CM2 INFO......

[Skipper]

The major factors that determined the outcome (ie, soviet victory with loss ratio heavily in favour of finns), IMHO, were the following:

1. The whole war (with exception of ill-fated finn counteroffensive, which was cancelled pretty fast), was a series of soviet infantry assaults on prepared finnish fortifications (and please, don't give me the crap that Mannergeim line was a bunch of hastily dug trenchlines or something - I saw it myself, pretty impressive concrete DOTs, great fields of fire, marshes on both flanks, f...ng meatgrinder in other words).

2. Extremely scarse road network in the theater - makes more impact on attacker, than defender.

3. Untankable terrain - even if you get a breakthrough, there is no way to exploit it properly.

These three things alone should be enough to determine the actual outcome.

Of course, finns were defending their country, soviets were just gaining ground around Leningrad. That makes a lot of a difference in the grunt's attitude, initiative etc. But not so much as to be decisive for why the loss ratio was far from 1:1. Far from it - in other terrain but otherwise similar circumstances it did not help French or Polish at all.

Skills and training of officers and grunts were on par.

Essays about finns accustomed to living in winter forest, as opposed to russians accustomed to living in cities (huh? in 1939, just 10 years after "industrialisation"

start?), or steppes, or I do not know where else (tropics?) hold no water in them.

Same story with Stalin being responsible for allegedly poor quality of officer corps. Put it this way, it was good enough to win the war with Germany, which was finished by the same generals as started. Certainly, no worse than US and british in 1944. Ie, proper training, early promotion due to massive mobilisation (NB: not due to "purges"), little or no combat experience.

Compare to Wehrmacht: all the same, but longer experience at present level of command, and a lot more of combat experience. Surely enough, those soviet officers who survived Barbarossa got much better by the end of the year.

The causes of 1941 disaster had nothing to do with quality of officers.

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Skipper:

The causes of 1941 disaster had nothing to do with quality of officers.

I think that John Ericsson and Eric Glantz would not agree with you there, and I happily take their word over yours any day.

The reason that the war went so badly to start with was according to Glantz that units were sent there from the Ukraine with no winter equipment, and that these units had no idea what they were facing, terrain and climate wise. Also - if you have a look at the result of the purges, most higher level COs (regiment and up) had if not been shot/imprisoned, been replaced/rotated. Also, at least one divisional commander was summarily shot as a scapegoat, and that hardly encourages initiative on the part of his colleagues.

Your statement that the early promotions of officers had nothing to do with the purges is just plain wrong. I will dig out the numbers of officers removed and their status later.

These BTW were the same officers that almost lost the war to the Soviet Union in 1941.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Barleyman]

sound of axes grinding in the background

Didn't Grigsby (the man!) say that he always has to implement some special rules for the Finns as otherwise they'd lose immediately with the troop/equipment levels present..

But what does he know

[Apa]

Skipper:

1) Did you see the Mannerheim line, or was it one of the lines build during continuation war, if you were in Russia, then it was propably Mannerheim Line, if you were in Finland, then it propably wasn't. I also have seen those late-war defence lines, damn impressive, propably one reason Finland had the peace treaty instead of losing the war.

French and Poland had one big difference during their wars. They were facing cleverly implemented (don't know if this is a good word for this, but I don't know a better one...) blitzkrieg army. During winter war Soviet officers hadn't propably even heard of blitzkrieg.

I didn't say that the Siberian troops of Russia would be any lower quality than finnish, but the troops from the warm areas propably were. And I didn't speak of living in cities, I spoke about winter quality of the troops, two completely different things.

Finlands highest ranking officer, Marsalkka Mannerheim, was earlier in his life an officer in Russian army. If he had stayed in Red army, he would have been killed years before the war, that is quite sure. That is what happened to majority of the high ranking officers of the "kingdom army" (now I really don't know how to say that in english, but the army russia had in WWI). Now, Mannerheim was very important to Finland, like propably his russian equivalants would have been to red army.

