The receiving end - Soviet breakthrough operations 1944

[Andreas]

In a book I am currently reading, he appendices contain some description of the initial stages of the Iassy-Kishinjev operation.

The book is 'Die Katastrophe in Rumänien' bei Hans Kissel. Kissel was a regimental commander during the retreat battles from the Dnepr into Romania, and then became head of the Volkssturm. He has written a few books, usually available only as OOPs in German.

The following is the experience of 15. ID, part of XXX.AK of (reconstituted) 6.Armee. It was facing the Soviet bridgehead at Tiraspol from which 3rd Ukrainian Front would break out. To its right was the 306.ID, the fate of which is described in another thread I started a while 'How to attack like a Soviet rifle corps'. To its left it connected to 257.ID, the old division of Kissel, who at this time had been posted away.

15.ID was pretty much up to strength, with an 'Ist' of 336 officers, 12,697 NCOs/ORs, 6,355 horses and 419 motor vehicles. It was reinforced by heavy artillery battery 414 and the I.Abteilung of AR 51, which may have been a 15cm sFH battalion.

(Text in brackets by me)

Report by Hauptmann Noll, 2 i/c of Gren. Rgt. 88 (written after the war):

For the night of 19th to 20th August the regiment has been ordered to stand-to. Numerous Russian radio transmissions, many in clear are intercepted: 'Tomorrow the Fritz will take a bath in the Pruth.' (the Pruth was a river far to the west of the Dnestr position). At 2 AM 60 Russian transmitters compare their watches. At 3 AM radio transmission: 'Zhukov expects every men of the Red Army to do his duty.'3.45 AM radio transmission: 'In 15 minutes night will fall again.' 4 AM - start of the barrage. Through the barrage, all our communication links break down. Our battalions report that the enemy has advanced with his barrage and attacked with 'Urrahh' on a broad front but with weak forces. (this was to test whether the German line was held or not) He was repulsed everywhere. Few losses. Signal links are immediately restored and ammunition is brought up. New radio transmissions: 'You are frightened, I will have you shot.' At 6.50 AM 'Are you ready?'. From 7 AM a new and much more intensive barrage, reinforced by air bombardment and Katyushas. The barrage has a demoralising impact on soldiers and staff. Russian radio transmissions: 'Fritz is leaving Hadgimus.' 'We are in Chircaesti.' 'No Fritz left in Pl.Stubai.' 'Zhukov is already waiting at the Pruth.'

During the second barrage, the Russian had cut some trees at the edge of the forest east of Hadgimus. These had stood as cover in front of clearings cut during the last few days. Within these clearings stood a number of T34s that fired rapidly but without proper target acquisition on our positions. Under this cover, the Russians carried specially prepared trees to a 2m wide side arm of the Dnestr, to prepare a crossing for the tanks. The first (tank?) was destroyed with a stovepipe (Panzerschreck). The others then retreated. On the whole front of the regiment we are now fighting grimly against enemy in divisional strength. The individual positions defend themselves desperately, in Chircaesti and Hadgimus every house is fought over, both villages are burning. The situation is extremely confused. But the Russian must have managed to break in, because after a while the first Red Army soldiers appear close to the regimental CP. Hauptmann P. is sent to counterattack with his battalion. The battalion throws back the enemy and occupies a blocking position (Riegelstellung). Hauptmann P. is KIA. In the blocking position all elements from the main defensive position (HKL) are caught up. The reports by the wounded talk about the most bloody close combat. Our men have to defend themselves with Verey guns, spades and knifes. Losses are heavy, and neither side takes prisoners.

The main defensive position is lost, but the blocking position, extended north and south, can mainly be held, with the artillery giving superb support in direct fire mode.

When darkness falls the regiment is retreating into the long prepared position east of Ursoaia. During the night full defensive readyness is assumed, and contact made to the left and right, so that the regiment is ready for combat with all its parts on the morning of the 21st August.

A comment on the last paragraph. While it sounds as if the division had managed to hold its own, what had really happened was that it was on the northern flank of the Soviet breakthrough, attacked by 68th Rifle Corps. 257.ID to the north of it was not attacked.

