An excellent article on tank comparisons, very relevant to CM2

[T-34\85]

Sorry if someone's already put this article up

This article is just great! I found it on Russian Battlefied, the new site that resulted from the joining of Russian Military Zone and I Remember

A lot of the observations in this article have been made on this forum but I think its well worth the read considering CM2 ....

Especially interesting is the comments about the Pz III ... it was my understanding the Pz III couldnt be upgraded to hold any gun bigger than 50mm and the Pz IV was a better candidate for upgunning ... but its interesting to know the Russians were impressed by the Pz III.

The issue of armor brittleness is funny considering I saw on this forum some pictures of Panthers whose armor had been plain and simple shattered like an egg shell

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Necessary Observations Regarding the Comparison of Tanks

A common occurrence in our field is the attempt compare two tanks, and even more frequently to answer the questions, "What was the best tank of World War II?" and "What was the Wehrmacht's best tank?" How should one make these and similar comparisons? By what parameters should tanks be compared? Can such comparisons be reasonably made at all?

In the overwhelming majority of cases, it is not the tanks themselves that are being compared, but numbers-simply the tactical and technical characteristics (TTCh). Sometimes we need to be reminded that the TTCh of any combat vehicle are, generally speaking, often idealized. They can differ significantly from the characteristics of the actual vehicles.

In arguments of this nature quality often is not even mentioned, rather, a categorical assertion of the type "the running gear of this tank is better". End of discussion. This, seemingly, settles many disagreements, as frequently no one disagrees. But what does "better" mean? Better as compared to what?

What is the basis for assertions regarding armor penetrability? This is a relatively complex process that in and of itself provides only a quantitative measurement. It does not speak at all to the issue of the probability of defeating the target. For example, the IS-2 was able to defeat the German Panther from a range of 1,500 metres. Yes, that is true. But what was the likelihood that this would occur? In addition to the obvious matter of armor penetration, there were two other very important factors: optics and the subjective evaluation of the gunner, that is, the person who directly employed the optics. How does one now make the comparison?

Everyone sees in the TTCh of a tank the thickness of its armor, but few go to the effort of understanding its quality. What is this armor made of? What is its chemical composition? By what technological method was it manufactured? In the best case for the most "experienced" one can encounter a mathematical expression of armor hardness on the Brinnel scale. Hardness is very important, but by far not everything! What about brittleness? Steel can be very hard, but at the same time brittle. In fact, this occurred with German armor in 1944-45. All this remains "below the radar", when in fact the resistance of armor to penetration depends upon its quality. For example, the forged armor of the Ferdinand was significantly more resistant to armor-piercing rounds than, say, the rolled armor of the Panther.

Similar comments can be made in regards to tank gun ammunition, which is often overlooked too briefly. The caliber, weight, and muzzle velocity of a particular round are pointed out and this is considered sufficient. But this is by far not enough information! In the first place, what type of round is it: armor-piercing, sub-caliber, and so on? There are many nuances and hidden dimensions. For example, is it a chambered (APHE) or solid-shot round? In some cases this has decisive significance, for example, in the case of the German so-called "spaced" armor. The Germans utilized this armor in some later production Pz-III tanks. A 20 mm sheet of supplemental armor was secured to the standard 50 mm frontal armor, with a small space between the hull and the add-on sheet. When an APHE shell struck this armor, the detonator functioned upon contact with the first sheet of armor, which caused premature detonation of the round. As a result the main armor remained intact. For example, the A-19 122 mm field cannon, and later standard armament for the IS-2 tank and the ISU-122 self-propelled gun, fired only a chambered armor-defeating round. As a result of this, the Pz-III could not be defeated in a frontal shot even by the 122 mm gun, while famous Panther was penetrated straight through even from 1,000 metres.

In the same fashion, there is a large difference between blunt-nosed and sharp-nosed projectiles. The effect of "normalization" permitted the blunt-nosed projectile (more precisely, a sharp-nosed projectile with blunt tip and ballistic cap - APCBC) better to penetrate sloped armor than a normal pointed projectile. Once again the matter turns on the quality of employment. For example, here is a well known condition that existed in the early part of the war. Theoretically, the Soviet 45 mm projectile should have penetrated the armor of the German Pz-III tanks, but in practice this frequently did not occur. Tests were conducted to determine the causes for this. The tests showed that the projectiles had been re-heated during production, resulting in the reduction of their armor-penetrating capability.

