On Killing--Soldiers Who Won't Shoot

[Gremlin]

I'm currently reading an intriguing book that I wanted to share a little about since it should be of interest to many here, both in terms of general military history and the accuracy of CM.

The book is called On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society by Lt. Col. Dave Grossman, a former Army Ranger and paratrooper, psychology teacher at West Point, and Professor of Military Science at Arkansas State University. I'ts currently in print, published by Back Bay Books/Little Brown.

It's a sociological/psychological/historical study of killing, particularly in the context of the American military. I've only started reading it and apologize if I misrepresent it, but the basic thesis as I understand it is that humans have an extremely strong instinctive aversion to killing their own species, and the demands of war, which urge soldiers to do just that, are at the root of the massive numbers of "psychological casualties" in war, not merely fear or fatigue, but rather being forced to override that instinct. Also (here's the CM-relevant part), the book notes that the US Army conducted a massive study after WWII that found that only 15-20 % of US soldiers would fire their guns at the enemy. The rest intentionally missed, didn't shoot at all, found other tasks to do, like calling out targets, helping the wounded, running messages, etc. (That study is summarized in S.L.A. Marshall's book Men Against Fire.)

Further studies have shown that figures along those lines were apparently common to most wars prior to WWII, and likely to troops of other nations in WWII. Also, the book argues that the US armed forces quickly learned from that surprising discovery, implementing conditioning programs (think Pavlov and Skinner) to help raise the firing figure to around 90% by the Vietnam War. Essentially, they have aimed to create killing machines--probably the appopriate term since drills aim to create machine-like, unthinking responses to certain combat situations. Also, the book argues that the media have adopted similar conditioning techniques (though not for the same purpose) that help overcome the natural reticence to kill our own kind, with enormous social consquences.

The book references numerous studies, interviews with combat vets, combat memoirs, and so forth. That is, it's a readable but scholarly book.

It's a fascinating read for anyone interested in the heart of warfare and what it puts soldiers through. It goes into great detail about combat-related psychological illness, the psychology of killing, combat atrocities, and so forth. From the reviews I read of the book, it seems like a particularly valuable read for anyone who either is or knows a combat veteran.

Sorry for the long post, but this book seems to have some very important things to say that relate to warfare and violence.

[ 04-28-2001: Message edited by: Gremlin ]

[Armdchair]

While I agree it's a fascinating book with important things to say, S.L.A. Marshall's claims (and methodology) have been severely questioned in recent years, by both scholars and WWII combat vets. While there is numerous anecdotal evidence recounting soldiers being reluctant to kill each other on occasions(see John Keegan's "The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt,Waterloo,and the Somme" NY,

Penguin, 1976 among others), I'd be reluctant to make any sweeping generalization about men's innate humane instincts towards each other. One of the reasons for WWII GIs' reluctance to shoot (not cited by Marshall) was the fact that they had been trained to shoot at stationary, highly visible targets (a rare occurence in combat), rather than in putting out rifle fire towards suspected enemy positions.The change in US Army training and the equipping of riflemen with fully automatic rifles (emphasizing firepower over aimed fire) during the Vietnam War era was a direct response to this. All that being said, I agree with you it's a worthwhile read. I'd also recommend Gerald F.Lindermann's" The World Within War: America’s Combat Experiences in World War II"

Cambridge, MA, Harvard Univ. Press, 1997 and

John C. McManus's "The Deadly Brotherhood:The American Combat Soldier in WWII", Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1998.

BTW, nice job on your Boot Camp articles at Manx's site.

[ 04-28-2001: Message edited by: Armdchair ]

[Andrew H.]

There have been some recent critiques of SLA Marshall, but other than some slight tweaking of his numbers, none of these critiques have been very compelling, IMO, and don't affect the underlying point that there were a lot of people not using their weapons. The key point about Marshall's research is that it was conducted immediately after combat. Interviews done 20 or 30 years later that are used to challenge Marshall's work just aren't good enough.

Now the *reasons* why fewer men fired than in a Hollywood reason are fair game (although I *thought* that the theory of unrealistic training (i.e., focusing on marksmanship rather than combat) was Marshall's theory.

