Deployment of Panzer Recon Battalions

[Kevin Kinscherf]

When one looks at the OOB for these formations and reads how in theory they were to be fought, I still wonder how they deployed on a regular basis. From the get-go (1939) these babys were armed to the teeth and self contained combined arms formations. They were trained to conduct

standard recon but also armed to break through or fight off all but the heaviest enemy force.

I wonder how often they were deployed en mass as a complete battalion. Sure at the opening of key operations and when the ground allowed they would - Poland 39, France 40, Kursk etc.

I wonder if more often and as the war progressed they broke up into small battle groups to cover far apart battle areas that were not mutually supporting by fire. That is .. they were not used en mass. Panzer divsions were always forming battle groups by mixing and matching formations. Recon elements would be part of these groups I am sure.

Perhaps in North Africa they saw mass action most often given the terrain. The battalions are interesting formations that remind me in some ways of the US armored cav regiment concept.

Kevin

[Michael Dorosh]

I get the feeling you're already familiar with the GD armoured reconaissance battalion, but in case you're not - they were employed in battalion strength increasingly in the late war period, often holding critical portions of line while the grenadier regiments, panzer, Tiger and StuG battalions were otherwise engaged. Not sure how typical their example was, given GD's special status.

[Kevin Kinscherf]

Given the battle space on the East Front, deployment in the line formation we see on a map may not mean the battalion was deloyed en mass

tactically. I have Scheibert's pictorical on GD and will check it some of the maps. I get the sense that the recon battlions contained such valuable trained troops and equipment that they were real "force multipliers". They were broken up as the situation needed. But I may be wrong hense this post.

Kevin

[JasonC]

"Panzer divsions were always forming battle groups by mixing and matching formations."

True.

"Recon elements would be part of these groups I am sure."

If meant to imply recon battalions would be split up and subelements assigned to other KGs, false.

In the US army, it was common enough for cavalry units as small as a platoon to be assigned to armored task forces. The Germans did not do this sort of thing with their panzer recon battalions. They did not think of panzer recon units as specialists that every task force required.

Instead they thought of the whole battalion as a basically infantry type battalion, but lightly armored, to be employed on division missions appropriate for light armor. In the same way, most panzer divisions had one armored rather than motorized panzergrenadier battalion. The Germans did not split these up to cross attach tiny pieces to every task force so everybody could have half tracks. Neither half tracks nor armored cars were things everybody needed.

If you read the histories you find divisional KG compositions following standard lines, with occasional variations certainly, but not scattered subdivided recon battalions. Sometimes the recon battalion goes with the armored panzergrenadier battalion (and sometimes an armored pioneer company), and the best tank battalion, in an "attack" KG, fully armored, sometimes also supported by the SP arty battalion. Sometimes it pairs up with the divisional Panzerjaeger battalion and forms a divisional reserve. Sometimes it screens a long flank alone, subdivided into companies, with only modest attachments (a little flak e.g.). Sometimes they have the bulk of the pioneer battalion attached to function as an additional infantry "regiment", alongside or in rotation with the 2 panzergrenadier ones.

What you don't find is, every KG with a tank battalion also has a recon company. Didn't happen. Not what they were for.

The panzer recon battalion was designed to suppress enemy infantry before it could get close enough to really engage. They wanted to fight with heavy weapons and MGs almost exclusively, for short periods if possible, at 500m to 1000m range. They were not expected to fight enemy armor. If they had to attack or enemy armor was expected, they worked with a tank battalion or with panzerjaegers (usually SP). As an infantry type battalion they were distinctly undermanned.

They were designed to run patrols, especially right along roads, to cover areas much too large to hold with a continuous front. Direct fire heavy weapons (MGs, 20mm, 75mm, 81mm) gave these patrols reach to the surrounding country. Armor and range let them defy unsupported infantry. When they encounter heavy AT assets they just back off and deny battle, unless they have tank or TD support. Their specific abilities really weren't needed anywhere the ratio of force to space was high. They were still used, but tasked with tanks or TDs as another armored infantry battalion, in that case - or held in reserve.