And now it is becoming clear that the comparison of two tanks is not a simple matter. It is also not so easy as it seems to so many people. What is meant by the question of the "best tank"? To this day many believe that the German King Tiger was the best tank. Let us stipulate this. Let us agree also that the Germans were not fools (how else could they have produced the "best tank in the world"?). Now we must ask ourselves, why did the Germans, who we have agreed are not fools, not halt the production of all their other tanks and throw all their productive resources into the manufacture of the "best tank in the world"? The answer is that this tank was extremely expensive to produce. And now we have exposed its first deficiency. Simplicity and efficiency of production are critical factors. History confirms this. It was apparent that it was better to have five T-34s or Shermans than a single Panther.

The same may also be said concerning the critical factor of reparability, that is, ability to correct damage to the tank without sending it back to the factory. In this regard, the German Panther, Tiger, and King Tiger come out rather poorly, according to the testimony of a large number of German engineers. The Soviet T-34 possessed exceptional reparability. There are many confirmed cases where a damaged tank was transported to a field repair base and a few hours later was back in combat. (The Germans considered this tank as destroyed, and would-be Wittmans added it to their scores! Here is yet another source of myths.)

It turned out that unification (standardization) had exceptional significance. An enormous number of various armored vehicles were created on the basis of the T-34. But this is not all. Unification can substantially ease the repair of tanks, the training of repair personnel, driver-mechanics, and crews in general. The Germans also had their own "T-34", the German Pz-III tank, on the basis of which were also created a large number of vehicles. Soviet specialists gave this tank high marks and were quite surprised by the fact that by the end of the war the Germans in essence abandoned it and undertook to construct the fantastic monsters like the King Tiger, Maus, and other designs. While it would seem that the decision was obvious: unification and utilization of the outstanding chassis from the Pz-III.

Many people attempt to explain the superiority of one tank over another by placing them in some kind of ideal conditions, that is, those conditions in which these tanks never fought and will never fight. For example, on a field as level as a table, like knights on a jousting field. If tanks were tested in this manner, then mobility, reliability, and cross-country performance would not be needed! Why bother? Make the armor thicker and the cannon more powerful and success will be ensured! Why do the engineers of all countries test new vehicles in field trials? Why are the reliability of individual components and the tank as a whole subjected to such intense scrutiny? In addition, the overwhelming majority forget that some vehicles were created in general not for combating other tanks but, shall we say, for storming of fortifications, or supporting friendly infantry.

And still another widespread misunderstanding. Efforts are made to compare two tanks using statistics of losses of these tanks in several operations. Overall losses of tanks of a given type are chosen for this and then it is determined which loss numbers are smaller. This is unreliable at its roots, since the cause of the losses is totally unclear. It is possible that tanks drove into a minefield or were destroyed by aviation. But it is most probable (and statistics confirm this) that the tanks fell victim to antitank artillery.

A tank is too expensive an item to be used simply as an antitank weapon. And in the Soviet and German armies missions for the destruction of tanks were assigned first of all to antitank, field, and self-propelled artillery. Tanks were advised, conversely, to avoid direct engagements, since this led to unjustified losses. It was recommended to operate only from cover and ambush. And only in the concluding phase of the war did the Germans, clearly having lost the war, change their tactics. This did not help but only increased their losses. German and Soviet design engineers, like the engineers of all countries, compared tanks. But they compared them not to establish "the best over the best", but to discern the strong and weak aspects of the tanks and in order to understand what an obvious or potential enemy possesses. Such a comparison is useful for domestic tank design and production. What is the purpose in endless arguments by amateurs, overwhelming numbers of whom have never been in a tank, and many have not once seen a tank up close?

---------------------------------------------

[Olle Petersson]

Excellent notes on armour, penetration and other factors!

Originally posted by T-34\85:

It was apparent that it was better to have five T-34s or Shermans than a single Panther.

