British Army tactics

[Tero]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

I think 'going soft' is probably the wrong expression.

It is actually. But while I was typing it I could not come up with a better one to depict the notion of valiant battle hardened veterans supposedly reverting into resembing these ineffective British troops that sailed to Normandy.

There were a number of factors here, but amongst them are that 7th AD had been in 'it' from the start in the desert, while they knew that many divisions were in England training for the whole four years.

Can you tell if they were envious or were they suspicious of the performance of these formations under fire (ie. did they fear for their lives upon going into action alongside green troops) ? Or was it a case (like it is starting to look like) of veteran officers being rotated out and being replaced with inexperienced ones from other outfits who were perhaps more concerned and mindful about their status and prestige than the battlefield performance of the veteran troops serving under them ?

Also, they had seen what a German AP round could do numerous times, and the vets in the division had come through - but if you believe you have a finite amount of luck to spend, they could probably see the bottom of the barrel for that one.

I can understand that.

It is often forgotten that while the Bomber Command pilots flew relatively few missions the (say) 1% chance of getting killed was cumulative. At 10 missions the chance was 10%. The same applied on the ground.

With all this it is quite amazing how difficult it is to find actual overall Allied armour loss figures.

Another factor was that they had nice diesel-powered Shermans in Africa, courtesy of the US Govt. They left them there, and were not only given slab-sided, crappy Cromwells that ran on gasoline, but also told that this tank was the best thing since sliced bread, an insult to their intelligence and battle experience (and before the proponents of the idea that British tanks rocked get all in a huff and fluster - this is directly from a divisional history of 7th AD, and based on the assessment by people like Tout).

This frustaration if you will is understandable considering the fact when they had seen the German armour getting progressively better (from the early PzKw-III's and PzKw-IV's to the Specials and ultimately the Tiger)while they had to make do with vehicles they knew were inferior.

A veteran unit will only be as good as its leadership - particularly its junior leadership.

Sometimes a unit performs well despite poor leardership, sometimes it fails because of poor leadership.

Since there will be a high turnover amongst these (high casualty rates, survivors being promoted up the CoC) that means that there will be an element of wastage even if the division does not take large casualties in numbers.

Do you know how much (if at all) did the British formations promote for example staff sargeants into second leutenants and keep them in the original formation ?

[Tero]

Originally posted by Ari Maenpaa:

I wonder if these differences come from the supposed Finnish propaganda like many here seems to believe or from the too one-sided western sources which are based on the Russian history writing. Quite possibly it's more or less both.

In case you are not aware there were books written before Glantz that handeled the Finnish involvement quite superficially. These books used German sources. One such book is by Earl Ziemke and it is called something like "The German operations in the Arctic" (saatavana myös suomenkielisenä käännöksenä). The text pertaining the Finnish involvement in the book is exclusivelly based on German sources (archives captured in Norway) and it was proof read by Germans and Germans alone. No Finn was invited to proof read it. The only Finnish source used were the memoires of Marshall Mannerheim. That is why mr Ziemkes book has a very heavy German bias. However it gives us Finns a good look at the German point of view and gives us also a very useful data base for German sources.

There is very little from the Finnish POV around in English. The most notable is Cold Will by Ries. But who is he compared to Ziemke and Glantz ? They have kept up the continuum because

A) Finland was a side show

German sour grapes sources and later Soviet sources were comparable and they did not contradict each other too much - even if they are in stark contrast with the Finnish sources. But our POV does not count, right ? The big ones know infinitely better how it really went down without having to ask us anything. Our Winter War claims of 200 000 Red Army KIA and 1 200 KO'd tanks were clear propaganda, only recent RUSSIAN sources admit to 130 000 + KIA and a total of 3 000+ tanks (with 1 200 combat losses). Despite this Glantz persists with the unedited Soviet POV, for reasons best known to himself. Our version of our involvement in the war between 1941-44 is überFinn BS based on Finnish porpaganda because Glantz does not corraborate it. Right ?

C) The entire structure the Anglo-American WWII history writing is based on certain axioms and if you started explaining the Finnish situation in detail many of these axioms would be rendered obsolete and the entire edifice would be in danger of toppling over. One such axiom is the US as the armoury of democracy. Yet a blemish like the way FDR quite callously left Finland to her own devices while FDR was already playing both ends of the table with Hitler and Stalin is best forgotten. Otherwise there could be some embarassing questions raised about the real motivation and interest of the US involvement in the conflict.

