Finland vs. USSR in CM2

[Skipper]

> However, I stand by that the forests were

> indeed immense were perhaps the most

> severe impact on combat.

Perhaps it was lakes. Lakes channel troop movement.

>did tanks have any effect in the war

>against Chechnia? No.

Resounding YES! As long as it was a "proper war" in the field, tanks ruled (as they are supposed).

> but it doesn't ammount to didly if you

> dont hit anything.

But soviet artillery used to hit quite a lot of things and generally was nowhere near "ineffective" or "conscript". Topical example: Karelian Front crossing Svir in the beginning phase of Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation. Artillery preparation started at 11:45 and lasted for 3.5 hours. Then there was a lull and finn defenders saw several rafts launched from the other side of the river. They opened fire, after which artillery barrage resumed for another 75 minutes, concentrating on newly discovered firing points. Those rafts carried dummies, and only 16 soldiers (each of them got a Golden Star afterwards). Real crossing went farily smoothly after that - finnish shore defences were thoroughly suppressed by artillery.

[Juha Ahoniemi]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

> You mean that U.S.S.R. wasn't interested

> in finlads as a whole.

No, I mean just what I say: ie, that soviet troops in Karelia did not have any directives or orientations from Stavka (high command) aiming them at Helsinki. At least, nothing like that is mentioned in the books. On the contrary, limited strategic objectives, such as I quoted from Meretskov, are mentioned.

I think, Stalin would love get the whole, but it seems that he did not consider it a feasible task at any stage.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

From http://virtual.finland.fi/finfo/english/war1.html :

“In the winter dawn of 30 November four Soviet Armies with 23 divisions - some 460,000 men with over 2,000 tanks - began advancing across the length of Finland's 1,200 km long eastern border. Their objective was to occupy the entire territory of Finland by the end of the year, installing Moscow's puppet 'Terijoki Government' in Helsinki, and establishing a new 'Democratic Republic of Finland'. Their troops were issued with detailed written warnings not to cross into Sweden once they had reached Finland's western border, and the 7. Army included a military band for the victory parade in Helsinki.”

Stalin's plan to bisect Finland from : http://www.publiscan.fi/sc20e-0.htm

"Stalin had clear plans," says the war historian Colonel Sampo Ahto. "Already during the Winter War the Soviet Union attacked with two divisions at Salla in an effort to cut right across Finland and reach the Swedish border at Tornio. However, Finland defended herself so effectively that the operation was a failure - like nearly every other Russian plan in the Winter War."

From: http://www.elknet.pl/acestory/finbomb/finbomb.htm

“Stalin had planned to occupy Finland in two weeks, whereafter Molotov's lies would soon be forgotten. The Soviet Union had already set up a puppet government, "the People's Government of Finland" (made up of Finnish -born Soviet Communist party functionaries surviving the purges of '37) and claimed that all military action was only to help that government. There was no war, just action against the "armed bands" of the Helsinki government to help the oppressed people of Finland: this was the official line of the Kreml. The Finnish people, however, tenaciously refused to be liberated by Stalin.”

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Protocols that you mentioned meant exactly the following: if one side undertook operations in her "sphere of influence", the other side wouldnt mind it.

Btw, Stalin and USSR in general were not notorious for breaking treaties. Not that their track record was perfectly clean (whose was?), but it was one of the best.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

About soviets keeping their treaties, Finland signed a non-aggression pact with them in 1932. Soviets broke it 28.11.1939 and cut diplomatic ties with Finland 29.11.1939. Next day they attacked.

From: http://virtual.finland.fi/finfo/english/before.html

“In international politics, Stalin trusted only the Red Army, which was now purged of its old officers. He used the army to consolidate his foothold in neighbouring countries. Pieces of paper like nonagression pacts did not interest him in the least. “

Roosevelt knew the name of the game too : at the time of Stalin's invasion of Finland at the end of November 1939, FDR had privately expressed dismay and remarked: "No human being can tell what the Russians are going to do next.''

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Besides, it was not terribly smart to have any misunderstandings with other allies in a crucial moment of fall '44. Mind you, at that time it was not known yet, whether the war will last for a few months or a few years, and indeed whether nazy regime will survive or not.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

In previous post Skipper Wrote: “ Diplomacy of all sorts played a big role in the outcome of that conflict. Ex, in 1942 USSR, UK and USA made a pledge to each other - not to make any new territorial acquisitions as a result WWII.”

Quite opposite! Read http://www.hazlitt.org/e-texts/fdrmyth/fdrmyth_Chapter_Nine___The_Great_Confere.htm

There is stuff about Atlantic Charter : Soviet ­ British ­ American agreement recognizing Russia's claims to the Baltic states, Finland and the eastern half of Poland. (well not all were included in final agreement if I understood the text correctly). Point is that Stalin got quite free hands!

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

> The cold fact is: ALL COUNTRIES THAT GAVE

> UP TO STALIN'S DEMANDS CEASED TO EXIST!

I dont understand this statement. Which countries were you thinking about? :confused:

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I mean Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

School education is fine and dandy, but... Real history is always too complicated to teach to a class of teenagers. Everywhere kids are taught a simplified, black and white interpretation, where their own kin are inevitably white.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

But I'm not a teenager sitting in a history lesson and there is a lot of stuff that wasn't in the books when I was. Opening of Moscow archives reveals many interesting things, and Finns have surely dug up some stuff about WWII including original plans Stalin had for Finland. They make great document these days, the investigators of those archives.

Just one more comment about situation in 1944:

From: http://virtual.finland.fi/finfo/english/after.html

“The allies invaded Normandy on June 6, 1944. Three days later Stalin launched a major offensive in the East. It was directed against Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus.The scale of the offensive was enormous, even when viewed from the perspective of the Second World War as a whole. The concentration of over 3000 guns broke through Finnish positions and Viipuri was lost on June 20. The Finns were nevertheless able to stop the offensive soon thereafter, and the Russians realized that further advances with the forces at their disposal were no longer possible.

Stalin’s massive offensive was senseless by all accounts since Finnish troops did not pose a military threat. Its geopolitical inconsistency also became evident when the advance came to a halt and the troops were transferred to the 'race to Berlin'.”

