Tank vs. Tank PROGRAM?

[CombinedArms]

Two recent Sherman threads have produced some exceptionally good discussions of tanks, logistics, tank development time, armor, gun power. We might roll these factors together into a single term, what we might call a tank program, the programatic way in which specific models of tanks were designed, produced and adapted for the changing battlefield.

Some of the confusion of discussing tanks like the Sherman and the Tiger I or II arises from an ambiguity about whether we're talking about the fighting ability of an individual tank once it has arrived at the battlefield (in which case, the King Tiger rules!) or about an overall tank program, including total fighting power delivered to the battlefield (in which case the Sherman wins easily over the Tiger or KT, IMHO).

The BEST TANK of WWII has been much discussed in this forum. I'd like to raise the question of: which was the Best TANK PROGRAM--i.e. which overall tank program had the most positive impact for it's side on the war. We might also consider, though I'll leave this to others, which was the WORST tank program in the war, the one that had the most harmful impact on its side in the war, through wasted resources, etc.

Anyway, my candidates for best tank programs, in order of excellence:

1. T-34 (in all its variants): excellent tank in great numbers

2. M4 Sherman (in all its variants): pretty good tank in great numbers

3. PzIV (counting it's impact from 1940): excellent tank for its time, early in the war, still adequate, with upgunning, late in the war. Not enough of them late in the war to stem the Allied tide.

4. Panther; excellent tank in significantly greater numbers than the Tiger I or II, but never enough of them to beat the T-34 or M4

Is this a useful distinction? And what are your thoughts on best tank program?

Does CM model the best tank programs sufficiently: e.g. should Shermans and PzIVs, for instance, actually be much cheaper than they are, relative to Tigers, Panthers or Pershings? In CM2, should T-34/85s be much cheaper than Panthers, JS2s etc?

[Maastrictian]

This is a very interesting question that I'm not really qualified to answer. But I will note that CM's points system modles the relitive value of tanks, not tank programs.

--Chris

[Jeff Duquette]

Great Idea for a thread CombinedArms. My off the cuff vote for the most influential tank program of the war would have to be the T34/76.

[PlankWithANailIn]

Bottom of the list should be any model of Italian/Jap tank.

Plank

[Guy w/gun]

I do not feel that CM does an adequate job of modeling tank programs. Why? Because currently, CM models point value based on over-all effectiveness of the AFV. That's why a Sherman M4A3 cost so much in comparison to a Tiger, 122-180 to 177 respectively.

What does this have to do with inadequate modeling of tank programs? Well, Shermans were great when it came to cross country. Tigers on the other hand, weren't. As I understand, the current point values reflect this. This is bad because cross country isn't even modeled in CM! In other words, who cares if 5 out of my 8 Tigers would have broken down in real life? All 8 of them will be in working order on the CM battlefield, so it doesn't matter.

I have heard that BTS is making an option for CM2 that will allow for point values to be based on historical rarity. I think this will enchorage players to use more Pz IIs and IIIs over Tigers and the like.

[Michael Dorosh]

I liked the way that ASL handled DYO purchases of tanks - you would roll for a historical factor during the purchase and could only buy tanks of the rarity factor you rolled (or those more common). It was a way of having their purchase points based on relative merits, while also handicapping by rarity.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

A fine question.

I think the palm for best program has to go to the T-34. My reasons -

50,000 of them produced, the most of any tank type of the war. For several years, superior to what they faced, and serviceable against the average tank down to the end of the war. Only one major upgrade (though also one minor one set of changes early on), produced in massive quantity, which corrected the perfectly real weaknesses of the original model (2 man turret especially). The guys that had 'em, won. Hampered at first by poor doctrine, but very effective once the Russians learned a thing or two about armor tactics, operations, and organizations. Cheap enough to make tons, simply enough to come from an existing pre-war model. Mobile, though a bear to drive - they certainly proved in practice capable of long range penetration and exploitation work,on several occasions, all of them of extreme operational importance. They also proved capable enough in tank battle work, at Kursk e.g.

One fellow mentioned minor powers, and certainly Japan had no servicable tank in the whole war. The French and Italians are easy targets. And one can point out small vehicle types that were failures, but without huge investments put into them.

But sticking to the major land combatants, and major tank programs, I give the raspberry to the Crusader. I will explain why.