[Gremlin]

Armdchair, thanks for the additional sources.

I can easily imagine that Grossman's work has come under at least equal scrutiny as Marhsall's, given its controversial points, as well as the way in which they're shaped. Not very far into the book, I'm already struck by what appears to be a tendency to overgeneralize and conveniently select sources, if you know what I mean. That said, a lot of what he says is also rather convincing, and certainly thought provoking and interesting.

[Mr. Johnson--]

I've read it and still own it. It is very good stuff. Its not that hard to understand how killing someone is unatural to a human. Its a top notch read. Very good for rounding out your reading. And I think he has some good points about PTSD (post tramatic stress disorder) and how WW2 soldiers got to spend a month on the ships after WW2 coming back to the states. And the long boat ride home with buddies gave soldiers the time to talk about what they had been through. Share stories, express grief of lost friends and the time to talk about their fears. Then when the soldiers got home they were greeted with parades and kisses. This gave the soldiers some license for the horror they went through. And how during Vietnam, vets were coming back to **** being tossed at them. Which caused many soldiers to never deal with their tramua completly.

Read it guys, Grossman has a good head on him.

[Abbott]

I have no idea of the big picture. On a small scale I can comment. Some days you just do not feel like killing, when the opportunity presents itself to suppress and run off those opposing you, that choice is sometimes made. It is a matter of personal decision. It is not always the same choice.

[Guest Babra]

One of the bonuses (perhaps the only bunus) to armies from nations with full conscription is that they are closely interwoven with the society around them -- everyone has served. It's not optional. Thus there is a huge resource of emotional support all around.

Killing is easy if you're scared enough.

[Abbott]

Killing is easy if you're scared enough-Babra

How true.

[Jeff Duquette]

Regarding debunking SLA Marshall’s work I would have to concur with Andrew, and have stated the same in the past regarding similar threads on this subject. Be that as it may, Grossman is a fascinating read...very thought provoking. At the risk of spoiling part of the book for anyone, I wanted to touch on some of my perceived discrepancies with some of the foundations of Grossman's primary thesis.

Grossman dives into the history of infantry fire fights to reinforce some of his points on natural fighters and the silent majority that become "Conscientious objectors at the moment of truth". Grossman delves into both Napoleonic War firefights and American Civil War firefights. Grossman’s reference to other men loading muskets for the more “natural killers” or "natural fighters" in a Napoleonic Infantry units actually has some historical basis in infantry doctrine of the era. With respect to Napoleonic warfare the typical battle line formations (with the exception of the British) were 3 men deep…or 3 ranks deeps. An infantry company of say 100 men would be about 33 men wide by 3 men deep. The doctrinal theory was apparently that a three rank battle line was the deepest formation practical in which all men within the formation could be expected to fire their weapons. The front rank was in theory supposed to fire from a kneeling position. In practice however, front ranks did not kneel in battle as it was apparently very difficult to load a musket from a kneeling position. In addition it was found to be difficult to get men to rise-up from the kneeling position once they were close to the ground. Presumably this was a function of the somewhat more protected state of an infantrymen might feel with his reduced target profile. It was however found in practice that men in the first rank were quite often becoming casualties from the fire of their comrades in the rear (third) rank. The issuance of fire from the third rank was therefore soon discontinued. The third rank was than employed to merely fill in gaps created by casualties that occur in the first two ranks. In addition, as volume of fire and rapidity of fire was crucial in a firefight of this era, the third rank was expected to load muskets for the first two ranks.

A couple things I wanted to put some emphasis on were:

<UL TYPE=SQUARE><LI> Very little live fire training (i.e. target practice) was ever conducted by any European Armies during the Napoleonic wars. Even the British ARMY, which has become revered for their musketry skills of this era, typically did very little target firing. Training tended to focus on close order drill, and going through the motions of loading a musket. Actual training fire was -- by most contemporary accounts -- nil.

<LI> This same attitude of minimal target firing was carried through in American Civil War armies. Again, training is typically concentrated on close order drilling, and going through the motions of loading a percussion rifle rather than actually firing the weapon.

