Loss of HQ

[JonS]

Originally posted by Ace Pilot:

I would not generally expect them to undertake decisions and actions that are the responsibility of the company HQ while there is still the confusion surrounding the status of the company HQ.

Ah, well there you go then. I would.

E/506 PIR didn't dick around on D-Day because the OC wasn't about. They dicked around because they weren't getting orders from Bn or Regt. That much is clear to me. As soon as Winters got orders to attack Brecourt Manor, he was up and in to it. He didn't dither about for a couple more hours waiting for the OC to turn up eventually.

[Ace Pilot]

Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Ace Pilot:

I would not generally expect them to undertake decisions and actions that are the responsibility of the company HQ while there is still the confusion surrounding the status of the company HQ.

Ah, well there you go then. I would.</font>

[JonS]

Originally posted by Ace Pilot:

You would expect a platoon commander to usurp the duties and responsibilities of the company commander every time his status is uncertain?

Are you trying to turn this into a strawman argument, or does it just come naturally?

In other words, they dicked around because the chain of command was broken.

What are you on about? Winters and his next higher were co-located. When the Bn or Regt commander (I forget which it was) made his D, he turned around and ordered Winters to carry it out. What is broken about that chain? They were waiting for orders.

Nor did he take it upon himself to attack Brecourt Manor

But the 'real' OC wouldn't have either! As soon as higher ordered it, it was attacked. Again, what was broken about that chain?

[Michael Dorosh]

The Battalion CO was LCol Strayer, I think, who is shown giving the orders in the movie version.

Col Sink was the Regt'l CO.

The best place to discuss this would be TRIGGER TIME (google Trigger Time Forum) - Mark Bando hosts it and knows all that is knowable about the 101st Airborne in WW II.

[tar]

Well, thanks Ace Pilot. You represented my thoughts quite well.

Michael Dorosh: My observations are based largely on reading historic accounts. I do not have any direct combat experience.

But it also stands to reason that if eliminating HQs has minimal impact on combat operations it would seem odd that enemy HQ positions are considered priority targets. Why bother trying to eliminate enemy command and control capability if it didn't have some deleterious effect on the conduct of the battle.

Current US military doctrine is very big on doing various things to disrupt enemy command and control capabilities, precisely because it makes the army less effective. So, the question is, why would loss of headquarters or disruption of communications make the army less effective? There must be some function or capability that doesn't work the same way. In general it is that the organization as a whole does not react quite as quickly as it would otherwise.

Once it is clear that something has happened to the Co. HQ, the platoons will attempt to establish communications with the next higher echelon. But the key is that the platoon first has to figure out that something has happened. Depending on the communications technology available, this can take perhaps some time. Even if you discover the enemy at the previous location of company HQ, one would presumably have to spend some time first trying to figure out if the HQ was able to displace and if so to where. After that, one would then need to link up with battalion HQ and provide a briefing update and situation report to someone who would not be quite as intimately familiar with the details of the company maneuver plan as the company HQ was.

As noted, this process can take more or less time to accomplish. Generally more elite units would tend to recover more quickly. It also helps if one has exceptional leaders available, too. But even with the drills and briefings about the general battle plan, breaks in the chain of command would most of the time result in some delays in the operations. Once immediate objectives were taken, follow-on orders would be delayed until a chain of command were re-established.

[JonS]

Originally posted by tar:

But it also stands to reason that if eliminating HQs has minimal impact on combat operations it would seem odd that enemy HQ positions are considered priority targets. Why bother trying to eliminate enemy command and control capability if it didn't have some deleterious effect on the conduct of the battle.

Well, now you're talking about something quite different. CoCs are robust beasties because they need to be.

Comms chains, on the other hand, are a bit more fragile. Degrading a units ability to communcate will degrade it's ability to react and co-ordinate, leading to all sorts of Good Things for the opposing side. But, see, that happens without 'destroying' the affected HQ. What happened to Geyr von Schweppenburgs HQ on 11 June 44 is a good example.

But bear in mind that this effect will be more marked the further up the food chain you go. A Coy HQ really only has to worry about co-ord'ing 3 platoons which are located very close in geographic terms, so it is easy overcome it's disruption, quite possibly by voice.

A Bn HQ has to co-ord the ops of 4 or 5 coys, involving 12-15 platoons, spanning some hundreds of metres. Resolving disruption to a Bn HQ will take more effort, probably involving runners and vehicles.

Disruption to a Bde or Regt HQ affects the 3 subordinate bns, plus attachments - so 12 - 20-odd platoons, spanning some 00's or 000's of metres. Resolving that will likely require line or radio links to be effective.

Disruption to a Divisional HQ invloves ... blah blah.

And it can all be repaired of course. Given enough time.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by tar:

Well, thanks Ace Pilot. You represented my thoughts quite well.

Michael Dorosh: My observations are based largely on reading historic accounts. I do not have any direct combat experience.

But it also stands to reason that if eliminating HQs has minimal impact on combat operations it would seem odd that enemy HQ positions are considered priority targets.

They're not, not at the tactical level. I've lived in a company headquarters - it was a jeep, three guys and a radio, lying in a ditch. You would be hard pressed to find a company headquarters much less actively target one...and I am talking two years ago. In 1944 it would be much easier to hide the company headquarters cause they wouldn't even have the jeep.

[Ace Pilot]

Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Ace Pilot:

You would expect a platoon commander to usurp the duties and responsibilities of the company commander every time his status is uncertain?

Are you trying to turn this into a strawman argument, or does it just come naturally?

In other words, they dicked around because the chain of command was broken.

What are you on about? Winters and his next higher were co-located. When the Bn or Regt commander (I forget which it was) made his D, he turned around and ordered Winters to carry it out. What is broken about that chain? They were waiting for orders.

Nor did he take it upon himself to attack Brecourt Manor

But the 'real' OC wouldn't have either! As soon as higher ordered it, it was attacked. Again, what was broken about that chain? </font>