"History, I'm talking about history"

[Compassion]

Originally posted by Rouge:

When the survivors were trudging off to a german prison camp, some of them - according to one german account - were observed rapping incredulously on the sides of german tanks parked by the roadside: they had heard that the armor of the german tanks was made of cardboard." - Time-Life: WW2 book 2

That settles that i think

Were that a factual account and not a fantasy spun by Joey Goebbels to explain the cavalry prisoners the Germans took and cover up quality of their performance (not to mention the propaganda value in proving the worthlessness of the 'Untermensch') it might...

From an article by M. Kamil Dziewanowski

The account I am going to give you is of a cavalry charge in which I took part at the very beginning of World War II in September, 1939, in Poland. Although it all happened 59 years ago, it now seems like a century away! It may well be that this attack will rank in the history of warfare as the last great charge of cavalry. Is there another chance of the whole cavalry brigade, sword in hand, obeying the order "Gallop, march!"? The old Marshal Semion Budenny, former commander of the Soviet First Cavalry Army during the Civil War, would not agree with this. (In 1967, during an interview with The New York Times correspondent in Moscow, the old retired marshal, who is over 80 and still rides horses every day, was asked: " What role do you think cavalry will play during the next war? "Decisive!" answered Budenny without hesitation.)

My story is a fragment of the fight the Polish armed forces put up, defending their country against the German invasion in September of 1939. I was a platoon commander in the 3rd squadron, 3rd Light Horse regiment. My place was on the extreme left of the charge, so that I was able to see the whole mass of men and horses wheel around to the gallop. A grand spectacle, never to be forgotten.

The Suwalki Cavalry Brigade, stationed at the frontier of East Prussia, near the border of Lithuania, was composed of three cavalry regiments, one artillery regiment, and a group of light armored cars. Since September 1, it had been fighting night and day on the right flank of the Narew army group, whose task it was to stop the left flank of General von Kuechler's army, pressing on Warsaw from East Prussia.

The group was pushed back by the sheer weight of German firepower and armor. The brigade, being more mobile than our infantry, and assigned to the right wing of the Narew group, was less affected by the initial German push; consequently, we had relatively small losses during the first days of fighting.

Early on September 7, the brigade still stood almost 40 miles from the border of East Prussia. It was fighting a defensive battle against a light German army group, reinforced by the East Prussian cavalry division, which was the only great cavalry unit the Germans possessed at the time.

The advantage of numerical superiority was definitely with the invaders. All we could throw in against their hundreds of tanks were about 20 light armored scout cars and two dozen antitank guns. In firepower, the Germans had a superiority of about nine to one. It seemed, therefore, that the Germans, because of their superiority in firepower and armor, would cut through the live mass of Polish cavalry like a knife through a loaf of bread.

And yet, in spite of this unequal struggle, we refused to give up. We were fully aware of the fact that we had to adapt ourselves to new methods of warfare.

After all, we had to make the best conditions imposed on us by war, not of our seeking. Each day, our techniques of fighting the enemy hiding behind armor improved. It was a technique of pursuit, of ambush, and of ruses.

A machine that looked formidable at a distance began to show, especially at night, its impotence against daredevils who had the nerve to approach the tanks and throw gasoline-filled bottles. Others crept up to wreck the caterpillar treads of these tanks with bunches of hand grenades. During the first week, our antitank guns destroyed 31 enemy armored vehicles. We smashed at least a dozen of them with bottles and grenades. We took over 200 prisoners.

Thus, step by step, from a proud cavalry brigade we had turned into an outfit of tank hunters. By night we lost ourselves in woods and marched over trackless ground to harass the enemy's armored columns at rest stops or on the march.

We realized, however, that in the long run, it was all hopeless. The numbers and the firepower were against us. Moreover, the beautiful, sunny weather seemed to be conspiring with the invaders, helping the speedy progress of their armor facilitating the bombardment.

The news grew steadily worse. On the evening of September 8, we heard over the radio that the Germans were closing in on Warsaw. We resolved to do our duty, come what might. Most of the time we were hungry, and for a week we had about three hours' sleep at night. Our poor horses, those beautiful chestnut horses of which we were so proud, could not be unsaddled for days on end. With fodder growing scarce, they were becoming dispirited and vicious, sheer skeletons.

One desire was uppermost in our minds, and we discussed it in our short talks at officers' roll calls. Should modern warfare depose the cavalry, then we would make a dignified exit after just one more glorious tradition of our cavalry.

Suddenly, on September 9, we received the following order: "To relieve German pressure on Warsaw and to give the capital time to organize its defenses, the Suwalki Brigade will make a diversion on the enemy's rear, blow up the bridge over the Narew River, near Tykocin, and tear up the railway track between the stations of Rypno and Fastow." At the officers' roll call, the tall, gray-haired, taciturn brigade Commander, General Podhorski, told us:

"Gentlemen, we have received an important assignment. We are to sabotage the enemy communications. To execute our task, we must march all night over the field-paths and avoid main highways, and penetrate behind the enemy lines to reach the region of Tykocin. When on the spot, the engineering squadron will proceed with the wrecking jobs as ordered, while the rest of the brigade will act as a covering screen. Once the assignment is executed, we shall head eastward and plunge into the Bialowieza Forest. From then on we shall wage partisan warfare."

