Any Caen scenarios/operations on CD or user-made in the works?

[Walter]

Do you mean 'Rommel'? Hardly underrated. And by that I mean, he was an excellent general and is generally viewed as such? Incidentally, his book based on his WWI experiences, 'Infantry Attacks' is a great reference for strategy in CM.

Cheers,

Walter R. Strapps

[Little Black Devil]

Yes, in refferance to Rommel I'd have to agree he was hardly underrated. Three excellent books on him I've recently read are;

"Panzer Commander" by Colonel Hans Von Luck

"With Rommel in the Desert" by Hans Werner Schmidt

and lastly,

"The Rommel Papers" Edited by B.H. Liddell Hart, with Manfred Rommel in assistance.

All contain a lot of usefull information in relation to CM.

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"Hosti Acie Nominati"

[Dittohead]

I think were all being a little rough on ole Monty. He would have captured Caen within two weeks if it had been held by Italians. So give him a break.

Tony

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Dittohead:

I think were all being a little rough on ole Monty. He would have captured Caen within two weeks if it had been held by Italians. So give him a break.

Tony<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Oh, he would have captured in within a day if it had been held by little grey squirrels I am sure - although Prince Philip maintains they are vicious...

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Andreas

The powers of accurate perception are often called cynicism by those who do not possess them. (forgot who said it)

[Spook]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

Not being a trained historian, but in my discipline you would have a big methodological problem here. How do you compare it? Against what? Where is someone who operated in similar circumstances, numbers involved, terrain, technology? Fiendishly difficult to do, therefore boiling down to personal opinion very often.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Indeed, Germanboy, it often comes to that. Even Stephen Ambrose wasn't very generous to Monty in "Citizen Soldiers" (any surprise, given Ambrose's support in SPR?), but I think that Ambrose's assessments of Allied commanders in that book were wide open to bias or faulty logic. I should note that I posed my "questions" earlier as rhetorical examples, and don't expect an in-depth discussion of Monty here. But I would rather that people START approaching leader assessments along the lines of using comparative situations, and adding in relevant factors, instead of issuing stock generalizations that a leader was "bad" or "good."

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Spook:

But I would rather that people START approaching leader assessments along the lines of using comparative situations, and adding in relevant factors, instead of issuing stock generalizations that a leader was "bad" or "good."

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

True, but I doubt that this will be possible in regard to Monty or Patton. Both of them have worked very hard on creating their own legends, and particularly Monty appears to have been very shifty in his commitments and goals. But he managed to connect extremely well to his men, he got the job done, and he did so with reasonable losses once outside Normandy, I believe. The problem was that at his level, generalship became an extremely political business, and he was maybe too aware of that.

I once saw an interview with a guy who was a Lt.-Col. in the 8th Army during El Alamein who was still livid that Monty was credited with the victory and about his intro "There will be no more retreat". He maintained that all the preparations had been done, that finally they had the men and material needed, and that his predecessor, I think it was Alexander would have achieved the victory as well.

Monty brings forth strong opinions.

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Andreas

The powers of accurate perception are often called cynicism by those who do not possess them. (forgot who said it)

[Formerly Babra]

It's hopeless. No matter how many volumes are written which illustrate the vastness, the complexity, of even the simplest, most basic aspects of history, there will always be those who can only see things in a cut and dried way. They just cannot conceive that there might be more to the story.

Real military incompetence above junior officers is extremely rare, but it's much easier to just slag generals, isn't it?

Perhaps our friend should step into the shoes of Monty and see how well he does against a couple of SS Divisions.

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When I die I want to go peacefully, like my grandfather, in his sleep -- not screaming, like the passengers in his car

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Formerly Babra:

Real military incompetence above junior officers is extremely rare, but it's much easier to just slag generals, isn't it?

Perhaps our friend should step into the shoes of Monty and see how well he does against a couple of SS Divisions.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I am not so sure about the first part of the statement. Quite a few of senior officers were removed in Normandy because of ineptness. One stunning failure according to Reynolds 'Steel Inferno' was operation PERCH (Villers Bocage), and there were others. Reynolds puts that one squarely down to senior command incompetence, and IIRC most of the commanders were gone soon after that.

But on the whole the point that the British/Canadians were facing a serious task is true. Ken Tout in Tank! makes the point that if the situation had been reversed (i.e. the allies defending in the situation, equipped with superior weaponry in positions affording them smashing observation), the Germans would not have looked as well too. And the German performance at counter-attacks seems to indicate that there is some truth to that argument.