... unless you only had crew, fuel and ammo for one of them, as was the case for late war Germany.

I think the problem for Germany wasn't that they had too little capability to produce new AFVs, but to crew and supply them.

Obviously all these new AFV models would have teething problems, that there were little or no time to overcome...

Cheers

Olle

[Sig]

Originally posted by T-34\85:

(snip)

Interesting post. Good to see things put in perspective in the text you quoted.

Sig

[Leeo]

Great post. Thanks!

[engy]

Originally posted by T-34\85:

In some cases this has decisive significance, for example, in the case of the German so-called "spaced" armor. The Germans utilized this armor in some later production Pz-III tanks. A 20 mm sheet of supplemental armor was secured to the standard 50 mm frontal armor, with a small space between the hull and the add-on sheet. When an APHE shell struck this armor, the detonator functioned upon contact with the first sheet of armor, which caused premature detonation of the round. As a result the main armor remained intact. For example, the A-19 122 mm field cannon, and later standard armament for the IS-2 tank and the ISU-122 self-propelled gun, fired only a chambered armor-defeating round. As a result of this, the Pz-III could not be defeated in a frontal shot even by the 122 mm gun, while famous Panther was penetrated straight through even from 1,000 metres.

Common enough to make it into CM2? If so, how is BTS ever going to handle this?

Excellent article, btw. Thanks for posting it for the rest of us to see.

engy

Edited for minor formatting changes.

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"He who makes war without many mistakes has not made war very long."

Napoleon Bonaparte

[This message has been edited by engy (edited 03-02-2001).]

[Jasper]

There a couple of articles comparing tanks on the website listed below - should anyone be interested.

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Check out http://www.geocities.com/funfacts2001/ or

http://hyperion.spaceports.com/~funfacts/ or

http://www.britwar.co.uk/members/FunFacts/ for military documents written during WWII.

[PzKpfw 1]

Originally posted by T-34\85:

It was apparent that it was better to have five T-34s or Shermans than a single Panther.

Maybe in quantity & strategic terms, it was but it certinly wasn't for the crews in the T-34's whom died in the thousands, or in material losses Ie, in 1943 61% of all T-34's built & sent to the front were destroyed in combat, in 1944 52% of all T-34 production was destroyed etc.

Russian reports on crew survivability in 1943 - 1944 showed that only 25 - 33% of the crew survived the tanks destruction. Basicly the T-34 was a death trap for more Soviet personell then any other Soviet AFV used in WW2.

Regards, John Waters

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"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.

[T-34\85]

Unfortunately yes; in the field of being a tanker instead of engaged in pure 'military arithmetic' I'd prefer to be in a Panther too; most of the time.

But; most T-34s were not lost to enemy tanks, they were lost to anti-tank weapons ... anti-tank guns; Schrecks and Fausts etc ... especially in the later stages of the war when the Soviet Union was inexorably advancing ... and many of these

T-34s that had been knocked out were back on the battlefield (with new crew) in no time apparently ... there are stats on the Russian Battlefield page to show the losses of T-34s to various types of weapons ...

[PzKpfw 1]

Originally posted by T-3485:

But; most T-34s were not lost to enemy tanks, they were lost to anti-tank weapons ... anti-tank guns; Schrecks and Fausts etc ... especially in the later stages of the war when the Soviet Union was inexorably advancing ... and many of these

T-34s that had been knocked out were back on the battlefield (with new crew) in no time apparently ... there are stats on the Russian Battlefield page to show the losses of T-34s to various types of weapons ...

That wasn't my point, either the real prevalence of the T-34 Ie, the hordes of T-34's we hear about; did not occur until late 1943 early 1944 after factory switch over programs had finally tooled up & the whole Soviet Tank industry was about 95% committed to T-34 production.

As to how they were lost etc, it still doesnt change the fact on the losses of total production I gave for 1943 - 1944 nor does it change the fact that an T-34 crewman was much more likely to have his tank destroyed then an IS-2 or ISU crew.

