Soviet Artillery in CM2

[Jeff Duquette]

This is an essay regarding Soviet WWII artillery practices written by Harold J. Gordon and contained in B.H. Liddell Hart’s “Red Army”. The book contains essays by the likes of Heinz Guderian, von Manstein, R.M. Ogorkiewicz (Mr. Tank Technology), and Several Soviet Army Corps commanders who fought in WWII. Great reference.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Harold J. Gordon, “Red Army Artillery”

Preparations for an offensive consisted of the selection and

occupation of positions, registration, and the delivery of pre-

paratory fires. Selection of positions was often made well

beforehand, and weapon-pits were often also prepared well in

advance. But the bulk of the artillery units arrived only a few

days before the attack. Registration was hampered by emphasis

upon secrecy, as noted previously. In many cases final registra-

tion was made in conjunction with the support of the battalion

and regimental probing attacks which immediately preceded

major Soviet offensive action or in the course of the pre-

paratory fires.

The Soviet artillery preparation for an attack became in-

creasingly shorter as regards time and more intense as regards

weight of metal fired. Such fires sometimes lasted no more than

forty minutes. No regular time-table was followed, and all

sorts of ruses were employed to deceive the enemy as to the

course of the preparation. In many cases a lull would occur in

the middle of the preparation, by which the Russians hoped to

lure local German reserves forward where they would fall

under the intensive fires of the remainder of the preparation.

Another favourite trick employed by the Russians was the

creation of 'islands' or 'channels' of safety in their preparatory

fires by halting the fire of one or more batteries or battalions.

Infantry units then advanced swiftly through these lanes to

the very edge of the enemy's position and often caught his

troops still in their holes, deceived into believing that their area

was still under fire.

The direct-fire guns were normally moved into the front lines

during the twenty-four hours immediately preceding the attack.

They were placed in carefully camouflaged holes. They were

wheeled out of these pits and into their prepared firing positions

only a few minutes before opening fire and often after the start

of the preparation fires. Thus their period of vulnerability prior

to opening fire was reduced, and once they had knocked out

their specifically assigned target they were moved out of the

way.

The support of the attack phase began when the infantry

assault was launched. The artillery then passed over from pre-

paratory fire to direct-support fire—which normally took the

form of an accompanying rolling barrage combined with area

concentrations. At this time the mortar units of infantry forma-

tions reverted to local control and some field artillery units

were assigned close direct-support missions, which called for

them to follow the infantry and deliver support fires from the

nearest defilade behind them. Other light artillery pieces

were manhandled along with the infantry and, together with

the anti-tank guns, helped to knock out point targets.

The accompanying rolling barrage consisted of a series of

linear barrages spaced 50 to 100 metres apart. The barrage

moved deeper into the enemy position as the infantry advanced.

This rolling wall of fire conformed to the enemy's defensive

system as it moved, and was subject to control by the infantry—

who were expected to advance closely behind it and catch the

enemy still shaken and under cover. The Russians believe—

with the Rangers—that it is better in the\long run to suffer some

casualties from their own artillery fire than to allow the enemy's

troops to recover from the initial shock and disorganization

resulting from the action of the Soviet artillery fires.

The effectiveness of Soviet artillery fire was astonishingly

good in the early phases of an attack in view of their com-

paratively rough registration methods. Even in areas where

few actual casualties were caused, the shock effect on the morale

of the Germans was considerable. But once the fighting moved

so far into the enemy position that the Soviet light artillery was

forced to shift forward, this effectiveness declined rapidly, as

did the weight of metal delivered.

Once the break-through of the main German battle position

was accomplished, and Soviet operational armour was com-

mitted, the final phase of the artillery attack began. This

amounted to support of the attack in the depth of the enemy

position. In this phase the control of artillery units was highly

decentralized, with each combined arms formation commander

having full control of organic and attached artillery and assault

gun units.

The artillery with such spearheads usually proved sufficient

to handle the resistance of a demoralized and greatly weakened

enemy, especially since the policy of Soviet operational forces

was to avoid unnecessary combat and to by-pass German

strongpoints. However, when the Soviet armoured and mech-

anized spearheads ran into a new defensive position manned by

relatively fresh troops under experienced and able com-

manders, the lack of artillery support rapidly made itself felt,

particularly the lack of medium and heavy indirect-fire

weapons. In such cases the advance elements sometimes had

to wait a week or more before enough artillery and other

support had arrived to make possible the resumption of their

advance. The same problems arose when strong German

armoured forces were encountered.

