Effectiveness of Field Artillery.

[tar]

A friend of mine ran across an article in the November-December 2002 Field Artillery journal, pp 8-11. His comments are:

[i found] an article from Field Artillery that includes some objective information on artillery effects vs. armored vehicles.

In reading the article, keep in mind that while the artillery they were using was larger than most WWII artillery, they were also using 1980s-vintage vehicles as the targets. WWII vehicles might not be any more vulnerable to the secondary damage effects (broken tracks, stripped antennae, etc.), but their generally thinner armor would make them more vulnerable to outright kills by penetration of the fighting compartment, fuel tanks, or engine (with attendant fire). Also, the 155 shells weigh in at about 100 lb., which is very light for an aircraft bomb. Most aircraft, particularly after '42, would be carrying something like a pair of 250 lb. bombs or a 500 lb. bomb. There were also the primitive bomblet dispensers available in limited numbers.

You can look up the article itself at the

Field Artillery Journal Web Site

[Michael Emrys]

I remember a comment in S&T years ago by, I think, Jim Dunnigan that no tank could withstand a direct hit from a 155mm shell. And he was referring to modern armor. I doubt that's changed in the years since he wrote that. Of course, getting a direct hit on a target as small as a tank is the trick. Even with modern guided weapons it isn't guaranteed every single time. With unguided munitions it isn't even very likely, given a limited expenditure of ammunition. You just have to hope that the tankers are not in a mood to risk it when the shells begin to fall.

Michael

[tar]

Well, the real issue in the article is a bit more about the effectiveness of HE artillery fire from near misses. It seems that direct hits are not needed to effectively take tanks out of the battle. All that was needed was shell impact within about 30m of the tanks and there would be sufficient gun, equipment (vision blocks, radio, etc.) or track damage to render the tanks hors de combat.

[JasonC]

There is already a long thread on this.

The study is tendentious special pleading by a partisan of the artillery arm (in which I served, around the time of the study, incidentally).

Most of the "armor" used in the test was less than full tanks. M113s and similar vehicles were mixed with a modest portion of full tanks, and the whole subject to 155mm barrage. The reports of outright armor penetrations by fragments are mostly cases of M113s being penetrated through side walls - around 30mm of aluminum (which is only a third as dense as steel. Marginally stronger - 20% or so - for the weight, but not for the same thickness).

This is a bit like testing universal carriers and then reporting the results as being about Sherman tanks. Various places in the document speak specifically of "tanks", while others say "armor". Armor means mostly light armor. The effects seen on the full tanks were limited to M-kills and loss of vision equipment (which might or might not cause "gun damage" in CM terms).

The document also shows full kills of main battle tanks - but those were caused by direct hits not 30m misses, and are so rare none occurred in the actual reported test. At other points it makes claims about KOs that refer to DP-ICM ammunition rather than HE. Where it claims kills from typical battalion (not battery) shoots, they are at large targets and say "more than one", expected to be "damaged or destroyed" not destroyed, still talking about "armor" rather than full tanks. He is trying to dispute a statement that it takes at least 50 155mm shells to kill one tank, and he fails to do so.

The reality from actual WW II combat is 155mm got M-kills from near misses by unseating tracks and smashing drive sprockets. Occasionally fragments holed the fuel cells or damaged the engine, in addition. Shells 105mm and up got full kills from direct hits, but mostly achieved those by direct fire in gun lines, not indirect (some that way, especially when whole corps of 105mm were firing in very high volumes to break counterattacks, but still rare compared to direct fire KOs).

Shoots in locations like Elsenborn ridge may have M-killed a few dozen tanks over the course of 3 days, for ammo expenditures on the order of 50,000 rounds, 105mm and 155mm combined. Not all fired specifically at tanks, to be sure, but even the 50 rounds per kill figure is generous by an order of magnitude, even if only M-kills are meant. (In the event, bazooka teams finished off the cripples at night. SP TDs outscored the arty, and tanks contributed. Towed ATGs did little).

[flamingknives]

ISTR a War Office document, now in the PRO and summarised in "Salt's Snippets", that deals with the effect of 25pdr barrage on Churchill tanks. Immobilisation of the tank was considered the worst case, and :

"There is no adverse effect on the crew from a 25 pdr direct hit. Fragments cannot penetrate the tank,

and the blast is not at all uncomfortable."

[JasonC]

Churchill is an unusually heavy tank, though, and the 25 pdr was light for a divisional piece. US 105mm did get full KOs of plain vanilla Panzer IIIs and IVs with HE direct hits. Neither side nor top armor was sufficient against it. 105mm vs. a Tiger, on the other hand, would be the same story as the Churchill - track damage the best case, not going to KO it that way.

[tar]

Right. But is the incidence of such mobility (and possible gun kills through ancillary mechanisms) high enough in CM?

[JasonC]

See the extensive prior thread on the subject, which initially was about Russian 132mm rockets but expanded to include all HE arty vs. armor issues. CM effects are fine, generous even.

[John_d]

Have you got a link to that Jason?

[JasonC]

It started November 20th in the CMBB forum, and ran 3 pages. Here is a link -

http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=23;t=011079;p=1