[ 05-30-2001: Message edited by: Juha Ahoniemi ]

[Ari Maenpaa]

Commissar,

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by The Commissar:

2) By "real" I mean an attack that the Soviet army was famous for at the time. If the first one failed, they would regroup, rearm, and stage an assault many times more massive and with lessons learned about the state of preperation of the Finnish defenders. Stalin knew that this sort of attack could not be staged, as all available troops were used in pushing back the Germans. Finland was deemed to be no major threat to the USSR and thus forgoten. Besides, although no none-conditional surrender was established, the Soviets did get land and a cease fire to eliminate Finland from their list of potential problems. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I haven’t my sources available right now, but I think that the whole Soviet assault was in fact series of “staged” attacks, just like you described. It wasn’t an everyday rush against Finnish defences. Particularly in Tali-Ihantala area the Soviet main forces regrouped, rearmed and assaulted many consecutive times. Or at least tried, because the Finns could get those regrouping areas under accurate artillery fire thus preventing many attacks even before they materialized. Also detachment Kuhlmey’s Stukas helped greatly there. And the Soviet troop transfers away from the Finnish front began only after the main assault had run out of steam. Not before the Soviets realized that further advances with the forces at their disposal were no longer possible.

I agree that Finland never was a major threat to the USSR. And without paranoid and aggressive Soviet politics, it most likely wouldn’t have been even a minor one.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> 3) As I said, its difficult with the massive forests and wilderness to have any success with tank use. Now, I know I hoped this would not get brought up as it is dealing with a weakened Russia, but...did tanks have any effect in the war against Chechnia? No. If they did have any effect, it was minimal. Mostly, they were expensive targets.

In the winter war, they had more of an effect in the more massive battles. However, considering the terrain and the countless numbers of ambushes that were relatively easy to stage. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

It’s wrong to assume that the whole frontline was in deep forest. It wasn’t. There were suitable terrain for tank operations particularly in Istmus area, where the deciding battles were fought. Also the lakes and even Baltic Sea were frozen in wintertime allowing troops to pass.

I agree that a tank isn’t an invulnerable weapon. In forested terrain tanks need infantry support. Infantry needs artillery and tanks. Soviets had them all abundantly. But during Winter War they lacked skill to use them in close co-operation. Same seemed to happen again in Chechenya (I respected your hope, but you brought it up yourself ). So quickly can lessons from history be forgotten. And I don’t mean the Russians only.

Btw. those new Russian aerosol weapons appeared to be formidable.

I also hope that the currently weak Russia could finally gets on her feet and bring back law and order in the whole country. It’s sad how communism ruined a great nation. Hopefully it will get brighter in future.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> 4) ... If I can't see what Im throwing shells at, there's a 1 in 100 chance that I'll hit something, especially if the target is small (like many Finnish forces).

Oh, and entire forests burned down and not being able to hide in them is, forgive my language, bulls@it. First off, there was still plenty of forests to hide in. Second off, even in a burned down forest of charred husks of wood, you can hide damn well. Especially in snow. Give me a white suit and have me lie down in the snow sorrounded by charred logs. See if you're able to notice me from even 50 metres off. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Firstly, I didn’t claim that all Finnish forests were burned down, just those woods on the actual battlefield. Let’s look at Winter War battles in Isthmus area: the frontline was static for months despite Soviet efforts. The whole time Soviets bombarded Finnish main defence line with inexhaustible barrages. There was no fear for counter battery fire. Protective woods were burned down and snow was blown away. Even those white suits got muddy in the snowless pits the Finns were lying. And anyway, what good would it make to have a white suit in charred snowless terrain?

But yep, proportionally speaking there were so few Finns that no catastrophic losses could be caused by any single grenade. Still the losses inexorably built up along time.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> 5) ... If it wasn't for the sacrifises of the early Soviet fighters who, sometimes unwillingly, died for the "motherland", the USSR would have been overrun.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I don’t want to belittle the sacrifices of Soviet fighters. They made it possible for Europe to avoid becoming permanent part of the Third Reich.

Although it would be interesting to hear opinions about this from Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Czech, Slovakian, Hungarian, Romanian and Bulgarian people, as they were forced under the yoke of Moscow’s communist regime for 50 years. They were autonomous nations only on paper. That was how Soviet Union honored the pledges to the other allied nations. And without doubt Finland would have shared the same dreadful fate had the Red Army succeeded in it’s attempts to crush Finnish lines during ’40 or ’44.

For further background information about Finnish – Russian relations during WW2 , I suggest:

http://www.finland.org/before.html

http://www.finland.org/after.html

Ari

[ 05-30-2001: Message edited by: Ari Maenpaa ]

[Ari Maenpaa]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

At least, nothing like that is mentioned in the books. On the contrary, limited strategic objectives, such as I quoted from Meretskov, are mentioned.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What books you are referring to? When were they written?

Like Juha already said, your information sounds like coming from the former Soviet Union. Ie. Kremlin hardly ever admitted any kind of mistakes on their part. It was sometimes quite ridiculous. The official Soviet war history of The Great Patriotic War, for instance, was partly (re)written to make it look like a big heroic tale for the Red Army. Is it still somewhere referred as being a reliable historical source?

It's imperative that your sources are based on the latest findings in the former USSR's closed archives. But if that already is the case then feel free to enlighten us more.

Ari

[Skipper]

Juha:

The URL you referred to is an iterpretation, and quite visibly black and white one. I would be compelled, if it quoted any soviet MILITARY document that would set out plans for occupation of the whole Finland (no press articles and public speeches, please). As it is, it's a school textbook interpretation.

In 1940, Mannerheim line was eventually broken. That was the background for the subsequent armistice. Notably, RKKA could but did not advance further than they wanted to go.

Afaik, throughout the war USSR asserted claims to parts of Finland, those parts that eventually were ceded to soviet sovereignty as a result of war.

Orders not to cross Swedish border: where is Swedish border and where is Helsinki?

Ari:

Marshall Meretskov was 7th army CO in 1940 and Karelian Front CO in 1944. His memoir was published in 1968. Memoirs being what they are, he still never talks about plans to occupy Finland. Neither in 1940, nor in 1944.