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Andreas

The powers of accurate perception are often called cynicism by those who do not possess them. (forgot who said it)

[pcelt]

Reference has ,I think rightly, been made to the influence of certain of Montgomerys less endearing personality characteristics in distorting judgments re his generalship.

Let me just briefly recount one illustrative anecdote :-

During one of the regular wartime briefings between Churchill and King George vi , Churchill remarked to the King "I suspect that Monty is after my job" , to which the King replied "Thats a relief---I though he was after mine..."

[Formerly Babra]

But those Generals were sacked. Perhaps I should have said military incompetence in senior officers only happens once. How long was Monty around? (Rhetorical question -- no answers expected).

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When I die I want to go peacefully, like my grandfather, in his sleep -- not screaming, like the passengers in his car

[Spook]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

True, but I doubt that this will be possible in regard to Monty or Patton. Both of them have worked very hard on creating their own legends, and particularly Monty appears to have been very shifty in his commitments and goals. But he managed to connect extremely well to his men, he got the job done, and he did so with reasonable losses once outside Normandy, I believe. The problem was that at his level, generalship became an extremely political business, and he was maybe too aware of that.

I once saw an interview with a guy who was a Lt.-Col. in the 8th Army during El Alamein who was still livid that Monty was credited with the victory and about his intro "There will be no more retreat". He maintained that all the preparations had been done, that finally they had the men and material needed, and that his predecessor, I think it was Alexander would have achieved the victory as well.

Monty brings forth strong opinions.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, to clear up the record, Monty did NOT precede Alexander. Alexander was brought in as the North African THEATER commander to replace Auchinleck, who helped win the first El Alamein battle and was relieved and reassigned elsewhere when he predicted an Allied counterattack unable to start until the fall of '42. (History proved him right, as slim consolation.)

Neither Auchinleck nor Alexander, however, served as direct commander of the "Desert Rat" 8th Army (although Auk had to step into the role on occasion in moments of crisis). In the fall of '42, the next general tapped for the 8th Army job was "Strafer" Gott. But Gott was killed when the plane transporting him had crashed. Thus enter into the scene Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, under the higher command of ALexander.

For those who would argue that Monty was always cautious and minimized the losses of his troops, they should review the third El Alamein battle. It was a head-on attritional slugfest with 23,000 CW losses to 9,000 Axis. But while lesser commanders might have flinched, Monty did keep up his determination in an admirable way, and it was the Axis forces who cracked in the end. Regrettably, this determination did not translate into an effective pursuit of DAK, as Monty just didn't want to be the next British commander to be surprised by a Rommel counterattack.

This example poses the interesting "what-if" to Normandy: What if it was Alexander or even Auchinleck who led the invasion ground forces instead? Can we say with certainty that they wouldn't have performed as well as Monty in that role?

And so it finally has to get down to analyzing commander capability, regardless of the traps and bias that have been laid down by prior American & British historians. When you say that Monty "got the job done", I'm sorry, but that's the same type of generalization I've hinted at earlier that doesn't really tell me anything. What WAS Monty's "job" in relation to other commanders at Normandy? How much of Normandy was it "Monty's battle", versus other commanders like Ike, Bradley, Tedder, Leigh-Mallory, Doolittle, Spaatz, Harris, Dempsey, Quesada, etc.? Or even the common Allied soldier?

From my personal view, I feel that Monty got "his" job done in Normandy, too, but as you've noted, when a general is painted up into VERY divergent viewpoints, it takes a while to assess the value of that leader's role in comparison to other operational commanders. I don't expect that any one-liner opinion of Monty from me is going to convince anyone here.

[Formerly Babra]

Excellent points, Spook. But you know, don't you, that when such a question is asked, only subjective replies will be given?

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When I die I want to go peacefully, like my grandfather, in his sleep -- not screaming, like the passengers in his car

[Spook]

Oh, sure, when the answer is expected to be brief.

When one human analyzes another, some degree of subjectivity seems unavoidable. I suppose I'm just getting anal in my exercise of semantics, so I better relax and let it go.

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Spook:

When you say that Monty "got the job done", I'm sorry, but that's the same type of generalization I've hinted at earlier that doesn't really tell me anything. What WAS Monty's "job" in relation to other commanders at Normandy? How much of Normandy was it "Monty's battle", versus other commanders like Ike, Bradley, Tedder, Leigh-Mallory, Doolittle, Spaatz, Harris, Dempsey, Quesada, etc.? Or even the common Allied soldier?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Spook, thanks for clearing that up about commanders in North Africa - the UK was changing commanders there more regularly then some people change their underwear, so I find it difficult to keep track of it. The vet was talking about Auchinleck then.