The Soviets had different classifications for lost AFV's; yes some were patched up & the blood hosed out (sometimes it was left in) & sent back to the Front, to be KO'd again, etc, but many weren't as they were total write offs, destroyed AFVs are shown in loss columns Ie, the below data is Soviet AFV losses by year starting from June 22 1941 to Sept 3 1945:

1941 - 20,500

1942 - 15,000

1943 - 23,400

1944 - 23,700

1945 - 13,700

From June 22 - Sept 3 1945 the Soviets lost over 96,000 tanks & SU's & suffered over 280,000 tank crewmen & women casualties.

Regards, John Waters

------------------

"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.

[This message has been edited by PzKpfw 1 (edited 03-03-2001).]

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Two somewhat mythological points. #1, Germany definitely suffered from an inability to make enough tanks at the end of the war, and not just to men to crew them. Tank crews can be trained, and the Germans had huge infantry forces in the field until the end, compared to the total personnel of the tank force. The Germans did also suffer from shortages of *fuel* to run tanks, but that factor would have been relieved somewhat by lighter tanks, not heavier ones.

The basic fact remains that Germany could not produce enough tanks. Part of the reason for this was diversion of resources to limited runs of monster vehicles that had little strategic impact. Part of the reason is that Germany did not go to all-out tank production as the top priority in armaments, and coupled with full economic mobilization, until after losing the battle of Stalingrad.

But the more basic reason is even simpler. Germany and the territories it occupied had, between them, about 1/5th of the world's industrial production, and the US, USSR, and UK had the other 4/5ths. (Japan is a blip - less than 1/60th). The three main powers Germany was fighting controlled half the earth's surface directly, essentially all of its seas and trade, most of its wealth, and with it the ability to call upon the services of most of the world's population.

There is nothing even to explain, about why she was outproduced by 4 to 1 by the time the Western Allies were in the fight. The other factors, like vehicle mix and mobilization timing, just made it 5 to 1 instead. Before US and UK production could be brought to bear in full force, the industrial match up with just Russian was more nearly even, and there issues like timing of mobilization of the economy made more of a difference.

Germany was outproduced by 2:1 by Russia alone, in tanks. Earlier mobilization and greater standardization of types might conceivable have reduced that to 3:2 or 5:4 for the middle part of the war, which would certainly have made a difference. But once US and UK tank production was in the field too, there was no way Germany could avoid being swamped, whatever production decisions she made.

The second #2 mythological point, is that the lighter Allied tanks were "death traps", whereas the Germans were all well protected in Panthers etc. In the German fielded armor force for the whole war, only 20% of the heavy AFVs could stop a 75mm short round from the front. I am not counting halftracks and armored cars, though there were as many of those again - just tanks and TDs. In the late war period, from 1943 until the end, this ratio didn't rise above 1/3. Basically, that means a Panther or other heavy vehicle, a Pz IV, and a StuG.

In addition to the fact that the Germans were *not* sitting in vehicles armored against typical Allied tank guns, the losses in the Allied tank forces were not excessive, compared to the losses in other branches. The picture is often presented on this board that all the crews of Shermans could be expected to be killed in a "lit" "zippo" or "ronson". Hardly.

The casualties in a typical western Allied armor battalion over the course of the war generally ran between 1x and 2x TOE, with most of them being wounded. That compares with 3-4 times TOE in a typical infantry battalion. It is in the same range as engineers who did fight as infantry but were often in the rear, while being above the loss rates for rear area artillery units. The reason it was much lower than infantry is that the armor was proof against the number one casualty cause, artillery shrapnel, and because heavy AT guns (tank, TD, SP, or towed) are rarer things than MGs (by a factor of 10 or more).

[Freak]

Jasoncrawley said: In the German fielded armor force for the whole war, only 20% of the heavy AFVs could stop a 75mm short round from the front. I am not counting halftracks and armored cars

Which heavy AFV's are you counting here? If you mean Heavy AFV, certainly you don't mean the Stug. I may be wrong though, I do not "know" as much about this (WWII history) as you but in counting german "heavy" afv's we are talking about Jagdpanzer, JagdPanther, JagdTiger, Tiger, King Tiger, Panther, to name a few. These certainly could hold their own against the short 7.5 cm round. Am I missing something here? I must not be counting the stugs.