And yes, red army officers were good enough to win the war, but it took Winter war, and some years of war against germans before they knew what they did. In operation Uranus it was the first time (at least according to Anthony Beevor's Stalingrad, doesn't say it directly, but says something like this: German officiers were surprised of the attack. They never believed, that the Russians could use BZ) when the Russians used Blitzkrieg tactics, and they had been fighting for some years with heavy armored forces (I think they had lost something like 10000 tanks that time...). Talk about bat officers . But yes, they learned their lesson.

One of the most important things for Operation Uranus to succeed, was that German had one moron in their armys hierarcy, and it was the highest ranking. Now a trivia question, who am I talking about? But russia would propably have won also without hitler taking the command, but that is something we will never know (unless BTS makes a game that is similar to Third Reich)

Apa

[Sergei]

Originally posted by Skipper:

The major factors that determined the outcome (ie, soviet victory with loss ratio heavily in favour of finns), IMHO, were the following:

1. The whole war (with exception of ill-fated finn counteroffensive, which was cancelled pretty fast), was a series of soviet infantry assaults on prepared finnish fortifications (and please, don't give me the crap that Mannergeim line was a bunch of hastily dug trenchlines or something - I saw it myself, pretty impressive concrete DOTs, great fields of fire, marshes on both flanks, f...ng meatgrinder in other words).

Oh great, you were there. Were you there in 1939? How many concrete bunkers did you see? And marshes, as well as lakes, rivers and even the Gulf of Viipuri, were frozen by the time, which favoured the attacker. And most of boulders intended to hinder tank movement were too small for Soviet tanks, especially when they were buried into snow. It certainly wasn't a Maginot line.

In north things were completely different

2. Extremely scarse road network in the theater - makes more impact on attacker, than defender.

Mm-hmm? Now you must be talking about areas north of Isthmus. In south, it wasn't full of German autobahns, but somehow Finns could deal with it in 1941 and Soviets in 1944.

3. Untankable terrain - even if you get a breakthrough, there is no way to exploit it properly.

Isthmus was mostly farmland. Soviet tanks didn't have trouble in exploiting break-throughs in 1944 in the same terrain.

The main reason was simply that, even while Finnish army relied on WWI-style war of attrition, Soviet tactics and proficiency were poor, and while they did have thousands of tanks, they could all be penetrated with 37mm guns with ease. After December the tactics were improved, which caused the break-through.

[Chupacabra]

Stalin's military purges played a large role in the opening years of the war, it's a bit quixotic to argue otherwise, IMO.

Take for example one of Stalin's most prominent victims, Marshal Tukhachevkskii. In 1936, the Soviet Union conducted a wargames exercise. The proposition of the exercise was that Germany had neutralized the Polish military, had concentrated roughly 80 divisions in the East, and had launched a surprise blow against the USSR. However, due to the political nature of the exercises, the director of the wargame, Marshal Yegorov, nullified the "German" force's advantages, assuming that the USSR would also have fully mobilized prior to the invasion, ignoring the surprise factor.

Needless to say, the Soviets won the game.

Nevertheless, Tukhachevskii made this criticism of the Soviet forces during the wargame:

Mechanized corps made frontal breakthroughs of enemy defence positions without artillery support. Their losses would have been enormous. Mechanized corps operations were jerky, the direction bad. Mechanized corps operations were not supported by aviation. Aviation was employed somewhat aimlessly. Signals, communications worked badly...Staff work, in particular intelligence, was very weak in all units...This must be changed.

From Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, p. 3

Any of this sound familiar? And yet by 1937, Tukhachevskii was dead, along with Marshals Uborevich, Yakir, Primakov, Putna and Eideman, with more to come. This also does not include the equally formidable list of officers who began the war in Siberia.

Is it unreasonable to assume that, had Stalin not killed his most experienced officers, the war might have gone differently in the first few years?

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Soy super bien soy super super bien soy bien bien super bien bien bien super super

[Skipper]

> I think that John Ericsson and Eric Glantz

> would not agree with you there, and I

> happily take their word over yours any day.

