Holding the line

[Si32]

During 1944 on the Eastern Front, what would each side typically hold a 6km portion of the line with? This would be the period of a lull between any major offensives where it's mostly recon units doing the fighting.

From what I gather, at least for the Germans, it would likely only be a battalion holding that much territory. So how would they be spread out to cover that much ground, especially if the terrain is built up with plenty of wooded areas, many scattered villages and hills that block views.

Thanks for any info.

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[Der Alte Fritz]

You statement about one bn per 6km seems about right but be aware that German defences increased in DEPTH during the war and a 20km deep defensive zone was not uncommon. See the article below about the evolution of German defence to mid war. The Imperial German Army evolved 'elastic' defence to deal with break ins and this evolved during the start of the second war. However this failed to deal with Russian offensives post Kursk so depth was increased to soak up the enemys reserves and momentum.

Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front During World War II; Prewar to March 1943, Wray, Timothy A. http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/wray/wray.asp

The Russians used a battalion every 2km at Kursk with another half battalion in reserve in a position 6 km deep but had three defensive 'belts' like this spread over 30-35km with 5km gaps between belts. Does not sound much but this was regarded as a very heavy defence on the Eastern Front.

cheers

[JasonC]

It varied with portion of the front and expected enemy opposition, but a normal force for that length of frontage, for the German side, would be a single infantry regiment. Occasionally you'd find an infantry division with a frontage as long as 30 kilometers, but that was known to be too thin to hold against any sort of attack. It would be used only to screen wide open ground or to cover gaps between obstacles, or when not in contact (as a warning force and trip wire).

A normal defense of 6 km with a regiment would have an outpost line and a string of company strongpoints, with the gaps between the company strongpoints covered only by fire, and occasional patrols. Behind the line you find the artillery, light field howitzers (105mm), that can reach any point in the sector. These would often be at the regimental HQ strongpoint, or occasionally their own, in battalion strength. Sometimes separate batteries.

The idea is that the outposts merely report something coming, everyone falls back on the company strongpoints, which defend themselves with machineguns and mortars at range. Artillery fire protects them and also ranges freely over the sectors between them. After barrages work over an area, a patrol cum counterattack goes out and recons the fire zone.

Other arms supplemented the company strongpoint heavy weapons - infantry guns, light flak, PAK. When LOS permits these allow a company position to plaster anything within 500 to 1000 meters, so the infantry positions do not have to be continuous with one another.

The outpost line is thin but more nearly continuous. It has two main roles - preventing easy enemy infiltration (especially at night), and providing the eyes and warning about incursions for the artillery and the rest of the defense. These had to be within small arms range of each other, and preferably easy night listening range, as well. But they could be quite small, each - fire team or MG position.

A regiment on 6 km might have one full infantry company in a reverse position, along with attached arty. They are the counterattack reserve for low level stuff, and the final defenders of the arty and HQ rally point in a major attack. Ahead of them by up to 2 km, picture reduced company strongpoints 1 km apart center to center, each with heavy weapons and a couple of infantry platoons, with perhaps a 200m footprint each. Now split the 3rd platoon from each into half a dozen listening posts 400 meters or so ahead of the line of company positions.

At night, man the outposts and have one of the other platoons in each sector send out a patrol at some point. Rotate the roles. If they have time, the companies prepare fall back positions on-line with the reserve company and regimental HQ, behind their own, but leave them unmanned or just a few sentries.

Suppose an enemy night probe comes in. Maybe it hits an LP, maybe they know about them and steer between a pair of them. OK, then maybe they run into a patrol or maybe they don't. If they don't, maybe they hit a company strongpoint or maybe they don't. If they wander through all of the above and are not heard before daybreak, they infiltrate, but are found the next day, and are cut off from their friends. More likely, one of the previous layers hears them or gets in a fight with them.

OK, now the nearest company can put mortar fire on them. All the company positions have 81mm mortars and all of them can reach any point in their sector, as can the neighboring strongpoints. If LOS lines are long, the HMGs also interlock. But if it is woods or something so that doesn't occur, then you put out platoon sized patrols between them. If one runs into anything it fixes it and calls fire.