I am just trying to figure out the 20% number.

Thanks for your time.

[Steve McClaire]

PzKpfw 1: I'm not sure I understand the point you're making. Are you saying the T-34 was not a 'good' tank because a certain percentage of their total production were destroyed in combat?

I don't have any numbers, so I'm not in a position to make a definitive argument, but it seems likely that most German tanks will look even 'worse' if held up to this critera -- what percentage of total Panther production where destroyed in combat? I would suspect the percentage is quite high, yet many people still consider the Panther a good (or even excellent) tank. This statistical comparison might be especially erroneous in 1945, when I would guess most every Panther that was produced was destroyed in combat.

[rexford]

Spaced armor was not the ultimate answer to the defeat of rounds with HE fillers.

If the burster did not detonate, which happened often, spaced plate is no help.

Spaced plate was very hard armor, and tended to crack after penetration. We looked at many pictures of tanks with missing spaced armor, which suggests good performance is short-lived.

British report on test against spaced armor with 75mm APCBC also notes that 50mm face-hardened plate was able to stop fragments after HE burster detonated. If a 122mm round exploded in close proximity to 50mm face-hardened armor, would the armor be able to stop the high velocity fragments? This is not a simple question.

Germans found that spaced and layered armor tended to shear connections after a few angled hits, and required alot of maintenance to avoid loss of armor.

U.S. 75mm projectiles are slowed down quite a bit going through 20mm at 30 degree impact, and are slow to start with, so plenty of time for HE burster to fully detonate.

122mm APBC would hit spaced armor at higher velocity and would lose less energy, so it may hit 50mm plate and penetrate before burster goes off. Detonation of 122mm burster in small space between spaced and main armor could also blow off or loosen spaced plate.

Spaced armor was not a great success against every type of ammo, but could do very well against 2 pounder and slow 75mm rounds.

There are pictures of 76mm rounds from M10 that went through JagdPanther wheels and penetrated hull side at an angle, so it probably takes a certain thickness to detonate HE filler, and then have it go off before the round reaches armor and defeats it. Panzer skirts didn't automatically set off HE bursters.

[PzKpfw 1]

Originally posted by Steve McClaire:

PzKpfw 1: I'm not sure I understand the point you're making. Are you saying the T-34 was not a 'good' tank because a certain percentage of their total production were destroyed in combat?

No Steve i'm not, i'm pointing out that despite the T-34 being an excelent tank it was also a coffin for more Soviet AFV crew then any other Soviet AFV.

Soviet AFV losses dwarf Allied & German losses Ie, in 1943 The Soviets lost 23,500 tanks & SU's compared to 8,000 German tanks & AG's yet in Dec 1943 the Soviets still had 21,000 operational AFVs vs 2000 German AFVs.

I whole heartedly agree with Jason's points on production. The Soviets produced 24,000 AFVs in 1943 & recieved another 3,300 thru lend lease compared to the Germans total production in 1943 of 10,747 AFVs.

And getting a bit off topic I was trying to point out that in reality fleets of T-34's did not actualy appear until late 1943, early 1944 when full production final geared up & kicked in.

Basaicly i dont support the theory that 5 T-34s were empericly better then 1 Panther or even a PzKpfw IV etc, as it ignores the the larger issues of actual effectivness & material & manpower losses, their is a line between winning and the cost of winning IMHO something the Russians learned first hand as their irreversible loss tables show asa well as the loss ratios Ie, the Germans were still inflicting an IIRC 4.5 to 1 loss ratio in March 1945 on the Russians.

Regards, John Waters

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"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.

[T-34\85]

Cool clarification on the spaced armor issue rexford, thanx a bunch

Pzkpfw 1; I'd definitely have to say that five T-34s is better than 1 Panther and definitely better than 1 PzIV ... with the Panther at least you have a measure of superiority ... the Soviet Union could sustain the horrendous losses it took ... if they could've reduced their losses (Stalin early war stuff ups aside) I'm sure the Red Army would've ... but this was a fight for national survival and they through everything in ... yes the average crewman was worse than his German counterpart and they paid the price in horrendous casualties but their simply wasn't the time to have a better standard of training and/or Panther equivalent (T-44 was the successor of the T-34\85 I believe ... not produced in large numbers; superseded by the T-54 ... beaut tank for the 50's)

I certainly wouldn't have spent the time and resources on improving the army training and resources and draining all-important production levels (as switchovers to new equipment produce) to achieve an increased measure of superiority ... and whats more give the Third Reich more time to establish a defense against your counter offensives and bring up more and more material to the front ... 'undestroyed' I think is the term.