<LI> Grossmans inferences on “Natural killers” could simply be those folks that were used to handling firearms for say hunting. The average volunteer or “draftee” or conscript of both the Napoleonic Wars and the American Civil War (particularly in the Union Army) would have been city dwelling folks with perhaps very little to no experience in firearms. I suspect the more rural southern states as well as the Unions more Westerly states would have been better capable of yielding up higher quotas “natural killers”, as these men tended to be more from upbringings which required woodsmen skills (i.e. having to be stealthy move through under-brush in order to secure your next meal) and handling fire arms regularly.

<LI> One might get the impression from Grossman’s discussions that engagements fought during the Napoleonic Wars and the American Civil War were relatively bloodless affairs fought by men that had no real desire to kill each other. This can’t be farther from the truth. A large engagement during either the Napoleonic Wars or the American Civil War would typically involve statistics in which upwards of 30% of all the troops involved would become casualties. By modern battle standards in which a statistic of 10% casualties of all participants is considered heavy, a staggering 30% figure should be considered nothing less than a blood bath.

<LI>Regarding the typical "aim low command" in which Grossman asserts soldiers would deliberately shoot high to avoid killing other human beings doesn’t seemingly make sine. Looking at this from a physics perspective, would not the recoil and upward motion of a rifle or musket begin at the instant that the powder is ignited, and therefore before the ball has physically left the barrel? So the barrel is already beginning to rotate upward as the ball is traveling down the barrel…thus resulting in fire tending to be slightly higher than the intended aiming point. An aim low command could simply be a rule of thumb means of dealing with physics of the problem. I’m not an avid shooter so correct me if I’m way out to lunch on this point.

Regarding Grossman’s reference to Prussian Musketry Experiments conducted pre-Napoleonic Wars. I have seen information on this experiment in the past. This was conducted under relatively ideal conditions with fire being issued by well-trained troops. The big-assed quote below is fairly interesting and touches on the merits of this experiment relative to actual combat conditions on a Napoleonic battlefield.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Gunther E. Rothenberg “The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon”

At that, accuracy also suffered because of the need for rapid fire. With a rate of two to three shots a minute, the first usually was the most accurate as the piece had been loaded with care. Later discharges were less effective and also a great many things could go wrong in the process of loading and firing. The powder might flash in the pan, but fail to ignite the main charge. Sometimes in the noise and excitement of battle this went unnoticed and a soldier might continue to load additional charges, often with disastrous results. As firing continued, flints became worn and had to be replaced, and vents became clogged and had to be cleaned. During a prolonged fire fight as high as 20 percent misfires could be expected.

All this, of course, lowered the capability of the weapon. Although the killing range of a musket was about 300 paces, this was far from its effective combat range. According to Prussian tests, the 1782 musket hit a 10-foot wide and 6-foot high target about 60 times out of 100 at l00 paces, only 40 times at 200 paces, and only 25 times at 300 paces. The French 1777 musket had slightly better performance, but this was under test conditions.* In 1814 a British ordnance officer concluded that 'a soldier's musket, if not exceedingly ill-bored as many are, will strike the figure of a man at 80 yards . . . but a soldier must be very unfortunate indeed who shall be wounded by a common musket at 150 yards, provided his antagonist aims at him, and as for firing at 200 yards you might as well fire at the moon'. Prussian, French, and British tests indicated that good men firing two volleys against an attacking infantry column over a range narrowing down from 100 yards could, in theory, expect to obtain between 500 and 600 hits. Actual combat experience, however, indicated that due to the thick smoke, careless loading, and various malfunctions, the number of hits, at best, ranged between 6 and 15 percent of the rounds expended. The first volleys were the most deadly; thereafter effectiveness declined sharply.

Writing in 1811, an American officer observed that considering the number of rounds fired, 'the little execution done by muskets in some engagements almost surpasses belief. Soldiers in most Continental armies carried between go to 60 rounds in their pouches, and normally were expected to use no more than 20 during a battle. At Vittoria, however, the British fired over 3,500,000 rounds, about 60 per man, and calculations show that it required some 450 rounds to inflict one casualty.' The British were lucky. By this time Wellington had an efficient ammunition train and soldiers were able to replenish their supply. At Marengo, on the other hand, Captain Coignet reports that his battalion ran out of ammunition and was saved only by the timely arrival of the Consular Guard carrying extra rounds.