Dead tired though we were, the news electrified us. The order of the brigadier was received with joy by officers and men alike. We felt that finally we would have the chance for action as a body of cavalry in a task for which we had been trained.

On that very day, we made four ambushes against tanks and fought two skirmishes. We had little more than two hours of sleep.

We moved off around 7p.m., after the sun set. Regiment after regiment, squadron after squadron, marched at a trot before our brigadier, a smart, proud, gray-haired veteran of the last war, as he reviewed his decimated, but still brigade. It was a grueling all-night march over broken ground, through thickets and over rugged terrain. We were protected by a dense screen of patrols, but we avoided human settlements, cut across roads, and stuck to the forests and untraveled ground.

On September 9, an early dawn, misty and chilly, found the brigade at the northern edge of the large Zambrow forest, eight to nine miles from the bridge that we had to blow up.

It was almost 6a.m. when the patrols suddenly reported to the brigadier a startling piece of intelligence: a battalion of enemy infantry was marching along the highway between Rypno and Fastow.

Our sentries did not see any patrols, but reported that a column of transport trucks was moving parallel with the infantry. What an unexpected chance!

The brigade commander was hard put for a decision. We were hidden in the woods about a mile and a half from the enemy. The condition for a surprise attack seemed ideal. It was now or never. On the other hand the risk was great. An attack by the entire brigade was bound to betray our purpose.

Moreover, the firepower of a German infantry battalion was superior to that of our brigade. They seemed to have no armor but our patrols might have been mistaken.

After a few moments of hesitation our commander made up his mind. He stopped his brigade and reversed the direction of our march. We briskly crossed the strip of woods separating us from the enemy. Our three regiments assembled at the edge of the woods. Between the enemy column on the highway and us ran a strip of stubble field over a mile long. Close by the highway was a stretch of dry meadowland.

Since we stood on higher ground, we saw plainly what went on the highway. What a magnificent sight! A long sprent of troops wound its way lazily through a cloud of dust, while the motor transport swiftly flowed by the slowly marching infantry.

The brigadier's command came fast: "The 1st Lancer regiment and the 3rd Light Horse regiment prepare for a charge. The 2nd Lancer regiment will be in reserve. The brigade's heavy machine-gun squadrons will get together and support the charge with their massed fire.

The antitank squadron will screen the brigade from the west against a possible tank attack. The German's armor might be in the vicinity. Meanwhile, the engineering squadron is to take advantage of the charge to reach the bridge and the railway track as quickly as possible and blow them up."

The regimental commanders promptly carried out their respective orders. The squadron pushed ahead to the edge of the forest, while the engineering squadron left us to do their job. We could watch it marching off at a brisk trot.

Meanwhile, the squadrons stretched out in attack formation on the open field beyond the forest. The command "Trot, march" rang out. The enemy had not yet seen us, and the rising sun promised a clear day. The picture of the regiment emerging from the woods was so enchanting that it seemed unreal. What a perfect model for a battle painter! Where is our Vernet or Gericault! First we proceeded at a slow trot. The Germans still marched on, apparently unconcerned. Then suddenly our heavy machine-guns, hidden in the woods, gave tongue with a well-timed salvo. It went straight into the enemy column.

The great adventure was on!

The command "Draw sabres, gallop, march!" flew down the lines. Reins were gripped tighter. The riders bent forward in the saddles and they rushed forward like a mad whirlwind.

Meanwhile, the surprised serpent of enemy infantry on the highway stopped. Soon the road became a scene of wild confusion. There were shouts, confused orders, and chance shots. We, however, continued our gallop. Fortunately, the first German shots went over our heads. We were then about 1500 feet from the highway and saw that under fire of our heavy machine-guns the Germans were becoming a frantic mob. Some enemy armored cars stopped, while others tried to ram their way through the confusion. Some of the enemy soldiers made a desperate attempt to make a stand in the ditch by the roadside. Other sought cover behind the transport wagons.

Suddenly the fire from machine-guns began to score hits in our ranks. The van of the column, which had been nearing Rypno, seem to have mastered its panic; soon its fire began to tell. The first casualties fell from horses. We were then so close that we could see vague outlines of men in the cloud of dust. Suddenly our machine-guns ceased firing. They had to do it to avoid hitting us. Meanwhile, within a few seconds we reached the highway.

Sabres and lances went to work fiercely. Some confused German infantrymen pushed off our sabre blows with their rifle butts. Some simply tried to cover their heads with their arms, but our lances reached even those who tried to hide between the wagons.

The wave of our charge crossed the highway and pursued those who sought flight. Stray shots from the thickets kept falling into the mob on the highway, killing the enemy as well as us. The battle on the highway was practically over. The Germans began to surrender in large groups. A squadron of the 2nd Lancer regiment, which so far formed our reserve, was dispatched in pursuit of the fleeing enemy.

We were out of breath and dog-tired, but elated by the dreamed-up victory. Moreover, it was paid for with no great loss of life. The panic-stricken Germans were decidedly poor marksmen. The horses fared the worst; we lost between 30 and 40 of them. We had a score or so of wounded men, but only three were killed. The morning sun was high when our bugler blew assembly. We came up slowly, driving our prisoners ahead of us. We took about 200 men, most of them insane from fright. The villages of Rypno and Fastow were aflame. They belched dense clouds of black smoke, which lazily rose to the morning sky. In withdrawing, the remnants of the German battalion did not miss the chance to set the torch to two innocent villages. Then, suddenly, from the north a sound of an explosion could be heard. In a few minutes there came another, and after a while two more shook the air. This was the signal that our engineers had done their job. The bridge over the Narew and the railway track had been blown up.

