Ardennes44: "Small Solution" feasible??

[Lindan]

Mahlzeit!

I'm just reading "A time for trumpets". From everything I've read so far there was no chance at all that Hitler's plan to reach Antwerp could have worked. But do you think that the "small solution" preferred by von Rundstedt, Model and nearly everybody else with some military sense in his mind could have been successful?

What would have been the consequences if it worked?

There were different versions but it was mainly about an attack through the Ardennes up to the Meuse and then circle north. (single encirclement) or as Model proposed, assisted by an attack from the north (double encirclement) to trap and destroy 14 Divisions of the US 1st and 9th army.

I'm sure there are some people here who spent a considerable time of their life researching this battle and could shed some light on this question.

cheers,

Oli

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[Guest Michael emrys]

Most of the people I've read who have speculated on this subject hold that the most efficient use of the resources available would have been to use them for local counter-attacks in a campaign of flexible defense.

Of course, this would have only bought time. It wouldn't have produced a decisive victory, which is what Hitler was gambling on in the Ardennes.

But then, it is as certain as anything ever is in war that Germany was doomed from mid-1943 onwards, and anything they might have done would only have been playing for time, dragging out the war.

Michael

[Guest Mr. Johnson-<THC>-]

I think Hitler's second biggest mistake was going to war in 1939 (treating the Russian people so badly is actually he biggest mistake, IMHO). Germany was just simple not ready for the scale of warfare that it embarked on. Hitler made so many bad calls during the war. If he had an "accident" and Germany held off the war until maybe 1945, there might of been a chance, but that would have giving the allies 5 years to prepare also. The most interesting idea is maybe Britan and France going to war with Russia. They almost did in 1940 when the Reds invaded Finland. Can you imagine what a 1939 Panzer divison would have looked like with Tigers and Panthers? Sorry If I got a little off your question, but the only way I could think to respond.

[Lindan]

I was thinking about 2 things:

a) chances of success

military/political consequences (if any)

(I fully agree that Hitler was probably the Allies' most valuable commander)

[Juardis]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Mr. Johnson-<THC>-:

I think Hitler's second biggest mistake was going to war in 1939 (treating the Russian people so badly is actually he biggest mistake, IMHO). <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I agree that alienating the Russian people was his single biggest blunder. If he had treated them better, he'd have won the war. Can you imagine having all that armor in Russia available in Africa? The Brits/Americans wouldn't have stood a chance for a long, long time.

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Jeff Abbott

[willys]

Maybe even more pertinent than France and Great Britain going to war with Russia was how the Germans treated the Russian people in Southern Russia. Many of these people absolutely despised Stalin and would have most likely allied themselves with Hitler's armies if they had been treated properly by the invaders. Instead Hitler launched his EinsatzGruppen into the conquered territories, completely destroying a very important potential ally against their own government.

[Lindan]

*ahem*

I really appreciate your answers, but we already had a biggest mistake thread several months back. (interesting read though )

I'd really like to hear something about my "Bulge" related question (or about miniature giant space hamsters if the first is not possible ).

thanks

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visit lindan.panzershark.com

member of the Combat Mission webring

[Guest Mr. Johnson-<THC>-]

And then the Germans wondered why there was not a massive people's uprising against the Soviets. The enemy of my enemy is my friend.

[willys]

Ok Lindan

I think the professional generals were simply trying to limit Hitler's ambitious plans just to avoid the horrendous German casualties they knew would go along with it. The war was over and they knew it. (They had for a long time). They just forgot to tell Hitler......

[Spook]

I better take this up now.

Because, Lindan, I think you've chosen an excellent (and personally fascinating) topic on the Bulge battle; the chances for a German "small solution" victory.

Let's take your first subtopic: the "chance of success." When Hitler first floated the Ardennes attack concept with the seizure of Antwerp as the objective, the German West Front commanders and their planners soon started devising a variety of "small solutions" to propose as more realistic alternatives. The options ranged up & down West Front as to where to attempt a smaller envelopment attack, from UK positions near Venlo to Patton's forces near Metz. But, of course, Hitler wasn't swayed from his "master plan."

Once the attack of Dec. 16 got rolling, however, the German commanders would sometimes focus instead to look for an opportunity to isolate the US 1st (and 9th?) armies in the Aachen salient. This specific "small solution" will be the basis of my response, because some historians give credence to the chances of success when the German IISS Panzerkorps advanced to the Manhay-area crossroads.

From my own view, the chances for success were basically nil for the following reasons:

1) Depth of reserves. The added German forces that would've been needed to run along the Meuse to "close the ring", and enforce this closure from both sides, just weren't there. And for those that might've broken through (a BIG "if"), the attritional scales were against the Germans as available replacements couldn't keep pace.

2) Logistics. There wasn't even enough motorized transport and fuel for the battle's opening days, and even less so to attempt an encirclement. Hitler's planning had presumed that the advancing Germans would simply capture the needed fuel stocks to keep going, but most of US 1st Army's fuel supply was NW of the US V Corps sector. Failure to break through this sector removed the best chance to capture the supply dumps intact. The logistics crunch also severely hampered the ability for German artillery to keep up with the advance and keep it well stocked in ammo.