At each echelon from regiment up, anti-tank mobile reserves

of increasing strength were formed. These reserves, which were

normally composed of anti-tank artillery, engineers, infantry

tank-killer teams, and heavy field-pieces or assault guns, were

used to break up German tank and infantry counter-attacks.

Employed successively in depth, such reserves proved their

worth time and time again.

All in all, Soviet artillery was extremely formidable in the

offensive, but it was not without its weaknesses, which an alert

foe with operational freedom of action could turn into sur-

prising reverses for the Red Army.

Soviet artillery was at least as important in defence as in

attack—perhaps even more so. It played a major part in each

of the three basic types of Soviet defence: (i) static defence,

(ii) defence on a broad front, and (iii) mobile defence.

(i) Static defence was the defence which the Russians

adopted when they had sufficient local strength to do so. In

static defence a continuous line of defence was formed, pre-

ferably a trench line, and behind this front line the situation

was organized in depth in a manner very similar to that used

by the Germans—usually with three broad defensive zones, one

behind the other, and so spaced as to force an enemy to dis-

place his artillery forward after forcing one zone before he can

support an attack on the next.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I got tired of scanning …if there is any interest in reading the Soviet Defensive Artillery info I can scan and post this section of the essay. Just A final note toward the tail end of the essay:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Although Soviet artillery is formidable, it is not without its

weaknesses, which help to balance the advantages mentioned

above.

Soviet field artillery in the Second World War proved itself

poor at engaging surprise targets with indirect fire once the

first forward displacement had been made and precalculated

concentrations were no longer available. Also, there seems

some reason to believe that the factors which led to this

weakness are still operative, because they are deeply

imbedded in Soviet tactical doctrine. Soviet indirect

fire, also, was comparatively inaccurate—even when

calculations were readily available. And Soviet forward

observers were not entirely trusted by their superiors—

although this situation will probably have improved

during the years of post-war training.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[ 04-22-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

[Matthew_Ridgeway]

**punt**

the good topics are always worth a little push

[Mr. Johnson--]

Did you hear the news about landlines and wireless FOs in CM2? Sounds like the Russians will be able to buy 152mm landline FOs for 20 bucks but the will take 5 turns to come down, and almost no adjusting allowed. Still a 152mm is a 152mm.

[Tero]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tss:

It will be interesting to see whether CM2 can handle the Ihantala battle or not. The infantry units aren't a problem at all: Finns had less than 500 men on the battle area and near reserves (a regiment, but so heavily attrited that it was down to a batallion strength) and on the final day before the 12th regiment was relieved its combat strength had fallen to 200 men or so.

The Soviets had more infantry, but they too had had so many losses that the units that were sent to attack were not much stronger than a couple of batallions, at most. However, they had several dozens of tanks and assault guns in the area left after they lost almost 50 tanks in the first two days.

The problems come from artillery.

Picture a CM map about 3000x2000 meter large. Put there at least 50 Finnish target registeration points and perhaps 20-30 Soviet ones. (I have seen the Finnish artillery target chart but not a Soviet one. The disparity in the figures is due the fact that Finns had many "barrage targets" that would need at least 2 or 3 CM TRPs to cover). Add enough Finnish spotters to get the fire of 21 artillery batallions, that is, 63 batteries (well, 247 guns to be exact, some batteries were not in full strength) ranging from 75mm up to 8". Add enough Soviet spotters to get ~500 guns.

Watch how many units are alive after five rounds of combat.

(At Ihantala Finns usually fired artillery missions 5-7 batallions at a time (15-21 batteries) against 200x300 meter target areas).

- Tommi

[ 04-20-2001: Message edited by: tss ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What would you say would be the correct or proper delay for Finnish artillery delays and adjustments. The most common term is "within minutes" but do you have any info that would be more exact ?

I think the firing at the sound of the guns if the FO goes off the air should somehow be incorporated.

[ 07-11-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Dr. Brian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Mattias:

As long as the distinction between “preparatory” and “on call” artillery is kept clear it should not be a problem.

The former they had, the latter they did not have to the same extent.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I don't know gang. All the readings I've seen indicate the opposite, especially during the latter part of the war, which is late 1942 on. They had plenty of arty, and on call too. For example, if one researches accounts at Stalingrad in November 1942 to January 1943, they had a lot.

As the war progressed, it was pretty darn good.

I suggest further reading on this material, but open it up to Red Army/Soviet accounts, not those written by western or german observers, especially accounts before 1980 which are heavily german biased.

Great topic for discussion.

[Commissar]

Ah, a thread from the past.