Not to mention letting the dirty filthy capitalist glory grabbing pig scum getting to Berlin first when they did jack crap compared to the USSR in fighting Nazi Germany.

[PzKpfw 1]

Originally posted by T-34\85:

Pzkpfw 1; I'd definitely have to say that five T-34s is better than 1 Panther and definitely better than 1 PzIV ... with the Panther at least you have a measure of superiority ...

And here is where we will disagree, & especialy, again if we go down to the to the tactical level . Because the PzKpfw IV also had advantages over the T-34 Ie, crew stationing, optics, gun etc. I also don't except the party line concerninglosses of manpower etc. & the Soviets did invest in better training, do a search for some of my old posts on Sov Rifle Plts etc, in their you will find some details on the lenght of training schools etc.

Regards, John Waters

------------------

"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

To Freak -

Sorry I wasn't clearer. I am including StuG and the like in "heavy" AFV; in doing so I am distinguishing the "tank-like" AFV with a serious AT gun, from halftracks and armored cars. Heavy is indeed used in a different sense to refer to heavy tanks vs. medium tanks, so I probably should have picked some other term.

About a third of the armored do-hickies the Germans built in WW II were just halftracks (22,000 of those alone), or armored cars with MG to 20mm armament, or thin-skinned self-propelled artillery not meant for tank dueling at all (Wespes, SiGs, etc). I call those "light armor". The rest are the "true AFVs", if you like - from Panzer IIs to King Tigers and from short 75mm StuG to Jadgtigers.

There were around 45,000 of the true AFVs built. ~10,000 of these were early war creatures, basically the generation with only short 75mm for HE in Pz IVs, and topping out at long 50mm in the Pz IIIJ and similar types. None of these early war true AFVs could stop a 75mm round. (In the early war, there were severak thousand armored cars too, but only a few thousand halftracks. The halftrack "explosion" to 5 digits occurred in the late war).

The later war fleet is around 40,000 true AFVs. And ~2/3rds of these couldn't stop a 75mm round - they were Marders (almost 3000), StuGs (11,000), and Pz IVs with long 75mm (8500). Practically all of these "vanilla" types mounted capable 75/L48 guns. They had Pz II through Pz IV chassis, but were not heavily armored by late war standards.

They were "eggshells with hammers", as the saying goes. A few StuG 105mm are included (1500), some of the Marders used captured Russian guns of similar ability (76.2mm). There were ~500 Nashorns w/ 88mm, thin armor. 23,000 AFVs are in this category, all late-war, not counting any armored cars or non-AT SPA or halftracks.

It is debatable whether Hetzers belong in this category or the next. In the right deployment and range, their front armor was strong, but the sides are paper. They are another ~4000.

The next category is Panthers and Jadgpanzers, with thick front armor but penetrable sides. The Panthers are numerous (7400), the Jadgpanzers are not (~2000). Incidentally, some of the last model Jagdpanzer were front-penetrable, because of economies in construction (a new superstructure, boxier).

All the heavier types combined, what I call the super-heavies and are often called the heavies, amount to only ~2000-2500 AFVs. Half of these are Tiger Is, and less than 1k are split between Tiger II and Jadgpanther, a few hundred of each. The rest combined don't amount to either of those types in numbers; each type has production runs with 2 digits.

So only about 12k of the later war true AFVs have serious front armor, most of them Panthers, only 1/5 to 1/6 of *those* what you call the heavies. That is ~30% of the late war AFVs; the "heavies" are ~5%.

The point is that the German armor fleet was not dominated, numerically, by uparmored AFVs, even in the late war. The typical late war German AFV could not stop a 75mm short round. Those that could do so, almost all of them, could only do some from the front.

