Use of CAS is gamey recon ? (Well, kinda sort of :-)

[Jeff Heidman]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

Originally posted by wwb_99:

>Reportedly, the 8 .50s on a P-47 were capable of flipping a mark IV on its back when fired next to it. That is a lotta high velocity steel jacketed rounds hitting in one place at one time.

"Heavy ordnance" is counted from the caliber, not the weight of the fire. I think <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I've heard that quote before, and frankly I seriously doubt it. It would be easy enough to do the physics given the data, but I would be rather dubious without proof of the claim that 8 .50cal machine guns could provide enough energy to flip a 38 ton tank over.

I bet this came from some scared ****less MkIV driver driving into a ditch and rolling when a P-47 strafed him, and the P-47 pilot going back and talking about his machine guns flipped a Panzer over.

Jeff Heidman

[Sirocco]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software:

If I am not mistaken the USAAF provided most of the CAS missions in the war, especially in Normandy.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I have the impression, from several books I've read on Normandy, that the opposite was true, but I might be wrong. I can certainly remember a friendly-fire incident the US 29th Inf Div suffered, I think, on the 7th or 8th of June as it advanced towards Isigny by RAF Typhoons, and if the USAAF had been the dominant partner I would have assumed they would have been over the US front line.

Would someone like to clarify this point..?

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[This message has been edited by Sirocco (edited 01-11-2001).]

[Jeff Heidman]

The semi-famous quote from teh Iraui Armored Battalion commander during Desert Storm (paraphrasing):

"At the beginning of the campaign my battalion had 30 tanks. After 20 days of air bombardment, I had 27. After 20 minutes of combat with M1s, I had none."

The ability of CAS during WW2 to directly take out armor was not decisive. Its ability to keep that armor from showing up, and severly restricting its operational utility within the theater, cannot be overstated.

Jeff Heidman

[Banshee]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

It is not 100% accurate, yes. But when it decides to attack it picks a valid target 100% of the time.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Ok if your definition of "Valid" is "The pilot is aiming at something (vehicle, gun, or person) and not randomly dropping it's ordinace" then you have a minor point. Except the valid targets can also be knocked out vehicles, tanks, or guns, OR friendly vehicles, tanks, or guns.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

But NEVER picking a bogus target just is not historically accurate.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Err define bogus? Do you think the pilots in CAS missions didnt attempt to ID their targets before attacking? You think they dropped their limited ordinace on "suspected" positions when in a direct fire support (not interdiction) role? Where do you get this idea from (i.e. supporting evidence)? Maybe by showing this we can dispell any misconceptions we both have.

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Veni, vidi, panzerschrecki

[Banshee]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Heidman:

The ability of CAS during WW2 to directly take out armor was not decisive. Its ability to keep that armor from showing up, and severly restricting its operational utility within the theater, cannot be overstated.

Jeff Heidman<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Amen.

CAS was a huge factor in isolating battlefields, limiting resupply and reinforcement. I think if someone did a study on the number of soft vehicles (HT's, trucks, etc) that were destroyed by CAS you would see a huge swing towards the effectiveness of CAS. Only looking at armor data limits their utility.

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Veni, vidi, panzerschrecki

[Polar]

You aren't making a valid point Bastables... the article that was posted was meant to illustrate your contention that air power was ineffective. From that article I draw the conclusion, from the same data the wroter used, that it indeed WAS effective.

You can name anecdotes all you want about in confrontation A, RAF Group B didn't take out any tanks. But to take that and say that CAS was not effective throughoiut the war is spurious.

Let me run through it one more time for you...

When this article was first posted here, there was a remark concerning the 9 CAS kills listed in that table. The writer uses it as an example of German hyperbole when writing about casualties... actually, Almost 50% of all casualties listed in that table that are attributable to allied efforts are CAS (33 CAS to 38 Ground weapons). Again, maybe it was the reltive number of CAS that contributed this 50% that threw off the German high command.

Again, with the sheer number of ground forces, it is impressive that CAS contributed what it did, given their limited action due to weather, and comparatively fewer numbers involved in actual attacks on tanks.