3) And even when logistics tried to keep up, this was further hampered by the third factor----Allied (US/UK) air power. The weather was usually bad during the Bulge battle, but when it cleared, the allied air forces maintained air superiority and paralyzed daytime German supply movement on the limited road net. Even the Luftwaffe's "Bodenplatte" attack on Allied airfields on 1 Jan '45 (which destroyed 270 allied aircraft for comparable German air losses) didn't break the tempo of Allied air control. So even if enough German forces & supplies were on hand to attempt a small-solution encirclement, this would still have been impeded by the lack of German air superiority.

In balance, if the Germans indeed focused to attempt a "small solution", I think it far more likely that any German forces attempting an encirclement from the Manhay sector (if possible) would've been isolated and destroyed instead. It was perhaps the fortune of IISS Panzerkorps that it wasn't able to break through, and it would ultimately escape the Bulge pocket in Jan '45.

Now to the second part of your question, which you label as "military/political" consequences to a "small solution" success.

On the military (strategic) level, I don't think that the Germans could've isolated and eliminated more than 3-4 allied divisions with a "small solution", due to the noted reasons above. So let's assume that a German encirclement did just that, and took out a corps-level formation.

In terms of overall strategic balance in late '44, this still wouldn't have made enough of a difference. Again, on the attritional level, the combined allies were more able to keep playing the game than the Germans. Although, if it was 3-4 divisions of the UK forces (British 2nd Army?) that were isolated and eliminated, this might've forced the UK sector to severely limit its contribution to the final ground offensives the next year, because UK ground replacements were also pretty lean at that time.

Now to the POLITICAL consequences---that’s where it gets a lot more fun in speculation. It’s very likely that the Allied army commander that would suffer the “small solution” (and the loss of 3+ divisions) on his front would be relieved. If it happened on the US army sectors, even Bradley, in his army group command role, might have been put "under a cloud" and considered for reassignment. The closest that the Bulge came to political shake-up was when Monty demanded full command again of all Allied ground forces, and that Ike decided to sack him (which was rescinded with a quick apology from Monty). What if Ike followed through? Would the British home front have regarded this as too much of an affront against what it felt to be its best commander? And what effect would all of this have been to Allied strategy in the final offensive? It’s hard to say.

[This message has been edited by Spook (edited 08-21-2000).]

[Lindan]

Thanks Spook!

This was very enlightening.

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[PatAWilson]

I'm reading the same book and decided to reply, so here it is - what Spook said .

IMHO the "Small Solution" would only have made for a lesser eventual defeat at the Bulge and, since fewer troops would have been wasted, a slightly longer war. The political consequences that Hitler was looking for needed a huge victory to happen (IMHO even a huge victory would not have caused the US and Britain to split). The "Small Solution" would not have provided that victory even if it went exactly according to plan.

Then you have the Russians ... in Dec of 44 the Russians were going to beat the Germans with or without the western allies. It was only a matter of time.

[Guest Michael emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Spook:

The closest that the Bulge came to political shake-up was when Monty demanded full command again of all Allied ground forces, and that Ike decided to sack him (which was rescinded with a quick apology from Monty).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You absolutely sure about this, Spook? Monty's appointment would have been at the pleasure of the Prime minister acting on the advice of the Imperial General Staff. Eisenhower, acting as Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Forces could have requested Montgomery's relief, but it would have been up to His Majesty's Government to make the call.

Michael

[This message has been edited by Michael emrys (edited 08-21-2000).]

[Spook]

Well, it was not so much that Ike himself would've done the actual deed rather than to force the decision onto higher command level.

Various references state that the essence of Ike's threat was "One of us will have to go." By example in the Osprey series book "Ardennes 1944" (not the best reference, but it's handy right now):

"For Eisenhower this was too much (the demand of Montgomery to be reappointed overall ground forces commander). He drafted a letter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff which presented the choice: Ike or Monty. Given the disparity in manpower, he knew Montgomery would go. Montgomery's dismissal would have enormous consequences. Promoted by an irresponsible press, virulent anti-American sentiment was sweeping England. Sacking Monty might mean an end to Anglo-American cooperation."

I think the author here (J Arnold) MIGHT be overstating things a bit. And he was the same author, in his noted book, to presume that the German's capture of Manhay put the German offensive in a position to "easily" sweep around behind the US forces in the northern Bulge shoulder and cut them off for a "small solution" (which I refute on my noted issues above). But in effect, Ike started to act so to force a decision by the higher-ups. For an "Allied Expeditionary Force" to stand, the discretion of the supreme commander (Ike) would've had to have been respected as to which commanders he would allow to serve under him. Further, many US commanders had expressed a greater inclination to serve with FM Alexander (commanding the MTO). So regardless of Churchill's and the IGS's sentiments, a rotation of Monty with Alexander would've likely been the end result so to maintain the basis of alliance.

An added note to remember is that Churchill wasn't in a position to absolutely overrule the decisions to direct military affairs either. By example, he tried to no end to get Operation "Dragoon" cancelled, but in the end was himself overruled.

[This message has been edited by Spook (edited 08-22-2000).]