One additional reason for the large expenditure of ammunition in combat at such close ranges was that musketry training remained extremely sketchy in most armies. Although the French Revolutionary forces often had used hordes of tirailleurs (sic skirmishers) in 1793-4 these men had little training, and this did not change much in later campaigns. Coignet, a writer assiduous in detail, reports that he learned to shoot only after Napoleon became First Consul, and in 1800 Berthier, Napoleon's chief-of-staff, ordered that 'all conscripts ought to fire a few rounds, and also learn how to load, hold, and aim their muskets properly'. But there never was enough time or powder for intensive training in the Revolutionary or Imperial armies, or for that matter in those of their various adversaries. Only the British, universally admired for their musketry, did better. Even so, regulations allowed but 30 rounds of ball and go blank cartridges annually for practice, and only light infantry and riflemen received a larger allowance and were expected to hit a mark.

Prussian experiments revealed that a slight angling of the stock would have greatly improved accuracy, but tactical doctrines still called for the highest volume of fire possible in a short time and not for individually aimed fire. This was provided by riflemen, present in most armies. The French had experimented with them, but in 1807, Napoleon had ordered all rifled weapons withdrawn. Other armies had small bodies of Jager as well as light infantry, two separate types, though interchangeably used for skirmishing. The all important difference was in their weapons. Both could be used in open order, but while light infantry, usually carrying a more accurate version of the issue musket also could fight in line, riflemen were armed with a weapon of greater range and accuracy, but one which suffered from a much reduced rate of fire and fouled very rapidly. When these factors were combined with the high initial cost of the weapon and the longer time required to train a competent rifleman, the disadvantages seemed to outweigh the advantages. In most Continental armies, therefore, the numerous Jager units (Russia had 20 regiments) were simply light infantry and usually only partially equipped with rifles. In the British army there were two rifle-armed regiments, the 60th and the 95th, though the famous Light Brigade, later the Light Division, in the Peninsula for the most part carried modified issue muskets.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[BloodyBucket]

It is a good read. The real interesting part for me was his discussion of the first person shooter as the ideal way to get people to kill. Makes sense as training: Endless reps, instant gratification, and realism that earlier military trainers could only dream about.

Kind of scares me.

[Wesreidau]

Don't forget, soldiers may also be reluctant to fire because it gives their position away!

PeterNZ

[StellarRat]

For what it's worth...I knew a guy that went to Grenada and actually killed someone. He said he couldn't pull the trigger until the Sergent came up and ordered him to fire. He said the sergent was running up and down the line screaming at them to fire and had to literally kick some of the guys in the ass to get them to fire their weapons at the enemy. These were "green" troops and I have no reason to dis-believe this story.

[Abbott]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by StellarRat:

For what it's worth...I knew a guy that went to Grenada and actually killed someone. He said he couldn't pull the trigger until the Sergent came up and ordered him to fire. He said the sergent was running up and down the line screaming at them to fire and had to literally kick some of the guys in the ass to get them to fire their weapons at the enemy. These were "green" troops and I have no reason to dis-believe this story.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Will he shoot? That is always the question. No one knows and no one believes what someone has to say on the subject until it is done.

[BloodyBucket]

I heard a story about an interview with a crusty old Finnish veteran of the Winter War.

The interviewer is a young blow dry hair yuppie journalist:

Journalist: "Did you get in any firefights?"

Finnish Vet: "Yes, many."

J: "Did you kill any Russians?"

FV: "Yes, quite a few."

J: "Was it hard to kill other men?"

FV: (Thinks a moment) "Yes, quite hard. They hide, they zig-zag, very difficult to hit."

So this reluctance to kill is not a universal thing.

[vimes]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Makes sense as training: Endless reps, instant gratification, and realism that earlier military trainers could only dream about.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I don’t think that Doom would have been a good training tool for the military trainees of the past. The games we have now are controlled with mouse and keyboard and aiming isn’t even an option, if you ever played Trespasser you would know what I’m talking about, every thing is an abstraction of reality in those games.

[Madmatt]

Moving to General Forum...