It is like going against the giant wind mills when you start contradicting these axioms and "facts" with facts that you can substatiante with a barrage of facts available only in Finnish.

Churchill even consulted the Dominions before the declaration and only Australia supported it. But Churchill had already tied his own hands by his earlier promise to Stalin. Even he himself regretted it.

This was perhaps best reflected by the sigle token air raid that dumped its payload into the sea.

Btw. USA broke up the diplomatic relations with Finland only in midsummer ’44, after the Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement was signed. But she didn't declare war against Finland.

Did they break diplomatic relations or did they just recall their ambassador ?

Maybe it's better to continue this discussion later in some other thread.

It is funny how these topics evolve...

[ 09-24-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Andreas]

Tero, I don't know the answer to your question about what happened to battle-field commissioned NCOs. I do believe that they stayed with the unit in most cases, but would be open to correction - I know that the South Alberta Regiment had a policy of 'growing its own' officers from the ranks, so it certainly was done. Due to the regimental system, I would expect them to stay on in the unit though.

Regarding how they looked on the 'green' troops. There is an English expression that you should 'do your bit' - the desert vets believed that they had done their 'bit', and that it was somebody else's turn. I think morale was quite low, and there even was something close to a mutiny in one of the armoured regiments of 7th AD - not sure about that though. A bit like 1st ID in the US, who were not exactly thrilled at the prospect of invading France in the first wave.

About the relationship with other units - I have never read anything about e.g. tankers being unhappy because they had to go into battle with green infantry or vice versa. What seems to have mattered more was how well they knew each other and could co-operate.

[Spook]

Beyond the 7th AD, there were also the UK 50th & 51st ID's that had come up from earlier combat experience in the Desert/Med. (The 50th went ashore at Gold Beach on D-Day.) From those who've read up on these units, what are your impressions as to their own overall performances in the Normandy Campaign?

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Spook:

Beyond the 7th AD, there were also the UK 50th & 51st ID's that had come up from earlier combat experience in the Desert/Med. (The 50th went ashore at Gold Beach on D-Day.) From those who've read up on these units, what are your impressions as to their own overall performances in the Normandy Campaign?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Haven't read a lot on them - I seem to recall passing mention that it took 51st Highland a while to sort itself out.

There were also 4th and 8th Armoured Brigades, which had served in Africa and Italy before.

[Spook]

Not necessarily to correct, tero, but instead to clarify in an off-topic way:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

It is often forgotten that while the Bomber Command pilots flew relatively few missions the (say) 1% chance of getting killed was cumulative. At 10 missions the chance was 10%. The same applied on the ground.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The standard tour of a Bomber Command (BC) crew was thirty missions, as compared to twenty-five for USAAF crews in the 1943 timeframe. (I think that US tours became longer in the last year of the war after relative combat hazards were reduced.)

And in the "Battle of Berlin" period of Nov '43 to Mar '44, overall loss rate of BC planes & crews was about 5%. But in the last month of that battle phase, certain BC missions saw loss rates ranging towards 10-14%.

So when trying to fly a tour of thirty missions with a 95% chance of survival each mission (averaged), this works out to a 21.46% chance of surviving a full tour in that timeframe without being killed or captured. Pretty damn harrowing.

On top of that, the expectation of BC higher command was for crews that survived their first tour to "volunteer" for another tour. I don't know as to how many actually did, but some certainly must have.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Spook:

Not necessarily to correct, tero, but instead to clarify in an off-topic way:<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Middlebrook, at least in 'The Nuremberg Raid' has a treatment of the chances of survival, and the very shoddy way in which BC treated those who volunteered for another tour, but could not go through with it. IIRC - even those who did a first tour, but then could not complete a second were branded LMF (lack of moral fibre) - been a while that I read it. The book comes highly recommended by me. FWIW.

[Slapdragon]

And of course, "Catch 22" was the standard U.S. look at the 25 mission system for daylight bombing. With nearly 2 million men involved in bombing facing a million and a half air defense, and air troops in Germany, the US and British bombing campaigns represented tied down more men than D-Day and represented a huge casualty imbalance for the Allies.

