Operation Sealion question...

[peter tilbury]

Of course one can't exclude the fact that they were speaking with the benefit of hindsight (by the way most people on this thread are doing the same of course), but it is an interesting slant on a well-established view.

In fact, it is quite interesting sometimes to watch German documentaries on the war; they often and understandably have a slightly different angle on things in contrast to what I (and presumably most others expressing an opinion on this thread) was brought up on as a child.

[Affentitten]

Although it is the accepted paradigm that the RAF was on is last legs and a small but doughty band of heroes saved Albion in the face of overwhelming odds, the truth is a little less dramatic.

The Luftwaffe had sustained serious casualties in pilots and aircraft during the preceeding campaigns in Poland, the Low Countries and France. That had reduced their superiority in fighters. Most statistical stack-ups of the BoB concentrate on the opposing numbers of planes, but if you take out all those Heinkels, Stukas and Dorniers, the number of fighters on both side was relatively even. Since the Me-109s only had the range for about 20 minutes of flight over the British mainland, the odds were a little more tipped in favour of the Brits, who also had their AA defences and the chance of getting their bailed-out pilots back in the air again the next day.

[Gen-x87H]

they often and understandably have a slightly different angle on things in contrast to what I (and presumably most others expressing an opinion on this thread) was brought up on as a child. "

This is very true. I gained this knowledge from reading a few books. One of them was a day by day account of the fighting from beginning to end. And it was obvious that with each passing day the German onsalught would continue with roughly the same amount of planes but the British resistance would lessen everyday. This was mainly from the loss of airfields and aircraft production. It is true that the German bombers were left alone on longer bombing routes but the stats just dont come out to favor the British in a long drawn out war where the Germans continue on with thier initial objectives. On average the Brits would not kill significantly more German planes than thier own losses. For instance between Sept 1st-6th the RAF lost 120 planes to the Germans 148.

The ratios dont vary too much through the whole ordeal.

At the end of August the Germans had knocked out the airfields of Biggin Hill,Manston,West Malling,Lympne, and Hawkings. This left the southeast of Britain almost void of any kind of protection.

Gen

[Michael Emrys]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Herr Kruger:

Hmm, is the consensus on this forum then that Hitler never really intended to invade Britain? That the "planned invasion" was more to mislead the Soviets then an actual plan...<hr></blockquote>

Not at the beginning. I think the possibility exists that it might have been a bluff to apply pressure to the British to accept German hegemony on the continent of Europe and cease making war.

Later, after the start of the new year, there is good reason to believe that the forces kept on the Channel were there at least partly to divert attention from the buildup in Eastern Europe for Barbarossa. Hitler wanted Stalin & Co. to believe that the German campaign for 1941 was to be the conquest of Britain.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Peaveyyyyyyyy:

Most of the BoB histories make a point that the Luftwaffe could have won, if they had realised how effective their short-lived strategy of bombing the RAFs airfields was.<hr></blockquote>

There's no question that Fighter Command was being worn down and was close to exhaustion, but so was the Luftwaffe. If it had looked like the invasion was on, additional resources could have been drawn from 12 Group and thrown into the battle.

The whole German strategy hinged on their being able to capture and working port at the outset so as to be able to pull deep water ships up to a dock and unload. But the British had no intention of allowing this to happen. I believe all their ports on the south and southeast coast were prepared for demolition and would have been blown rather than allowed to fall intact into German hands.

The Germans could have only have moved two or three divisions across in the first wave. Assuming they arrive intact (a pretty big assumption in itself) their only hope of supplying and reinforcing those troops lay in getting hold of a port, or better two or three. My guess is that any troops that made it to England would have either died there or spent the war in prison camps. Seems like the German high command reached the same conclusion.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Gen-x87H:

The RAF was being bled dry. Germany's bombing of RAF airfields and Aircraft factories really did take a toll on the RAF.<hr></blockquote>

The bombing of aircraft factories was never a critical factor. In fact, throughout the Battle of Britain aircraft production increased. The critical shortage was among trained fighter pilots. These were becoming worn out from flying four or five missions a day and making mistakes in the air that rested pilots would not have made. Throughout this period there were more planes than pilots to put in them.

Michael

[Simon Fox]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Gen-x87H:

they often and understandably have a slightly different angle on things in contrast to what I (and presumably most others expressing an opinion on this thread) was brought up on as a child. "

This is very true. I gained this knowledge from reading a few books. One of them was a day by day account of the fighting from beginning to end. And it was obvious that with each passing day the German onsalught would continue with roughly the same amount of planes but the British resistance would lessen everyday. This was mainly from the loss of airfields and aircraft production. It is true that the German bombers were left alone on longer bombing routes but the stats just dont come out to favor the British in a long drawn out war where the Germans continue on with thier initial objectives. On average the Brits would not kill significantly more German planes than thier own losses. For instance between Sept 1st-6th the RAF lost 120 planes to the Germans 148.

