stalingrad question

[coe]

So I often see on maps at the time of Stalingrad (e.g. Nov 1942) there is a huge gap between the 4th Pz Army and Army Group A in the Caucasus (e.g. around Yelista etc.)....was this really only lightly guarded and if so what prevent the soviets from simply just marching up the step in that area...If I remember right only one motorized division seemed to cover about 150-200 miles or so it seems.

[huhr]

hi coe,

i have read a few books on Stalingrad and the one I have in front of me is by Antony Beevor and the chapter on Operation Uranus with a great looking map on pages 242-243 shows the Operation from the north through the Rumanian forces sweeping down and then the later thrust of 51st, 57 and 64th Armies sweeping westward toward Buzinovka and meeting the northern armies at Kalach therefore closing the ring. Most units once trapped in my opinion believed that a rescue would be attempted and many units (German) went back toward Stalingrad and therefore the pocket became larger. I would check out Beevor's book which can be looked at at any public library. Lots of stuff out there, i just think Army Group A was just worried about getting there butts back to supplies or else be cutoff

[coe]

hmm if you go even further south though its like it is wide open....almost like a straight shot to rostov.

[huhr]

hi coe, i would have to do more reading on this situation, even though i have read a lot its very confusing but a good question, i also think the soviets were somewhat worn out and wary of the german counterpunch. want to get a game going on cmbb?

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by coe:

was this really only lightly guarded and if so what prevent the soviets from simply just marching up the step in that area

Lack of resources, at least in the opening stages. The dual axis advances towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus, plus the losses sustained from as far back as the Izyum offensive, left the Russians with very little to commit to the open flank of Army Group A.

[Guest Mike]

also consider teh infrastructure of the era and area - lack of rail and roads in that gap might make it essentially unpassable to major forces.

[Kingfish]

During the campaign the Russians were able to lay a single rail line that ran from the oilfields near Baku to Astrakhan. This was laid directly atop the steppes without any foundations, so although German mobile detachments were able to cut it at many points with ease, it could be just as easily repaired.

This line served two purposes; it supplemented the amount of oil supplies being delivered from tankers on the Caspain sea, and later in the campaign it allowed the Russians to deploy forces along that wide open flank of Army Group A. It was these additional forces that helped speed up the withdrawl of AG A from the Caucasus by threatening the crossing points along the Manych river.