[Ari Maenpaa]

Skipper,

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

Marshall Meretskov was 7th army CO in 1940 and Karelian Front CO in 1944. His memoir was published in 1968. Memoirs being what they are, he still never talks about plans to occupy Finland. Neither in 1940, nor in 1944.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Frankly I would take Meretskov’s memoir with grain and salt.

Why?

Because it was published in time when USSR was at it’s pinnacle. As I said earlier, it wasn’t Kremlin’s way to confess blunders on their side. I assume that being common information to all of us?

For instance the official “cause” for Winter War were gunshots which landed on Russian village called Mainila. USSR accused Finland for those, but only recently it cleared up officially (from the archives) that it was actually USSR, who carried them out. Of course the Soviet Union never admitted that.

I don’t believe that in ’68 it would have been possible for recognized military commander to publish his memoir which were in clear conflict with official history. And the official history was that USSR never practised aggressive politics. And USSR was a totalitarian country. So how could it have been possible for Meretskov to publish memoir which would have proved something else? This of course means that there’s no mention about occupation orders in his memoir.

Did you know that nothing was teached about The Winter War in Soviet schools? So basically it was something that never really happened to an average Soviet citizen. I doubt that even now there’s mention about “Mainila shots” or which country committed them in Russian school books. Hopefully I’m wrong.

Ari

[ 05-30-2001: Message edited by: Ari Maenpaa ]

[The Commissar]

Ari,

1) Although this assault or assaults did not completely crush all Finnish resistance, they achieved the objective of concluding an agreement and a land deal with Finland. If this deal was refused on Finland's part, and the USSR high command felt that it still required to be defeated, it would have been. Even if this assault was a group of assaults instead of a single one (a practical theory even without historical evidence, since launching one giant attack would be very cluttered and lead to disaster in the more closed terrain of Finland), the USSR would have eventually dominated Finland, despite losses. That this was not so because an agreement was indeed reached, is obviously a great relief for all Finns who were saved from the grip of communism.

2) OK, let's look at the Isthmus battles and discuss them in detail. Now, seeing as how you are more familiar with the battle(s), I'll ask you exactly in what sort of terrain these battles were fought and if indeed this was terrain in which tanks were useful.

As I see it, the ideal terrain for tank warfare would be somewhat resembling the Russian steppes or perhaps the deserts of Africa. Here, with the tank able to cross large distances quickly and concentrate massed firepower upon the exposed enemy (or perhaps their rear or flank), made the tank a very useful weapon. Even in the less open terrains of Russia the tanks still proved their worth, as Russia is a land with much open space.

Now, let us discuss the Isthmus area. I assume it is not a steppe or a desert. I also assume some sort of cover had to be present, or otherwise the tanks would simply roll over the infantry, especially since the Finns did not have much AT capability (meaning conventional AT means like guns and rifles). Since I once again do not have a map, I will stop here and await further responce.

3) You said yourself those suits get muddy...perfect for charred earth with broken patches of woods, snow, and other clutter

4) To be fair, quite a few of those countries were part of Russia before the communist revolution. Poland being among them. Looking at how the Soviets bringing the smaller nations under their reign, I see nothing amazing in it. Simply human nature. If you had to fight over hundreds of miles of terrain, with much hardship and loss, to finally defeat the enemy, would you toddle on home and say goodbye to all the nice people you sacrifised so much for? Nah. The USSR was power hungry. If I was in command of such an immense nation, I would be too.

Skipper,

I will have to disagree with you on tanks having a large effect on the war against Chechnia. Especially the first war.

Throught the majority of both wars, tanks ammounted to very little. It was unconventional warfare, after all. A tank is useful when you have an enemy in number, concentrated, fighting a regular war. When the enemy pretends to be a regular civilian by day, and then goes out by night to mine the road or set up RPG ambushes for your armored collumns, that's guerrilla combat. Most battles lasted/last only several minutes, with the Chechens achieving surprise and retreating. Sometimes they pull it off well, sometimes they do not, but usually the Russian forces do not have the time required to call in tank support.

[Juha Ahoniemi]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

Juha:

The URL you referred to is an iterpretation, and quite visibly black and white one. I would be compelled, if it quoted any soviet MILITARY document that would set out plans for occupation of the whole Finland (no press articles and public speeches, please). As it is, it's a school textbook interpretation.

In 1940, Mannerheim line was eventually broken. That was the background for the subsequent armistice. Notably, RKKA could but did not advance further than they wanted to go.

Afaik, throughout the war USSR asserted claims to parts of Finland, those parts that eventually were ceded to soviet sovereignty as a result of war.

Orders not to cross Swedish border: where is Swedish border and where is Helsinki?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I'm sorry I can't read text in russia (can You?) so didn't find (at this time)direct russian military acrchive about orders to occupy Finland. However following text IMHO can be trusted as a source of information. It is Official Web site of Finnish army. Here is discription about the document: "Finland and NATO, Tomas Ries (in English)

"Finland and NATO" is an introduction to the open discussion of NATO in Finland. It is not meant as a definite study of this topic, but as a first contribution to a broad open examination of NATO issues. The basic purpose is to break the ice for further analysis."

Here is quote from that text: "Thus the first foundation for Finland's independence is of course the fact that Finland's Defence Forces prevented two determined Soviet attempts to occupy Finland through military force. The first in 1939 - 1940, and the second in the summer of 1944. With today's release of archival material there is no longer any doubt that Stalin in fact intended to occupy all of Finland in 1939, and most of southern Finland in 1944. Nor should there be any doubt that had he succeeded Finland's fate during the Cold War would have resembled that of Estonia - at best that of Poland."

here is URL for You : http://www.mil.fi/tiedotus/julkaisut/finland_and_nato/chapter_1.html

Before You question this source I remind You that Finland is a democracy with free press, member of EU and don't have any need for anti-russian propaganda.

So it's no wonder You haven't see stalins real plans in Your history books (especially if there was a red star on cover...)

[ 05-30-2001: Message edited by: Juha Ahoniemi ]

[Skipper]

> Frankly I would take Meretskov’s memoir

> with grain and salt.

But of course! All I say is that so far I've seen no evidence of occupation plans, but some (non-conclusive) evidence that RKKA had a different operational task.