The ratios dont vary too much through the whole ordeal.

At the end of August the Germans had knocked out the airfields of Biggin Hill,Manston,West Malling,Lympne, and Hawkings. This left the southeast of Britain almost void of any kind of protection.

Gen<hr></blockquote>

I am sorry, but a laughed my arse off at your post. You have totally misconceived the whole battle. As Michael points out the main problem for the Brits was the pilot shortage. The facts are that they failed to properly manage the pilots they had available. This was the main Brit mistake of the whole battle. They actually had plenty of pilots available, many of them experienced, they just didn't relocate them to fighter command. Their losses only exceeded production for a limited period, the main reason that to many it looked be a 'close run thing' was the inefficient manpower management practices of the Air Ministry. Thoughout the battle the British outproduced the Germans in fighters by 3:2.

In any prolonged conflict it was inevitable that the British would win. The British aircraft industry was producing more aircraft than the German at the time and had far more residual capacity for expansion. In order to win the BoB the Germans had to acheive dominance quickly which they didn't and couldn't do. The Luftwaffe was totally unsuited both in organisation and equipment to that type of battle.

From where did you get that data on knocked out airfields? As far as I know some were out of action for a few days but they can hardly be said to be "knocked out" of the battle. The Brits always had the luxury of withdrawing to airfields beyond German fighter reach. Which is not ideal but doesn't preclude them engaging the Germans over their targets anywhere in Britain.

On the issue of the canal barges. I understand that because they were underpowered for use on the open sea, the German plan was to tow them with tugs...at a maximum speed of 3 knots. No wonder they gave up the idea.

[Michael Emrys]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Simon Fox:

As Michael points out the main problem for the Brits was the pilot shortage. The facts are that they failed to properly manage the pilots they had available.<hr></blockquote>

True. However, ISTR that during the latter stages of the battle they woke up to the problem and began transitioning bomber pilots into Fighter Command. This was not always a happy solution though, as the personal qualities that make for a good bomber pilot are not always the ones you want in a fighter pilot, and this was known. However, needs must...

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>On the issue of the canal barges. I understand that because they were underpowered for use on the open sea, the German plan was to tow them with tugs...at a maximum speed of 3 knots. No wonder they gave up the idea.<hr></blockquote>

Yep. From the point of view of the men who would have had to ride those barges, the whole notion was a bad joke.

Michael

[Monty's Double]

Michael and Simon have pretty much wrapped this one up I think, but if you want an entertaining and balanced view of the BoB, try "Burning Blue". As mentioned, the fact that the British geared up their economy to war production faster than Germany meant time was on the Brits' side. The BoB is historically seen as a decisive battle because the cancellation of Sealion is seen as a direct consequence. Whether this bears close scrutiny is another matter. Was Sealion ever viable? Doubtful. Certainly, the British didn't view the battle as decisive at the time. Let's get this straight; NO airfield was knocked out for more than a couple of days. Even if the increasingly-strained Luftwaffe had concentrated on airfields, it's debatable whether they'd have done anything more than forced a slightly greater reliance on the Northern Air Groups.

[Gen-x87H]

I am sorry, but a laughed my arse off at your post. You have totally misconceived the whole battle."

Dont be sorry. If you disagree just say you do. No need to be insulting.

"From where did you get that data on knocked out airfields? As far as I know some were out of action for a few days but they can hardly be said to be "knocked out" of the battle."

Well smarty pants I thought you knew it all?

I am reading it right out of the book titled.

"World War II Day By Day" by Donald Sommerville.

Good book. Just gives action reports for each day of the war. Not much editorial.

If you want to get it turn to page 52. On August 31st 1940 according to this book the following airfields were out of commision for the RAF.

Manston,West Malling,Lympne, and Hawkings. They only had 2 air stations operational south of the Thames river. As for how long they were knocked out that is totally debatible. As for how much air supremacy the Germans achieved is also debatible.

Gen

[Spook]

It always seems that so often when "Sealion" or the Battle of Britain (BoB) are invoked, there is a tendency to declare "victory" or "defeat" when looking at one or two factors in isolation. The meaningful way that the BoB was going to be a German victory was if a successful air battle would lead to a timely amphibious assault, that in turn allowed a successful German beachhead to take hold in SE England.

And per the points given earlier by Simon & Michael, the German means to mount an amphibious assault were very insufficient. I also recall reading, as Simon mentioned earlier, that German shipping collected for cross-channel movement in ports like Boulogne, was heavily damaged by British counter-bombing raids.