Again, there is a real problem with running straight from numbers to make claims of ineffectiveness of any given platform. Yes, I have used numbers in my arguments, but I use numbers to illustrate that there is no hard and fast evaluation that can be made from these numbers.

Again, the numbers you use and the writer uses can NOT be used to come to any conclusions concerning the effectiveness of CAS. It is impossible to come to your, or the writers conclusions using these numbers.

And, the real point here is, you can NOT take numbers from one instance, and inflate it tpo the general... and it is a DEFINITE no-no to take a general number and use it to argue the particular. Which is essentially what you are doing if you try to take your numbers and translate them into what you think should happen in Combat Mission.

Example: Much of the reason that CAS numbers are "low", disregarding for a moment the fact that there were fewer CAS planes shooting at tanks then there were "ground weapons" shooting at tanks, is the fact that (as stated several times) armor moved at night, and in rain, any time that they were asured the lack of CAS harassment. SO how could these numbers POSSIBLY be used to illutrate how effective CAS was when it WAS daylight, ther WAS NO fog, and it WASN'T raining??? You can't! So, how can you use these numbers to evaluate the modeling of CAS in Combat Mission when you ONLY see CAS when it is a clear sunny day? You CAN'T.

You seem incapable of this realization... so maybe this discussion should stop here.

If you have any more anecdotes lined up to show a time that some RAF pilot missed a Tiger with a rocket salvo, or Armored division X racked up more kills than the five thunderbolts that were supporting them, spare me. They are pointless, and they can't be used (logically) to illutrate the point you are trying to make.

Joe

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"I had no shoes and I cried, then I met a man who had no socks." - Fred Mertz

[Bastables]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Polar:

You aren't making a valid point Bastables... the article that was posted was meant to illustrate your contention that air power was ineffective. From that article I draw the conclusion, from the same data the wroter used, that it indeed WAS effective.

You can name anecdotes all you want about in confrontation A, RAF Group B didn't take out any tanks. But to take that and say that CAS was not effective throughoiut the war is spurious.

Let me run through it one more time for you...

When this article was first posted here, there was a remark concerning the 9 CAS kills listed in that table. The writer uses it as an example of German hyperbole when writing about casualties... actually, Almost 50% of all casualties listed in that table that are attributable to allied efforts are CAS (33 CAS to 38 Ground weapons). Again, maybe it was the reltive number of CAS that contributed this 50% that threw off the German high command.

Again, with the sheer number of ground forces, it is impressive that CAS contributed what it did, given their limited action due to weather, and comparatively fewer numbers involved in actual attacks on tanks.

Again, there is a real problem with running straight from numbers to make claims of ineffectiveness of any given platform. Yes, I have used numbers in my arguments, but I use numbers to illustrate that there is no hard and fast evaluation that can be made from these numbers.

Again, the numbers you use and the writer uses can NOT be used to come to any conclusions concerning the effectiveness of CAS. It is impossible to come to your, or the writers conclusions using these numbers.

And, the real point here is, you can NOT take numbers from one instance, and inflate it tpo the general... and it is a DEFINITE no-no to take a general number and use it to argue the particular. Which is essentially what you are doing if you try to take your numbers and translate them into what you think should happen in Combat Mission.

Example: Much of the reason that CAS numbers are "low", disregarding for a moment the fact that there were fewer CAS planes shooting at tanks then there were "ground weapons" shooting at tanks, is the fact that (as stated several times) armor moved at night, and in rain, any time that they were asured the lack of CAS harassment. SO how could these numbers POSSIBLY be used to illutrate how effective CAS was when it WAS daylight, ther WAS NO fog, and it WASN'T raining??? You can't! So, how can you use these numbers to evaluate the modeling of CAS in Combat Mission when you ONLY see CAS when it is a clear sunny day? You CAN'T.

You seem incapable of this realization... so maybe this discussion should stop here.

If you have any more anecdotes lined up to show a time that some RAF pilot missed a Tiger with a rocket salvo, or Armored division X racked up more kills than the five thunderbolts that were supporting them, spare me. They are pointless, and they can't be used (logically) to illutrate the point you are trying to make.