M. Kamil DZIEWANOWSKI Is a professor emeritus of Contemporary Russian and East European History at Boston University and Associate of the Russian Research Center at Harvard. He has published several books:

The Communist Party of Poland - An Outline of History, Harvard University Press, 1959 and 1976

1. A European Federalist - Joseph Pilsudski and Eastern Europe, 1918-1922, Hoover Institution, 19693. 20th Centry Poland, Columbia University Press, 1977 and 1979

2. A History of Soviet Russia, Prentice Hall, 1979, 1984, 1988, 1992, and in 1996 under a new title

3. A History of Soviet Russia and its Aftermath.

4. War at Any Price: A History of WWII in Europe, Prentice Hall, 1987, 1990

5. Alexander I - Russia's Mysterious Tsar, Hippocrene Books, 1990

6. One Life is not Enough, Marszalek, Torun, 1994 (in Polish)

His article makes clear that he was a junior officer in the Polish cavalry at the beginning of the Second World War and participated in the cavalry charge he describes.

[JerseyJohn]

Stukas were never intended to hold their own against either anti-aircraft defenses or enemy fighter planes. The were intended to do exactly what they did, hit open targets of opportunity, create confusion and damage and disrupt communications, then return home in one piece to fly another mission. They were designed at a time when the German war planners couldn't envision a battlefield where they did not have absolute air superiority.

I think the crux of the matter is the philosophy behind each of Europe's major armies.

Germany designed hers to win quick wars against more backward opponents. Tanks were originally light and fast as they were intended to pour through breeches and disrupt enemy rear areas while the infantry caught up and consolidated.

The Luftwaffe had two missions, flying artillery and air superiority. It was never intended to fill a strategic role and was misused in that capacity over Britain. Conversly, during '41 and '42 the RAF had the same problems in it's missions over Europe that the Luftwaffe had over England -- overextension of fighter range, total loss of downed aircrews, German radar defenses!, etc., but little was ever made of that -- the strategic air war over Europe is generally seen in only two phases, the Battle of Britain, and the large scale bombing of the Reich.

Much of the equipment in all armies was either obsolete or obsolescent when they began seeing service. Talk about the Stuka, what about the British Swordfish torpedo plane? If the Panzer III and IVs in France were not what they should have been (the lighter tank as tank destroyer and the heavier tank with low velocity anti-infantry weapn!) what about the British Matildas? The French tanks, though generally either heavy or fast, were plagued with mechanical problems and had no tactical doctrine within the French Army.

At that same time the United States was seeing it's own armored role in the light Stuart and medium Grant tanks, neither of which saw extensive use during America's actual fighting. the Stuart being used mainly in the Pacific and the Grant primarily by the British in North Africa (in the 1943 movie "Saharra" Humphrey Bogart is pictured in one; it had the same chasis as the more successful Sherman, also a death trap but fast and mechanically reliable).

This forum has had many sweeping statements bandied about, but to me it boils down to this: The German army succeded magnificently in what it was intended to do. It crushed Poland and France.

-- yes, the Poles had few tanks and resorted to using cavalry, but that was considered when the German army made it's plans; Poland by the nature of it's geography had to employ a large, primarily infantry army for a defensive war. There was never any doubt that, left to her own resources, she was doomed. It was only a matter of how long it would hold out.

-- Yes, the French were also tactically backwards, but that too was taken into consideration. It was no secret that France was lagging modernization and relying on the Maginot Line, and the Germans planned for a revised Schlieffen Plan, this time with the armor being the exploiting weapon, as laid out in the pre-war book, "Achtung Panzer" by then colonel Heinz Guderian.

The German army succeded as well in Russia, during the initial stages, it achieved roughly two French victories. Here, the army was let down on a strategical level -- Russia was much more than France x2.

Essentially, the Germans never planned for a long war. They envisioned a year at most with the taking of some minor countries followed by a quick armistace with England and France. Originally they didn't even anticipate the complete collapse of the French, and it might have been this unexpected success that condemned them.

Most importantly, air power decided the war. When the Axis had it they were conquerers, when the Allies had it the Axis was conquered!

It's significant that the German army, designed to work with air superiority, managed to fight so stubbornly even against an allied onslaught of total air superiority.

All in all, when getting into this sort of discussion, we're a bunch of monday morning quarterbacks. There were too many factors involved, not the least being the eccentric personalities of the principal leaders, for generalizations like "The Germans were overated" to have much meaning.

It's like casting a glance 2,000 years back to the Mediteranean and saying "The Romans weren't so tough!" Fine, but what does it mean?

[Flash Gordon]

Originally posted by JerseyJohn:

It's like casting a glance 2,000 years back to the Mediteranean and saying "The Romans weren't so tough!" Fine, but what does it mean?

It means the Romans were over-rated!!!!

[JerseyJohn]

"It's FlashGordon again -- but not to worry, this time he's picking on the Ancient Romans."

"That is good."

"Yes. And besides, they were overated -- look what we did to them in that forest."

[Rouge]

Someone quoted:

"....And, since that time, the US military has become an elite and unparalleled unit."