And for getting the job done - they won the war, I can not really do much more analysis than that, because I don't know enough about the topic of Monty or the other commanders. Some of the Grognards should address that.

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Andreas

The powers of accurate perception are often called cynicism by those who do not possess them. (forgot who said it)

[Bobbaro]

One of the most important tasks of an effective general is to select an effective staff, command its loyalty, and see that it operates efficiently. Another is to listen, or at least give appropriate attention to the input of his staff and his subordinants. Then there is the need to be acutely aware of the prevailing conditions of battle which only sometimes sinks home by personal observation.

Both Patton and Montgomery failed in having political horse sense. They played too much to the gallery instead of giving due regard to the men who asses were ultimately in the political sling, if things went wrong. Their generalship was sufficiently competent to keep their jobs militarily, and their play to the galleries helped them overcome any distaste their military and political bosses may have had to their posturing. Probably any number of guys participating here on the Forum could provide as good a mix of decisions as these two men provided.

But the professional qualities they acquired over years of study and experence made their decisions work, You or I most likely could dream up a Market Garden or at least recognise it as a possible coup, when broached by some subordinant, but leading the performance is a very heavy task in leadership and command. That the project came as close as it did to success is quite a measure of the competence, that went into it. That it failed is an object lesson in the dangers of impetuosity and plans laid in such a hurry, and with perhaps a bit of ego riding in the saddle rather than a more considered approach.

When the time came both Patton and Montgomery did a decient job of flanking the Bulge. Patton in his anticipation and preparation for the need got a lot of deserved credit. But had he been caught flat footed the result is likely to have been much the same, just a little later. Monty's role was just as efficient, though again his mouth got ahead of his performance.

While a single thrust can sometimes penitrate directly to a critically sensitive objective, it also can cause every resource that an apprehrensive enemy can muster to be delivered against it. Monty shared with Patton the strong desire to command a single thrust against the enemy. Eisenhower vascillated between his eventual broad front strategy and the single thrust demands of his two primadonas.

Perhaps that is understandable. The slow safety of one and the attractive speed and devastating potiential of the other would vie for support. Monty seems to have had the best of the arguement on his army group being closer to the political objective. He held a level of command better suited to lead such an endevor than Patton. Bradly not Patton held the reins opposite Montgomery and had more resources. However, Patton's 3rd Army and Dever's 6th Army group were adjacent and working a thrust so that using Patton would have involved some heavy reorganization on this the longer route. I can't imagine Patton being able to act alone with Third Army by itself. But it was the place to hit the Germans where they were thinnest. The more rugged terrain may well have nulified that advantage. The campaigns that did take place there showed a much recovered German capability and what ever weakness there was, was compensated by the strength of being on the defensive.

SHAEF certainly had its hands full in mullilng over the attractions and dangers. Probably logistics were the straw that screwed any chance of running amuck on a single thrust. A single thrust would have depended on being launched before the German forces could have sufficiently recovered to threaten the effort. The period of abject German weakness passed quickly as the Allies hit the tattered end of its streched logistical tail. The rapid progress of the advance to Germany had not been anticipated

with providing adequate resources to support that, and a major attack into the heart of Germany. Had it been planned, it is doubtful that the goods could have been delivered in time anyway.

At the point in time when the greatest chance for success was possible, Market Garden was supported and launched in spite of all obsticles. That it had insufficient impetus to succeed had to be a strong lesson for SHAEF. All the arguements about this or that detail being overlooked and that it would have succeeded just if -- is beside the point.

Virtually any attack has to be strong enough to overcome unexpected adverse details. Otherwise the margin for success is too narrow, and a commander is depending on luck as the arbiter of success. This may well serve in desparate situations. (eg. the Japanese effort at Leyte Gulf, though a failure it could have succeeded in prolonging the war and was on the verge).

A gamble will also safely serve against a weak enemy, though one's own capabilities are thin. It seems to me to be a weakness in the Market Garden strategy, that the Allies did not seem to have the resources to really exploit Market Garden had it succeeded. It was safe to risk, but it was likely only a piecemeal step to victory as were many other subsequent operations. Perhaps at best it would have grabbed a toehold. To an extent it did that anyway, but without anywhere near the potential inconvience to the Germans that holding a bridgehead would have had.

Without Antwerp both sides were likely to have petered out along some line of advance and become stalemated, Germans mustering forces to contain the thrust as logistical shortages slowed progress. Admittedly they were better off stopping Market Garden on the south side of the river.

With both sides capable of eventually building up to a difficult to answer and dangerous single thrust, it became a risky situation to launch such a thrust, more so for the Germans. Who ever moved first risked his flanks to his opponent's reserve capability.