Joe

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You of course forget this 'Often the German attack at Mortain is used as an example to show the effectiveness of the fighter-bombers as tank killers. But in fact this engagement is rather an example of vastly exaggerated claims. The British 2nd TAF claimed to have destroyed or damaged 140 German tanks in the Mortain area 7 - 10 August, while 9th US Air Force claimed 112.1 This actually exceeded the number of German tanks employed in the operation.2 In fact no more than 46 tanks were lost in the operation and of these only nine had been hit by air weapons.3' http://home.swipnet.se/normandy/articles/article.html

And that I inserted the page it to show that Allied ground forces were the pre emanate killer of the German army. The reasons that CAS kills are low of Armoured veh is that the weapons were ineffective for a variety of reasons, this is not mere anecdotal evidence but explains the anecdotes and British firing trials of such weapons as the rocket and their disappointing accuracy, the fact that even the 2cm cannons were having problems when having to deal with even 15mm deck armour due to the oblique angles involved (one should remember that there are incidences of 3,7cm guns killing T-34, KV, Tigers and a host of heavies this did not make the 3,7cm gun the best or even the sure bet in killing such veh. 2cm cannons firing a mix of HE and AP would have even more difficulty. I think we'll have to agree to disagree on this.

[Guest tero]

For once I was able to obtain some relevant details before the trail went cold.

Here are some figures I found from

http://militaryhistory.education.webjump.com/

And I quote:

Even allowing for some exaggeration and duplicate claims, the sortie claims of the Ninth AF and 2 TAF during the Normandy fighting is most impressive.

Fighter-bomber sortie claims in Normandy.

...................2 TAF.....9 AF....Total

Sorties flown......9,896.....2,891...12,787

Claims for

motor transport

destroyed..........3,340.....2,520...5,860

Claims for

armor destroyed....257.......134.....391

Total claims.......3,597.....2,654...6,251

Claims per

sortie.............0,36......0,92....0,49

End of quote.

The exaggerations and dublicate claims aside I draw your attention to the number of sorties and the ratios derived from them.

The definition of sortie being 1 plane doing a mission OR a mission done by 200 planes I must question the number of sorties when it is layed against the number of claims. Was the data gathered from squadron reports or CAS requests ? The claims are all made by individual pilots so it is misleading research to compare the number of claims made by individual pilots to the number of "communal" sorties. The numbers and ratios are relevant only if they are compared on a 1:1 basis.

I have a strong feeling the number of 9AF sorties have been "delflated" either with statistical tricks to get the claim per sortie ratio up or simply the number of 2TAF and 9AF sorties are not comparable due to different counting criteria. The only reason for unquestionably pairing them is to emphasise the "accuracy" of the USAAF ground support over that of the British.

[This message has been edited by tero (edited 01-12-2001).]

[Guest tero]

>Ok if your definition of "Valid" is "The pilot is aiming at something (vehicle, gun, or person) and not randomly dropping it's ordinace" then you have a minor point.

For the lack of a better term I picked the term valid.

>Except the valid targets can also be knocked out vehicles, tanks, or guns, OR friendly vehicles, tanks, or guns.

I've never seen CAS actually hit KO'd assets in CM, even during follow up strikes. But that does not mean it does not happen. If they were KO'd by ground assets just prior to the strike then the strike on KO'd assets would be realistic.

Friedly fire isn't.

>Err define bogus?

Grassy knoll, shadow of a tree on the roadside, deer/lifestock moving in the shadows, haystack, suspiciously acting brushes. Whatever seems like a target at 500 mph from an altitude of 2000 feet through FLAK and smoke.

>Do you think the pilots in CAS missions didnt attempt to ID their targets before attacking?

Yes. But being human there is not reason to believe they picked real (or the right) targets 100% of the time. Not even if they were Americans.

>You think they dropped their limited ordinace on "suspected" positions when in a direct fire support (not interdiction) role?

Would you rather jetison the ordnance into the sea before landing than drop it where it might do some good if you fail to locate the designated target ? And since there were friendly fire incidents there is the issue of simple target identification.