The closest you'd get to broken down use would be when the whole battalion was acting as the divisional reserve, and the whole frontage was under attack. Then they might "fire brigade" from point to point, and tactically wind up supporting other units. They would still try to do that in sequence rather than in dribs and drabs everywhere at once, if possible.

The combined arms integration of German panzer recon was really set at the battalion level. It would be relatively clumsy to try to duplicate it in separate companies - lots of cross attaching would be necessary, scrambling commands. The company organization had armored cars in the first, or first and second, and heavy weapons in the fifth, with infantry in the other two or three.

That is a solid mix of weapons at the battalion level. The component companies were not, without cross attachments from the other types within the battalion, aka scrambling the whole thing before dividing it.

Understand, if there is one thing they specialized in, it was holding huge areas where forces of any kind were extremely thin on the ground. Both enemies and friendlies. This is not a specialty that needs to be co-located with every main force maneuver element you have.

[ February 06, 2004, 04:47 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Hans]

Kevin

An excellent answer on the use of Pz Recce Battalion. What would have been the Germans 'organization of choice' for conducting a delaying action or manning a forward contact zone with a company/company(+) element?

[JasonC]

Usually a single sub-element, one echelon down, sometimes two echelons down. A battalion rearguards for a division, the battalion itself in two up one back formation. A platoon outposts for a company (in a few small MG nests, and occasional small patrols between them). That kind of thing.

As for delaying doctrine, the Germans made extensive use of mines for this. They found that even limited numbers of mines made attackers move much more slowly. Also some obstacles occasionally extensive ones (from a single roadblock covered by MGs and fausts, to a mile or more of blown tree ablatus along roads e.g.). Small numbers of heavy weapons in good doctrinal roles or positions e.g. a small flak nest overlooking wide steppe, or one hull down TD blocking a road through bocage, or a few hidden PAK overlooking an open valley.

The infantry was typically in multiple layers of all around "strongpoints", many of them not particularly strong. They interlock only by fire. The rest of the doctrine is all counterpunching, not by higher echelons after hours of prep, but by local units and immediately, before attackers have a chance to consolidate on any ground they've taken. They were sometimes quite reckless about this.

From the advancers point of view, he is passing through obstacles and taking light harassing fire from snipers and a few MG nests. He finds some more serious block, some critter or weapon well sited, that needs a particular "counter". That takes time to coordinate. Then when it goes after the thing, it pulls out if possible or there is another one farther on (because few have been used).

Then a blind side small scale counterpunch comes at him - one platoon from along the line from the left, or a few vehicles supporting the local reserve in front. If that succeeds, the force that delivered it pulls out again rapidly. A mile up the road an hour later, there are more mines. And so it goes.

None of it threatens real annihilation of a larger attacking force. All of it threatens modest losses, no certainty about where the line is or what the right counter is or how fast to push or whether you've actually taken something for good or it is still up for grabs. Delivered by quite limited forces. (At, one should add, considerable risk to those limited forces...)

The regular infantry was expected to do all this, not specialists. In the mobile divisions, the infantry portions were up front acting as a screen, but could expect more support from vehicles. They had gun armed halftracks and assault guns etc.

Turreted tanks tended to appear in company strength or not at all, though. (Depleted by losses, that means 7-15 AFVs). TDs and StuGs and Marders were often "penny packeted" below that, but they tried to avoid that with the turreted tanks.

So in a mobile division delaying action, it is a screen like the above but sometimes the counterpunches have a tactically significant number of tanks, working with infantry in company to battalion strength. When the mobile divisions decide to counterpunch it would generally be heavy enough to change the tactical initiative, in other words.

[ February 06, 2004, 05:02 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Kevin Kinscherf]

Jason -

Thanks for the thoughtful answers. The implications seem to be:

Panzer recon battalions operated both en mass

and over wide areas where formations could not directly support each other until they concentrated again.

Panzer recon battalions did not task organize into KGs ie the battalion commander never lost control of his formations.

Within the battalion they would organize as required by the tactical situation.

Tank and Infantry heavy battle groups needed to provide for their own recon ie point formations.