Below the report by a battalion commander in the southern position of 15.ID.

Hauptmann Kuhn, CO I./Gren.Rgt.81 - report written on 5th October 1944:

On 20th August 1944 von 4-5 AM heavy barrage, from artillery pieces, grenade launchers, Katyushas and numerous AT guns. Enemy attack in battalion strength was repulsed in the sector of 1st Battalion. Soviet radio transmissions (clear) were intercepted: 'All batteries ready to fire.' and 'It'll start again soon.' From 7 AM another very heavy barrage and bombing from the air. Behind the moving barrage massed infantry attack by two rifle divisions on very narrow frontage. Because of the preceding barrage, all signal links, including radio were out. Losses of men and weapons were over 50%. The crew of our positions was overwhelmed in close combat, only 28 men of the battalion were able to get out. Following the successful breakthrough, the Russian immediately exploited to the west with numerous tanks (embarked infantry on them) and fully loaded trucks.

During lunchtime I managed with ~150 men from various parts of the divisionto establish a blocking position just west of Carnateni, and to hold this until 21st August 7 AM against a number of enemy attacks. I was then ordered by division to move back with this Kampfgruppe.

The Ursoaia position was too far north to interfere with the Soviet breakthrough by 66th Rifle Corps and 6th Guards Rifle Corps sectors that I have described in that other thread. At the evening of the 20th August, south of 15.ID a giant hole had opened. Within it stood the remnants of 306.ID, and 13.PD, unable to plug it. 15.ID was encircled with the rest of 6th Army. Small elements of it may have managed to break out, and it was reformed in Hungary in October.

[ October 18, 2003, 01:07 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Andreas]

Last piece, the view from the divisional CP.

Written by Hauptmann d.R. (Reserve) Weitzel, then Ic (Intelligence Officer) of 15.ID (written after the war):

The 20th August 1944 was, like the previous day, sunny and hot. At 4 AM the barrage started, mainly aimed at the positions of Gren.Rgt.81 (the southern flank of the division). When it petered out, Russian infantry attempted to gain the German positions with the last incoming rounds. This first attack was repulsed everywhere. Everybody was satisfied, and we believed that this stalled attack would be it. (I find this astonishing - the guy was the intel officer, but was not aware of the nature of Soviet attack operations?) But at 7 am a renewed and much stronger barrage began. The forward divisional CP on a rise west of Carnateni also came under fire. The picture that could be seen by observers from there was monumental. The whole Dnestr valley and the right sector of our division were a single cloud of smoke. The sun which had been shining out of a blue sky was darkened. In the final phase of the barrage, Russian infantry started the attack with strong tank support, breaking through the infantry positions and appearing at the CP of Gren.Rgt. 81 which was destroyed to the last man in hand-to-hand combat.

Soon after the end of the barrage the first survivors (Verprengte) appeared close to the divisional CP. At the same time we could note that in some of the most forward trenches combat was continuing. Meanwhile, Russian tanks passed the CP to the south on their way into our rear areas. Already in the morning hours of 20th August a clear picture of a Soviet breakthrough in 306.ID and the right-wing sectors of our division emerged for the divisional staff. The most pressing task was now to set up a new front line at Carnateni, and to secure the right flank along the breakthrough.

Finally, the view from the gunners of 15.ID:

Report by Hauptmann Pfordte, then 2 i/c of AR 15 (written after the war):

...7-9.35 am second barrage, but in much stronger form, coinciding with air attack, mainly on our gun positions. After a short time, all lines to the artillery battalions are destroyed, so that we have to rely on radio for communication. This is not sufficient, so the Ordonnanz Offizier (ADC to the regimental commander, I think) is sent out to the firing positions to check the particularities of the situation. Some batteries have to move to direct fire. The commanding height east of Carnateni is lost. Some of the OPs there are lost. At the junction with 306.ID a Russian break-in, initially with 50 tanks is successful. The IV.Art.Rgt.15 destroys 6 tanks, losing one gun with the whole crew through a direct hit. In total the regiment destroys 18 tanks on this day. Heavy battery 414 is lost. The commander of the spiked battery reports to the regimental CP; he is ordered to organise the survivors of regimental units. Immediately on leaving the CP he is killed by a mortar bomb.

