-ins with Tigers, although usually only against 1 or 2 at any given time.

Here is a nice shot of the first Tiger destroyed by Kiwi troops just outside of Villa Strada

Come to think of it, I think there's a scenario that covers that battle. Now where did I see it...

[JonS]

Map1

****

Map 5

****

Both maps are a bit truncated, but not around the Chianti Mts. I appreciate the maps above are too small to be useful - if you go to the links you can d/l a higher res version. If that still isn't good enough (and, having had a look, I wouldn't be too surprised if it isn't) drop me an email, and I'll send you the original high-res scans (~1.5MB total for both maps). Email in the usual place.

Oh, BTW, nice find Dook. That chronology is quite useful.

Regards

JonS

[ May 12, 2006, 06:12 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Kingfish]

A question somewhat related to the above battles: does anyone know what the max firing range is for a Sherman III? I tested one out in CMAK and was able to area fire to a distance of 6700+ meters. That sound right?

[JonS]

King,

off the top I don't know, but a look at "the South Alberta's" might help - especially the section where they were firing indirect across the Rhine. Alternately, a seach through NZETC for the OHs of the NZ Armd Regts, or the Arty one, again for examples of indirect fire might reveal the ranges at which the targets were being engaged.

Jon

[John Kettler]

Kingfish,

I own the WW II FM 17-12 TANK GUNNERY, 10 June 1944, of which over half is devoted to indirect fire procedures. On page 20, the maximum range I can find listed for any type of gunnery range estimation is 5000 yards. Figure 21 on page 55 shows 75mm M61 APC has a reticle out to 4200 yards and Shell HE M48

(Super Charge) goes to 4100 yards. Normal Charge is 2800 yards. Only the AP reticle for the 76mm M1 Gun is shown on Figure 23, page 57, and it shows 76mm APC M62 goes to 4200 yards. By similarity, then, firing HE (Super Charge), 4100 yards seems about right. The only way to know for sure, though, is to consult the firing tables, which aren't in the manual.

Regards,

John Kettler