This view and Jason's comments appear to be born out in Panzertaktik by Schneider. He describes area and local recon. The recon battalion conducted area recon and the tank battalion provided local recon with their organic recon platoon.

- Kevin

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Kevin Kinscherf:

Panzer recon battalions did not task organize into KGs ie the battalion commander never lost control of his formations.

As I envisioned it, Panzer recon battalions always seemed to me to constitute combined arms mini-KGs in their own right.

Sidebar: I always felt that if I had to be the the WW II Heer, the commander of a Panzer recon battalion is what I'd want to be. They always seemed to have the most interesting forces to lead and the most interesting missions to perform.

Michael

[Kevin Kinscherf]

Micheal -

Perhaps we would have been in the same training company going after that same job! I really have an interest in mech recon. My personal library does not paint a clear picture of the standard mode of operation for panzers. I just pulled out the "Hand Book on German Military Forces" by the War Department in 1945. Its talks about German recon battalions operating on a front up to a width of 30 miles! That can not be the norm.

I have been collecting published information on how panzer platoons through battalions fought. We have plently of info on how divisions fought as part of corps. But how panzer divsions themselves fought seems to missing in the literature. Good panzer divsion commanders seemed to get promoted any we don't have a good first person account at that level of command spanning several operations.

If so .. someone send me the ISBN #

- Kevin

[JasonC]

There is good stuff on how the divisions fought. You rapidly get a sense of it reading detailed enough tactical narrative. Especially if you follow the moves with any kind of thought given to why the commander did something that way and what the alternatives were.

But you do have to dive into nitty gritty unit history detail to get this stuff. You don't get it in the synoptic overviews by the grand poohbahs, who are all trying to explain why the whole war went the way it did - i.e. things way above their pay grade in the real deal, and a different person's job afterward (the historians').

As an example, on the web there is substantial info on Kursk. If you go to the following website -

http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/town/avenue/vy75/data.htm

There is a zip file in the 3rd link there, the one that reads -

Narrative data on all German units from the Kursk Database.

Download it. Unzip it. Open the .loc files for various units. (The .unt files include staff level stuff on supply, equipment, ammo, losses, etc. Useful but not for this). (Note that the Russian side stuff on that site is perfunctory, nothing like the level of narrative coverage on the German side).

An example - 19th panzer division at the start of the fight -

(Clearly the first part is from an operations staff order - after that is an execution report on what happened)

Div was divided in to three assault groups as follows:

KG 73

73d PzGren Regt

19th Pz Pi Bn (-3 coys)

1 coy, 19th PzJg Bn

Orders: conduct surprise attack on E bank of the Donez S of Pushkarnoje, break through Soviet defenses between div right boundary and the reformatory, and continue attack NE past the RR

to take Kolch. den Uroshaja S of the Kreida siding. Then, in combination with KGs Richter and Becker, which will come up to the reformatory from the Mikhailowka bridgehead, the three KGs

will attack to seize the heights overlooking Blishnaja Igumenka.

KG Richter

74th PzGren Regt (-I Bn)

1 coy, 503d Hvy Pz Bn (Tiger)

3d Kp/19th Pz Pi Bn

Orders: Attack out of the S portion of the Mikhailowka bridgehead, staying to the E of the road that runs to the reformatory. Tie in on the left flank when KG 73 comes into line, and together execute the attack on the Kreida siding.

KG Becker (armored group)

27th Pz Regt

I/74th PzGren Regt

Orders: Remain in assault positions vic Pushkarnoje, prepared to follow KG Richter. Once the Kreida siding is taken, mount immediate attack from vic Point 139.9 over Kolch. den Uroshaja-- Blishnaja Igumenka to seize the commanding heights N and E thereof. This attack will be pressed with all vigor even if all

supporting units are not present. 27th Pz Regt is intended for use only in the KG Becker area. The main task of the regiment is to send platoons into the depths of the Soviet positions and

destroy Soviet artillery positions vic Blishnaja Igumenka.