A unparalleled unit still equiped with the latest version of a 40 year old weapon the M-16A2- heres an example of a highly over rated weapon. If these were so good then they would be sought after by more countries however now days soldiers fight with SA 80s, Styers ect.

The US soldier is still an efficiant soldier. But no not the best. To say so is knieve

[ November 16, 2002, 02:09 AM: Message edited by: Rouge ]

[Compassion]

Originally posted by Rouge:

[QB]Someone quoted:

"....And, since that time, the US military has become an elite and unparalleled unit."

A unparalleled unit still equiped with the latest version of a 40 year old weapon the M-16A2- heres an example of a highly over rated weapon. If these were so good then they would be sought after by more countries however now days soldiers fight with SA 80s, Styers ect.

Um... British soldiers (and a few Jamacians), perhaps... and the Brits complained about them jamming in Afghanistan to which the govt. blamed the soldiers for not keeping their weapons clean. Oddly enough when left to their devices, the SAS chose an AR15 derivative... and the Canadian military just went to a licenced M16 as their standard rifle.

This thread in the General Forum from a few weeks back has lots of good info from people who have used SA80's, M16's & AK's & Fal's in combat and on the range. THere are also some tasty links for the gun grogs out there.

[ November 16, 2002, 02:18 PM: Message edited by: Compassion ]

[Rouge]

Contries do still yes fight with them but there was something on the ABC about a millitary UN specialist saying that obsolete weapons are the ones most commonly found on black marketers, and the M16 is starting to appear to as it ages( there are still 1st rate weapons on the market but not common)

[Rouge]

Contries do still yes fight with them but there was something on the ABC about a millitary UN specialist saying that obsolete weapons are the ones most commonly found on black marketers, and the M16 is starting to appear to as it ages( there are still 1st rate weapons on the market but not common)

[Compassion]

Originally posted by Rouge:

Contries do still yes fight with them but there was something on the ABC about a millitary UN specialist saying that obsolete weapons are the ones most commonly found on black marketers, and the M16 is starting to appear to as it ages( there are still 1st rate weapons on the market but not common)

Yeah ok, but you said that "more countries however now days soldiers fight with SA 80s..etc" and I am just pointing out that this is 1) not true and 2) that there is nothing wrong with the M16... no matter what someone from the UN says and how his point is inferred by the aussie broadcasting co... As stated, commonwealth SAS forces can use what they want and they choose the M16. Also, While the handy A2 is getting a little long in the tooth, it's still serviceable until the next paradigm hits.... One that some people keep tryign to introduce before a new system is field ready. Besides, while the A2 is getting along, the A3 and G4 are here today...

As for the statement about m16's starting to show up on the black market.. I'd put the lack of them up until recently (if this report is to be believed... sounds like it was painted with pretty broad strokes to me) down to the fact that AK-47's have bee npouring onto the international market cheaply and in huge competing quantities and that they are more easilyused in places where cheap and plentiful is a necessity (like Subsaharan Africa, the ME, South America, etc.) and where more complicated system like the M16 require a higher maintananece standard and expense.

[waltero]

If you think the Germans were over-rated now,

you certainly would of thought otherwise in 1940.

the only clame to fame the french have ever had was Napolean. ( not to mention thay are the best at dying).

During the 1936 Olympics Everyone stood in awe, at the vary sight of the German country!

Thay are the perfect villian. look at Amarican cinima. you see them in Star wars and any movie that needs A bad ass army.

The only reason that Hitler lost the War was GOD!

Ok I have to go change my brakes now. Thats all I have to say about that

So Germany at that time was the ****t!

[Compassion]

Originally posted by waltero:

The only reason that Hitler lost the War was GOD!

Ok I have to go change my brakes now. Thats all I have to say about that

Well, to be fair, one of the big reasons Hitler lost the war was becasue of Hitler.. that and the German general staff in toto thought too much about the political value of Moscow, me thinks.

[ November 16, 2002, 10:20 PM: Message edited by: Compassion ]

[BriantheWise]

I'm going to get in trouble on this one...but here's my thought:

One of the reasons Hitler lost the war was because of how he treated the Jewish people (and the Russian people).

I'll be succinct here, since all here knows the history (oh, and now I realize that one of the other top ten books were the Winds of War), and very likely this has been discussed (and I have to be careful):

1) The Jewish People: Hitler's hatred was actual. But he could have easily exploited their energies and intelligence (after debasing them) to his advantage, instead of wasting so much resource to kill them.

2) The Russian People: Hitlers hatred was again, actual. But he could have easily exploited their oppressed, terrorized lives and liberated them from their oppressors.

Hitler, and his fancies, simply hated too much, were so barbaric, that they couldn't see this. So they killed them instead. He could have enslaved them easily like us American's did with the Black people and used their energies to futher his Reich.

The other thing he should have done was gone for the Middle East (but that was simply bad strategy).

I know that this will rile some of you, since it sounds inhumane, but this is analysis only, and not meant in anyway to be racist, prejudiced or mean. Still though, based on the economic conditions of the time, after Hitler and his fancies, conquered France, he could have won the war by doing these things.

It is only my opinion, and very well could be wrong.

Brian

[Flash Gordon]

You are probably right.

Some of the greatest brains in Europe pre-WWII were Jewish. And Hitler's hatred of Jews led him to discount the atomic bomb, calling the physics required to devise such a device "Jewish science". Had he been willing to exploit and harness the intellect at hand instead of attempting to enslave and exterminate it, who knows what might have happened?