That's up to you, but I am not sure if you interpret them right. As I said, surely enough Wehrmacht had more experienced officers, however it was not the decisive factor. The quality of pre-war soviet officer corps was better than average.

Speaking of purges, go ahead, dig up some facts, and make sure they are:

(a) from VERITABLE sources (ie, not an anti-soviet propaganda genre);

( separate combat officers from political officers and various civilians with military rank (such as police, judicial, railroad managers (!) etc, etc).

> units were sent there from the Ukraine

> with no winter equipment, and that these

> units had no idea what they were facing,

> terrain and climate wise.

They were sent there hastily, when it became clear that the originally deployed force was not strong enough. Easy successes in Mongolia and Poland made RKKA too arrogant. Iirc, the initial force consisted of Leningrad Military District troops.

> 1) Did you see the Mannerheim line

Most certainly.

> During winter war Soviet officers hadn't

> propably even heard of blitzkrieg.

Dead wrong. The buzzword of 1930-s soviet operational theory was "deep operation" and "motomechanised troops" - blitzkrieg plain and simple. Exactly what Zhukov pulled off in Mongolia in 1939, even before the invasion of Poland. The concept itself dates back to WWI. An attempt to pull it off in Finland proved more complicated, initially.

> If he had stayed in Red army, he would

> have been killed years before the war,

> that is quite sure.

Not necessarily at all. There were many enough tzar's army officers and unter-officers among soviet generals. Including the chief of General Staff.

> German had one moron in their armys

> hierarcy, and it was the highest ranking.

If USSR would lose, I am sure surviving soviet generals would say the same about Stalin. And that's simply not true on both counts.

> They never believed, that the Russians could use BZ)

Underestimating opposition is a big mistake, too. Soviet leadership was also guilty of it in case of Winter War. If you read Barbarossa directive, you get an impression that OKW was unaware of Second Strategic Echelon existance at all.

> And marshes, as well as lakes, rivers and

> even the Gulf of Viipuri, were frozen by

> the time, which favoured the attacker.

That's when you know exactly where they are. When you don't know, you often end up drowning your tanks and trucks in wholesale numbers. The defences I saw were certainly built with likelihood of winter in mind.

> It certainly wasn't a Maginot line.

Yup. Thanks to surrounding terrain, it is better.

> Isthmus was mostly farmland. Soviet tanks

> didn't have trouble in exploiting break-

> throughs in 1944 in the same terrain.

They did! As well as Germans+Finns in 1941. They just "learned to cope" by that time.

Back to the original topic, the main point is that if/when anyone will be building Winter War scenarios (or for that matter June-July 1941 scenarios), it will be historically ridiculous to make it Finnish crack troops against hordes of Soviet conscripts. In fact it was mainly regulars on regulars (veterans on regulars in 1941). Scenario balancing for Winter War should rather come from fortifications, terrain etc. See above.

[Skipper]

Tukhachecvsky, by the way, was the one who screwed up in Poland in 1920.

Uborevich, Yakir were chekists, not military.

All listed were trotskists (ie, there was a damn good reason for Stalin tpo get rid of these people).

Look. I definitely don't need you to tell me the names of marshals and generals who were purged. I want you to show that it was a negative factor.

PS Purges among civilians, however morally wrong, were undeniably a POSITIVE factor for USSR industrial capacity and mobilisation capability.

NB: the hundred thousand purged officers figures you might have seen are anti-soviet propaganda plain and simple. In fact, if we are talking about army officers "purged", we are talking about much less than ten thousand all told.

[Apa]

Come on now, are you truly saying that Hitlers leadership past the usual hierarcy (he gave orders to division level from the main headquarters wasn's stupid? Or that the high ranking officers of Wermacht, who tought Hitler's orders to split the summer 42 attack was suicidical were all wrong? Or that Anthony Beevors (sorry to bring this up again...) was wrong when he judged Hitler as a bad commander? And this list could go on as long as one wishes, no withdraval from Stalingrad, no winter equipment...