There really was a WW2 rule brought forward by the airforce that stated you could only quit flying if you were crazy, but that asking to stop flying meant you were not crazy. Casualties in the air for the US at one point was running 90% to end of tour. The casualties where so bad that as soon as they could find a bomber that made 25 they sent it home for a huge tour of airbases. The Memphis Bell only made its 25 in the days before good fighter support by drawing an unusual number of support drops.

There have been a number of books written since then about the strategic campaign and this aspect of the fighting. Sheckley's "Armor" was written in reference to this, and "Forever War", partly a counterpoint to "Starship Troopers" also included very open refrences to this campaign, hidden under the guise of science fiction.

[Brian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

I think 'going soft' is probably the wrong expression. There were a number of factors here, but amongst them are that 7th AD had been in 'it' from the start in the desert, while they knew that many divisions were in England training for the whole four years. Also, they had seen what a German AP round could do numerous times, and the vets in the division had come through - but if you believe you have a finite amount of luck to spend, they could probably see the bottom of the barrel for that one.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

While "war weariness" has been overstated IMO by many authors, what hasn't been examines is "war wariness" - a better understanding that you can only survive for a certain amount of time in any combat situation, which only comes from the sort of experience that you're talking about.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Another factor was that they had nice diesel-powered Shermans in Africa, courtesy of the US Govt. They left them there, and were not only given slab-sided, crappy Cromwells that ran on gasoline, but also told that this tank was the best thing since sliced bread, an insult to their intelligence and battle experience (and before the proponents of the idea that British tanks rocked get all in a huff and fluster - this is directly from a divisional history of 7th AD, and based on the assessment by people like Tout).

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I've read the reference to the 7th veterans being unhappy with the change from diesel engined Shermans to petrol engined ones (which is interesting in itself, as it brings up questions as to why the US was so unwilling to continue with the diesel engined vehicles as against the petrol ones, in the light of the 8th Army's combat experience).

I believe it was in the book, "Desert Rats, Desert Foxes" or something similar which I've read just recently.

I was unaware of any unhappiness (beyond the general one of "why do the Germans have so much better tanks than we do") about the Cromwell. In some ways it was considered superior to the Sherman, if not as good as - it was faster, had the same gun, the armour was approximately the same value, etc. It was though, primarily restricted to the cruiser and recce regiments, though.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

The division was also badly led during the initial phase, something that was born out when the Brigadiers (I think it was both of them) and the GOC were replaced. Villers-Bocage was a direct consequence of loss of nerves on the part of the command.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The issue of quality of command is one that is always difficult to qualify or quantify. John Howard provided the Australian example of the two AMF battalions in New Guinea, who had very similar backgrounds and experiences - one was well led and gained great hattle honours, the other badly led and broke and ran.

The problem for the 8th Army units brought back for the invasion was that all too often their commanders were judged "too old", "not aggressive enough", "out of touch", etc. and replaced with commanders whose experience was not as great and who weren't as well known by the men under them. Much to the detriment of the units.

The result was, as you note that a great deal of the responsibility for actually leading the units in battle and ensuring momentum was maintained was down to the junior leaders, the SNCO's and Subaltans in particular, with the result that as they suffered disproportionately high casualty rates, their unit's morale and cohesion suffered as well.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Brian:

[/qb]The result was, as you note that a great deal of the responsibility for actually leading the units in battle and ensuring momentum was maintained was down to the junior leaders, the SNCO's and Subaltans in particular, with the result that as they suffered disproportionately high casualty rates, their unit's morale and cohesion suffered as well.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Another good example for this: in one of the 'new' divisions - 49th West Riding Infantry Division - 6th Battalion The Duke of Wellington Regiment was disbanded because it had an extremely high turn-over of officers, with the OC becoming casualties in quick succession during two or three days of combat in Normandy, pretty much the first battle after they landed. The men were so shaken that the assessment from the new OC was that the BN should either be disbanded or sent back to the UK for rebuilding. The men were sent back, the BN disbanded, and the Lieutenant-Colonel who wrote the assessment branded 'not a team-player' by Monty, IIRC. I would think his career was over.

