Kursk question for anyone with the knowledge

[John Kettler]

In Axell's RUSSIA's HEROES 1941-45, there is an entire chapter, titled The Thirteenth Commandment, concerning what sounds like a truly remarkable engagement at one of the Kursk schwerpunkts: the seam between two Russian divisions, with the forward line already breached by a Panzer glocke and the combat stability of the defending regiment of the 184th Infantry Division critically dependent on what happened at Captain Georgi Gubkin's antitank battery reinforced company strongpoint.

If the account's to be trusted, this place won the kitchen sink award and got hit with all of it: Nebelwerfers, Tigers, Ferdinands and lots of infantry. The fighting was ferocious and got down to grenade range against men and AFVs alike. Supposedly, the defenders killed a number of the big cats and Porsche toys, mostly with antitank gunfire, and mines got a few more, with a handful destroyed via close assault. From what I can tell, T ammo was used, and the antitank guns were either 76mm ZIS-3 or 57mm ZIS-2, with the likelihood's favoring the former, considering the nastiness of the latter sans T ammo.

This strikes me as a spectacular scenario possibility embodying the very essence of the Kursk experience. Does anyone have any additional information on this apparently spectacular fight?

Gubkin is included in Sakaida's HEROES OF THE SOVIET UNION 1941-1945, and Sakaida also has a companion volume on the heroines.

http://books.google.com/books?id=Y3UbdijeLssC&dq=georgi+gubkin&source=gbs_summary_s&cad=0

Regards,

John Kettler

[Cuirassier]

Well I would have doubts. 184th Rifle division was employed in the south, west of the 22GRC and 1 TA. This means it couldn't have faced Elephants, as these were only used in Model's attack from the north, AFAIK.

Moreover, 184th Rifle division is not opposite the main effort of 48th Panzer Korps, but west of it, and is part of 40th Army and in second echelon until the 12.

Thus, all of the German armor of 48th Panzer Korps was hitting the 90th and 67th GRD's and later the the 6th TC and 3rd MC of 1st TA. It was not hitting the 184th.

The 184th division doesn't appear to be on the front line until the 12, when in joins 6th Guards Army and moves opposite the 332 ID. From here however it likely only screened against the 332 ID and maybe elements of 3rd Panzer. But it deffinately wasn't subject to a multi-Panzer Division thrust from 48th Panzer Korps.

To me, the source seems unreliable. Perhaps others will have more to say on the subject.

[JasonC]

First point - Russian side accounts employ the term "elephants" or "ferdinands" to means simply "armored assault guns", and StuGs are frequently meant. Sometimes even Nashorns, if the context is ranged anti-tank fire rather than fending off an armored assault. The likely meaning in the south is the former, StuGs.

Second point - the Russian defensive success in the south consisted of progressively narrowing the width of the successful portion of the German advance. Key parts of that were stopping AD Kempf on the right, and stopping the left wing of 48 Panzer corps, aka 3rd Panzer, on the left. The latter induced PD GD to make a number of left hooks around the blockages, that cumulatively drew it away from the SS panzer corps advance, and also wore it out.

So, fighting on the left edge of the 48th Panzer corps sector was by no means unimportant to the outcome in the south. A description of key sector fighting there and the described menagerie, would fit just fine for any position that first checked 3rd PD frontally, and then was hit from the right by PD GD. The latter had some Tigers of course, all the Panthers (though only a fifth or so running after the first two days), plenty of StuGs, as well as the usual Panzer IVs and IIIs. Anyone in the path of PD GDs right hooks would have felt under the sort of assault depicted.

All that said, I'll have to check further for specific unit info.

[JasonC]

As for T ammo, there are Panther wrecks at Kursk, surveyed by the Russians, with 45mm sub caliber holes in their side armor (and occasionally, the gun itself). As well as any number with 76mm holes of course. T ammo was available by then for 76mm guns, including those on T-34s, despite CMBB not showing it appearing until 1944. 57mm ATGs, on the other hand, were quite rare. Standard ATG formations had 76mm guns, some also had 45mm, and the rifle divisions themselves of course had many 45mm. Mobile divisions had single battalions each of 85mm AA used in a ground AT role.

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[JasonC]

John - So I've looked at the specific unit and can isolate the time. The 184th was in a "backstop", second echelon defensive position, when a big GD hook supporting3rd Panzer hit the formations in front of it, penetrated them and partially dissolved them. This was on the 10th of July, and I believe has to be the time intended.

The 11th was a lull in that area of the front, as both sides repositioned forces. On the 12th, the Russians counterattacked, with 184th providing the infantry component of 5th Tank corps part in that. 5th Tank corps was down to 70 tanks and was the formation largely smashed ahead of the 184th Rifle 2 days previously. The opponents opposite by then, however, were the 332nd infantry division, and the critical part of that day's fight was farther north, outside of 184th's sector, where 3rd Panzer was attacked.

I do not think anything happening on the latter day can be meant, therefore, nor after it. The 184th was not yet engaged before the 10th. So that leaves the fighting on the 10th as the passage referred to.

What as happening tactically is that the 184th was deployed in a relatively long line in support of the 5th Tank corps and other remnant formations still in line ahead of it.

PD GD attacked 5th Tank corps, with 2 KGs doing the heavy lifting. One was formed around the divisional recon battalion, the SPW mounted Pz Gdr battalion, and the StuG battalion as the AFV component. This pushed deep into the Russian defense and isolated forward elements by its fire etc.