> For instance the official “cause” for

> Winter War were gunshots which landed on

> Russian village called Mainila.

iirc, they landed on a border guard post. Funnily enough, reports from the place of that incident were published in the newspapers on the same day. It is no question, who was the aggressor.

Official post-war version for the reason of Winter War, however, was a military threat to Leningrad, Murmansk and Kola peninsula. Failed attempt to negotiate an exchange of land.

> Did you know that nothing was teached

> about The Winter War in Soviet schools?

Not true. Something was. At least, after the school I knew that before 22 June 1941 there were small clashes with Japanese and Finns. Both successful for the soviet side.

> I doubt that even now there’s mention

> about “Mainila shots” or which country

> committed them in Russian school books.

> Hopefully I’m wrong.

Hopefully, you are right - this is real history, not for schoolchildren.

> Before You question this source I remind

> You that Finland is a democracy with free

> press, member of EU and don't have any

> need for anti-russian propaganda.

Don't underestimate the consequences of this fact on the validity of source. It has a modern political agenda. It has no reference to the actual research paper. It just says that it is now "obvious". Hmm...

[Skipper]

> I will have to disagree with you on tanks

> having a large effect on the war against

> Chechnia. Especially the first war.

Their presence pretty much determined that insurgents had to withdraw from "proper war", which they initially attempted to wage, both in 1995 and 2000. Guerilla warfare has as many disadvantages, as advantages for them.

To use CM analogy, imagine that we you have to assault on a map which sports an impassable ridge across most of the map, with a narrow passage in the centre. So, you are forced to go through this passage, with all the relevant consequences. To say that tanks were unimportant to chechen war is same as to say that this ridge was unimportant to the scenario.

But, on top of that analogy, there were many enough tactical engagements with tanks involved.

[Ari Maenpaa]

Skipper,

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

All I say is that so far I've seen no evidence of occupation plans... <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I’m sure that you won’t find any evidence about the occupation plans in any memoir published in USSR. And it doesn’t mean that there weren’t any plans.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> iirc, they landed on a border guard post. Funnily enough, reports from the place of that incident were published in the newspapers on the same day. It is no question, who was the aggressor. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The communist Soviet Union :mad:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Official post-war version for the reason of Winter War, however, was a military threat to Leningrad, Murmansk and Kola peninsula. Failed attempt to negotiate an exchange of land. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Was this the version teached in Soviet schools?

There was no military threat. The original reason for Winter War was Stalin’s paranoia. He was ready to kill masses of his own people without hesitation. Just for distrust. So it’s no wonder that he was also ready to eliminate Finland. Hitler and Stalin were similar in many respects. I think that T. Vihavainen has compacted the background of The Winter War truthfully and well in http://www.finland.org/before.html

Is that pure propaganda to you?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Not true. Something was. At least, after the school I knew that before 22 June 1941 there were small clashes with Japanese and Finns. Both successful for the soviet side. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

But was that the same Winter War than we know, or totally something false?

I’m also interested what they teached about the occupation of the Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia), as it is quite related to the Winter War. Have you any information about that?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> > I doubt that even now there’s mention

> about “Mainila shots” or which country

> committed them in Russian school books.

> Hopefully I’m wrong.

Hopefully, you are right - this is real history, not for schoolchildren. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Are you saying that truth is NOT for schoolchildren? How are they supposed to learn anything from history if they don’t even know it?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> > Before You question this source I remind

> You that Finland is a democracy with free

> press, member of EU and don't have any

> need for anti-russian propaganda.

Don't underestimate the consequences of this fact on the validity of source. It has a modern political agenda. It has no reference to the actual research paper. It just says that it is now "obvious". Hmm...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That was straight from official pages. Dr. Tomas Ries (the writer) is an internationally recognized researher. He is a citizen of USA and came to work in Finland from Switzerland. No offence, but I understand that anyone who has been a citizen of former USSR, takes any official information with great suspicion. Probably in same circumstances I would too. But in this case Dr. Ries' text seems valid enough to me.

Ari

[André]

Finnish SMG ski soldier:

[zahl]

It is a common misconception that having fulfilled their given task, the Red Army halted the offensive, but could have continued if needed.

The directives, plans and actions to signify this were carefully suppressed in Soviet political and military history, but not entirely. In the following I quote two sources, both of which were written during the Soviet era by Soviet authors. S. M. Shtemenko was Chief of Operations Directorate of the General Staff at that time. His memoirs, entitled "Generalnyj shtab v gody Vojny" (The Soviet General Staff at War) is a two volume out of print classic that saw limited circulation in the west.

The second volume deals with the 1944 summer offensive on Finland and includes an interesting map that shows Leningrad Front's objectives. According to caption, this plan was authorized by Stavka. Leningrad Front would overrun the Karelian Isthmus, capture Viipuri, cross the border that was agreed upon after the Winter War and continue the drive towards Helsinki.

Shtemenko wrote about the preparations that were carried out in the spring of 1944: "After the Finnish government had rejected our conditions for peace [April 44], Stavka and the General Staff had to reconsider which forces should be eliminated first - the Finns or the Germans [in Lapland]. [...] In the Finnish section of the front we could swiftly advance within striking distance of the major population centers of Finland as they were closer in that direction. And the Finnish main forces were deployed there. Their defeat would result in the collapse of the entire Finnish defensive system. For this offensive we had at our disposal the Leningrad Front, the Karelian Front, the Baltic Sea Fleet and a great number of aircraft."

He then claims that the Finnish defensive preparations were very solid, but that the troops and material available would crack them.

Shtemenko writes that the Leningrad front had a decisive manpower and material advantage and gives the following ratios: infantry 2:1, armor 6:1, artillery 6:1, aircraft 3:1. This apparently includes all reinforcements received by both sides during the offensive (Kuhlmey et al). The Leningrad front had 30 divisions in 3 armies, including 5 divisions received as reinforcements at the end of June. The Karelian front had 15 divisions (2 armies) for the offensive.

These forces were led by experienced and successful commanders, Govorov, commander of the Leningrad Front, and Meretskov, commander of the Volkhov Front. They had defeated the German forces south of Leningrad, breaching the siege and liberated Novgorod and Luga.

Meretskov was assigned to command the Karelian Front after the Volkhov front was disbanded on February 13, 1944.