[Ari Maenpaa]

Tero,

Thanks for the book recommendations. I haven’t read Ziemke or Ries yet (eikös Riesin kirja löydy myös nimikkeellä Luja Tahto?). IIRC Hans Peter Krosby has written several books about Finland in WW2. I just don’t know his POV.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> They have kept up the continuum because

A)...

...

C)...

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

And D) Because for decades we did nothing to correct these "facts". Unfortunate side effect of finlandization

I wouldn’t be too ready to condemn others for believing incorrect information, because it’s easy to assume it right if nobody isn’t telling that something is wrong. But yep, history gets written by the victor. So who would be interested how FDR played for his own good just like everybody else? Even our leaders weren’t Sunday school pupils although they never had such leeway than some others did. The truth is that even the most democratic people and states are selfish.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> This was perhaps best reflected by the sigle token air raid that dumped its payload into the sea. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The raid happened months before the declaration of war. On 30th of July 1941, 6 British fighters and 18 bombers attacked Petsamo’s harbor. Note that there were German forces mostly. The planes succeeded to sink one Norwegian ship, destroyed piece of docking platform and got couple of hits on local fishboneflour factory and warehouses. Two German soldiers and the cook of the ship died. Three attacking planes were shot down by the Germans. The whole attack was made up only for political reasons. The Brits wanted to show to Stalin that they were actively doing something on the Northern theater. Also it was one of the reasons for the Finns to break the diplomatic relations with Britain.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Did they break diplomatic relations or did they just recall their ambassador ?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

After a quick browse my source (Nevakivi’s Ystävistä vihollisiksi) says only that this was the definitive break up. Nevakivi also remarks that Roosevelt opposed the break up to the end and most likely it was Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, who initiated it.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> It is funny how these topics evolve... <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

For my part I'll stop this now

Ari

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Ari Maenpaa:

Slapdragon,

OK, this is off the topic here, but I'm interested in your opinions of WW2-era Finland. As it seems that you are a history professional, I find it intriguing how different views you have got from mine or other Finns' in general.

I wonder if these differences come from the supposed Finnish propaganda like many here seems to believe or from the too one-sided western sources which are based on the Russian history writing. Quite possibly it's more or less both.

Anyway there have been some factual errors in your information. For instance some time ago you wrote:

This is not true. Finland never declared war against Britain during WW2. But she broke up the diplomatic relations to Britain late in summer '41, basically because Britain had allied with the USSR and because Operation Barbarossa had already began.

On the other hand Britain did declare war against Finland because of the pressure from the Soviets. Churchill even consulted the Dominions before the declaration and only Australia supported it. But Churchill had already tied his own hands by his earlier promise to Stalin. Even he himself regretted it.

Btw. USA broke up the diplomatic relations with Finland only in midsummer ’44, after the Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement was signed. But she didn't declare war against Finland.

Maybe it's better to continue this discussion later in some other thread.

Ari<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Ari,

I don't doubt that my information is slanted by the post war "Finlandization " of Finland.

My books are mostly English translations of books by Finnish expatriates, including Jukka Nevakivi (whom I have heard is not well loved by Finnish), Lasse Lehtnen, and Hannu Rautkallio. In addition, Sakari Jutila wrote heavily about the aspect of Finlandization and its roots. From a Finnish American perspective I have John H. Wuorinen.

Please contact me off lists about this and I will fill you in about how the histories I accumulated seem to fit together. And let me add that I assume that your understanding of Finnish History and mine are really more accurate if we meet in the middle.

The only thing that ultranationalist Finnish and Commonwealth responses on this board have done is to make me look very very carefully at claims coming from those sources. All of the writers I have on Finland take a very even strain on Finland, most admit Finland's mistakes and its triumphs with a clearly neutral tone.

So, please contact me at my e-mail address where the national biases can be put away and we will discuss it.

[Spook]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

Middlebrook, at least in 'The Nuremberg Raid' has a treatment of the chances of survival, and the very shoddy way in which BC treated those who volunteered for another tour, but could not go through with it. IIRC - even those who did a first tour, but then could not complete a second were branded LMF (lack of moral fibre) - been a while that I read it. The book comes highly recommended by me. FWIW.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thanks, Andreas, I'll keep watch for that. My own past source for the Nuremburg Raid is Campbell's "The Bombing of Nuremburg," and this book also makes note of the LMF punishment system and its callous application.