Also, the Germans were initially greeted as liberators in many of the Soviet Republics, due to Stalin's repressive anti-nationalist policies. However, native "appreciation" quickly gave way to hatred when the Germans quickly made it obvious that they weren't liberators at all. A less heavy handed policy might have yielded many more anti-Soviet volunteers and manpower for the Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS. Instead, it yielded a bunch of pissed of partisans running amuck and wreaking havoc and tying down troops who might have been put to better use at the sharp end.

But the primary reason that Hitler lost was because he and the higher ups of the Nazy party never envisioned fighting a long term war so never prepared for one. Once the economies of the USA and the USSR were brought to bear, it was only a matter of time before Germany was crushed between Western Liberal Democracy and Soviet Totalitarianism.

[JerseyJohn]

Originally posted by FLASH GORDON

-- ". . . Also, the Germans were initially greeted as liberators in many of the Soviet Republics, due to Stalin's repressive anti-nationalist policies. However, native "appreciation" quickly gave way to hatred when the Germans quickly made it obvious that they weren't liberators at all. A less heavy handed policy might have yielded many more anti-Soviet volunteers and manpower . . .."

Great points by both Flash and BriantheWise.

In many previous forums I talked around Germany's racial insanity for fear of needlessly offending anyone, but the truth is, more than anything else it lost the war for Germany.

First, as Flash points out, by not only depriving themselves of manpower but of also turning much of that manpower into a hostile force! Madness!

In 1918 -- when Imperial Germany had helped cause the downfall of Czarist Russia and was in the process of defeating the Bolsheiviks -- they were very careful in signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, to create semi-autonamous dependancies such as "Ukrania." In that manner they effectively controled the Ukrane west of Rostov and most of European Russia and the Baltic States without having incurring the hostility of occupying them.

Those independent states fought against the Bolsheviks even after Germany's unexpected defeat and were not fully absorbed into the U.S.S.R till the mid-20s, sometimes with the aid of maverick German Freikorps troops. In 1941 the Russians assumed Germany would ressurrect it's earlier policy, but, as Flash says, we all know what happened.

Second, The Hollocaust. What an insane waste. Aside from the humanitarian issues it deprived Germany of much specialized talent -- bankers and others from families like the Rothschilds who had specialized in finances since Mideival times because traditionally, Jews had been excluded from other, more "Christian" professions throughout much of eastern Europe.

Beyond that, the sheer resources required for "The Final Solution" in personnel and rolling stock, all given top priority after Heydrich's Wansee Conference of January 1942, overburdened an already strained transport and labor structure and caused shortages of troops and supplies all along the Eastern Front in addition to the totally unnecessary disruption of war production by these pointless transports. Concentration camp labor was not cost effective and only made fortunes for a few SS Lords and industrialists reaping the rewards of plunder and working slaves to death.

Those same workers would have been much more productive in a civilian environment without a death sentence hanging over their heads, working in whatever field they were actually skilled at.

Third, it produced a decadent mentality within the Reich itself -- the state dictated who was inferrior and from there other quacks took it even further -- if you were tall and blonde and blue-eyed you were a warrior, if you were more squat and dark eyed and black haired you were, though still a German, a farmer, and so on. There was no end to that sort of idiocy.

What I'd like to know is which prominent Nazis, other than Heydrich, looked even remotely like the so called "Ideal Nordic?" Hittler! Himmler! Goering! Goebbles! Hess! Borman! Where are these magnificent Nordic Types?

The reasons can go on, but why bother.

Despite the Holocaust many German naval officers were part Jewish and Goering's right hand man, Erhard Milch, openly half Jewish, was elevated to the rank of Fieldmarshal. When confronted about this Goering said, "It is I who say who is and who isn't a Jew!"

Above is Luftwaffe Administrator, and non-aryan, Erhard Milch.

*** *** ***

Below is all-round rabid nazi, Reichsprotector of Chechoslovakia, etc., former naval officer turned SS-General, Reinhard Heydrich, author of "The Final Solution" among other things. Also the only top nazi who looks Aryan.

*** *** ***

There's an outstanding HBO movie about the Wansee Conference, "Conspiracy" available on DVD.

*** *** ***

-- Compassion

The Soviets made great use of cavalry and mounted infantry attached to T-34 attack groups operating in lightly defended areas. They used hit and run tactics and helped seperate German sectors during major Soviet offensives. Long into the Cold War there were Soviet mounted units, there is film footage of these soldiers and their horses outfitted with gas masks -- no kidding, the horses are also rigged up! There's no doubt that, untill recently and maybe not even then, mounted troops would have been useful in terrain too broken or rough or soft for wheeled or tracked vehicles. The Russians realized that better than most others.

As was said earlier, the Poles were not imbeciles, their falling back on cavalry attacks was sparked by desperation, not a delusion that men on horseback could defeat tanks or machine guns in open battle. What is often overlooked is the fact Poland and the U.S.S.R. both used cavalry effectively in the forgotten eastern European wars that followed WW I. That was only two decades prior to Germany's assault on Poland -- they had every right to be doctrinally behind and, in any case, Poland -- unlike her larger neighbors -- could have fielded neither a modern air force nor large tank formations. When all you can afford is horses, that's what you go with.