Shtemenko: "Leningrad Front was to strike first at the enemy main forces. The objective was to breach the Finnish resistance in the direction of Viipuri, threatening to advance deep into Finland towards the primary centers of political and economic activity, including Helsinki."

After Viipuri was captured, he continues: "The time had arrived for our [Leningrad Front] armies to advance beyond Viipuri, into Finland, and along the western shores of Lake Ladoga, towards north, into the rear of enemy defenses in Karelia." The fact that these attacks were repulsed is basic military history.

The Karelian front did not reach their final objective either. Shtemenko clearly states that the objective in Karelia was to break into enemy rear, encircle and eliminate the Finnish forces, but this did not happen. He writes: "The enemy was able to withdraw and parried imminent thrusts. As it turned out, we had not been able to annihilate the enemy forces, but only managed to push them back so that they slipped through our fingers."

More serious setbacks were about to emerge, however. Shtemenko reveals what happened to Meretskov's spearhead: "When our units were approaching the border at Kuolismaa, two divisions found themselves to be in a critical situation. In that difficult terrain the Finns had encircled them." In Stavka's report it was said, according to Shtemenko: "it was mainly due to bad leadership that the last operation on the left flank of the Karelian Front did fail. Stavka has likewise noted that the staff of the front is full of inefficient and incapable personnel."

This staff, including the commander Meretskov, was the ex-staff of the disbanded Volkhov Front.

One final quote from "Bitva za Leningrad":

"The repeated offensive attempts by the Soviet Forces failed to gain results. The enemy succeeded in significantly tightening its ranks in this area and repulse all the attacks of our troops. During the offensive operations lasting over three weeks, from June 21 to mid-July, the forces of the right flank of the Leningrad front failed to carry out the tasks assigned to them on the orders of the Supreme Command issued on June 21st."

I could continue this, but let me just state the facts. Finland did not capitulate or surrender, although the Soviet Union demanded this during the offensive. Finland was not occupied, unlike all the other countries that were at war with the Soviet Union. The Finnish army was not defeated nor was it disarmed. It withdrew and fought the Red Army to a standstill - holding unbroken lines when the peace treaty was signed. Military wise, the Finnish defensive victories had resulted in a strategic draw, neither side having the strength to resume offensive operations. Politically Finland had to accept harsh conditions since it was obvious that eventually the Soviet Union would concentrate new forces in the northern theater of operations and hammer their will in. However, these conditions were easier than in the spring of 1944.

[The Commissar]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

Their presence pretty much determined that insurgents had to withdraw from "proper war", which they initially attempted to wage, both in 1995 and 2000. Guerilla warfare has as many disadvantages, as advantages for them.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yet it can be argued that because of this withdrawal from conventional warfare to guerrilla combat is the reason that Russia lost the war with Chechnia.

In a conventional war, I doubt that the Russians would have lost or would have at the least suffered less casualties and defeats as they have suffered from the results of hit and run tactics of (usually) small groups of Mujihadeen.

I agree with you that guerrilla warfare has its disadvantages. It is difficult to concentrate men and remain undetected, you are forces to wait for ideal conditions in which to launch attacks and ambushes, and your men are forced to blend in with the civilian population or live hidden in the wilderness in order to not be discovered.

However, the advantages proved to be greater during the course of this war. This was largely due to inefficient Russian leadership, bad morale, lack of funds and many other reasons all contributing to the poor state of the Russian military.

Thus, AFV's lost their effectiveness. When they were lucky enough to survive an ambush, they could provide assistance to the fighting men. These rare occurances (an RPG shot from a hidden position some 50 or less meters away accompanied by automatic rifle fire usually renders an advancing collumn shred tp pieces) were an exception.

[killmore]

Couple of Comments:

1) Before winter war Finns started to build a huge defense line with long range guns - Soviets thought it was a threat to them. I think KV2 was built partially to breach such defenses.

2) I think Alan Clark wrote that Finns (& german units attached) had 2:1 advantage over Soviets in the 1941 - but Finns failed to achieve their objectives. Thus they were no super-soldiers. (And 3:2 in 1942)

3) My friends Grandfather fought in WinterWar on Soviet side. He said they had idiots for commanders. They were forced to attack the bunkers through the half frozen lake and most of them died. At night 10 of them walked around the lake and took out all of the defenders easily. (they were acticting on their own - had no such orders)

4) Finns were bravely defending in 1939

5) As a part of peace with Soviets Finns had to expell all German troops and stop sending supplies to Germany. There were battles between German troops and Finn troops in 1944

[Juha Ahoniemi]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by killmore:

Couple of Comments:

1) Before winter war Finns started to build a huge defense line with long range guns - Soviets thought it was a threat to them. I think KV2 was built partially to breach such defenses.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Here are links about it: http://www.mannerheim.fi/10_ylip/e_mlinja.htm http://www.mannerheim-line.ru/

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

2) I think Alan Clark wrote that Finns (& german units attached) had 2:1 advantage over Soviets in the 1941 - but Finns failed to achieve their objectives. Thus they were no super-soldiers. (And 3:2 in 1942)

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What objectives were those? I thought only one objective wasn't accomplished (during so called "attack-phase" of continuation war)and that was to get shorter frontline. Reason for not getting that was poor German advance in northern Finland and eastern side on Leningrad.

[Tero]

>1) Before winter war Finns started to build

>a huge defense line with long range guns -

>Soviets thought it was a threat to them.

Where DO you get this kind of info. Take look at

www.winterwar.com

and

www.mannerheim-line.ru

Yes, a Russian site on the breaching of the defensive line.

Firstly, there were no guns in the Finnish inventory that could have reached Leningrad from the border, let alone from further inside the Finnish territory.

Secondly, the defensive line was constructed quite far from the border.

>I think KV2 was built partially to breach

>such defenses.

Could be.

>2) I think Alan Clark wrote that Finns (&

>german units attached) had 2:1 advantage

>over Soviets in the 1941 - but Finns failed

>to achieve their objectives.

What ? What were these objectives they failed to adcheive ?

The Finnish army did adcheive the objectives set down by the Finnish High Command.

>Thus they were no super-soldiers. (And 3:2

>in 1942)

Nobody says they were. But they did outfight the Red Army repeatedly.