One point I certainly admit: Stalin wasn't a genious either

And you are saying that Stalin didn't kill a lot of Red army officers, so if _you_ have any facts showing this, I would be more than glad to see them. Also no soviet propaganda, please

Apa

[The Commissar]

I dont know about anybody else, but I dont feel that Finnish *should* be able to *massacre* Soviets.

Take away the idiotic "wave attacks" and you have a fairly-decent army - not great, but not the worst either. Certaintly capable to taking out the Finnish with proper leadership.

Now, assuming CM players are better leaders of virtual Soviets then the conscript officers of real life, I expect to massacre the Finns - not the other way around.

Yes, conscript experience status and the like will keep Soviet players from achieving spectacular, flawless results, but I am willing to bet money that the Finns will have a much harder fight on their hands this time around.

Cheers!

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"...Every position, every meter of Soviet soil must be defended to the last drop of blood..."

- Segment from Order 227 "Not a step back"

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Skipper:

The causes of 1941 disaster had nothing to do with quality of officers.

and

Speaking of purges, go ahead, dig up some facts, and make sure they are:

(a) from VERITABLE sources (ie, not an anti-soviet propaganda genre);

( separate combat officers from political officers and various civilians with military rank (such as police, judicial, railroad managers (!) etc, etc).

Glantz, When Titans Clashed p.11

'For the next four years, right up to the German invasion, Soviet officers disappeared with alarming frequency. Of an estimated 75,000 to 80,000 officers in the armed forces (inserted: so not railroad managers or police officers), at least 30,000 were imprisoned or executed. They included three out of five marshals; all 11 deputy defense commissars; all commanders of military districts; the commanders and chiefs of staff of both the navy and the air force; 14 of 16 army commanders; 60 of 67 corps commanders; 136 of 199 division commanders; 221 of 397 brigade commanders; and 50% of all regimental commanders. Another 10,000 officers were dismissed from the service in disgrace. Source: O.F. Suvenirov 'Vsearmeiskaya tragediia' (An army-wide tragedy', VIZh3 (March 1989), page 42. Other archival documents released in the 1990s.

Furthermore: The Ukrainian 44th Rifle Division was destroyed at Suomussalmi on 9th December 1939. The war started on 30th November 1939, 10 days before. So they were there from the get-go and directly involved in the initial desaster. The Divisional CO was shot on the spot on the order of Mehklis. (Glantz, ibd, p.21)

I will not even bother to post any other info regarding your claims about Tukhachevsky's performance, since you seem to believe the claims that some of these officers are Trotskiists and agree that that was sufficient reason to snuff them out.

Have a nice day.

Edit:

Originally posted by Skipper:

NB: the hundred thousand purged officers figures you might have seen are anti-soviet propaganda plain and simple. In fact, if we are talking about army officers "purged", we are talking about much less than ten thousand all told.

Funny that, Glantz comes up with at least 40,000 in total. About 50% of the total officer complement. I really think you may benefit from some reading.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[This message has been edited by Germanboy (edited 02-06-2001).]

[Skipper]

Apa:

You know, how they say "Victory has many fathers, failure is a bastard"? I especially liked you blaming on Hitler the lack of winter equipment. ROFLMAO, they had no time to procure it, the whole frigging gamble of Barbarossa was to destroy RKKA during summer campaign, within 500 km from the border.

To tell you the truth, Hitler was very good politician and diplomat.

As for Stalin, well, those who dealt with him (ex, Churchill) expressed an opinion about his mental abilities diametrically opposite to yours, too.

> Certaintly capable to taking out the Finnish with proper leadership.

Which, by the way, they eventually did in 1940, although with more guts and blood than originally anticipated.

[Chupacabra]

Originally posted by Skipper:

Tukhachecvsky, by the way, was the one who screwed up in Poland in 1920.

Yes, and what's your point? Tukhachevskii still saw the flaws in the Soviet Army and recommended they be changed. He also predicted with some degree of accuracy what a modern war would look like. Do either of these have anything to do with the Polish war?