It was not a bad tank, by specs or in principle. It 1940 it would have been a fine tank. But it was a large investment, and there were high hopes pinned on it. In practice, the armament had not improved enough for the time of the war, still the 2 lber, without HE capability. It was supposed to be built for speed but only made 15 mph cross country. The armor was not good enough to stop the mid-war AP rounds it faced - thin sides, very boxy, with near verticle plates defeating what benefits there might have been in the reasonably thick front armor (for its day).

Big fleets of them were tried in North Africa, and largely were destroyed by considerably smaller bodies of German tanks, with quite low losses. Some of this was doctrine, some combined arms, some particular SNAFUs.

Last model (Mk III) have a better 6 lber gun, but the upgrades always seemed to be behind the curve. It was used at the main tank type from the summer of 1941 until being taken out of service completely in 1943. After that, it was used only for training purposes. More than 5000 of them were built, a high total for a early to mid-war tank, and a significant part of total British AFV production.

For the amount of effort invested in them, the tribulations of those that fought in them, any follow-on uses of the same ideas or production lines, I think the return was quite meager. I mean, marginal lines like the Pz II went on to field marders and wespes, and many other types found some useful role for the vehicle program, even if a given model became obsolete. These lost battles to DAK on their own, played second fiddle to Shermans and Valentines in the desert wins, and were then reduced to training vehicles. Not a lot of bang for several years work and >5000 made.

[lcm1947]

Not a tank expect by any means and I normally don't even take part in a discussion of this type, letting those who know a ton more then myself have their say, but I do want to point one thing out. If the T-34 was the best program of the war as you referred to it then why did they use our Sherman's? I would think that alone tells which the best tank program use. So, there I jumbed in and spoke my piece. I might be wrong but seems like a good point.

[Michael Dorosh]

Given the type of warfare predominant in the Pacific, can we not excuse the Japanese for concentrating their efforts on aircraft and shipbuilding?

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by PlankWithANailIn:

Bottom of the list should be any model of Italian/Jap tank.

On the whole I would have to agree with you, but with a couple caveats. The tanks the Japanese brought with them to Malaya seem to have definitely given them an extra edge in their offensive against the Commonwealth forces they opposed. But then, that was because those forces lacked credible AT capability. Otherwise, the Jap tanks were crummy and never got much better, relative to the rest of the tank building world.

I don't know if you regard the Italian Semovente as a tank (it was actually an assault gun), but it wasn't too bad an AFV. The riveted armor was rather regretable, but for the rest, it was not worse than the opposition it faced.

Michael

[BloodyBucket]

Great thread.

My vote also goes to the T-34. The Panzer III gets early war honorable mention. Raspberry to any of the resource consuming German ubertanks.

Who had the best anti-tank program? My vote goes to the US with the P-47. Honorable mention to the German panzerfaust, and raspberry to the Japanese human bomb.

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"Roll on"

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by lcm1947:

Not a tank expect by any means and I normally don't even take part in a discussion of this type, letting those who know a ton more then myself have their say, but I do want to point one thing out. If the T-34 was the best program of the war as you referred to it then why did they use our Sherman's? I would think that alone tells which the best tank program use. So, there I jumbed in and spoke my piece. I might be wrong but seems like a good point.

Er, not meaning to jump on you, but the logic of your argument eludes me. If the Soviets needed more tanks than they could produce, why wouldn't they incorporate foreign-built tanks into their army? They also used British built Matildas and (I think) Valentines. Surely you aren't going to try to maintain that those were superior to the T-34s?

Michael

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Er, not meaning to jump on you, but the logic of your argument eludes me. If the Soviets needed more tanks than they could produce, why wouldn't they incorporate foreign-built tanks into their army? They also used British built Matildas and (I think) Valentines. Surely you aren't going to try to maintain that those were superior to the T-34s?

Michael

Grants also. I've seen some nice pictures of shot up/knocked out Grants on the Russian front. They also used Stuarts, GMC trucks, P-39 Airacobras...pretty long list of stuff, really.

Beggars can't be choosers?

[Michael Dorosh]

I think one needs to divide the tank programs of the different nations into two categories - prewar, and then look at how they adapted during the war, where the most impetus for change was present.

The British Army was very much a junior service between the wars; if you look at the flirtations that the British had with alliances between themselves and Japan, Italy, France, Russia, etc. you get a sense of how complicated their foreign policy was, and, consequently, how they spent their defence dollars. The Royal Navy received the largest budget of the three services. The British Army was not expected to fight a major war in Europe, but rather to police the Empire. In 1940, they were still expecting trench warfare to prevail. The tank program was very much hindered by such factors as this. Luckily they were able to ally themselves with the United States, and to produce the finest artillery system in the world.