For comparison with these figures, 40% of all U.S. built tanks and TDs were mounted with 76mm - ~1/4 of the Shermans, plus the same again in TDs. Sherman 76mm were as numerous as StuGs. U.S. 90mm were as common as all German "heavies" (in your sense)combined, and British 17-lbers were more common than that (on Fireflies and Achilles TDs).

And most of the heavy and up-armored German medium tank types, were fighting the Russians anyway. The German late war AFV fleet represents the force that fought in Russia for 18 months, and then on both fronts for 11 more. (1943 on). Probably only about 1/4 of that fleet, was ever available in the west to face the U.S. and British fleets. That means no more than 3000 AFVs that could stop a short 75mm, spread over 11 months, faced a cumulative total of at least 21000 up-gunned Shermans and TDs, U.S. or U.K.

U.S. tankers justifiably complained that they went into Normandy with tanks that could not penetrate Panthers or Tigers or Jadgpanzers from the front. In Normandy, 1/4 of the British Shermans were upgunned, and about 1/5 of the U.S. AFVs were upgunned TDs. There were almost 900 of those German beasties in Normandy, out of 2500 total AFVs sent - 125 Tiger I, 125 Jadgpanzer, 650 Panther.

This was not fun, and numerous Shermans were knocked out and crews wounded or killed. It certainly justified both the complaints of the crews and the upgunning program. But 2 months later, the total of running German AFVs in Normandy was 300, with most of them Pz. IVs and StuGs. The Germans could not replace such losses of the better tanks, and present the same difficulty to the Allies continually. The Allies did not face serious problems from better German armor again, until the Bulge and Alsace counterattacks Dec.44-Jan.45, and by then around 40% of the Allied fleet was upgunned.

I hope this explains what I was talking about, and sorry for the confusing use of "heavy" in different contexts. I simply meant "true AFV", tanks and TDs, not halftracks or armored cars etc. 20-30 tons and up, not 1/2 that or less.

[Skipper]

+++

. I also don't except the party line concerninglosses of manpower etc. & the Soviets did invest in better training

+++

That's when they had an opportunity for that - ie, in 1943. Before that time, they had to cope with the fact that the regular army was all but annihilated.

5 T-34s are ways and ways better than 1 Pz-V, because between them they can fire 5 times more HE shells in the same timeframe, and were also a bit more mobile. For a medium tank this is all that really counts.

Both sides were basically quickly loosing aa many tanks as they could make - on operational level full strength tank units are expendables - you trade in as many as you have, and hope to get as much as possible in exchange.

By the way, 1941 RKKA was exceptionally well trained for a peace-time army, freshly mobilised to full stength. It is another story that it did not prove enough to stop the enemy at the border. But hey, did french or anyone else do better than that?

[Skipper]

Oh, yes, forgot to mention - that would be 5 times more 85 mm shells, as opposed to 75mm shells. So, make it 8 (?) times more HE.

[rexford]

One Panther is worth 5 T34 if the T34 are advancing across a 2000m open steppes and the Panther is in a nice defensive position. This would also go for T34/85.

One Panther might also be able to put out five times the number of rounds that one IS-2m can in a minute, and Panther is probably more accurate.

Panther designed to knock off T34 and Sherman at long range, ranges where enemy can't penetrate, or maybe even hit, Panther. Panther gun has smallest shot scatter of any German gun, better than Tiger "88".

We have seen Panthers in our wargames decimate attacking hordes without losing too many tanks. It all depends upon the situation.

In face-to-face combat where flanking is hard to do, Panther frontal armor will frustrate hits by T34, T34/85, Sherman 75 and 76, M10 76.

T34 crews sometimes have a few hours training, and their HE fire would probably be less effective than one good Panther crew. Book written by GrossDeutschland vet indicated Soviets sent unarmed Asian soldiers against tough German lines, so it is conceivable that T34 with untrained crews might show up alot. Desperate times bring on desperate measures.

And if things look bad after shooting up most of the enemy, Panthers can beat it out of the area faster than a Tiger (if it doesn't break down when it shifts into high gear!).

[Skipper]

Seems that the point is lost on you - tanks don't fight tanks.