(That was the order - I'll analyze it below. Here is the "results" narrative)

The Mikhailowka bridgehead area and bridge site lay under heavy Soviet artillery and heavy weapons fire from about 0155 on. The div jumped off at 0225 with the two assault groups, KG 73 and KG Richter. KG 73 attacked down the Rasumnoje--Mikhailowka road. It then advanced SW of the reformatory by late morning. KG Richter attacked the woods SE of Mikhailowka and by 0430 had cleared the NW corner of the woods, but then its attack was stopped by heavy Soviet arty fire.

By nightfall KG 73 had reached the woods at the railway embankment 1 km S of the Kreida RR siding; KG Richter had reached the area E of Point 139.9; and KG Becker was still in its

assembly area. Soviet harassing mortar fire fell on German positions S of the Mikhailowka bridgehead throughout the evening. The div was

ordered to attack out of those positions at first light on the 6th.

(That concludes the narrative for the day - the whole account continues of course. They didn't get as far as planned on that day, obviously).

So what is the principle behind the tasking and what is the basic plan? They think of it as having 4 infantry and 1 engineer battalions, one tank regiment (it had 80 tanks split evenly between IIIs and IVs), and a Tiger company. One of the infantry battalions is armored, as is the 3rd company of the engineer battalion. The tactical mission is to seize high ground on the enemy side of a stream, over which they have only a narrow bridgehead so far.

They think of that as primarily an infantry task. Get infantry over the river to widen the bridgehead, and roll up the flank toward the existing bridgehead, to expand ground held on the enemy side of the river. Tigers down in the bridgehead itself, at first holding then attacking frontally out of it. When those give room for maneuver across the stream, unleash the armored main body to seize the heights and exploit beyond them.

What tasking does this produce? They send the all unarmored panzergrenadier battalion across the river with most of the engineers. They need something for AT ability so they are also given some of the Panzerjaegers, but it is a largely infantry force, with 8 of the division's infantry-type companies in one KG.

The armored group gets the whole panzer regiment, and the armored panzergrenadier battalion. The order doesn't say where the recon battalion was. It appears in the narrative later. It was probably either off defending elsewhere with the rest of the Panzerjaegers attached (the division had only 2 companies of those), or was just held in reserve.

The remaining battalion in the panzergrenadier regiment the armored battalion was from gets the Tigers and goes in the bridgehead proper. It also gets the armored panzergrenadiers. Notice also how the cross attachments are listed - some have not a battalion but a regiment minus one battalion. That means they also have the regimental support and command group. The three main regimental commands thus each have a KG - 73 for the infantry group, the head of 74 for the Tiger-reinforced bridgehead group, and the panzer regiment commander for the armored group.

So on the group, most of the armor and the armored infantry are in reserve to exploit. They have a very high armor to infantry ratio. They aren't leading the attack because the terrain is deemed unsuitable. The frontal attack part gets Tigers and armored pioneers - thick armor, big direct fire guns, flame, etc - and 4 infantry type companies to 1 armor. The crossing move gets most of the infantry.

You can see here the purposes the KG system was meant for - adapting the force mix used to the tactical task, terrain, space available, and enemy. No even division of all types for everybody. Specific missions with specific mixes.

Notice also that the initial attack was at night. But didn't catch the Russians napping - they were instead under a spoiling barrage. See why they didn't want to mass troops in the bridgehead area? When they tried to use the armor (Becker's KG) early the next morning it was still premature, and mines stopped them.

It is one example. The division will go through several adaptations in a single week of fighting. You read twenty of these things and think through how you'd task the elements of a division or what might have been done differently, and you get a pretty clear sense of how it worked. And of the real coordination and planning tasks of a divisional operations staff.

[JasonC]

As for what a Pz recce battalion on 30 miles means, it means there wasn't anything else for that much frontage. It is a screening mission. They'd have a few bases for company level HQs strung across that length of front, each of which would keep one platoon in reserve to drive out to a threatened place.

The rest would be spread out and forward to every crossroads and village, a few halftracks or armored cars worth each. They'd run patrols between these, and occasionally forward. If they find any enemy, they call the local reserve platoon and it drives over ASAP. In the meantime they try to pin the enemy with long range MG or light cannon fire.

On open steppe, there might not be any enemy for 10 miles if there weren't an attack in progress.

