Smoke as a close air support marker.

[Fatmac]

I did a search, but didn't find anything about this.

If you have air support, does smoke have any effect on aircraft targeting, ie if I fire smoke at an enemy tank, will my planes use this as a sight, or will it simply hide the tank and make it more difficult to hit?

Thanks in advance

[Colin]

Hmmm...I've never seen this suggested!!!

It sounds like it could be quite a good suggestion.

Of course for arty smoke it would be some what difficult.

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And if we abandon any platform, I can assure you it will not be the Macintosh.

-Steve

My website!

A major source of Wild Bill scenarios!

[Tiger]

How are the planes supposed to know who's smoke it is?

-john

[Colin]

Exactly.

(Since my last post I've actually thought about the idea and I think there's too many problems.)

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And if we abandon any platform, I can assure you it will not be the Macintosh.

-Steve

My website!

A major source of Wild Bill scenarios!

[Tris]

The manual (pp. 59-60) alludes to this in an oblique manner with reference to the design decision to exclude white phosphorous ammo, partly for the reason that this ordnance was as often as not used for . . . marking targets. (The tortured logic of this point seems to be that BTS would rather keep the effect of air power as abstract as possible. This is probably a good a good idea, by the way.)

The manual also goes on the mention that the primary reason it is not used is a fear on the part of the developers that gamers would likely use this ammunition in such an ahistorical manner as to unbalance play. I found that to be curious for a number of reasons, but I'll limit myself to calling everyone's attention to tungsten rounds, which not only cannot be abused with the way BTS has set it up but are something of a rarity to be seen used in play at all (I have yet to see one of my tanks shoot one off).

[chrisl]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Tiger:

How are the planes supposed to know who's smoke it is?

-john<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Colored smoke. I've read accounts of D-Day where colored smoke (orange?) was used to identify allied units. The germans eventually figured it out and fired up their own orange smoke to make life difficult.

I even read one account (I think it was over at tankbooks.com) of a guy who ambushed a German unit at night that tried to get past by calling out in english, but he saw someones hat in profile as a german cap so he started shooting, and when they started shooting back their tracers were a color that allied forces didn't use.

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Slayer of the Original Cesspool Thread.

[Kitty]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by chrisl:

Colored smoke. I've read accounts of D-Day where colored smoke (orange?) was used to identify allied units. The germans eventually figured it out and fired up their own orange smoke to make life difficult.

I even read one account (I think it was over at tankbooks.com) of a guy who ambushed a German unit at night that tried to get past by calling out in english, but he saw someones hat in profile as a german cap so he started shooting, and when they started shooting back their tracers were a color that allied forces didn't use.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yep. And anyone who'd ever seen "A Bridge Too Far" has seen colored smoke used this way.

Kitty

[Lawyer]

"Closing with the Enemy" describes smoke usage and problems to mark targets for aircraft. I think the Allies finally settled on using artillery for accuracy with a TOT to avoid warning the Germans in advance. This was combined with better radio communications between air and ground.

This could be be modelled in CM, I believe. It would be interesting and add a tactical twist while being historically accurate. Right now, aircraft don't seem useful to me for the Allies because they are too abstract to the battle plan.

The Allies depended on airpower instead of ubertanks for tactical advantage, and were very successful. IMHO, CM ought to model that better. Better integration of airpower would go a long way toward resolving the endless force balance arguments about the Germans being favored with the ubertanks.

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Lawyer:

The Allies depended on airpower instead of ubertanks for tactical advantage, and were very successful. IMHO, CM ought to model that better. Better integration of airpower would go a long way toward resolving the endless force balance arguments about the Germans being favored with the ubertanks.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I have said it before, I feel I have to say it again: where is the proof that allied airpower played a significant role on the battlefield, as opposed to interdiction and attacking C&C?