>Where do you get this idea from (i.e. supporting evidence)?

The discrepencies (and indeed the figures themselves) of number of sorties per kill, calculated ordnance expenditure per kill, admitted lack of accuracy even after extensive training. The pilots, not even the superefficient and überproficcient American pilots, did not turn Daniel Boone once they were over the battle zone.

>Maybe by showing this we can dispell any misconceptions we both have.

I am not too confident Anglo-American history research is un-biased enough to start dismantling the old misconceptions and digging the sceletons out of the closets just yet. The Anglo-American historians are at times worse the the historians in the former Soviet Union were. And the Soviet historians distorted history because they were told to do it. The Anglo-Americans perpertuate the picture war time propaganda created voluntarily.

[This message has been edited by tero (edited 01-12-2001).]

[This message has been edited by tero (edited 01-12-2001).]

[tss]

I went through tank-kill records of my favorite example battle, Kuuterselkä. As I have posted before, the commander of the Soviet forces there reported losing 40 AFVs in that day. However, Finnish sources have explanations only for 27 of them. The distribution is:

* 21 by Stug-IIGs.

* 1 by a Panzerfaust

* 5 by a Panzerschreck (they all were destroyed by Heimo Vinni, who was killed in the battle).

This leaves 13 unaccounted losses (~33%). There are four possible causes for them:

1) Mechanical failures.

2) Artillery hits.

3) Aircraft bombing.

4) Unrecorded faust or schreck kills.

As for 1), I don't know whether Soviets included breakdown figures in their casualty reports.

Probably few of the kills should be attributed to the cause 4). The battle was very heavy and the infantry units had severe losses. It is very possible that kills of some AT teams went unrecorded because of casualties.

I can't estimate what effect did the artillery have on tanks in that battle.

The air support consisted of a single bombing run by a squadron (9 planes) of JU-88s. The bombers reported hitting a deploying area of Soviet tanks. This probably caused at least several tank losses, but again, the exact statistics is not know. Finnish counter attack didn't advance to the bombed area before it was stopped.

So, making a wild guess that breakdowns were not included in the casualty report, and that 3-5 infantry tank kills were unreported, it would leave 8-10 kills by artillery and JU-88s. Continuing this speculation, I would guess that maybe 2/3 of these were by bombs (after all, they hit the deployment area), which would be 5-7 tanks (~20-30% of Stug kills). However, as I said before, the exact distribution of the unclaimed kills is not known. If all of them were by bombers, the kill ratio (bombers : Stugs) would be 13:21, or ~60%.

- Tommi

[Guest tero]

You must also consider the fact that of the some 40 AFV's we Finns lost during the summer of 1944 none were lost to enemy air action, eventhough the Soviets had absolute airsuperiority. At least I have not seen any data referring to that. The Stug and BT-42 losses are accounted for in detail, the balance is T-26's and possibly Komsomolets arty tractors. I have not seen any reports about the conditions of those losses but I have not seen it mentioned the Soviet CAS took out any.

[This message has been edited by tero (edited 01-13-2001).]

[Major Tom]

First off, my understanding of Artillery in 1944-1945 was that the British/Commonwealth had a much better coordinated system than the Americans. Although not nearly as large, they were able to put down more concentrated fire through direct communication between the FO's on the field, and Corps/Army Group commanders. Especially in later engagements (ie. Operation Veritable) the British were able to concentrate massive firepower even though their total numbers were less than the Americans.

Top tank armour cannot be compared to side armour. They were relatively unarmoured and a 0.5 inch shot could probably penetrate some of the biggest German tanks. Combine this into the P-47 which has 16 0.5 inch HMG's then tanks can be pretty chewed up.

Hurricane IV's, equipped with 40mm Guns were only used in North Africa and Burma. The last places that the Hurricane (any mark) saw active service was Burma (into late 1944). There were enough Tempests and Typhoons to regulate Hurricanes to rear patrol, training, or sub-theatres. Rockets were very innacurate, but, 20mm armed RAF aircraft, like the 12.7mm armed USAAC aircraft could result in some high numbers of killed German tanks. The main problem, as others have said, is FINDING them.