If they see a whole formation of infantry headed their way, they can "alarm" most of the battalion to the area - 2/3rds - and try to mess them up at range. While letting the rest of the division know.

30 miles is a huge distance to try to man as a line, continually. But it is only a half hour's drive - or less - from any of the reserve locations behind it to any point along it. The guys up front only need to see and call in the threat, and hold or fall back for a brief period, before help arrives.

[Kevin Kinscherf]

Excellent post. I have that link but never thought to look at the narratives.

Here is some more stuff I found in:

Sharp's "Panzer Tactics in WWII" p. 76.

It is hard to tell where he quotes these from ... but they are quotes:

1st Pz Div 11/43-1/44

"the engineer and recon batallion were very fit and well organized. They were used as a last resort by the commander"

24th Pz Div 11/43-1/44

"The Pz Div detached from the normal organization of the recon battalion the only armored car company we had of about 16-18 wheeled ACs. They were always under the direction of the division commander because it was normal the the rest of the recon battalion consisting in this case of two armored companies in light APCs and one in heavy APCs was attached to the armored ... command as an infantry unit."

Authors comments for this section:

all comanders need an immediate reserve even if this means the division commander has to detach a company from his recon battalion for his own use"

Is this evidence that recon battlaion were broken up (last resort?) and attached (in 24 Pz Div case) to KG.

Kevin

PS: very useful thread.

[JasonC]

"Is this evidence that recon battlaion were broken up (last resort?) and attached (in 24 Pz Div case) to KG."

No I don't really think so. The comment about "last resort" is just the "3rd regiment" use I mentioned earlier. The engineers and recon are used together as a substitute panzergrenadier regiment - in reserve, but put on the front line as soon as they are needed.

Obviously they are specialists. It was something of a waste to use them as just ordinary infantry. That is the motivation of the "last resort" comment. Which is partially boilerplate - the "resort" was frequent and repeated, in many units.

The heer panzer division was quite light in the infantry arm. Without this use of the engineers and recon, they would have been strapped to hold any length of front after taking any appreciable losses.

Doctrinally, it was supposed to attack, on the same length of front as one enemy regiment. In reality they were defending, often on the same length of front as an enemy corps. Hence a great need felt for more infantry manpower.

The attachment case is just the armored group use I mentioned, meaning paired with the single armored panzergrenadier battalion, working with the tank regiment or its best battalion. They didn't send the single armored car company with that group - that is the only variation from that common scheme.

Armored cars didn't fit. They weren't felt to be an appreciable asset to the formed KG. When the armored recon battalion is operating on its own, those armored cars have the role of "its own" "tanks". In the heavy armored KG of the whole division, the whole panzer regiment, or its best battalion, is fufilling that role. (Some divisions kept them anyway, wanting as much armor as possible in the armored KG).

So the divisional commander kept them as a reserve. Tactically those would probably backstop units where the front failed, in platoon strength. "They broke through in sector A", so send an AC platoon to the next village or ridge back in sector A. Is that splitting up into KGs? Eh.

Contrast it with typical use of US armored cavalry. A cavalry troop would be attached to an armored division task force built around a tank battalion or an armored infantry battalion. As a matter of course. Every task force in the division would have a small bit of cavalry attached, running jeep patrols supported by a handful of armored cars. Not what the German KG system did.

[Kevin Kinscherf]

"The attachment case is just the armored group use I mentioned, meaning paired with the single armored panzergrenadier battalion, working with the tank regiment or its best battalion. They didn't send the single armored car company with that group - that is the only variation from that common scheme."

In this case were they performing a recon role for the battle group or just filling in as regular line armored infantry?

[JasonC]

Armored infantry. They are working with the other half track mounted battalion in the division. The standard mounted battalion had 3 companies in halftracks plus a heavy weapons company with gun armed halftracks, mortar halftracks, and Grille style SP infantry guns. The recce guys add 2 more companies in halftracks and another company of gun and mortar haltracks.

So that is a substantial addition to the armored infantry strength, almost half of it. Sometimes the one armored panzer pioneer company would be added too, making the equivalent of 2 full battalions of armored infantry. Which would then work either with the whole panzer regiment, or with one battalion of it (e.g. the Panther battalion, in a late war case).