Shortly after the end of the barrage, the first survivors come into Causani. Everybody who was in it is obviously impressed by this barrage in a strength we had never observed before. Trains are set off for the march to the west. Around evening the CP of A.R.15 relocates under Russian fire to the divisional CP in the western part of Causani.

[Runyan99]

I find the radio intercepts interesting.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Runyan99:

I find the radio intercepts interesting.

Me too - it is almost as if they are taunting them.

[Keke]

Andreas, have you ever heard about a major Soviet offensive where the defender left just a picket-line to the front so the massed arty barrages were relatively ineffective?

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Runyan99:

I find the radio intercepts interesting.

Me too - it is almost as if they are taunting them. </font>

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Keke:

Andreas, have you ever heard about a major Soviet offensive where the defender left just a picket-line to the front so the massed arty barrages were relatively ineffective?

I think this happened to some degree during Bagration. I also seem to recall that during L'vov Sandomierz part of the barrage was cancelled. I check that later. I can imagine it happened a lot in 1942/3.

I think this pulling the defenders back was quite normal (and to a degree sensible) practice, in order to not expose the forward troops to the losses reported in the AARs I posted above. When the Soviets cottoned on to it, they set up these initial attacks referred to above, in order to:

a) seize the trench before the Germans got back into it

avoid wasting the barrage on an empty trench

What has me surprised is that some in 15.ID's divisional HQ seemed to believe the initial attack was it.

[Sergei]

Originally posted by Andreas:

When the Soviets cottoned on to it, they set up these initial attacks referred to above, in order to:

avoid wasting the barrage on an empty trench

The way I first read this was that they preferred having the trench full of their own soldiers before bombarding the hell out of...

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Sergei:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

When the Soviets cottoned on to it, they set up these initial attacks referred to above, in order to:

avoid wasting the barrage on an empty trench

The way I first read this was that they preferred having the trench full of their own soldiers before bombarding the hell out of... </font>

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

a) seize the trench before the Germans got back into it

avoid wasting the barrage on an empty trench

The mission of the picket line is to make the attacker to believe that the frontline is fully manned before the barrage begins. Once the barrage begins, it usually lasts as long as was planned in the first place.

[ October 19, 2003, 07:23 AM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Keke:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

a) seize the trench before the Germans got back into it

avoid wasting the barrage on an empty trench

The mission of the picket line is to make the attacker to believe that the frontline is fully manned before the barrage begins. Once the barrage begins, it usually lasts as long as was planned in the first place. </font>

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

If the picket line succeeds in its mission, yes. But that is a bit of a gamble. It seems to me that this is why the Soviets went in in battalion strength. Just a picket line will not stop a battalion - especially if the picket line has already been hit by a pre-barrage.

Of course it's a gamble, but a risk worth taking if a major scale offensive with overwhelming numbers is expected. It is a difficult task,and includes repulsing any recon forces.

Originally posted by Andreas:

As I said, at L'vov Sandomierz the Soviets noted that this picket line approach had been taken, and cancelled the full barrage. So it did not begin in the first instance, and therefore did not last as long as planned.

It is a case of failed picket-line approach. Maybe Germans didn't use any deception, like false radio messages there?

Originally posted by Andreas:

At Iassy, it appears reasonable to assume that had the Soviet recon in force succeeded in taking the forward trenches, the barrage would have been cancelled, unless you are of the opinion that the Red Army habitually shelled its infantry in order to stick to the plan? Or do you have another explanation for the staged approach taken?

The picket line has failed its mission if it allows recon forces to capture forward trenches. 'Nuff said.

[Andreas]

Keke

I think the Germans were really in a no-win situation when they attempted to hold the ground. If they did a picket line, it most likely would not stand up to recon in force. If they put the main force into the trenches, they would lose most of it in the barrage.

The only credible defense, as acknowledged by the Germans in 1945, when it was too late, was to completely withdraw to the next line, just before the main attack. This would force the Soviets to completely start anew, even if it was only a 10-20km withdrawal. This approach was advocated amongst others by Raus, I believe. Of course you don't win the war by withdrawing, but you lose it a lot slower than by handing 400k soldiers and 500km of territory to the Soviets in the space of two weeks.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Keke

I think the Germans were really in a no-win situation when they attempted to hold the ground. If they did a picket line, it most likely would not stand up to recon in force. If they put the main force into the trenches, they would lose most of it in the barrage.