All listed were trotskists (ie, there was a damn good reason for Stalin tpo get rid of these people).

Wow. Do you really believe that? I doubt that even Stalin thought there was any such thing as a Trotskiite, except as a handy label for his political enemies.

Look. I definitely don't need you to tell me the names of marshals and generals who were purged. I want you to show that it was a negative factor.

Can I prove conclusively that it was a negative factor? No, of course not. Why? Because it's pure speculation. They were purged, and so it is impossible to tell how they would have performed.

However, based upon my knowledge of military history I would say that it is generally better to have experienced generals than politically inoffensive ones.

So, can you conclusively prove that purges were not harmful militarily? Since you are making the radical statement here, I'd say the burden of proof lies on you, not on anyone else here.

Edited to fix formatting.

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Soy super bien soy super super bien soy bien bien super bien bien bien super super

[This message has been edited by Chupacabra (edited 02-06-2001).]

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Chupacabra:

[bSo, can you conclusively prove that purges were not harmful militarily? Since you are making the radical statement here, I'd say the burden of proof lies on you, not on anyone else here.

To reiterate - not just a radical statement, but one that is plain wrong in the light of the generally accepted sources. But I somehow get the feeling that we will be hit with some pro-communist propaganda soon

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Barleyman]

Yes, conscript experience status and the like will keep Soviet players from achieving spectacular, flawless results, but I am willing to bet money that the Finns will have a much harder fight on their hands this time around.

Are you willing to test that hypothesis over a game, assuming CM2 comes out with winter war support?

On an unrelated note, I feel it's just an american bias to give units with little or no experience "conscript" status.

After all, certain central european country with a conscript army certainly made fairly big waves between 1939 and 1945..

Yeah, put the conscripted AA staff company where I served in 1994 into any frontline and arrange for a lot of funerals..

Similarly conscripted jaegers with qualitatively and quantitatively vastly superior training would give much better account of themselves in the same situation.

[Jeff Heidman]

Originally posted by The Commissar:

I dont know about anybody else, but I dont feel that Finnish *should* be able to *massacre* Soviets.

Take away the idiotic "wave attacks" and you have a fairly-decent army - not great, but not the worst either. Certaintly capable to taking out the Finnish with proper leadership.

Exactly my point.

When someone plays a sceanrio against a human, and that human stubbornly refuses to march his Russinas across open ground to be mowed down by the noble Finnish farm boys defending hearth and home from the Evil Red Menace, we are going to hear much wailing.

As far as the Soviet officer corps, what si the point? I find it amusing when people try to make "their" side (in this case the Finns) look good by building up the other side and ignoring the circumstances that suggest that the results were driven by more than just Finn inate superiority.

The fact is that the Finns beat up the Soviets because the Soviets were ineptly led, not very motivated, and fighting under appaling conditions. Certainly the Finns were *much* better motivated, and fighting on defensive terrain of their choosing, in a an environment of their choosing.

When the Soviets were well led and had manaeged to create some elan and professionalism, the Finns lost.

I am not trying to take anything away from the Finns and Finland, but the myth of the Finn super-soldier is exactly that. A myth.

Jeff Heidman

[Jeff Heidman]

Originally posted by Barleyman:

Are you willing to test that hypothesis over a game, assuming CM2 comes out with winter war support?

On an unrelated note, I feel it's just an american bias to give units with little or no experience "conscript" status.

What in the word does this have to do with "American bias"?

"Conscript" in CM terms means more than just a bunch of draftees. It means a bunch of draftees with basically no training, poor leadership, and a decided lack of motivation or espirit de corps.

I would not consider Finns at almost any point to fit that description. I would guess that they would start out at Green at the least.

Conscripts are German volkstuurm at the end of the war that were largely composed of boys and old men yanked from their homes and handed a SMG and pointed towards the nearers Russian tank.

Or the Soviet POWs in German service at Normandy.

Jeff Heidman

[This message has been edited by Jeff Heidman (edited 02-06-2001).]

