Bulge Contention

[dalem]

Kwazydog-

MacDonald was a company commander in the 23rd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division from fall '44 to the end of the war.

"Company Commander" is a basically a diary of his command - no frills and no punches pulled. Very informative. If it's still not in print, do a search for it.

-dale

[Guest KwazyDog]

Thanks for the info Dalem

I will do some searching for it. I foudn his book about the Buldge very informative and would be greatly interested in reading his other book as well.

[This message has been edited by KwazyDog (edited 02-06-2000).]

[Spook]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Mark IV:

Other than the possibility of a Magic intercept of the Japanese diplomatic message, I know of no "evidence" that there was real foreknowledge of the Ardennes Offensive. It's always amazing, the extent to which "coulda" is interpreted as "evidence".<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Bingo. Well stated.

[Major Tom]

Also, we should start to consider wether or not that the 1944 Ardenness offensive was really that much of a threat? They managed to break through in the weakest part of the Allied line. There were virtually no reserves, they relied on capturing allied fuel dumps, and they also lacked air superiority. Lets say that the Germans managed to reach the outskirts of Antwerp. The neither had the men, material or fuel in which to hold this line. The best thing that the Germans could have hoped for was what actually happened, delay the allied advance into Germany. I hate to say it, but, the Battle of the Bulge get's way too much play in Western History. Every single child hears of it, but nobody hears of the more important battles, such as Falise or Goodwood, let alone the massively important ones in the East.

Seeing what actually happened in the battle I can only really come to the conclusion that the German's succeeded in maintaining secrecy, and were also successful in their retreat (it could have been MUCH worse). Also, no General is perfect, they are human, subject to human traits. Possibly Montgomery felt that stabalizing the situation would have been a safer mode of operation than to recklessly attack a foe which was thought of incapable of further attack (how was anyone supposed to really know that this wasn't a feint to take attention away from the real target?).

I read this one book years ago about the precieved Japanes naval order of battle by the Americans in 1944. There were many accurate accounts, but, most were completely wrong. There were entire fictional classes of ships. No matter how good the intelligence there are always mistakes made. I believe that the Ardennes offensive was one of those Allied mistakes, albeit a relatively bloodless one.

[Mark IV]

Major T: Exactly. While no one would argue that German occupation of Antwerp would have been a good thing (except Hitler), the generals leading the attack knew they weren't going to make it that far anyway. Even if they had, the situation would have been as you stated.

This was part of Montgomery's POV (point of view). He, and the British staff in general, were appalled at the American unwillingness to give ground and the casualties they took as a result. He did not believe that Patton could make it north in time, which was understandable without the benefit of hindsight. And he found a disorganized, demoralized, and disconnected American command staff which was allowing forces to be isolated and destroyed piecemeal through an unwillingness to "roll with the punch". He may have saved the 82nd Airborne from annihilation.

I'm not a big Monty fan (aren't there any Brits here?), but he was an extraordinary leader of men and had to make some big decisions in a tough spot. There were very different British and American styles, and Monty's approach to the Bulge was more conservative of human life. His idea was to a) guard the Meuse in case another attack developed in the north, reorganize the American forces and build a reserve on the Allied left, and c) stage a methodical attack as a left pincer to cut off the Germans. It doesn't sound as though communications from SHAEF were very specific, and both they and Monty were "assuming" about the other's goals, based on their own philosphies.

Though his approach lacked dash, it would have worked just as well with fewer Allied casualties in the long run. If he had only kept his mouth shut until the war was over, history might treat him more kindly.

[Spook]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Mark IV:

Though his approach lacked dash, it would have worked just as well with fewer Allied casualties in the long run. If he had only kept his mouth shut until the war was over, history might treat him more kindly. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

By & large, some good points you gave earlier, Mark IV. But to a certain degree, Monty's contribution can be asserted to mythical proportions too.

We can agree that it was appropriate for Ike to put Monty in overall command of the north. His "tidy" nature certainly helped in getting the 1st Army into better defense deployments. HOWEVER.....

1) When Monty first came up, he wanted the US to withdraw from Elsenborn Ridge altogether. Had this been done, it would've given a good deal more freedom of movement for 6th Panzer Army, and probably meant even higher US casualties in the Jan '45 counterattack.

2) His withdrawl of 82nd Airborne helped improve the frontage that unit had to cover, but it's speculative to say that Monty "saved it from annihilation." That ultimately depended on whether or not 2nd SS Panzer would able to "get behind" the 82nd with a right-hook from Manhay, and upon reaching that town, the 2nd SS was worn out and low on fuel.