***

[ November 20, 2002, 05:37 AM: Message edited by: JerseyJohn ]

[JayJay_H]

Originally posted by JerseyJohn:

Those independent states fought against the Bolsheviks even after Germany's unexpected defeat and were not fully absorbed into the U.S.S.R till the mid-20s, sometimes with the aid of maverick German Freikorps troops. In 1941 the Russians assumed Germany would ressurrect it's earlier policy, but, as Flash says, we all know what happened.***

Even the jewish population in the baltic states, the ucraine and white russia, when their children told them to pack their things and go because the germans were coming, they usually said somth like: oh, my son, i know the germans. They had been here in the first war also, and they were so kind and cultivated. Tell me, what is standing about german culture at all? No need to be on the run from them

[ November 20, 2002, 01:33 PM: Message edited by: JayJay_H ]

[Rouge]

He thought they were sub human so the ivans treated the frits the same

[Compassion]

Originally posted by BriantheWise:

[QB]I'm going to get in trouble on this one...but here's my thought:

One of the reasons Hitler lost the war was because of how he treated the Jewish people (and the Russian people).

YEs... but the whole of NAZI ideology folds on itself if you don't treat the JEws and Slavs as Untermench and exterminate them. And there's no way that rhetoric could have been tempered once Hitler gained the Chancellery as his staunchest supporters were dead serious about that crazyness. He would have been out on his ear by 1935 if he hadn't made his rabid racial purity into law as soon as he was elected.

Without even needing to crack a book, I would say to anyone with an interest to go pick up a DVD copy of Triumph of the WIll... there is one out now that has an excellent commentary by Anthony Santoro that illuminates who's who and has lots of interesting tidbits (the story of the blood flag and the guy who's only job was to carry the blood flag is illuminating in the land of National Socialism)... After watching what passes for a party congress it'll be easier to see and understand the differneces between NAZI Germany where deed mathced rhetoric and say... Fascist ITaly which went much more for the look and feel (Not that Il Duce was a peach or anything).

So yeah, HItler probably would have won the European war if he had been a nicer conquerer... but he never would have gotten to that point.

[Compassion]

Originally posted by JerseyJohn:

-- Compassion

There's no doubt that, untill recently and maybe not even then, mounted troops would have been useful in terrain too broken or rough or soft for wheeled or tracked vehicles. The Russians realized that better than most others.

I read recently (and damned if I can remember where) that an ageing Russian marshall said in the early 90's that horses would be instumental in the next great war.... Because it was brief, I could't tell if he was portending that we would nuke ourselves to the bronze age or not...

As was said earlier, the Poles were not imbeciles, their falling back on cavalry attacks was sparked by desperation, not a delusion that men on horseback could defeat tanks or machine guns in open battle

Right, that was my point in posting what I did... THe overblown propaganda aobut lancers cliking off of tanks and amazed dumb poles is a fiction of Goebbels (sp?). The fact is that cavalry was used well and intelligently with an understanding that it wouldn't stop the Heer, but could be used for certain specialized jobs that required mobility and the ability to operate away from it's supply trains for a time such as those described in my post above. Too often people hear cavalry and think it's 1805.

[JerseyJohn]

Exactly -- I was pleased with everything you said and wanted to reinforce it. It annoys me to hear people making fun of Poland in World War Two. They were extremely courageous and doomed right from the start. It especially bugs me -- as it obviously does you -- to hear mocking tales about how they were surprised their cavalry failed to stop German tanks.

Someone should let those experts in on a little secret, the German tank crews involved in the one verified action of that kind were full of respect and admiration for the Polish riders who tried -- not to ram lances through armor plating, but -- to somehow disable the tanks with explosives. Bravery is not stupidity, and I know of no greater bravery than was exhibited by those cavalrymen.

At any rate, even though they had just one cavalry division, the Germans still relied upon a lot of horses to haul their artillery and supplies and I never hear anybody referring to them as idiots.

In most of the world's armies, particularly those that were not heavily industrialized, horses -- either as mounts or as beasts of burden -- filled some important role right up to the fifties.

And I'm sure in places like Siberia and Mongolia they see heavy service even now.

Americans shouldn't get too smug about their own car oriented situation because these things tend to change very quickly. I remember the early seventies when sitting in line at gas stations waiting for the priveledge of paying usurous fees, people started talking nostalgicly about the good old days when you just needed some oats and a carriage and a couple of horses!

[ November 20, 2002, 08:51 PM: Message edited by: JerseyJohn ]

[Compassion]

Originally posted by JerseyJohn:

At that same time the United States was seeing it's own armored role in the light Stuart and medium Grant tanks, neither of which saw extensive use during America's actual fighting. the Stuart being used mainly in the Pacific and the Grant primarily by the British in North Africa .

Well, The Grant was recognized as a stopgap and it's problems were apparent. The Brits needed armor though and they weren't being picky. ONce the French 75 was mated to a turret that could be mounted on a Grant chassis, the M3's production quickly spooled down. THe resulting tnak, the M4 was judged to be the US infatry support tank and US armored doctrine called for M4's to support infantry action only while TD's should be called up from a mobile reserve to deal with enemy tanks... Of course this doctrine failed, but that's how it was. At the time of it's inception, the M4 was pretty good tank and would show itself easily the equal of any tank in the world... in 1941.