The only credible defense, as acknowledged by the Germans in 1945, when it was too late, was to completely withdraw to the next line, just before the main attack. This would force the Soviets to completely start anew, even if it was only a 10-20km withdrawal. This approach was advocated amongst others by Raus, I believe. Of course you don't win the war by withdrawing, but you lose it a lot slower than by handing 400k soldiers and 500km of territory to the Soviets in the space of two weeks.

When the Soviets launched the Petroskoi-operaton 21th June 1944, Finnish picket line had in fact already abandoned their trenches, and the main forces moved approx. 25km behind the frontline to the so called PSS-line. It didn't hold however, and Soviet landings behind the line made the situation extremely difficult, and so Finnish forces had to withdraw to the next line, so called U-line (reached it by the first week of July), where the offensive was finally repulsed by mid-July.

Is there any German defensive operation on the Eastern Front (excluding Manstein's forces in the winter of 1942-43) where Germans systematically withdrawed to the more or less prepared defensive lines, and managed to repulse the offensive eventually? I would exclude Operation Mars from this, since it didn't have any systematical withdrawals on operational scale.

[Andreas]

Hmmm... I am not aware of any in the central and southern sectors, at least not post winter 1941. I think von Rundstedt was sacked for withdrawing behind the Mius line.

Think think think... AG North's withdrawal in February 1944 comes to mind. They managed to let the Soviets run into empty space, did not get encircled (except sometimes for rear-guards, my grandfather almost was encircled with one), and went into the Pantherstellung which they managed to defend for a while.

Only example I can think of.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

AG North's withdrawal in February 1944 comes to mind. They managed to let the Soviets run into empty space, did not get encircled (except sometimes for rear-guards, my grandfather almost was encircled with one), and went into the Pantherstellung which they managed to defend for a while.

Only example I can think of.

Thanks. That sounds pretty much like the Finnish defensive operations in 1944.

Now how many generals did Hitler sack on that occasion?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Keke:

Thanks. That sounds pretty much like the Finnish defensive operations in 1944.

Now how many generals did Hitler sack on that occasion?

Don't think he sacked any. AG North's position had become untenable, I think and that was obvious to see. Next round of sackings was 21st July, I think.

Speaking of organised withdrawals, the Büffelbewegung comes to mind, the withdrawal of 9th Army from the Rhzev salient. But this was not in response to any looming Soviet offensive, but to free forces for Kursk.

I also think there was a fighting withdrawal in autumn 1943 in AG Centre sector, which ended in the positions from which Bagration would be launched. I don't know a lot about that though, middle-war in Russia is not my forte.

[White Phosphorus]

I just started reading about bagration, and in the 1st Baltic Front 5th army sector the recon elements captured the first trenches, so the barrage was directed deeper into the enemy rear.

In the 1st Baltic Front's sector. "The time allocated for the artillery preparation in the 6th Guards Army was shortened, and the quantity of artillery to be used in the preparation was reduced by up to 50 percent. The artillery offensive in the 43d Army's 1st Rifle Corps began as an accompaniment to the attack period, while in the 60th Rifle Corps it began during the suppression period."

2nd Belorussian Front's sector. "Most of the first-echelon regiments had crossed and occupied the first German trench by the end of the artillery preparation; some had even reached the second and even third trenches. Individual battalions of the rifle divisions (290th, 222d) had penetrated so far forward during the artillery preparation that they reached the fourth enemy trench and had to return to the third trench for fear of being struck by their own artillery fire. The swift infantry advance required that artillery correct its schedule for the artillery offensive. These changes were not, however, always implemented in a timely fashion, and there were instances when our artillery and mortars fired upon regions already occupied by our sub-units.

Also during the Manchurian operation the barrage was cancelled completely due to a heavy thunderstorm.

[ October 21, 2003, 01:52 AM: Message edited by: White Phosphorus ]