It should be recognized, of course, that the British military in WWII felt in the position not to be very lenient to perceived "slackers" while engaged in a "war of survival." But the application of LMF (considering the earlier related BC survival rates) struck me as applied most ardently by RAF higher officers who themselves had virtually no prior experience or understanding of the hazards faced by BC crews.

[ 09-24-2001: Message edited by: Spook ]

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Spook:

It should be recognized, of course, that the British military in WWII felt in the position not to be very lenient to perceived "slackers" while engaged in a "war of survival." But the application of LMF (considering the earlier related BC survival rates) struck me as applied most ardently by RAF higher officers who themselves had virtually no prior experience or understanding of the hazards faced by BC crews.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What really got me was that IIRC LMF was used as a stamp for those who had already done one tour. If it was applied only to someone who volunteered for BC but then did not make it through the first tour, it would be different. They were all volunteers after all, IIRC.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Ari Maenpaa:

(eikös Riesin kirja löydy myös nimikkeellä Luja Tahto?).

Muistaakseni.

IIRC Hans Peter Krosby has written several books about Finland in WW2. I just don’t know his POV.

A BOL.FI search came up with a grand total of 1 (one) matches.

I wouldn’t be too ready to condemn others for believing incorrect information, because it’s easy to assume it right if nobody isn’t telling that something is wrong.

I'm not condemning anybody. But some people who post these facts as Gods truth without disclosing their sources take personal offence when the mistakes in their facts are pointed out and corrected. Instead of debating the subject when it is clear they would lose the debate if they hold on to their facts they turn to ad hominem attacks.

Even our leaders weren’t Sunday school pupils although they never had such leeway than some others did.

Saints they were not. But it should not offend anybody if the "extenuating circumstances" they were forced to work in were told from all POV's and with the best possible set of facts.

The truth is that even the most democratic people and states are selfish.

Human nature.

The raid happened months before the declaration of war. On 30th of July 1941, 6 British fighters and 18 bombers attacked Petsamo’s harbor.

WHat about the raid on Turku ? Technically speaking the raid on Petsamo was made against the Germans.

For my part I'll stop this now

Exits are through here, there and everywhere. In case of flaming follow the illuminated dotted line .......................

[Tero]

Originally posted by Spook:

So when trying to fly a tour of thirty missions with a 95% chance of survival each mission (averaged), this works out to a 21.46% chance of surviving a full tour in that timeframe without being killed or captured. Pretty damn harrowing.

Driving to and from work every day makes you wonder how the statistics creep up on you and when they are going to catch up with you. So far so good.

But to expand these to armoured ground operations: is there any way to determine statistical AFV crew survivability based on losses/replacement rates and number of engagements to extrapolate similar statistics that are drawn from the airforce stats ? Just so that a scientific data gan be presented to show the extent and validity of the gut feelings the people at the time had and how it might have quantifiably affected troop morale.

[Hon John Howard MP LLB]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

Originally posted by Spook:

[qb]So when trying to fly a tour of thirty missions with a 95% chance of survival each mission (averaged), this works out to a 21.46% chance of surviving a full tour in that timeframe without being killed or captured. Pretty damn harrowing.

Driving to and from work every day makes you wonder how the statistics creep up on you and when they are going to catch up with you. So far so good.

But to expand these to armoured ground operations: is there any way to determine statistical AFV crew survivability based on losses/replacement rates and number of engagements to extrapolate similar statistics that are drawn from the airforce stats ? Just so that a scientific data gan be presented to show the extent and validity of the gut feelings the people at the time had and how it might have quantifiably affected troop morale.[/QB]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The only study that I am aware of was one done by two RMO's of one of the British Armoured Divisions right at the end of the war.

They looked at hits on vehicles that they could examine, by weapon (where this could be identified) by casualties to the crew by type/serverity.

Apparently much as expected except that the Panzerschreck was not the "killer" it is claimed. Where one hit "fair and square" it did cause fatal damage to crew and vehicle BUT there were many more fired which obtained only glancing blows at best.

They ascribed this to the problem of "holding one's nerve" to ensure the hit.

One proviso - I have not seen the actual study just excerpts from it.

(Full title "Survey of Casualties Amongst Armoured Units in North West Europe" by Capts Harkness and Wright published JAN46