3) I really can't equate Monty's "methodical" counterattack at the Bulge tip (Jan '45) as really having "saved lives", and was probably worse-executed than Patton's drive. There was no effort to cut off the Germans, just a straight-on push with the same bad weather & terrain to deal with, where German delaying actions would extract their toll.

4) Monty coming in to improve demoralized US command can be overstated too. Some US divsion commands (99th & 106th) and the VIII Corps command had lost nerve in the attack, but most others performed quite well, and were full of fight, beyond any support from Monty: Robertson, Andrus, Gavin, Hasbrouk, etc. British historians tend to label the 1st Army commander (Hodges) as overstressed & ineffectual during the battle, but hardly any substance has been given to this claim. The counterattack of 2nd Armored Division that smashed the 2nd Panzer was executed against Monty's intentions.

Nope, I'm not a Brit, but I do think that Monty should objectively get his historical due. However, there are times when Monty's role can be inflated to mythical proportions too. Sometimes the methodical attack can produce more losses than the "bold" attack, if the enemy can read your intentions and apply countermeasures. It ultimately depends on the resources you assemble for your attack.

I keep coming back to this topic, because the Bulge is one of my focal WW2 subjects of study. But as Major Tom & Mark IV have noted earlier, it's a battle that can easily be distorted by myth and overblown in its overall role to WW2. I don't consider Goodwood & Falaise as "more important" than the Bulge, but the overall Normandy campaign definitely had a greater impact.

[Mark IV]

No real disagreement here. I only wished to point out that there are at least 2 sides to every story, and that commanders deal with the information available to them at the time (in a real-time WEGO environment!).

Re: point 3, I don't think any Allied commanders drives were as well executed as Patton's. Patton was extraodinary and ruined the class curve for everybody. Monty certainly didn't set any records for drives in Europe.

Re: point 4, there is enough doubt about the state of the American command to have, well, doubt. I suspect you are better versed in this than I am, so I defer.

Just trying to lend perspective to the time-honored American past-time of Monty-bashing.

[Spook]

Indeed, Mark IV. Monty most often seems to invoke "love or hate" when discussed by historical gamers, or is rated opposingly as great or lousy. I'd rather that Monty get an objective treatment, because he did have some good qualities and he made a real contribution to final victory in WW2.

[Lindan]

if the DAK had been better supplied we would't have to discuss Monty more than any other average commander.

[Simon Fox]

That sort of ill informed glib comment is not only off-topic but out of place in this well reasoned discussion. I could equally well say that if Rommel hadn't been promoted beyond his capabilities then the DAK would have been better supplied

[Grisu]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by scoop88:

2. The Allies had complete air superiority.

5. In general it's not a militarily sound idea to launch a major offensive in the dead of winter. Poor road conditions, freezing temperatures and short daylight are not conducive to large-scale offensive operations.

it's a tribute to the American command that they quickly recognized it as an all-out offensive rather than a local attack and reacted much faster than Hitler anticipated. As Patton said, "The Krauts have their head in the meat grinder and I've got the handle!"<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The best reason for point 5 is point 2 . That was the only possibility to avoid the danger of a total air power . And because nobody was awaiting such a thing it will be the best idea .

The Germans has shown in 1940 that they are able to go through this area in a large scale attack . So why not 1944 ?

If the plans of Model has come through and not Hitlers plan the US had their head in the meat grinder . Models plan was "only" to encircle and destroy the 9th US Army with this attack . Most of the historicans are sure that it would work in this dimension , Hitlers dimension of a break trough to the meuse river and later to antwerp was not realistic at all for the german army at that time but everybody who critizised Hitler at this time would find himself very fast in big trouble .

The US Intel was not as good as often written , in the Battle of Hurtgen they forgot to occupy the Roer River Dams so they find themself after hard fighting at the river roer sitting with no possibility to cross the river . No defend on the other side , only some germans waiting at the dams to open them . So again back into the bloody forest to fight again . Intel mistake !

------------------

[Spook]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Grisu:

If the plans of Model has come through and not Hitlers plan the US had their head in the meat grinder . Models plan was "only" to encircle and destroy the 9th US Army with this attack . Most of the historicans are sure that it would work in this dimension , Hitlers dimension of a break trough to the meuse river and later to antwerp was not realistic at all for the german army at that time but everybody who critizised Hitler at this time would find himself very fast in big trouble .

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes, many historians have cited the desire of the higher German commanders to opt for the "small solution" and attempt instead to surround, cut off, & destroy the 1st/9th Armies in the Aachen salient. Thereby, it's automatically presumed by those historians that the Germans were capable of doing so.

It's understandable that you've mentioned it, Grisu, because it's cited so often. But it's another Bulge myth.

To even begin to accomplish this "small solution", the German attackers needed the following:

1) More fuel.

2) Air superiority throughout the campaign.