In addition to the self help from the 81s, the 105s back at the regiment position reach everything. They are the regiment CO's main way of breaking up minor attacks. He can follow them up by sending his reserve company forward, to replace one hurt by a large attack, or to seal off an incursion between two of the company positions, "halving" the distance between positions in this or that sector.

If the whole regiment is having trouble, the division has a reserve battalion somewhere, and the division has 150mm sFHs capable of hitting any location in the division's sector. There might also be a "schnell" battalion based on the divisional panzerjaegers and their trucks; there may be a StuG or Marder company as part of it. There are engineers and a replacement battalion (normally doing training) somewhere too, if there is a major emergency these will act as additional division-level reserves.

But none of the previous are called upon in the typical case of low level fighting on a relatively inactive front. In the northern woods fighting, the Germans found their edge in artillery coordination extremely useful. In principle the Russians should have been able to infiltrate with easy, grab the less numerous German infantry in close range bear hugs, and trade them all off. But in practice the Russians did not coordinate artillery fire as well as the Germans did, when LOS was limited and enemy positions extremely uncertain.

Of course, they also used obstacles. Natural ones of water or marsh, artificial ones of minefields between the company positions and wire ahead of the outpost line and around the strongpoints. The outposts often had overhead cover, MG bunkers in CM terms, and you'd also find those in the company positions, along with trenches. Promising routes would be registered for the 81s and 105s.

See the system?

[JasonC]

Against a very heavy attack - a full corps hitting 1-2 regiments e.g. - the thickness I describe would not hold for more than a day or two. But it would slow them that long and inflict losses, mostly from the artillery fire, and some defenders would live to pull back to another position. To continue to hold they would need reinforcement.

The Germans relied on panzer divisions shifting very rapidly to meet main attacks, often getting an alert PD in the region into the fight by late on the first day, and up to a full panzer corps to the region of a main attack inside of 72 hours. They also relied on larger infantry formations shifting their less pressed subunits around, and especially concentrating their fires against a perceived main effort. So you pound through the forward screen, and there is a new one plus it is raining 150mm shells, and tomorrow or the next day there will be tanks.

Naturally if you can get through clean in 12 hours and turn a whole tank corps loose, you can still rupture such defenses readily. And they did. Leading to fights between the rival arriving reserves, in the operational rear of any major attack. Sometimes the initial break-in was quite expensive, but generally it worked. (Unlike, say, Verdun or Somme fighting in WW I, at much higher force to space ratios and under much more concentrated artillery firepower).

[Runyan99]

Originally posted by JasonC:

It varied with portion of the front and expected enemy opposition, but a normal force for that length of frontage, for the German side, would be a single infantry regiment.

And how many CM scenarios have you seen that model that kind of force density? Not too many.

[Der Alte Fritz]

And how many CM scenarios have you seen that model that kind of force density? Not too many.

What sort of density are we talking about? 1944 German Infantry Regt = 2 Battalions (probably at 75% strength if lucky)over 6km or 1 Bn (4 companies) over 3km. So a map 1km wide would contain an outpost line a company position and a bit of a reserve (say 2 platoons) for a counter attack and artillery of 11 x 105mm (say 3 wire spotters) which is not unreasonable for a CMBB game.

"Russian Offensive 1" at the Scenario Depot is this size. Attacking force is a Russian Battalion and it is tough going against these defences.

Compared this with Russian front line at Kursk: 1 Regt occupies 4km, battalion occupies 2km with half bn reserve. Say 5 companies so allow per km 2 companies in front line with reserves. ie double the German concentration.

This is quite tight in CMBB terms and I have an experimental layout at TPG under "Kursk First Day 375th Division". Not the thickest Russian defence - this Regt 1245th had 3 bn in front line and no reserves (the other Regts in the Division had 2 bn up front and 1 in reserve)