The other was formed around the Panzer regiment and one of the Pz Gdr battalions, and had numerous Panthers (still) and a few Tigers, in addition to Panzer IVs. It was attacking farther northeast, and took an important hill that gave it wide LOS, but also subjected it to incoming from roughly half the compass.

The Germans were not, however, trying to break clean through the 184th to the west. They were trying to defeat 5th Tank corps to clear their left flank before returning to a northern advance - which they tried on the 12th. So the close attack, while probably true for that subunit, was not representative of an overall breakthrough fight through the 184th.

Instead it was something of a melee, resulting from the Germans first getting through and around elements of 5th Tank with the two armor KGs above, and the bypassed Russians fighting in place, facing all directions. The 184th was supporting them by fire and sheltering the elements getting clear of the Germans - and no doubt, got the pursuers coming on top of some of its subelements etc.

From the Russian side of the field, this would look like a pretty decisive turn of the tide moment, in the sense that the Germans failed to penetrate the 184th, the line held, and the next local action had the Russians attacking rather than defending. They had also seen the strongest elements of PD GD up close and personal, and undoubtedly felt they had fought the best beasts the Germans had, and stopped them.

The operational reality was somewhat different. 5th Tank corps was clearly defeated that day. 184th sheltered survivors. It was not pressed full strength because it was not hit cleanly without stuff in front of it, by a solid wall of Germans in contact, etc. And the Germans voluntarily changed their axis of advance on the 11th, to be ready to move north not west on the 12th.

But this means the opponent forces would be PD GD elements. There were also 3rd PD forces in the area, but one tactical piece of 184th would not have faced those as well, I would think - they were a bit farther south still. The "ferdinands" would be StuGs from the recon, armed Pz Gdr, and StuG KG. The other heavies would be Panthers and IVs, with a few Tigers still running too.

Those two were separated by a fair distance, however, and the same ATG battery might have taken one or the other under fire at long range, but would not have been closely attacked by both. The Panther etc group particularly reports strong flanking fires after reaching their hill objective, some of which probably originated from guns in the 184ths PAK network.

That is what I make of the real context. FWIW.

[John Kettler]

Thanks for all the responses! Per Axell's chapter notes, the primary work used to describe this clash was Shapirov's A TRUE TALE OF TWO WARS, Moscow 1981,

with secondary mentions in GENERAL CHERNYAKHOVSKY, Moscow 1980 and Gladkov, OPERATION BAGRATION, 1984.

Anyone own/read these, or, for that matter, the Sakaida book?

Have just learned that this set exists! Does anyone have access and can supply the Gubkin citation for Kursk?

http://collectrussia.com/dispitem.htm?item=2473

Had pretty much ruled out the 45mm ATGs, given that the chapter has the battery commander's admonishing one of his gunners not to fire at the front of a Tiger. If this was a Tiger, the real kind, who in his right mind on a 45mm ATG would even attempt such a shot? My reasoning was that a ZIS-3 gunner might, especially with T ammo, which, I believe, is what the phrase "high charge ammo" refers to. Also, page 197 of Axell's book specifically refers to a "heavy gun" firing in reply to two gun straddling shots from a Ferdinand. Would hardly call a 45mm ATG a heavy gun! Sadly, the account neglects to provide the open fire range for the Russian ATG battery.

Regards,

John Kettler

[ April 05, 2008, 04:27 AM: Message edited by: John Kettler ]

[JasonC]

Of course 76mm guns were the most common, but ATG formations sometimes had a mix of 76mm and 45mm. If "high charge" is a mistranslation of "high powered", it might have the meaning you think, but it also has another obvious meaning for any field artillery piece, 76mm and up. Which is just putting the maximum powder charge in the breech.

Field artillery adjusts the powder used as well as the angle of the tube to get different ranges, and firing HE you don't need a high charge at close range. But if you want maximum kinetic energy striking a target, obviously you use the largest possible powder charge.

As for "heavy gun", the usual meaning for Russian artilleryman of that era would be a 122mm gun (rather than howitzer), the standard corps level piece, which normally stuck to indirect fire and specialized in counterbattery work, due to its range. That is basically the same weapon later mounted in IS-2s and ISU-122s, and was a perfectly capable "animal killer", if fired direct.

We don't see those in CM, but it doesn't mean they didn't exist. The Russians used 85mm AA in a ground role just like the Germans used 88mm Flak, and they occasionally used their bigger 122 and 152mm field pieces, just like the Germans used 105mm Kanone to kill KVs.

In CM, the closest thing is to use an 85mm AA. But even those suffer from extremely undermodeled ammo in 1943, enough that they can bounce from StuG fronts down to 600 yards, when actually they'd kill them easily. I suppose you can also just put down TRPs and call for FO versions of those calibers...

[Renaud]

My experience with period Russian sources on Kursk is that they tend to liberally borrow elements from various locales and times to assemble a symbolic narrative. Usually very melodramatic as well. As JasonC has observed, very loose terminology abounds and of course translation issues. Like the western troops calling every tank a 'Tiger' and every field piece an '88'. Later Soviet studies of ww2 actions are more analytical and lose the iconic-moment melodrama (redarmystudies.net has a lot of these, don't know if it's still up).