The German tank program may have been very adaptable, but the refusal to mobilize for a war economy until well into 1943 handicapped them greatly; their cottage industries and lack of uniformity also hurt them (Ford and Willy's parts for Jeeps were interchangeable; Porsche and Henschel built very different parts for their Tiger tanks).

American tanks were built in large numbers, were mechanically reliable, and Chrysler-built parts could actually fit into a Ford Sherman. The Germans were dumbstruck by that; it was completely alien to their concepts. So no matter what they tried to do, the Germans were hamstrung by lack of standartization. The Combined Bomber Offensive didn't help either (how much it hurt is open to question).

The Russian T-34 was indeed revolutionary and scared the hell out of the Germans. Given that the Russians did not feel the need to maintain a large navy between the wars, I wonder if we can attribute their supposedly forward-thinking tank program more to luck (in that the combat their army saw in the Second World War happened to fit the equipment they were designing and implementing).

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

On the Japanese supposedly not needing tanks - they fought a land war in China for nearly 10 years, against numerically superior forces, and were still trying to launch offensives there as late as 1944 (to shorten lines, free up troops, etc). Of course tanks would have helped them there, potentially freeing units. They also fought the Russians in Manchuria and saw in the process what tanks could do. They also sent inspectors to Germany to report on tank warfare developments. They had plenty of reason to need decent tanks, knew it, and they made several types. They just never made one that was worth a damn.

On the Russians using lend lease, they were free. No further reason required.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

On the Japanese supposedly not needing tanks - they fought a land war in China for nearly 10 years, against numerically superior forces, and were still trying to launch offensives there as late as 1944 (to shorten lines, free up troops, etc). Of course tanks would have helped them there, potentially freeing units.

I'm not familiar with the terrain in China, but if it is anything like Korea, would tanks really have been of any benefit? I don't know, which is why I ask. I do know that the UN tank units in Korea from 1950-53 usually acted as mobile pillboxes and fired indirectly as artillery, and were not of much use in the limited offensive actions the UN troops took after 1951. Would the Japanese really have been able to employ armour to advantage in China?

EDIT - I should have said 1951-53; the Communists did use limited amounts of armour as more than just pillboxes and artillery early in the war.

[This message has been edited by Michael Dorosh (edited 04-04-2001).]

[GriffinCheng+]

Let me add some:

In early years of Japanese invasion (1931-1941), most of the battlefields were located in plains, where tanks were very effective -- even Chinese armies equipped with German 37mm PaK. But their lines were already extended too long : almost, if not longer, the size of the Eastern Front from north to south.

But after the Chinese armies retreated into rugged, mountainous area, the Japanese began to suffer much tougher battles. Moreover, they began the invasons into Indo-China and Pacific.

Hope it helps.

Griffin.

------------------

"When you find your PBEM opportents too hard to beat, there is always the AI."

"Can't get enough Tank?"

Get the CMSOD at Combat Missing Command Post (CMCP) at http://www.angelfire.com/games3/CMCP/

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

The main limit on using them wasn't terrain per se, it was infrastructure. Beyond the cities of the coast, and a short way up the main river valleys, there were almost no roads. And Japan had only a limited ability to supply forces there. The Japanese limited themselves to the coastal areas, and the more developed northeast 1/3rd of the country, because of this. In fact, they didn't possess a land line to Indochina until 1944. Plenty of the land they didn't control was flat, or modest hills.

The Chinese forces were internally divided, not only communist vs. nationalist, but by factions within the, especially the latter. The nationalist forces had been formed, before the Japanese invasion, essentially out of a sort of snowballing of local warlords, many of whom remained as officers, with their men loyal to them. The Japanese also patronized various local puppet forces to rival these. And everybody fought everybody else, but with much of it internal security level, guerilla, or political, rather than military fighting.

The Japanese still had nearly a million men there, over 50 divisions - some of them garrisoning Manchuria and keeping an eye on the Russians, more than half of them to deal with the Chinese.

The Chinese army was huge on paper, smaller but still large in manpower terms. Their problems were political division (already mentioned), and military supplies. There was no industry in country at all - well, tiny amounts in Japanese held areas, that was it. They got some stuff from the U.S. and U.K. (less) through India, and the Russians had sent some stuff back when the war began (and was mostly lost, from the Chinese point of view and in conventional military terms). More came through when the Burma land route was finally reopened, but the war ended not long after that. For most of the period, Chinese military supplies had to come in by U.S. transport planes, while for the Japanese it was shipping.