While the Russians and Germans played a game of armored one upmanship at breakneck pace for the next few years, the US went at a more sedate pace for several reasons. Even after we had some experience with the difficulties in using tanks as doctrine called for in the Med, there was resitance to speeding up development of a next gen tank both in Washington where beancounters fretted about costs, the quartermasters fretted about shipping multiple typs of spares & ammo during transition and also the size constraints of shipping a 45 ton tank with a 90mm gun as well as US commanders who wanted lots of iron on the front now and didn't want to risk a shortage. Lots or reasons that all add up to haveing Shermans flooding the battlefield... Good discussion of these points as well as tactical doctrine for both armor and small infantry units can be found in Michael Doubler's most excellent book "Closing with the Enemy."

As for the M5... well, it was produced in huge numbers and saw pleanty of use in Europe with both teh British and hte US... of course they were used for specialized applications such as cav and reece work where their high speed served them well.

[JerseyJohn]

Compared with the tanks they had in 1940 the American Grant was a fine weapon. In fact, compared with the Panzer III in it's antitank role the Grant would still have been a pretty good weapon. In North Africa Rommel didn't have anything spectacular himself, just Pz IIIs and IVs and the Italians had outright junk. Considering which the performance of the Ariete armored division becomes noteworthy. The mainstay for Rommels victories was not his tanks but his ability to lure British tanks into being ambushed by his 88 mm's, itself a trade off because in an anit-tank role they left the rear areas without adequate anti-aircraft protection.

The Grant Tanks main problem was the placement of it's main gun -- it didn't have a traversing turret for the weapon and it's field of fire only was only to the right side.

The Sherman was a good workhorse of a tank but not a match for it's nearest Axis rival, the Panzer IV with a long barelled piece (and not the Panther). The Sherman was more mechanically reliable than most German tanks and quick, maneuverable and adopable, as were most American tanks.

There was nothing wrong with Stuarts scooting around in the North African desert avoiding combat or assisting infantry in the Pacific where Japanese tanks were few in number and generally not very heavy.

The only real problem American tanks had, untill late in the war, was they tended to be blown up fairly easily by German tanks and anti-tank guns.

It sounds ridiculous, but it's true. Everyone knew that was the problem and the trick was to find ways around it.

America had no counterpart to the German Panther and Tiger and the Pz IV outfought the Sherman. But, we had them in large numbers and -- when the Shermans bit off more than they could chew --air support was just an HQ call away. The U. S. army also relied very heavily on artillery bombardment; the plan was to blast heavy resistance with massive artillery and what ever was left could be taken care of by infantry and the Shermans and air strikes. It worked.

Whether it would have worked against the German army of a year or two before is debatable but then they knew they weren't fighting that army in France 44, they were fighting an army that couldn't show itself by day and had a shattered supply network behind it. Fuel and spare parts gave out early and the more sophisticated German tanks, already prone to mechanical problems, began breaking down and being abandoned with their crews in full retreat.

An uncle of mine was a sergeant in a Sherman during the French campaign. It was difficult to get him to talk about any of it but one thing he did say has stuck with me -- it was that after riding in that thing against the Germans he didn't feel safe again till 1956! (sorry, you'd have had to hear the way he said it)

I can't fault the United States on its war production; it went with what it knew would run and mass produced it. The Sherman was incredibly adaptable serving as everything from a bulldozer to a mineclearer and a flamethrower, and was a good all around armored verhicle in normal combat. But in a tank battle I think you'd prefer to sit in a T-34.

---

Most of these discussions seem get carried away on who had the better whatever weapon and consider little else. Heavy tanks are fine, but Stillwell used to kill Shiang Kai Sheks requests for them because there were almost no bridges in China capable of supporting their weight. MacArthur wanted Carriers because Nimitz had them, but King killed the idea because they'd have been worse than useless in the island groups he was fighting in.

But in these forums we continually hear about which kind of tank or plane was best and the circumstances they were being used under almost never comes up. Against troops like the Rumanians and Italians -- who lacked anti tank weapons -- almost any tank would have been effective.

Likewise, toward the end of the war in Europe when most of the German army lay in ruins or captured and it was primarily Hitler Youth and overage volksgrenediers armed with small arms and bazookas, did the United States or Britain really need state of the art armor -- especially with massive and undisputed control of the air?

These discussions tend to become accademic. I still find them interesting, but it gets a bit lame to hear how the stuka sucked because it was easy meat for spitfires -- what a revalation! Perhaps a few ME 109's for an escort might have been nice -- and I'll bet the Germans felt the same way.

"What a Grouch! Long discussions really get to him."

[ November 20, 2002, 09:21 PM: Message edited by: JerseyJohn ]

[Brendan_D]

Howdy, new here...

With regards to the issue of American vs. German combat power, from the historian's perspective it is perhaps an oversimplification to say that the Germans were good at tactics, better disciplined, trained, etc. but the Americans were better supplied and thus ultimately won out. Increasingly historians and other analysts of WWII combat are discovering that the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS did not live up to their myth of invincibility as often as has been touted in the past. Trevor DuPuy's quantfication of "combat power" (along of course with Martin van Creveld's expansion) which for so long underlay this assumption of German superiority has shown some considerable cracks.