All the accounts I have read do not mention it taking out German tanks while they were engaged by Allied tanks. Worthington force (according to some accounts) had air support that left the Germans alone and shot up their own side; Guards Armoured breaking out of the bridgehead at the start of Garden found air support to be ineffective and resulted to threatening a German POW. A divisional history of 7th Armoured (UK) does not once mention this use of airpower. A regimental history of 9th RTR has not yet mentioned it (halfway through for Normandy). Divisional histories of 3rd, 43rd and 49th UK IDs have not mentioned it, IIRC.

I do not believe that making airpower more controllable and more effective would do anything to make the game more realistic, quite on the contrary.

I am open to be convinced, but I have yet to see the proof. And that proof will not be found in accounts by the airmen with their wanton overstatement of their kills, BTW.

BTW, I prefer to play the Allies.

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Andreas

<a href="http://www.geocities.com/greg_mudry/sturm.html">Der Kessel</a >

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

Germans - they come here, they shag our anteaters. (Angus Deaton)

[This message has been edited by Germanboy (edited 11-20-2000).]

[PeterNZer]

Totally agree with Gerbiltoy. Airpower was used with wildly varrying effectiveness before and after battle but seldom during battle.

I've read AARs where coloured smoke was used to lead bombers in on a target near the siegfried line, and accounts from Guderian of very effective use of german dive bombers, (more as a psychological terror than anything), and also serveral occassions where they bombed their own forces or just failed to blow stuff up they were told to. Not once is air power being used in that 30 minutes of hell

Air forces were well aware of the dangers they faced in getting involved in firefights and didn't want to blow their own guys up, so generally avoided it unless they were operating out of a combat zone in rear or support areas where they were sure of their targets, (even then mistakes were made).

It's a fun idea to let smoke lead air support in on targets but not that realistic. For starters, I don't think tanks carried coloured smoke shells often/at all? Also, there's a lot of smoke on a battlefield..

PeterNZ

[IPA]

Germanboy,

I'm not qualified to comment on the ETO as a whole, but I am not aware of an account of the breakout of Guards Arm'd Div at the start of Garden that states that their air support was ineffective (Whether the plan or the ground forces themselves were effective is another matter). If I'm wrong please direct me to the source and I'll beat a hasty retreat.

As I recall an RAF forward controller unit was attached to the Irish Guards to call in the Air Support. To aid in the location of enemy positions, purple smoke was fired from British tanks to mark them. From accounts I've read it seems the air support was pretty successful after the initial breakout set backs. As Horrocks later wrote "it was a perfect example of coordination between the RAF and the Army".

However, I think that whether or not the use of smoke was effective is besides the point, whether it was commonly used and is realistic to simulate is. Can someone advise, please. The ineffectiveness, inaccuracy or even failure of air support to arrive could be modelled in.

IPA

"START THE PURPLE!" (Michael Caine as Lt Col JOE Vandeleur 3rd Bn Irish Guards.

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by IPA:

Germanboy,

I'm not qualified to comment on the ETO as a whole, but I am not aware of an account of the breakout of Guards Arm'd Div at the start of Garden that states that their air support was ineffective (Whether the plan or the ground forces themselves were effective is another matter). If I'm wrong please direct me to the source and I'll beat a hasty retreat.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

'A Bridge too far' by Cornelius Ryan (Corroborated in 'The struggle for Europe' by Chester Wilmot, IIRC) states that Typhoons attacked the first line of defense after being pointed by the FAC, but that these attacks were ineffective, and the German guns were only silenced after a German POW taken earlier was 'convinced' that it would be good for him to point out to the tank gunners the German AT gun emplacements. Wilmot states that the German was told that he would have to ride on the tank to Eindhoven, because of the delay. Ryan states that the Guards Armoured Intel officer put a gun in his belly and started questioning.

Also, according to Ryan (and Wilmot), RAF refused to give air support to the paras in the Oosterbeek Cauldron, saying the fighting was too close and the danger of hitting their own side too high. This would indrirectly speak against the effectiveness of smoke.

Chester Wilmott was a war correspondent, he jumped into Normandy with 6th Airborne, and was apparently present at or shortly after many of the key occasions, AFAIK. Ryan did what is probably the standard work on Market Garden. I would be interested in other people's opinion on these two books, particularly their connection to reality.