The Japanese never really made the logistic commitment necessary to take control of the whole country. They may not have been able to had they wanted to - Japan had only about 3% of world steel production in 1941, on the same scale as Italy. But even Italy had better tanks, which is saying something - LOL.

[Skipper]

The most successful tank program was T-34 hands down. I dont even see a subject for discussion here

On lend-lease: supplies of US and British tanks were, of course, helpful, and since they were available, they were taken with gratitude and used. However, they were a fraction of soviet own tank production. If you want to know whch part fo lend-lease was critically important, here you are: trucks, jeeps and food. In 1942 american canned meat was already known as "The Second Front" - which was the russian name for Western Front.

On the soviet navy during the war. It is an interesting topic. Objectively, there were not many things a navy could do for USSR in a large war. Supposedly, there were no crucial blue water communications to defend. Who could predict that the nest of communist revolution would receive heaps of stuff from the proverbial imperialists, ie US and UK? So, navy's strategic role was disruption of enemy sea traffic, and defence of coastal areas. Soviet naval doctrine reflected that by building a large fleet of submarines (over 200 in 1939, as opposed to some 60-90 for Germany, USA, UK and Japan each) and not building a blue-water navy (there were only a handful of capital ships and no air carriers at all). Ie, large resources were spent on building up the navy, although it was spent on subs, rather than big ships.

[GriffinCheng+]

Jason, that why I open up a section on your posts. Good one.

Another off-topic post:

To add a few, many "armies" in KMT Army during that time were embraced warlords who co-operate with KMT (or Nationalist Party) during the Re-unification Campaign. Rivialry among the sections were pretty strong, even during the Civil War later.

But the Japanese did not limit themselves to costal area. They had extended to mid-Zheung Jiang area in 1941 but was stopped, and this is not short way in a "river valley".

And the troops garrisoned in Manchuria or Noth-Eastern provinences saw very little combat until the end of WW2 when the Soviets declared war on Japan, freeing up from fighting the Nazi Germans.

I would point out that the Chinese was able to pull some local counter-offensive in 1941 with some success. However, the Japnaese took back the area later.

Also, the prolong war started in 1931 drew too much resources from Japanese and also due to US sansaction, especially petrol, so the Japanese had to start war in Indochina to gain access to oil and gas to keep their war going.

Griffin.

------------------

"When you find your PBEM opportents too hard to beat, there is always the AI."

"Can't get enough Tank?"

Get the CMSOD at Combat Missing Command Post (CMCP) at http://www.angelfire.com/games3/CMCP/

[This message has been edited by GriffinCheng+ (edited 04-04-2001).]

[Spear]

Great thread. Re: lend lease tanks, it is my understanding that the Soviets were very pleased with the Sherman tanks that they received, largely due to their mechanical reliability. I think that speaks well of the Sherman, given the success of the Soviet tank designs. Didn't the Soviets equip some of their Guard units with Shermans?

[PlankWithANailIn]

I was of the understanding that the T34 was built on top of an American designed chassis that was turned down by the American army due to it have complicated suspension or something.....Other Russian tanks designs were copied from the tanks of other nations, so perhaps what were looking at here is that the Russians knew a good tank when they saw one but didn't have the engineering ability at the beginning of the war to design their own tanks from scratch.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by PlankWithANailIn:

I was of the understanding that the T34 was built on top of an American designed chassis that was turned down by the American army due to it have complicated suspension or something......

Christie.

[Guest machineman]

See the family resemblance?

Christie M1931, produced in 1931 chassis sold to the Soviet Union (and to Britain, BTW)

1942 model T34/76

If the christie tank isn't showing go to:

http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Lakes/6702/

[This message has been edited by machineman (edited 04-04-2001).]

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I think one needs to divide the tank programs of the different nations into two categories - prewar, and then look at how they adapted during the war, where the most impetus for change was present.

The British Army was very much a junior service between the wars; if you look at the flirtations that the British had with alliances between themselves and Japan, Italy, France, Russia, etc. you get a sense of how complicated their foreign policy was, and, consequently, how they spent their defence dollars. The Royal Navy received the largest budget of the three services. The British Army was not expected to fight a major war in Europe, but rather to police the Empire. In 1940, they were still expecting trench warfare to prevail. The tank program was very much hindered by such factors as this.

The funny thing is that between the wars the tanks the British built were possibly the best in the world. They made excellent tanks after the war as well. It's just that for some reason, during the war they always seemed to be a couple or three years behind the curve. Tough on them.

Michael