>3) My friends Grandfather fought in

>WinterWar on Soviet side. He said they had

>idiots for commanders. They were forced to

>attack the bunkers through the half frozen

>lake and most of them died.

Drowned ? Exposure ? Shot ? If the lake was half frozen they could not have gone over it and survive without proper shelter.

>At night 10 of them walked around the lake

>and took out all of the defenders easily.

>(they were acticting on their own - had no

>such orders)

Where and when did this take place ?

>5) As a part of peace with Soviets Finns had

>to expell all German troops and stop sending

>supplies to Germany. There were battles

>between German troops and Finn troops in

>1944

Concur

[Skipper]

killmore:

>1) Before winter war Finns started to build

>a huge defense line with long range guns -

>Soviets thought it was a threat to them.

Mannerheim line itself had field guns, not long range.

Long range (naval) guns were in other places. I dont think these could reach Leningrad, either.

The perceived threat was not the LR artillery, but the fact that an attack launched from the pre-1940 border had very good chance to capture Leningrad and cut Murmansk railroad in a matter of days. Both were extremely vital from soviet military planners point of view. Besides, Finnish Gulf islands could effectively lock soviet Baltic Fleet within the harbour.

Only prototype KV (five different prototype KVs, iirc) took part in 1940 war.

The most successful tool for taking out bunkers turned out to be a high caliber (152mm or more) gun in direct fire mode, concrete piercing round.

zahl:

Shtemenko is the book I dream to put my hands on.

As I understand it now, what Meretskov tells in his book was the objectives for the first stage (which was more or less successfully achieved). 1944 operation actually had further goals, which were not achieved.

So, what is the final conclusion about strategic outcome of 1944 fighting? Soviet primary goal in that sector clearly was to take Finland out of war, thus releasing several armies for operations in West and South West directions. That's why peace negotiations took place both in April and in August '44. Ie, right from the start, Stalin was prepared to accept an armistice. This objective was achieved, and it was enough.

Secondary objective was to encircle and destroy finnish main forces, which could have led to a possibility of occupation. Which did not happen, and this was essentially blamed on Meretskov and his subordinates.

As for 1940 campaign, it still seems to me that after Mannerheim line was breached, there was a possibility of occupation, which soviet side did not exploit for reasons well beyond the military domain.

[tss]

I get caught by Real Life for some time and when I come back, I find this thread. Well, on to replies...

Tero wrote:

Firstly, there were no guns in the Finnish inventory that could have reached Leningrad from the border, let alone from further inside the Finnish territory.

Finnish army (WWII-time) had only one gun that could fire from the pre WWII-border to suburbs of Leningrad. It was a 305 mm railroad gun that was captured from Soviets at Hanko in 1941. Several other 305 mm coastal guns were in use even before the war, but they had shorter range. However, I think that they could have reached the Krondstadt fortress if they had been positioned right at the border, but they weren't (the Esternmost coastal fort at Ino was disarmed in the 20's according to terms of the peace agreement between Finland and Soviet-Russia).

2) I think Alan Clark wrote that Finns (&

german units attached) had 2:1 advantage

over Soviets in the 1941 - but Finns failed

to achieve their objectives.

What ? What were these objectives they failed to adcheive ?

I'm not certain about that 2:1 advantage. It surely happened in some parts of the front, but not in all places. I guess that the Clark reference is about the attack towards the Murmansk railway at Kiestinki region.

The most complete Finnish victory of 1941 happened at Western Karelian Isthmus and there was three Finnish infantry divisions against three Soviet infantry divisions. Two Soviet divisions were encirled and they lost all their heavy equipment (most captured intact) and most of their men, the third division was knocked out of battle.

Thus they were no super-soldiers. (And 3:2 in 1942)

After December 1941 there weren't any Finnish offensives at all, barring local counter-attacks. When the Soviets noticed that the Finnish front is quiet and will likely remain so, they took most of their troops out to fight Germans. In 1943 there were about 300000 Finns at front and 150000 Soviets, a difference of 2:1.

- Tommi

[ 06-01-2001: Message edited by: tss ]

[tss]

Skipper wrote:

Note that soviet generals never had a directive to go to Helsinki - neither in 1940, nor in 1944.

I don't know about 1940, but in 1939 they certainly had one. Oh, technically the honor of libarating Helsinki was reserved for the "People's Army of Finland" that was the "army" of the communist puppet "People's Government of Finland" that was formed at Terijoki on 1 December, 1939 shortly after RKKA had captured it.

The Terijoki Government is perhaps the best evidence for the fact that Stalin didn't simply want the Karelia Isthmus for the war. After it was formed, the official policy of the Soviet government was that it was the only legal government of Finland. In particular this meant that negotiations to end the war were not possible (until Stalin quietly disbanded it in February, IIRC).

Originally, the intent was that the "People's Army" would have two or three divisions formed from Finnish communists. In practice, it had only a single regiment and less than 50% of its manpower had Finnish roots (Finns, Ingrians, Karelians, Vatjans, Vepsäns, ...) and the rest came from different parts of Soviet Union (at least Russians, Ukrainians, and Kazahs). The non-Finnish men of the unit saw the humor of the situation and there was a running joke about Finnish mines ("Finskij mini", pardon my terrible Russian) and Minskian Finns ("Minskij Finni").

I've read several interviews of men of the "People's Army", and they all say that they were told that they would be the unit to liberate Helsinki.

As for 1944, soviet generals considered results of the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation, and consequent peace treaty with Finland as a 100% successful.

They might have considered it a success. However, according to the original operation plans it was a failure. The original plan was that the first phase of attack would capture Vyborg and the the attack would continue to Lappeenranta. Vyborg was captured but the RKKA was stopped long before Lappeenranta.

The Soviet attack against VKT-line at the Tali-Ihantala area was a real attack and it was stopped. It is also clear that Soviets could have crushed Finland militarily in late 1944 if they had committed themselves to it. However, the first try failed and they would have sent a lot more troops in to do it. That was one thing that Stalin didn't want to do, since Germany was the main adversary so he was satisfied to have a conditional armistice.

Note that the terms of the armistice were much more lenient than the terms that Stalin had given in March 1944. (In particular, the condition that Germans had to be evicted from Finland in only two weeks--a truly impossible task--was removed).