All this off the top of my head, I am at work.

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Andreas

<a href="http://www.geocities.com/greg_mudry/sturm.html">Der Kessel</a >

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[This message has been edited by Germanboy (edited 11-20-2000).]

[IPA]

Germanboy,

I'm looking at a copy of "A Brige Too Far" as I write and I can't find the word or similar words to "ineffective" (its propably in your other book).

However, we're mixing up to point here, we're not talking about effectiveness (well I'm not). The point being that did ground units such as tanks commonly use smoke to identify targets for air support. In the case of Garden the answer is yes. Elsewhere I don't know. But does it sound logical that that close support coordination between ground forces and air support was uncommon?

I don't see how the POW story relates to Air Support. The POW was for spotting of units. This thread is not relate dto the subject of the effectiveness of aircraft spotting.

Your point about the British at Arnhem, actually works in reverse. It was an issue of great bitterness amongst many veterans that there was a total lack of air support during the whole operation (I believe if given the choice they would have taken the risk. In fact the non-existant luffwaffe were able to mount several attacks on the Arnhem Bridgehead at Oosterbeek and the Bridge during the battle.

Sorry but I'd beg to differ that Ryan's book is the "standard" work of Market Garden. It was written in the 60s and it is accepted that it contains numerous factual errors. It is however the most famous and an absolute classic.

My Horrocks quote comes from "The Devil's Birthday" by Geoffrey Powell.

IPA

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by IPA:

Germanboy,

I'm looking at a copy of "A Brige Too Far" as I write and I can't find the word or similar words to "ineffective" (its propably in your other book).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

IPA - I would say that if you have an air attack to do the job, and afterwards still have to do the job yourself because it failed, this counts as having seen an ineffective air attack. This is also where the German POW comes in. The FAC/Air support combo was ineffective, other means had to be used to get the job done. But I take your point that this was not what you wanted to know. If you look again at my original post, you will see that it is a response to Lawyer's post asking for more effective air support. I have an issue with that request.

To help me put your original question into context, all you ask for is that smoke is being used to mark targets, but that this should not increase effectiveness, but lead to a more realistic feel of combat? Or do you just want to know whether smoke was used? In which case the answer is 'yes'. Another means was fluoresent panels. All no sure fire means, as a lot of accounts of strafing by 'friendlies' show.

I fully take your point about the paras' opinion of the RAF. Gen. Urquhart himself was apparently highly critical of the RAF, because he saw them as only interested in actual hits scored, but that they never understood the effect they would have had on morale on both sides. Again, the point I made was that the RAF did not trust the effectiveness of markings in such a close combat. In CM I have seen air support in this sort of fighting though, which leads me to believe it is too effective already. The disclaimer from above applies, I know this is not the point you were making, but others did.

Thanks for the info about Ryan's book. Would you recommend the one you read?

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Andreas

<a href="http://www.geocities.com/greg_mudry/sturm.html">Der Kessel</a >

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

Germans - they come here, they shag our anteaters. (Angus Deaton)

[This message has been edited by Germanboy (edited 11-20-2000).]

[IPA]

Germanboy,

Thanks for the reply. Points well made and accepted. All I'm looking for is to add another realism factor into the equation ie pinpointing targets on the ground with smoke, all the drawbacks accepted and factored in. Sorry I didn't read the earlier mails thoroughly enough.

As to Arnhem and Operation Market Garden it's my chosen WWII fascination. Bought up just about every source I could find.

IMHO the best account of the action at Arnhem itself is "Arnhem 1944 the Airborne Battle" by Martin Middlebrook. Meticulously detailed, a real hour by hour account at platoon level.

An alternative to Ryan's overview of OMG would be the book I mentioned "The Devils Birthday" by Geoffrey Powell (He was a 156 Parachute Bn Co Commander at Arnhem). But Ryan's book will always capture the true essence of that tradgedy for me.

A good German perspective of OMG is "It Never Snows In September" by R Kershaw (A modern British Para who spent several years on exchange with the German Army).

Cheers.

Got to hit the sack now.

IPA