The logistical situation seems to have really been the general in charge. It was possible to support some grinding action along the existing front, but that was difficult enough as it was.

I think what both Patton and Montgomery were asking, was for politicians to support an all out effort that would rob either Briton or the US of a primary role in defeating Germany (supposing it would work) and face what that would do to concerted cooperation if it should fail or to post war relations if it should succeed. One war had already been won at the expense of the following peace. Allied cooperation was far more important longterm than fast results, if indeed fast results were the outcome.

Comparing Patton and Montgomery, they seem to have been rather alike. Both very competent in their profession, and both capable of impetousity, even in command as well as tongue. I am reminded of Lee biting off more than his army could chew at Gettisburg. Their competence was demonstrated over the long haul when faced with a strong enemy. They took the necessary bites to eat into his defences and upset the integrety of his position. Both successfully pursued the enemy when he was broken, Montgomery pushing the bulk before him and Patton in openfield running.

While both men were capable of creating their own difficulties with their mouths, their example was too much for the press, many of their would be historians and their partisan public, who seem to vie for the honor of emulation and contest for having the biggest mouth.

They both were dangerous to the German army; the Germans knew it and so respected them.

Bradley also a capable and professional general, did not seem to generate strategies as such. He seemed more to take the front as it was and eat away at it being able to recognise an opportunity and move on it occasionally, Faliase not withstanding. Cobra seems just a larger bite, a part of the strategy that was inherent in the Overlord planning. In audicity there is not much evidence that Bradley compared to either of the two rivals. His leaving Falise to Montgomery, when he likely could have mounted some kind of a greater supporting action seems pedestrian in the extreme. If he feared clashing with friendly forces, he could have cut deeper ahead of the retreating Germans complicating their escape if not exactly totally forestalling it. Bradley seems to have been as prone to a kind of deliberate inerta as Monty critics accuse him of being.

Stripping away the noise of the crowd, the arm chair generals, and to a large the said generals themselves, they did play their roles and did not blow the responsibility to conduct their armies successfully in victory inspite of all the friction.

At least when a Brition pauses at the wrong time, he takes tea and accomplishes something. What is it that an American does? Scratch his ass? From first hand experence at that fine art I can confess its satisfactions, but own up that at least tea has awakening properties and may carry a little nutrition in sugar and creame.

It is perhaps the lot of the military mind, which never suffers defeat, to appear so slow and painfully deliberate, foregoing all fantastic oportunities and risks, that only the great generals, being willing to take a risk, so suffer.

These matters have been debated throughly by various people far more qualified than I to the point of exhaustion. Suffice it to say that anyone, who holds snap, jingoistic judgements, obviouly has not got very far in studying the matter, if any at all. I can only pose my impressions with a great deal of doubt in their validity. There are others who are far more able to say just where and how our subject generals were competent, and otherwise, and why.

All these generals had their good days and bad ones. I have not seen a one of them who was beyond criticism. I look at myself in the performance of my own tasks and a lot of other folks I know in theirs and pause from time to time that we had as good as we had all around. Having found myself in a spot or two as circumstances brought me, I can look back and wish I had done some things differently; yet, all and all those matters were resolved on the positive side due somewhat to my decisions, due to the good offices of others, and some just plain damned good luck, so that all the obsticles were not enough to sink the operation.

[Spook]

Well, I gotta de-lurk again and state my appreciation for the content of your latest post, Bobbaro.

I also appreciate your example of Leyte Gulf---it ultimately proved a case study to naval command & control and the perils to leaving open an approach route to the enemy. But I personally don't view it to have been a "close-run" affair that could've prolonged the war. I think that if the Japanese admiral Kurita chose to continue towards Leyte Gulf after the Samar naval battle, the end result would've been the annihilation of his task force instead, as he would've been caught between the 7th Fleet, TF 34, and a group of TF 38. (And the invasion forces had already debarked onto Leyte.) But that'll have to sit for another discussion.

I'm not quite inclined either to attribute Bradley as having similar or even more "inertia" than Monty; Bradley supporters would be fervent to argue the opposite (as you've noted), and in the Bulge battle, both Bradley & Patton had the more aggressive idea to attack at the "base" of the Bulge instead of the "tip" that Monty insisted on. (Whether the weather & terrain would've cooperated for an advance quick enough to bag the Germans still remains the open question, though.) As to Falaise, it can be recognized that Bradley was certainly being overly cautious on the south end of the pocket, and actually, he was more worried about US blockading forces being overrun by escaping German troops than about friendly fire. But Monty still was in command of Bradley and of all the forces surrounding the Germans, so he can't escape his share of responsibility in that many German "cadres" in the pocket had still gotten away.