But for the moment, let's presume that the BoB was successful, and that German shipping was sufficient in numbers and capability. What then? Well, obviously, the Royal Navy was going to be a threat to the invasion & supply fleets. Granted, a Luftwaffe that had air superiority over SE England would threaten the RN in turn. But the Luftwaffe was very limited in night-targeting abilities, and once the invasion started, it was very plausible that British cruisers & destroyers would have "dashed" into the Channel for nighttime raids, even with the ability to "dash through" with English ports on either side. The Kriegsmarine in turn wasn't up to strength to parry all possible thrusts by the RN.

A more effective way to counter the RN would have been to extensively mine either side of an "invasion corridor" across the Channel. But here again, the minelaying abilities of the Germans probably weren't available in 1940 as to what was needed.

Or, to help "isolate" Britain and further threaten the RN could had been the German U-boat arm. But pre-war, U-boat leader Karl Donitz said that he needed 300 submarines to do the job effectively. Perhaps he was overestimating, but regardless, he had only 56 at war's start.

The reason that the BoB is regarded as focal, however, is that regardless of all other possibilities & theories on German resources, the Germans ultimately had to gain air superiority in SE England. Even on this end, I don't think this was going to be maintained for any sufficient time period in 1940. For one reason, as noted by others, the Luftwaffe of 1940 wasn't sufficiently built up in reserves of aircraft & aircrew to fight the level of attrition that had occured.

Second, the limited range of the German fighters made it so that the RAF bases of No. 10 & No. 12 Groups could not be attacked without restrictive bomber losses. Even if the SE England bases of No. 11 Group were "knocked out" earlier, Fighter Command could had simply pulled back its fighters to the bases further north & west, and kept them in reserve until the Germans started to move across the Channel. The empty "knocked-out" bases of No. 11 Group would likely had been repaired in the interim (at least the runways). So, the Luftwaffe would then have to "fight the battle all over again" over SE England.

Finally, even allowing that the Luftwaffe could greatly trump the RAF in attritional terms than was the case in 1940, the added fact is at this time the Luftwaffe "strike power" wasn't sufficient to neutralize the number & type of targets as to help chances for an amphibious assault. It was mainly a "tactical air force" being tasked to perform a strategic role. Beyond just attacking airfields, the aircraft factories, dockyards, munitions facilities, supply depots, naval warships, communications, coastal defences, road nets, etc. of SE England would all also have to had been attacked & crippled. Could the Luftwaffe had effectively attacked all of this with its light bomber forces in 1940?

So, in sum, the likelihood of German victory in the BoB and a successful Sealion in 1940 was virtually nil. As noted by others, Germany just was not "tooled up" in the needed resources & reserves for the job. The army was certainly capable, but it needed the air & naval resources to get it across that just weren't strong enough.

This seems to read as to "deflate" the historical contribution of RAF Fighter Command in the BoB, in that even a German "victory" in the BoB would still not had been enough to allow Sealion. But this is not the case. Even a psychological victory of the Luftwaffe in 1940 might had been enough in Hitler's eyes to remain interested as to consider "Sealion 1941" instead. Then one can start to ponder on possibilities (not necessarily probabilities) to German chances of defeating the RAF and of a Sealion success.

The epic defense of the RAF in the BoB, however, played its role to help Hitler to cast his eyes eastward instead; and thus set Germany on its fatal two-front course.

[PiggDogg]

Even if the Luftwaffe had acheived air superiority over the Channel, the Brits would have starved the German invasion forces by using and possibly sacrificing a relatively small number of destoyers. The Brits would not have had to even expose heavier ships (cruisers, much less battleships) to have stopped appreciable supply to the German invasion forces. :eek: :eek:

This does not even consider the Channel weather which has approximately 20 plus gale force storms per year.

The Germans were quite smart & fortunate not to have attempted Sealion.

Cheers, Richard

[Michael Emrys]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Spook:

Or, to help "isolate" Britain and further threaten the RN could had been the German U-boat arm. But pre-war, U-boat leader Karl Donitz said that he needed 300 submarines to do the job effectively. Perhaps he was overestimating, but regardless, he had only 56 at war's start.<hr></blockquote>

Now this is an interesting point. Forget about Sealion, if the Germans had begun the war with 200 U-boats and then increased that number to, say, 500 over the next two years, there ws a real possibility that they could have forced Britain to seek terms. Or if not that, then reduce them to military impotence.

The tricky question then becomes what in that case would the US have done? It is not obvious just how far Roosevelt would or could have gone in bringing the US into the war. We see the US Navy gradually assuming more and more of the escort duties prior to Pearl Harbor. That process might have been accelerated somewhat, but there were practical as well as domestic political constraints. I think we would have been extremely reluctant to see Britain removed as a belligerent, but a truly serious U-boat campaign might have resulted in that, at least temporarily.

Michael

[ 11-03-2001: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]</p>