I don't think anyone's doubting the fact that the Soviets had a crap lot of artillery particularly in about 1943 onwards, perhaps even earlier. A lot of intial Red artillery assests either were captured or destroyed in the opening days of Barbarossa. Later on, Soviet artillery would outnumber the Germans by large margins. In one, I think the Russians had a 10:1 advantage. I've also read accounts of German lines literallly evaporating from some of these massive prep fires.

I don't see how you can have a game set on the Eastern front and not try to simulate some of these massive barrages. However, I would imagine gameplay and balance would be thrown out of wack. On call airstikes would also be a very interesting addition as one poster hinted at.

[Mr. Johnson--]

I don't think it would be very fun to play a game just simulating an opening barrage of a massive offensive. Maybe the follow up battles after a breakthough, Germans rushing firebrigades to the scene of the crime..so to speak.

[Grisha]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Mr. Johnson-<THC>-:

I don't think it would be very fun to play a game just simulating an opening barrage of a massive offensive. Maybe the follow up battles after a breakthough, Germans rushing firebrigades to the scene of the crime..so to speak.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I don't know, Mr.Johnson. I've been playing Soviet since the late 1970s, and one of my favorite moments is laying in that initial barrage. From time to time I'll make a QB in CMBO, playing Germans and giving them rocket artillery. All I do is play the initial turns until the rockets come in. I love it

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Commissar:

I don't see how you can have a game set on the Eastern front and not try to simulate some of these massive barrages. However, I would imagine gameplay and balance would be thrown out of wack. On call airstikes would also be a very interesting addition as one poster hinted at.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I can see very easily how you can have a squad-level game of GPW warfare without these. Opening barrages are IMO simply outside the scope of the game. The Commonwealth used so-called pepperpots (or somefink along those lines) repeatedly on the western front, where all available guns (including AAA and the Vickers MGs) would fire indirect fire into an area. Then you walked in and mopped up the dazed survivors. That also is not simulated, and it should not be. The Germans had a habit of disrupting Soviet attacks by hitting the assembly areas with a barrage. That can not and should not be modelled either, IMO. CM starts when these barrages are over. If you want to simulate it in a scenario, just start by giving the side that was hit by the barrage 'broken!' and 'panic!' squads, which they will have to use for the first number of turns, and then feed in fresh units from the counter-attack. That way you could simulate the barrage without:

a) wasting huge amounts of time (what fun for the one being shelled to send 15 PBEM turns just watching his troops cowering and breaking)

the need to waste valuable coding time for a seldom used feature in H2H play

c) preserve game balance

Also, regarding Soviet arty, they did have lots of it, but I really wonder about the flexibility of the arm. It essentially comes down to where the arty was in organisational terms. The way I understand it, there was little organic arty at or below division level. (corrections please if that is incorrect) That to me would indicate a very inflexible system, in which you can deliver a huge weight of metal in a short time, as part of a pre-planned barrage, but which would not be very well suited to emergency support missions, or flexible engagements of opportunity targets.

One example that I can recall off the top of my head is that during the start of BAGRATION the preceding recon in force (BN sized) was so successful in penetrating the German lines in some places that the barrage was cancelled (i.e. not relayed onto another target two miles in, just cancelled). This could indicate inflexibility of the system, compared especially to Commonwealth & US artillery.

If someone could point me towards some good info on Soviet arty, especially in the later stages of the war (tried to find the books Jeff quoted, but they seem to be out of print), and in particular to their FOO system, that would be most appreciated. I know there is some stuff on Valera's site, but is there anything else.

Jeff, if you could supply me with the ISBN numbers for those books please, that would be great.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Dr. Brian:

I suggest further reading on this material, but open it up to Red Army/Soviet accounts, not those written by western or german observers, especially accounts before 1980 which are heavily german biased.

Great topic for discussion.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I agree with the latter, but despite the former here is a footnote from von Mellenthin's Panzer Battles (p.297):

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The Russian artillery was very formidable in quantity but somewhat lacking in its methods. Accurate survey and 'silent registration' had little place in their system.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Lateron he is going into a bit more detail, mentioning the creation of small lanes up to 100yards wide, leaving room for the infantry to advance while the Germans still thought the barrage was in process, and the mistake by the Germans to create hard shoulders and counter-attack at the point of breakthrough, instead of taking into account the fact that the farther advanced Red Army elements would no longer have artillery. Basically all what Jeff in his quote said.

Very interesting on an operational level, but all really a bit outside the CMBB scope. What von Mellenthin suggests is that in the same battle, you could have situations where the Germans would face lots of arty (counter-attack at the point of breakthrough) or very little (counter-attack at the spearhead). Regarding methods, registration is clearly outside the game, CBF is outside the game, barrages are really outside the game, so not a lot to do there, except for thinking about the price in relation to flexibility and weight carried by a single FOO.