Both Pz-V and T-34 could shrug off a 57mm AT round from the frontal, but would not like it in the side.

Quality of crews is not an issue in discussion, although it was obviously not as poor as you seem to think. Germans trained their tank crews longer, though.

I bet your Grossdeutcheland veteran has heard that fairy-tale from a buddy who has heard it from a buddy. In reality, it was just like described, only not an assault, but a hasty counterattack; not asians, but georgians; not "unarmed", but "not supported by heavy weapons" etc.

[PzKpfw 1]

Originally posted by Skipper:

Seems that the point is lost on you - tanks don't fight tanks.

No i think the point is actualy being muddled as yes tanks do fight tanks, why do you supose the Panther & Tiger were developed?, why was were such strict anti armor demands on performance for the KwK.43.

The Panther & Tiger E, Tiger B etc were nothing more then heavily armored AT gun platforms, while the PzKpfw IV lang & Stug's became AT platforms as well. The US & Soviet's both had an tanks don't fight tanks doctrine, neither of which held up in the long run Ie, the failed TD program, the 76mm Shermans, 85mm T-34's etc, all stemmed from the need to be able to defeat enemy armor, something they never were originaly intended to do doctrinly & all these guns suffered lower HE performance for better AT performance as well.

Regards, John Waters

------------------

"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.

[Skipper]

They do, when they have to. But their main prey is not tanks, and their main threat is not tanks, either.

[Skipper]

err. it's "was" and "did". Since then things changed somewhat.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Why do I feel like I am talking to the crickets outside, while the Baptists and the Episcopelians shout it out inside?

The Panther was a better tank. The problem is, the German army did not consist of Panther tanks. It consists of StuG IIIs and Pz. IVs, with an occasional stiffening by Panthers.

The number of times the superiority of the German tanks made an operational difference in WW II can be counted on one hand. Every one of them was a defensive success, useful but indecisive.

Two of them in the west. In Normandy, the difference was the front held for a month and a half before collapsing under the weight of attrition, instead of being blasted off the map in two weeks, as it probably would have been without ~900 superior AFVs. In the the Bulge, the difference was that the U.S. January counterattacks faced bloody slogging matches, and much of the German army therefore made it back out of the salient, after losing several of the forward divisions anyway. That was a success compared to the whole force being chopped to pieces faster than the Germans could retreat, which probably would have been the result without the advantage.

In the east, the three times they mattered were stabilizing the south front after the Kursk breakthroughs (they were not remotely capable of making Kursk work, nor of stopping those breakthroughs), after enourmous loss and with the Russians at the limit of their logistical reach. E.g. around Zhitomar or however the battle is generally known. The edge allowed a relatively small reserve force to finally halt the Russian forward momentum.

Both of the other eastern occasions were similar. Patching together some kind of line in Poland after Bagration - better ranged firing helped there. And the final front holding near the German border, which similarly relied on superior AT ability at range to attrite and eventually halt the Russian spearheads.

That is quite completely all. Why was it not a more important edge? Because there weren't nearly enough of the things, from Panther upward. Two years on the eastern front and one on the western, 7400 Panthers built all told, equals only 200 per month can be afforded on either front. The loss rate in Normandy was twice that, on a front of only 150 kilometers.

Even with ordinary running, you will have 1/4-1/3 of them in the shop after a month in service or less. If you loss rate exceeds that sustainable level, then after a short period you don't have *any*. It is not a question of having 1 for every 3 or 5 attackers, but of having none left to speak of for months on a front of 100 miles.

The German late war armor fleet did not consist of Panthers. I do not know why this is so hard for people to assimilate. Everyone reflexively nods, and then carries on the discussion as though the brute fact were irrelevant.

The late war German armor force was mostly "egg shells with hammers". The guns were good. The armor was not, not better than the western Allies and not equal, on average, to the Russians. T-34/85s did not face fleets of Panthers, they faced fleets of StuGs and Pz IVs, and layers of PAK 40s and 88 FLAK, and they blew them off the map, too. They lost heavily to these perfectly effective "hammers". But the eggshells were quite thoroughly smashed in return.