[Jeff Heidman]

I think the most interesting question about CM2 is how to model early war Soviet infantry.

Alll indications would suggest that a large portion would be considered conscript, given their level of training and motivation. But at the same time, they would not break as easy as conscripts because of the real and known consequences of failure to follow orders in the Commisar time period (up until late 1942 IIRC).

How will that be modeled?

Jeff Heidman

[Chupacabra]

Originally posted by Jeff Heidman:

I think the most interesting question about CM2 is how to model early war Soviet infantry.

Alll indications would suggest that a large portion would be considered conscript, given their level of training and motivation. But at the same time, they would not break as easy as conscripts because of the real and known consequences of failure to follow orders in the Commisar time period (up until late 1942 IIRC).

How will that be modeled?

Jeff Heidman

Probably the easiest way would be to make them green or conscript, but to give them a higher fanatacism.

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Soy super bien soy super super bien soy bien bien super bien bien bien super super

[Apa]

Skipper:

With this you are proving that Hitler wasn't too genious strategic: Apa:

You know, how they say "Victory has many fathers, failure is a bastard"? I especially liked you blaming on Hitler the lack of winter equipment. ROFLMAO, they had no time to procure it, the whole frigging gamble of Barbarossa was to destroy RKKA during summer campaign, within 500 km from the border." You know of the saying: Always prepare for the worst... And, yes, Hitler was a good politician and a good diplomat.

The Stalin part, A: has a smiley. B: Is my opinion, which I am _not_ trying to make everybodys opinion, like sombody here...

Soviet Union _never_ took over Finland. At least officially.

Heidman:

I have not sayed that Finnish troops should always massacre Russian ones. All I am saying, is that they should definitely not be named conscripts in game terms. And neither Finnish officiers should be of the lowest quality.

My last post to this topic.

Apa

[Jeff Heidman]

Originally posted by Apa:

Heidman:

I have not sayed that Finnish troops should always massacre Russian ones. All I am saying, is that they should definitely not be named conscripts in game terms. And neither Finnish officiers should be of the lowest quality.

My last post to this topic.

Apa

OK, but who are you arguing with here? Has someone said that the Finns should be conscript, or have poor officers? I do not think that is the case.

Jeff Heidman

[Francesco]

I hope to see KV2s...

But what do you think about JS3 problem?

[Chupacabra]

I don't think the IS3 actually saw combat during the war, so IMO it would be wrong to include it.

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Soy super bien soy super super bien soy bien bien super bien bien bien super super

[Apa]

Heidman: not sure, but that is where this whole thing got it's start for me... Also I didn't read your posts well enough, sorry for that.

[tirpitz]

German Skijäger and Gebirgsjäger are my pet subject, as is the 20 Gebirgs Armee's campaign in Finland.

For those interested the Germans made quite extensive use if ski troops on the squad to batallion level during the winter. They even created a division, the 1 Skijäger Division which grew from the 1 Skijäger Brigade. There were also several independent Jäger batallione formed too. The divisions of the 20 Geb. Armee equipped large numbers of troops with ski's. They were used during the winter months for patrolling and assaults, it is after all the only way to get about in deep snow.

The attack method used by Finns and i suppose the Germans too was to advance as close as possible to the enemy on ski's then at the last minute, kick them off for the final assault on foot.

I have some video footage of German ski troops assaulting Soviet positions with the support of Hotchkiss H-39 beute-panzers in 1942.

If CM2 is to include the fighting in the far North then Finns, Russians and Germans (mostly Austrians actually) should all have the opportunity to be ski equipped.

One last point. The W-SS troops fighting in this theater (SS.Inf. Rgt 9 and SS. Division 'Nord') should have the experience level of 'Green' at very least in 1941. They took a severe hammering for their inexperience and incompetence during their first months in combat.

If anybody would like to read further on the German Skijäger then i recommend the book 'Die Deutschen Skijäger' by georg Gunter. published in 1993 by Podzun-Pallas verlag.

regards

Simon