[Commissar]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

Lateron he is going into a bit more detail, mentioning the creation of small lanes up to 100yards wide, leaving room for the infantry to advance while the Germans still thought the barrage was in process, and the mistake by the Germans to create hard shoulders and counter-attack at the point of breakthrough, instead of taking into account the fact that the farther advanced Red Army elements would no longer have artillery. Basically all what Jeff in his quote said.

Very interesting on an operational level, but all really a bit outside the CMBB scope. What von Mellenthin suggests is that in the same battle, you could have situations where the Germans would face lots of arty (counter-attack at the point of breakthrough) or very little (counter-attack at the spearhead). Regarding methods, registration is clearly outside the game, CBF is outside the game, barrages are really outside the game, so not a lot to do there, except for thinking about the price in relation to flexibility and weight carried by a single FOO.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Granted it would be out-of-scope for CMBB but since CM does allow arty in the form of FO, one would imagine that it would be modeled in some way even if it's very, very basic. I wonder exactly what is meant by "silent registration"?

Soviet arty may not have been as flexible as German or American methods but it very effectively worked for them. My impression is the Soviets actually did a lot of recon and preparation for their artillery barrages and they often worked to great effect. The Soviets would also modify their timetables to fool the Germans by bombarding them with intial artillery, pausing, and then restart when the Germans exposed themselves by emerging from their shelters back into open, catching them by surprise. The barrage would then shift to the secondary lines. Anway, that's my impression but I'm no arty expert.

[Jeff Duquette]

It does my heart good to hear someone else is actually sitting down and reading Von Mellenthin.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

It does my heart good to hear someone else is actually sitting down and reading Von Mellenthin. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Standing, most of the time. I read it on the commute into London (Connex South Central anyone?)

Commissar, unfortunately I am no arty expert, but my grandfather (who was a German CBF observer with Heeresgruppe Nord) told me that they would register (spotting round) by firing an airburst onto the target quite high up, so that the target would not notice and would not move out to avoid the fire. Tabulating whether this airburst was correct could take 1-15mins, according to him.

[offtaskagain]

I believe silent registration is getting a battery pointed at a target without firing to get it correct. As mentioned before, the Russians tended to check accuracy by firing a ranging round, letting the enemy know he was a target. The British were pretty bad for this too. On some occasions they had to fire ranging rounds for 10 minutes before they could fire for effect.

[Commissar]

That airburst method sounds interesting. They were able to fire so far up and with so little sound, the enemy didn't even notice? Calculations may have taken a bit, but I don't think it would be too far a stretch of the imagination to suppose that the German arty in CM is a result of these calculations before the battle so that the arty already has a general reference with the FO giving more accurate adjustment coordinates.

Again, the mass barrages are probably outside of scope for a tactical game like CM2 but I can also imagine the tactical battle being the spearhead of large general attack with such heavy artillery in preplanned support. If it's not there for gameplay considerations I can certainly understand and agree. No prob.

However, if we want to be historically "accurate", should rocket artillery and heavy artillery be even an option at all in CM1 or CM2 then? I honestly can't say for sure but it would seem to be inconsistent to say, "mass barrages are out BUT we'll leave rockets and the other bad mamas in" other than for strict gameplay or cater-to-the-customer considerations.

[Ari Maenpaa]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Harold J. Gordon:

The Russians believe— with the Rangers -that it is better in the\long run to suffer some

casualties from their own artillery fire than to allow the enemy's troops to recover from the initial shock and disorganization

resulting from the action of the Soviet artillery fires. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Probably an artillery general in his command post thought this way, but not the front line soldier who had to advance into the firestorm. This problem was solved by alcohol. In the offensive on Karelian Isthmus (June 1944) the attacking troops were drunk. The Finns got numerous sightings of boozed Soviet soldiers and POWs confirmed the fact.

The attacking troops (including the elite Guards) had been served 100 – 200 grams of strong alcohol per man before the assault. This allowed them to advance stoically even when they suffered heavy casualties from own artillery fire. Of course the alcohol caused problems too. Some troops consumed their drinks too early and weren’t in shape to attack as planned. Also a drunk soldier may be brave, but everybody knows the drawbacks that alcohol inflicts in human being. These problems were partially solved by using huge troop concentrations in the focal points.

Maybe there should be an alcohol bonus/handicap for Soviet troops in some scenarios as these alcohol servings seemed to be SOP. I’m pretty sure that this happened on other Soviet fronts too, although right now I haven’t sources to confirm that.

Ari