Anyway, I am certainly in agreement with the main gist of your post---it's one thing to plan an operation, and another to follow through with the leadership and an loyal, effective staff to get the troops moving with the needed coordination. Finally, as you've also noted, a good leader has to have a proper grasp of "force vs. objective", who can maintain the added force needed to overcome unexpected contingencies.

[This message has been edited by Spook (edited 06-08-2000).]

[Guest Germanboy]

Bobbaro - I would give you membership status just for this well-argued and well-written post. It was a pleasure to read it.

On the topic of incompetence - I guess it is a one-off on all levels. As a brigadier it gets you removed and sent home to live your retirement out in a seaside resort, as a company CO it gets you killed. The problem is if somebody else's incompetence kills you. I guess that is what we will be very vary of in CMMC. There seems to have been an extraordinary amount of batallion commanders buying it in the commonwealth forces.

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Andreas

The powers of accurate perception are often called cynicism by those who do not possess them. (forgot who said it)

[Maximus]

Well, one thing is for sure. Bil Hardenberger is no Monty from the latest AAR.

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"The greatest risk...is not taking one."

[JeffRaider]

Lemme ask:

Why did Hitler and Rommel go for a static defense of the French Coast, when they themselves had used maneuver to such devastating effect in France? It seems that von Runstedt was the only guy who had a clue in Northern France.

[Bobbaro]

The satisfaction of writing a post here is not the pain in the knuckles length and the roar of keyboard punching in my ears, but responses of considered commentary, criticism, suggested alternatives and correction. If I listen only to my own line of proposals I don't learn a damn thing. Thanx guys. Some fine counter points you made there. No arguement.

On the Leyte thing, I suppose the main inconvience would have been the destruction of the available support. It could have been made up eventually and some of it almost immediately. Perhaps the landing would have suffered some Guadalcanal like inconviences in material, but the line about of setting the war back significantly does seem overstated. Hell, it was worth saying just to find out someone was awake!

The response about Bradly's role is also on the mark. The only "but" I can inject is that these were just larger bites at the enemy than Monty was willing to make at that point. Maybe he was still remembering the Market Garden adventure. Yet, there was no comparasion. Only Monty and Patton came up with a straight to the juggler strategy, unless you count the overly optomistic expectations of both the British and American bomber commands.

Somehow this has put me of a mind to think about Anzio. But, that is another matter. Somewhat. I suppose in combat there are nibbles, bites, slices and the ultimate stroke. The latter so much dreamed and promised and so seldom delivered. When you are chewing on prickly pear, one longs for the ultimate and final slice.

By the way, I was a member as Bobb long enough not to get too wrapped up about the Jr. status. The Forum still reads and writes the same. But, thanks for the consideration all the same.

[This message has been edited by Bobbaro (edited 06-08-2000).]

[This message has been edited by Bobbaro (edited 06-08-2000).]

[Bobbaro]

There were preparations for a counter attack on the invasion. There were problems with getting it underway. Hitler belived (and he was not alone) that the invasion would come further north where the channel was narrower. It took him forever to loose the mobile forces in place for that contingency. Then, Allied airpower and the French Resistance had nearly isolated the beachheads by destroying transportation facillities. Finally Allied airsuperiority made daytime travel unusually hazzardous. The plan was there, it just was not executed as intended.

[Spook]

Maximus:

Just for the added record, Fionn has noted that Bil H has moved up the learning curve quite a bit from that AAR game.

JeffRaider:

Far & away, the one with the most clue to the impending invasion was Rommel. Hitler believed in a "stand fast on the beach" posture, while von Rundstedt wanted the Allies to get inland deep enough to receive a hard counterblow from the Panzer reserves. The latter plan might have had some merit IF the Germans had air superiority or at least an air standoff. By June '44, the Luftwaffe in France was only capable of the occasional spoiling attack, putting up hundreds of daily sorties maximum to the tens of thousands from the Allied air forces. Rommel recognized this threat, and preferred a "forward defense" of many Panzer divisions not ON the coastline, but at least within a day's march to whichever coastal region was invaded. But as typical to that time of the war, Hitler's habit of interfering thwarted even the Rommel plan. The Panzer reserves were placed in a command chain that answered directly to Hitler, both to Rundstedt's and Rommel's chagrin.

[JeffRaider]

That makes better sense. I just read some retarded book that made a WHOLE lot of bad contentions, and that was one of em. Thanks!!!