3) Greater motorized ability. Many of the "Panzergrenadiers" were on bicycles, and much of the artillery was horse-drawn.

4) A sizable German offensive force deployed in the Aachen sector to provide the "eastern pincer."

The Germans weren't even close on any of the above, let alone all four.

If a sizable German force got through to the Meuse & beyond, more likely IT would have been cut off & destroyed by the US forces that it was trying to encircle. That's exactly what happened to most of the force that got the closest to the Meuse (2nd Panzer). With the flying weather getting better by New Year's, Allied air power would have absolutely paralyzed any sizable German force still trying to move northward. (The RAF was well involved in the Bulge operations too.)

The fate of 2nd Panzer stands as one counter to the historian's assertions that the Germans could pull off the "Small Solution." Bastogne stands as the other. If the German attackers couldn't overwhelm the Bastogne defenders, then what tangible basis exists that they could bag two armies at that same time? Virtually none.

I'm a bit of jackass to keep popping up just to offer counterpoints to people's comments. (Sorry about that, ) But as I've mentioned earlier, the Bulge battle is easily given to mythical assumptions.

[This message has been edited by Spook (edited 02-08-2000).]

[Guest Seimerst]

your point about the east-west roads is a serious point. I am stationed in Europe and last winter drove all over the area to see what it might have really been like. Still after more than 50 years there really aren't any military usable north-south roads-- some local farm roads where the bridges are not rated for the tonage a WWII tank would require. There is an old SF adage "When the terrain differs from the map, go with the terrain." That is one reason why the pinching off the shoulders would have been a challenge.

[Guest KwazyDog]

Mark IV, just for reference sake I read about the intercepted in Charles MacDonalds book which over here is simple called 'The Battle of the Buldge' (p 25)

Apparently the message was sent by the Japanese Ambassador Baron Oshima to Tokyoin late September a few days after his meeting with Hitler. Apparently is contained a description of a 'Large Scale offensive in the West' start as early as 'the beginning of November'. This message was indeed intercepted by MAGIC, and was reported to have arrived on the desk of the Pentegon shortly there after.

He has a reference listed for this info as follows :

War Dept - ACofS G-2 - No. 897,8 Spt. 44, RG (Record Group) 457 (Records of National Security Agency), Box 10, "MAGIC" Diplomatic Summary, 1944, NA (National Archieves)

This info is what I was basing my statement on and point to a fore warning had it been taken seriously (which it wasnt because it was believed such an offensive was not possible by the Germans at that time).

Thought it might be of interest

[Mark IV]

M. Dog: It is of interest, since I didn't know whether or not Magic had picked it up.

Does it say whether the information was relayed on to SHAEF? Sometimes the best way to keep a secret (from US forces) is to forward it to the Pentagon

[Guest KwazyDog]

Hehe, this is true It just says that the message was passed onto the Intellegence experts in the Pentegon in Washington probably at pretty much the same time it arrived in Tokyo. To be honest I doubt wether I went a hell of a lot further. I guess it was just one piece of a puzzle that didnt get put together until it was too late.

Reading on, the book also describes two other intercepts from the Japanese ambassabor by MAGIC. In the first he sneered at the possibility of a German offensive describing it as 'one of those instances in which truth from the mouth of a liar reaches the highest pinnacle of desceptiveness'.

In the second though he changed his view stating that 'we may take at face value' the reports of a new offensive for 'a Germany whose battle lines have contracted virutally to the old territory of Germany.....will have no choice but to open a road of blood in one direction or another.' And probably in the West he added...

Unfortunately it dosnt go into much more detail about these than that though. Interesting stuff, tis a good book, and very well referenced

[Mark IV]

Something that just occurred to me, is that recorded WWII contemporary Japanese and German views of one another (especially as the wars developed) often seem to reflect the view that "Jeez, those f#%$&@s are crazier than WE are".

The Japanese were more or less baffled by the Jewish thing (I think they could relate to the race of destiny thing, but not the designated bad guy routine). The Germans, to the Japanese view of the time, were a for-real Western Power and thus "establishment". It must have been hard to understand why they would deliberately blow the status that the Japanese were striving so hard to attain, by taking on what was obviously more than they could chew.

The Germans were impressed by the fact that people who lacked full international military "credentials" had decided to take on the USSR, China, and the US more or less simultaneously, without any natural resources to speak of. YES, I'm aware that they were really only engaged on battlefields with all these powers at once for a matter of days, but the political facts of the matter were that the Japanese challenged them all simultaneously in the same sphere of time and space (not to mention the Dutch and Great Britain- damned cheeky).

Simply amazing, the more so to us post-nuclear children (apologies to pre-nuclear folk among us) who haven't really lived through diddly-squat.