In 1940, Mannerheim line was eventually broken. That was the background for the subsequent armistice. Notably, RKKA could but did not advance further than they wanted to go.

I think that particular statement is little misleading. First, it is quite certain that had the war continued for several weeks more, Finnish defence would have totally collapsed. In the Karelian Isthmus there were three critical points (from South to North):

1) The Viipuri Bay. The Soviet breakthrough had been contained but the defenders were spread so thin that had the attack continued with reinforcements, the defence could have stood for maybe 3-4 days, not more.

2) The Tali area. Here the Finnish 23rd replacement division was all but crushed. The division commander was not too good and his men were poorly-trained and green. Here the next Soviet attack would probably have resulted in breakthrough and a possible encirclement of Vyborg.

3) The Vuosalmi-Äyräpää area. Finnish defenders were depleted and utterly tired. Additionally, the Soviets had captured most of the Äyräpää ridgeline and had an excellent LOS to Finnish lines. Here the defence could have stood for several days, at most.

The worst thing for Finns was that there was only _one_ trained infantry batallion left as strategic reserves in the whole country. There were also several very poorly trained replacement units that would not have had real change in a battle.

Thus, that part of your statement that RKKA could have advanced more is true.

However, to claim that they didn't want to advance is false. In particular, the attacks against Vyborg continued to the end of war. In fact, last attacks were made in the morning of 13 March, a few hours before the peace, because some general or marshall wanted to conquer the town by arms. (I've read an account by one Russian soldier who had to participate in that last attack. He was _very_ bitter about it).

In the end the Soviet decision to negotiate the peace was a political and not military. Stalin feared the possibility of war against Britain and France more than he wanted to occupy Finland. However, I believe that if he had known the true Finnish military situation, he would have continued the war.

- Tommi

[Ari Maenpaa]

Commissar,

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by The Commissar:

1) Although this assault or assaults did not completely crush all Finnish resistance, they achieved the objective of concluding an agreement and a land deal with Finland… <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I recommend to read zahl’s recent post. Thanks to him for his effort to settle this issue.

Just a little list of related events:

9 June 44 Large scale Soviet attack by 21st Army begins on Karelian Isthmus with one of the most intensive artillery bombardments of the Second World War.

21 June 44 Finland asked terms for peace via Sweden.

22 June 44 Soviet Union demanded unconditional surrender

3 July 44 Red Army tries to achieve breakthrough in Ihantala, but fails.

7 July 44 Battles in Ihantala end.

8 July 44 German 122nd Division repulses last enemy attempt to cross the Gulf of Viborg.

10 July 44 Soviet Stavka orders forces in Carelian Isthmus to take defensive positions. Best troops are moved to fight against Germans.

12 July 44 Soviet Union informs the Swedish that it is willing to discuss peace with Finland.

In ’44 (like in ’40) Finland had no other rational choices than accept the peace treaty with harsh conditions. Finland alone had no resources to stand against USSR for long. The most important thing for the nation was to preserve her independence. And that succeeded. Now when looked afterwards, as you said, it’s indeed a relief that Finland was saved from the grip of communism.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> 2) OK, let's look at the Isthmus battles and discuss them in detail. Now, seeing as how you are more familiar with the battle(s), I'll ask you exactly in what sort of terrain these battles were fought and if indeed this was terrain in which tanks were useful. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Ehh, now when you have already told everybody how easy it was for the Finns just hide and ambush the Soviet troops from their forested mountains, you ask what kind of terrain it really was.

Well... I don’t mind

Karelian Isthmus had quite diverse terrain. No major elevations, but many ponds and ditches which were frozen during wintertime. Sixty years ago there were fields and the whole Finnish Karelia was often called as Finland’s grain storage. Road network was good, as Tommi (TSS) has demonstrated with his PDF-map from 1938. And then, yep, there were forests too. Those big waters around the Isthmus freeze during the Winter War thus giving more elbow room for the armies.

As a whole the Isthmus can’t be said to be ideal tank terrain, because of diversity. Still there were enough fields and roads to make it very possible to carry out concentrated tank attacks. Although even on Isthmus the terrain was generally spoken advantageous for the defender, it certainly wasn’t such continuous forest as you described all Finnish border to have been. Why else would the Soviets had ever feared that it was possible to attack Leningrad through the Isthmus area?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> I also assume some sort of cover had to be present, or otherwise the tanks would simply roll over the infantry, especially since the Finns did not have much AT capability (meaning conventional AT means like guns and rifles). <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

During Winter War the Soviet tanks were, in fact, able to roll over infantry lines. Not everywhere, but in certain places along the Finnish front. That is when many got destroyed by Molotov cocktails. Firstly, of course, the accompanying infantry had to be eliminated.

Quite possibly it might have been possible for concentrated Soviet tank force to achieve a deciding breakthrough, since there weren’t large masses of reserve troops behind Finnish lines. Once a tank succeeded to pass the Finnish defence line, it was quite free to do what it wanted. I guess that it never occurred to the Soviets how scarce manpower the Finns really had. Fortunately the Red Army had faulty doctrine: tanks were used for infantry support only. Once the following infantry got stalled the tanks usually also halted and retreated. Maybe Tuhatsevki could have fixed that but Stalin in his paranoia had had him executed three years earlier.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> 3) You said yourself those suits get muddy...perfect for charred earth with broken patches of woods, snow, and other clutter <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That was ankward. C’mon, you can do better

Anyway, to muddy your suit such way and and make good use of it, you have to be on the actual fire zone. Not somewhere else hiding and ambushing the enemy.

Anyway it’s impossible to hold the ground without being there right in the front line. And line the Finns held, because it was static so long. Surely they didn’t volunteer to be targets for Soviet guns. Of course all means were used to get protected against enemy fire and surveillance. Just how sane the Soviets were if they didn’t anticipate that? I think you confused Finnish defensive war to some kind of guerrilla warfare in which there aren’t clear front lines at all. That wasn’t the case.