When attacking, these sorts of armored KGs usually led with tanks, not mounted scouts. The armored infantry followed in their halftracks. The tanks would just blow through any light opposition. If heavy AT defenses were encountered the tanks would halt and the infantry would go first, after dismounting. Halftracks charging ahead doing "recon by death" would not be part of the program.

The intended use of the armored infantry was to mop up in areas the tanks penetrated, where the passage of a large body of tanks had already smashed the defending AT system. Light armor is extremely effective against an enemy that has been done to. The MGs on the 'tracks split up isolated infantry pockets, the gun armed ones park out of range of infantry retaliation and shell each pocket, the infantry goes in and mops up with local odds created by hitting each bit in sequence.

Strategy is the art of not fighting fair.

[Kevin Kinscherf]

Jason -

Looks like 4 main deployment modes:

1. The entire Pz recon battalion works together as a whole fanning out to front, flank or rear of the Pz Divsion - "screening mode"

2. Held in reserve as a whole - "reserve mode"

3. Concentated en mass - "mop-up/exploitation mode"

4. Armor Car and engineers held by division command and the rest as a whole working as regular armored infantry in a specific tactical assignment after which the battalion is reestablished. (I wonder where the battalion commander is when his unit is used this way?)

- "task organised mode"

- Kevin

[JasonC]

Well, add a variant of 2 and 4 - paired with the divisional Pz Jgr battalion as an extra "tank-infantry" task force, for attack or in reserve. I've seen that several times.

It helps if you understand the command issues involved. The divisional commander is going to retain some assets for himself. He has 3 maneuver unit regimental commanders under him (plus an arty guy, but he isn't maneuver units) - the head of the panzer regiment, and the heads of each of the panzergrenadier regiments.

Tasking is going to be done by the divisional commander or his staff. But if he assigns a battalion or company to one of the regimental commanders, it is in practice gone. In the sense of "spent" or "invested", out of his tactical control, and likely to be committed. Units he wants to decide on the use of later - time or place of commitment etc - he will retain at the division level, by simply not assigning them to one of the regimental commanders (and whatever KG they have).

The standard units of the division are all "spoken for" in this command propriety sense. Meaning, the panzer regiment, the panzergrenadier regiments, the arty regiment. But the "divisional troops" - recon, pioneer, panzerjaeger, flak if available - are not.

Now, suppose the panzerjaegers have Jagdpanzers or StuGs - they are a powerful armor unit therefore. Well, then up to a third (a quarter perhaps in some formations) of the real combat power is with these divisional troops. Combined, they are as big as half the panzer regiment working with one of the panzergrenadier regiments.

So it was quite common for these division level units to work together. Often getting thrown in relatively late in whatever tactical battle the division was fighting.

The main determinant though isn't how the recce battalion itself is united or split, it is who it is assigned to work with and what they are doing. Their own pure specialist function is the screening role. When that is the mission they do it alone (or with a small attachment of flak or pz jgr to strengthen their heavy AT ability, perhaps). For all the other functions, something else is "driving", and usually a consideration higher not lower in echelon level. (The division plan - not what battalion or company "needs" "recon" or light armor).

[Kevin Kinscherf]

Jason -

This is clearing the picture for me and helping me on a scenario for CMBB I am scripting. The main thing for folks to know is that the infantry component was never split up and went into battle together. The infantry component is the key component in the infantry heavy combined

arms battalion. It is also important to know that panzer units were trained to provide local recon so they would not be completely blind if the recon battalion was on a non-screening mission.

- Kevin

[Sirocco]

Would it be fair to say that in the latter half of the war, in general terms, German recce went from it's intended role to more of an "ersatz infantry" use, plugging exposed gaps and screening flanks? That's the sense that I have from the reading I've done.

[Kevin Kinscherf]

Just when you thought my questions were over ...

Recon had 75mm half tracks to support the infantry. Would they be ever posted to cover open ground ahead of a screening position? Or would they be held away from the "point" and brought up once the enemy attack was identified?

Would they ever be posted in woods away from a road?

- Kevin