First, DuPuy (and later van Creveld) took their cue from NATO thinkers in the 1960s who developed a wildly exaggerated "cult of the defense" based upon the experiences of the German army et. al. during the War. The SS in particular was pratically deified for their seemingly superhuman ability to keep the Soviets at bay once the balance had tilted on the Eastern Front. The (wishful) thinking was that if such feats could in general be repeated, then NATO could protect Western Europe from an attack by the numerically superior Warsaw Pact. To some extent, this think was also propagated by the addition of West Germany to the Alliance and the re-appreciation for all things militarily and Teutonic. Thus, post war thinking has had a dramatic impact upon the assessment of combat power, creating from the start an uneven playing field upon which the performance of both armies has been judged.

Critics of DuPuy and van Creveld (and ergo their predecessors) point out that their choice of battles to examine was itself highly selective. They focused heavily on combat in areas such as Normandy and the Heurtgen Forest. Although German tactical, and even operational and strategic, doctrine called for aggressive counter-attacking, the battles in which the United States army encountered relatively cohesive German forces as studied by DP/vC - - Normandy and Alsace-Lorraine for example - - were ones in which the Americans were attacking prepared defenses (or if they started out as hasty defenses by the Germans, they soon became prepared) with all the force-multipliers that entail (that the defence has the natural advantage in modern warfare notwithstanding).

When the situation was reversed, or in meeting engagements such as were fought periodically during the Battle of the Bulge, American units were able to give a solid account of themselves against their German counterparts.

* * *

Second has come a new appreciation that beans and bullets alone cannot win battles exclusively. Yes, the allies had a clear material advantage (in quantity if not always in quality) over the Germans, but a battle such as Normandy demonstrated that if the Allies were to win with a politically acceptable level of casualties, then mere numbers would not suffice.

When the Allies attacked point-blank, their losses on a local level at times reached comparable to those on the Western front in World War I! Using the Allies' massive aerial and artillery assets to blast ones' way through the bocage was the logical application of such an advantage, but even this did not work as we know. The learning curve was steep, but by the end of the Normandy campaign, American forces in particular became highly adept at "hedgerow busting" - and the main weapon used was found between the average GIs ears. American soldiers proved remarkably adept at adapting to the battlefield conditions of Normandy. Such factors as air superiority and greater availability of supplies, and technical ones like the Cullen/Rhino blade on allied tanks, helped greatly, but it was the combat power of the generic rifle platoon that ultimately led to the breakthrough/out created by COBRA. In sum, mass was an advantage, but only if used properly. Even the Soviet case bears this out: numbers alone (and good tanks) were not enough for them to eject the Germans in a timely fashion. It's often overlooked that the Soviets developed an extremely effective operational doctrine, calling for deep penetrations by OMGs then consolidation by follow-on forces, that made victory on the Eastern Front a reality by 1945.

So in conclusion, I think the Germans still were excellent soldiers, but were equalled by the Americans once they got their feet wet. No one factor in war can be divorced from another for easy dissection - we must study the amalgam as best we can and humbly reach what conclusions the documentary evidence suggests.

[Jestre]

I have to disagree with the previous post about Trevor Dupuy's quantitative analysis of German performance in selected WWII engagements. Colonel Dupuy used about 80 engagements to demonstrate his (QJMA), these engagements spanned actions from Salerno, Volturno, Anzio, Rome, Lemans to Metz and the Saar Campaigns. He broke down the results into both Attack and Defensive actions by both sides. The Germans outperformed the Allies in both situations. Colonel Dupuy used engagements that featured relative cohesiveness for both sides. The previous post intimates that the author failed to include actions that heavily favored the Allies, why should he, the whole point he is trying to make is that given relatively equal footing the Germans outperformed the Allies. Colonel Dupuy also quantifies the perfermance values of individual divisions from the American, British and German armies with the Germans rating 23% higher. Colonel Dupuy is a highly regarded military historian with ties to West Point, he gives an excellent argument for the German performance being superior due to the nature and intent of the General Staff. Of course there will always be the ugly roaring of the nationalistic head whenever anyone claims 'our boys' aren't as good. Colonel Dupuy wasn't trying to demonstrate the superiority of the German soldier, he was merely attempting to prove the impact of the German General Staff on the effectiveness of the German fighting force as a whole. I would be very interested in the 'quantitative' findings of Colonel Dupuys detractors....

[Marlow]

Originally posted by JerseyJohn:

But in a tank battle I think you'd prefer to sit in a T-34.

Not according to Russian tank ace Dmitriy Loza.

Also, consider that the M4A3E8(76) Sherman (otherwise known as the "easy eight" was more than the equal of the T34-85 in Korea. The Sherman was preferred to the M-26 Pershing in Korea due to its supperior mobility.

Finally, the M4 was every bit the equal of the Mark IV Panzer. Each one had its pluses and minuses, but on balance the Sherman was probably a better tank. It was the Panther and Tiger that really gave the American's problems. The Brits however found the answer for German heavies by mounting the 17lb gun in a Sherman, creating the Sherman Firefly. This was issued at about 1 to 3 with regular Shermans, and intended for anti-tank work.

[Compassion]

Originally posted by Marlow:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JerseyJohn:

[qb]But in a tank battle I think you'd prefer to sit in a T-34.

Not according to Russian tank ace Dmitriy Loza.

Also, consider that the M4A3E8(76) Sherman (otherwise known as the "easy eight" was more than the equal of the T34-85 in Korea.

The Sherman was preferred to the M-26 Pershing in Korea due to its supperior mobility.</font>