There’s a picture from the Finnish Summa sector in Trotter’s book and the landscape seem to be straight from the moon. Wood cover was totally blown away. My talk wasn’t bulls@it. Soviet artillery had hellish power there. It’s amazing how the defenders endured such pressure.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> 4) To be fair, quite a few of those countries were part of Russia before the communist revolution. Poland being among them. Looking at how the Soviets bringing the smaller nations under their reign, I see nothing amazing in it. Simply human nature. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

How does it go about absolute power and corruption? Yep, the Russians have a long history as conquerors. They are not alone. The bigger the nation the bigger it’s ambition. Still that doesn’t justify anything. The war in Chechenya, for instance, is a direct fruit of Russian thirst for power. Aren’t the Chechens formerly conquered nation? To be fair I have to admit that even Finland has had it’s share of megalomaniac people. Fortunately the country has always been so small that it haven’t had resources to fuel such ambitions

In my opinion the Soviet Union was far too big to be administered efficiently even before the war. And after, with all the new territory, it went FUBAR. Of course communism was worthless politics to even begin with IMHO.

Tommi,

You have a good grip on these matters. So feel free to correct me if you spot error(s) on my posts

Same of course to all others too.

I'm going to be (k)off for couple of days.

Ari

[tss]

Skipper wrote:

But soviet artillery used to hit quite a lot of things and generally was nowhere near "ineffective" or "conscript".

In the late part of the war, true. In the early part (especially in the early Winter War) there was a lot of ineffective shelling where a battery would fire against the same empty spot of a forest for days or even weeks in some cases.

Lately I've been searching information about the Särkisyrjä battle, 18-21 July 1941. (My grandfather and his brother were there, my grand uncle was killed on the second day of the battle). A quite lot of the Finns who were there had been at Taipale in the Winter War. Taipale was among the most heavily-shelled front sections of the war. Still, two different sources of Särkisyrjä both quote Taipale veterans saying that Soviet artillery was much worse at Särkisyrjä than at Taipale. I haven't been able to find out how many artillery pieces Soviets had there, but most probably they had only one or two 76 mm batteries [Oops, editing. I meant to write batallions], plus some 82 mm mortars.

The reason for the perceived difference: at Särkisyrjä there was an excellent FO with an excellent position (the attic of a two-story school building situated on top of a high ridge). (Unfortunately, Särkisyrjä wasn't the worst artillery experience of the unit; in 1944 they were positioned at Rajajoki, the point of attack of the Soviet summer offensive. In that battle my grandfather was cut of his unit and had to spend three weeks behind Soviet lines with few of his mates).

There is a persistant legend (well, not an actual legend but an attitude) here in Finland that in pretty much all battles the Soviets had at least 10:1 superiority and that heaps of Russkies died for each Finnish casualty. The image of early-Winter War battles is imprinted very deep.

There certainly were combats like that (some even in the Continuation War), but in most cases the odds were quite equal, and losses were quite comparable.

For example, at Särkisyrjä Finns had (in practice) two batallions (I/JR 37 and III/JR 37) while Soviets had a reinforced batallion (the exact strength is not known). So Finns actually had a numerical superiority, but not very large. Finnish losses, in particular of I/JR 37, were terrible. I don't have the exact figures right now, but there were well over 100 KIA and 200 WIA (and 6 MIA). Soviet losses are not known. The heaviest company losses were for 1./JR 37, my grandfather's company. When they were ordered to attack to the heavily-fortified Kokkomäki hill on the third day of the battle, only 27 men were left in line, less than 20%.

The war diary of I/JR 37 estimates that Soviets losses were over 300 men, but that is almost certainly an exaggeration. In any case, Soviet losses were heavy, as evidenced by 12 Maxim MGs that were captured along with ~20 DT LMGs (I can't remember the actual figure).

Actually, Särkisyrjä is a perfect example in that the heavy losses were to a large extent result of the belief that "one Finn equals to 10 Russkies". The regiment commander, colonel Sainio, most apparently believed that "worthless Russkies" couldn't stand a determined attack by "real men", and stubbornly continued to order frontal attacks against the heavily-defended village, sending his reserves into the battle piecementally. After the second day of the battle he verbally abused major Komonen (commander of III/JR 37) for failing to cut the Ruskeala-Sortavala road and ordered him to buy and wear a dress.

It tells something of the battle that the losses of 1./JR 37 (later 9./JR 58) on that period were heavier than losses of the rest of the war combined, including the losses on 9-12 June 1944 when the company was, as I mentioned above, almost at the spearpoint of the Soviet major offensive.

- Tommi

[ 06-01-2001: Message edited by: tss ]

[tss]

Ari Maenpaa wrote:

And line the Finns held, because it was static so long.

One interesting thing is that at Taipale the front line units generally lost ~2/3 of their strenght during one stay in the trenches.

First, a term was two weeks, then it was shortened to one week, then to five days, and so on until at the end of the war the defenders were changed daily. The absolute losses changed from day to day, but the relative losses stayed remarkably constant throughout 1940.

- Tommi

[Skipper]

> They might have considered it [Vyborg-

> Petrozavodsk operation] a success.

They actually didn't - I am corrected. First stage went according to the plan, second went wrong.

One thing demonstrated by 1940 was that RKKA formations badly lacked mobility. Ie, there were fast tanks, but there weren't any means to haul infantry, artillery and supplies around with the same speed.

And you can't put an infantry squad on a T-26 or a BT-5 as riders - those were too light for that.

[Tero]

>They actually didn't - I am corrected. First

>stage went according to the plan, second

>went wrong.

I think the rate of success adcheived depends which set of objectives you use, the ones set before the attack or the ones set after the attack had stalled.

>One thing demonstrated by 1940 was that RKKA

>formations badly lacked mobility. Ie, there

>were fast tanks, but there weren't any means

>to haul infantry, artillery and supplies

>around with the same speed.

True to some extent. But I think the main cause was the fact that the exploitation phase failed because the tanks could go as far as they could but without infantry escort they fell back (or were taken out) when it got dark. The day light lasted for about 6 hrs or less at worst (9AM -3PM). Winter War demonstrated acutely that a tank without infantry escort is a dead tank driving. Even against an adversary armed with sticks and stones.

>And you can't put an infantry squad on a

>T-26 or a BT-5 as riders - those were too

>light for that.

They did develop armoured sledges which the tanks hauled behind them. Their effect is debatable.